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ABSTRACT. 
SPIRIT, IDENTITY, FREEDOM. 
The thesis reformulates the traditional grace-freedom debate in terms of the activity of the 
Spirit, the primary Divine hypostasis involved in Christian metamorphosis (referring to 
conversion, regeneration and sanctification), and by employing concepts of freedom and 
personal identity drawn from Analytic philosophy. The generating question concerns the 
issue of how the work of the Spirit in metamorphosis of a person is compatible with 
human freedom and personal identity? A Personalist model is developed, based on an 
extended analogy between interpersonal human relationships and the Spirit-human 
relationship. The Personalist model proposed conceives of metamorphosis taking place as 
a result of the personal, affecting presence of the Divine initiative, which challenges a 
person to respond and enter into personal exchange and reciprocal identification with God. 
This is preferred to "Non-personal" models, which function as analogical shields 
protecting the Creator-creature distinction. 
The second methodological strategy employed is that of "Systematic contextualisation, " 
which relates the generating question to other loci of Christian doctrine, in order to qualify 
some of the "negative analogies" of the Personalist model. These loci include: the doctrine 
of the image of God and intersubjectivity, general concurrence and providence. A pattern 
of Divine activity is discerned: a dialectic of relative autonomy and dependence, 
distinction of identity yet interrelationship. The doctrine of revelation suggests that God's 
intent of Self-communication is embedded within creation from the beginning, shaping its 
form and pointing to its goal. This Divine purpose is expressed in the covenant, the 
meaning and basis of creation, and the condition of loving relationship between the Divine 
and the human. The "negative analogies" are further qualified by considering the 
discernment of the Spirit. In sum, the "negative analogies" associated with the Personalist 
model proposed are not vicious. The Personalist model offers the best explanation of the 
compatibility of human freedom and personal identity. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
SPIRIT, FREEDOM, IDENTITY. 
PROLEGOMENA. 
Gregory Samsa woke from uneasy dreams one morning to find himself 
changed into a giant bug. ' 
Thus begins Kafka's famous short story Metamorphosis. What is odd about this altogether 
surreal story is that Gregory's own reaction to his horrific change of bodily form is 
incomprehensibly matter of fact. He accepts his new situation as if it were just another 
assignment handed down to him by the chief clerk, at his anonymous and soulless office. 
His eventual death is not due to the direct effects of the metamorphosis on him, but 
brought about by the hostile reaction of those around him, for whom the metamorphosis is 
perceived in all its horror as a terrible transformation. The question of how Gregory's 
metamorphosis is reconcilable with his sense of self or personal identity, is not something 
that Kafka discusses directly. In comparison, the change that underlies Ovid's tales of 
Metamorphoses suits well the Pythagorean theory of change and flux, making one 
suspicious of outward appearance or form. Yet it is principally employed for dramatic 
effect, often to deliver the moral of the story. 2 
In both Kafka and Ovid, metamorphosis is a dramatic device. 3 In Christianity 
metamorphosis is of an altogether different kind, embodying an ontological claim. This is 
evident not only in the Transfiguration and Resurrection of Jesus, but also the 
metamorphosis of the Christian believer in their "being formed" in the image of Christ and 
their movement towards the full state of glory of the eschaton. Christian metamorphosis, 
1 Franz Kafka, Stories 1904-1924, trans. by J. A. Underwood (London: MacDonald & Co., 1983), p. 91. 
2 For example, in the story of Philemon and Baucis, the metamorphosis of the old faithful married couple 
cedes the moral of the story: "Whom the gods love are gods themselves, and those who have worshiped 
should be worshiped too. " Ovid, The Metamorphoses. trans. M. M. Innes (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 
p. 615-725 [Book III]. Another translation offers this rendering: "The gods look after Good people still, and 
cherishers are cherished. " Trans. by Rolfe Humphries (Bloomington: Indiana Press, 1955), p. 204. This is 
one of the stories that does leave open the possibility that the metamorphosis is a symbol for a psychological 
and spiritual change, as Jacob Needleman indicates: "When the ancient wisdom speaks of mortals becoming 
gods, it is telling us about the birth of a new and higher self, or soul, within ourselves. It is this inner birth 
that has been served by the marriage of Philemon and Baucis. " J. Needleman, On Love (London: Arkana, 
1996), p. 9- 
' See, for example, Ovid (Innes translation), pp. 877-883 [Book VIII] 
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as we shall see, is not a question of a change of outward appearance or form (morphe, 
morphosis), 4 as in the case of Ovid's and Kafka's description of metamorphosis. Christian 
contentions concerning metamorphosis are much more radical: a "new creation"; 5 "born 
again"; 6 a "renewal of the mind"; 7 a "new heart"; 8 a "new spirit"; 9 a "new covenant"; 10 a 
"new aeon"; 11 a "new song"; 12 a "new commandment"; 13 and ultimately a "new heaven and 
earth" 14 and a form of bodily transformation in the eschaton. 15 
What happens to the human person in this radical Christian metamorphosis? Does all take 
place while the believer, as in the case of Kafka's protagonist, sleeps with "uneasy 
dreams"? Both Kafka and Ovid are little concerned to give realistic accounts of how the 
events of metamorphoses affect the persons involved. This is of little concern as the 
metamorphoses are instrumental to their purpose. In Christianity metamorphosis is not 
instrumental, but intrinsic to Christian soteriological claims. It is the concern of the 
Christian theologian, therefore, to give a serious account of how Christian metamorphosis 
is effected and how it affects the believer. Some of these concerns were shared by John 
Oman, who in 1917 wrote his classic Grace and Personality. He wished to move away 
from what he considered to be the dominant conception of grace in the history of theology, 
namely, grace as "the irresistible might of omnipotence directed in a straight line by 
omniscience. "16 The traditional view of grace had more to do with a theistic conception of 
God, than "any notion of God as Father" 17 and squeezed out the "personality" of both God 
4 See: Georg Braumann, "Form, Substance", in NIDNTT Vol. 1, ed. Colin Brown (Exeter: Paternoster Press, 
1975), pp. 705-8. 
5 See: II Cor. 5.17; Gal. 6.15; Eph. 2.15; 4.24; Col. 3.10. 
6 See: Tit. 3.5; John 3.1-8; IPet. 1.3,23; 2.2; Jas. 1.18. 
7 See: Rom. 12.2, Eph. 4.23 (noun). 
8 See: Jer. 31.31; cf. Ezek. 36.26; cf. Col. 3.10. 
9 See: Ezek. 11.19,18.31,36,26; Acts 3.19. 
10 See: Jer. 31.31, cf. Ezek. 34.25; 37.26. 
11 See: Heb. 6.5. 
12 See: Rev. 5.9; 14.3. 
13 See: John 13.34, I John 2.8. 
14 See: Isa. 65.17; 66.22; II Pet. 3.12f; Rev. 21.1,5. 
15 See: I Cor. 15.44ff, 51f; Phil. 3.21. 
16 J. Oman, Grace and Personality (London: Collins, Fontana Library, [1917] 1960) p. 37. This way of 
thinking about grace he considers to be challenged by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
intellectual 
shattering of the Church's "old infallibilities" and more pressingly, the 
"great distresses" of human evil and 
suffering, such as the First World War. In the face of these realities, the old view 
had to meet the question: 
"If, then, God can work anywhere with overwhelming fiat, why not everywhere? Can a world, thus easily to 
be corrected, be evil, and Omnipotence be good and blameless? " ibid., p. 39. 
17 ibid., p. 24. 
2 
and His human creatures. 18 Oman wanted to take the "moral independence" and 
responsibility of human beings seriously, as well as their "religious dependence" on God. 
Many of the concerns of Oman's work are to be found in this thesis, however there is a 
difference in the way that the generating question of my thesis is constructed. 
I. ) First Prolegomena: Setting up the Generating Question. 
This enquiry, as shall be argued in section 11.02 below, commences with the identification 
of a series of claims stemming from Christian revelation and experience, which require 
explanation and as a result a generating question is stimulated. 19 Scientific enquiry, 
according to Rom Harre, asks the question: "Why is it that the patterns of phenomena are 
the way they are? "20 In science the phenomena will be experience of physical reality, or 
theories of what constitutes physical reality. In theology it will be experience of God and 
human being's relationship to that God, governed by the event of God's revelation in the 
person of Christ. 21 
Christian revelation as witnessed to by the Bible and Christian tradition claim that the 
believer, as a result of Christ's atoning death, will, in relationship to the Spirit, undergo a 
"new birth", a "renewal", a "new creation". This is what Jesus proclaimed and made 
possible by His life and death, it is what the disciples paradigmatically experienced at 
Pentecost, and it is how the apostle Paul experienced the action of the Christian God. 
Christian Scripture also testifies to the fact that this "new birth" is not the achievement of 
individual human effort, but accomplished in relationship with the Spirit. As a result of the 
claims of revelation and Christian experience the generating question of my thesis is 
induced: how is the agency of the Spirit in bringing about Christian metamorphosis of the 
believer compatible with human freedom and personal identity? 
18 Ibid., p. 38. 
19 The term is taken from the philosophy of science. The scientist's curiosity is sparked 
by a pattern of 
phenomena, which requires explanation, and leads to the 
formulation of a generating question. See R. M. 
Harre, Principles of Scientific Thinking (London, Macmillan 1970), p. 35; David 
Lamb, Discovery, Creativity 
and Problem Solving (Aldershot, Avebury, 1991), ch. 
V. 
20 Harre, p. 35. 
21 Christoph refers to this as the essential "Christocentricity" of the 
Christian faith, distinguished from 
christocentrism as purely the insistence on "the particularity of 
God's revelation in the historical individual 
3 
1.01) Defining the Terms of the Generating Question. 
1.0101) Metamorphosis. 
The term metamorphosis is derived from the Greek verb metamorphoo, 22 which literally 
translated means to "change into another form, " and in its biblical context is translated by 
the verbs "transfigure, " "transform" and "change. "23 Thus, the verb is used to describe 
Christ's transfiguration, 24 but for our purposes the key biblical use is that which refers to 
the change within a person. 25 J. Behm refers to it as, "an invisible process in Christians 
which takes place, or begins to take place, already during their life in this aeon. X26 In II 
Corinthians 3.18 the present continuous is used to indicate a process of transformation or 
change of character, with the end being that of the final degree of glory. 27 David Peterson 
comments on the use of metamorphoo in this passage: 
Transformation is the miracle we all experience as a result of seeing the 
glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ... Not just the outward appearance 
but the essential person is being changed. Linked with the expression 'the 
same image' (Gk. ten auten eikona), this verb indicates that we are changed 
into the likeness of Christ, who is himself the true image of God. In Christ 
we see not only the radiance of God's glory but also the true image of 
humanity. Into that one image we are all being transformed together. 28 
In this thesis the term metamorphosis will be used as an umbrella term, inspired by, but 
not limited to the biblical use outlined above, to refer to the transformation or change that 
is involved in the application of Christian redemption. In traditional Protestant theology 
Jesus Christ who is confessed as the Christ. " C. Schwöbel, God: Action and Revelation (Kampen: Kok 
Pharos Publishing House, 1992) p. 14. 
22 The term is to be distinguished from another biblical word, metaschematizo (ICor. 4.6; II Cor. 11.13,14, 
15; Phil. 3.21), which literally means to change the form of a person, and in II Corinthians has the 
connotation of disguise or "masquerading". Thus, Satan may look like an angel of light, and false teachers 
may appear sincere. In Phil. 3.21 Paul uses the term to speak of the transformation of our bodies in the future 
resurrection. It should be clear that in this thesis metamorphosis and metaschematizo are not being used 
synonymously. 
23 See, W. E. Vine, An Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words (London/Edinburgh: Oliphant, 1939). 
24 Mtt. 17.2; Mrk. 9.2; Lk. 9.29. Behm writes of the use of the verb in relation to Jesus' Transfiguration that it 
is "the anticipation and guarantee of an eschatological reality. " TDNT Vol. IV, ed. by Gerhard Kittel, trans. 
by G. W. Bromiley (Stuttgart: William. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1967), p. 758. 
25 For example, Rom. 12.2; II Cor. 3.18; cf. Gal. 4.19: "in travail until Christ be formed [morphothe] in you. " 
Braumann makes the following comment on this verse: "It is rather that of coming into the world as a child 
comes into the world through conception and birth. Christ himself is to be formed in them in the reality of his 
being"(NIDNTT, p. 708). 
26 TDNT IV, p. 758. This comment may be compared in Chapter 4 with William Alston's conception of the 
"internality" of the operation of the Spirit. 
27 J. Behm comments on this verse: "To Christians the Spirit has granted free vision of the heavenly glory of 
the Lord, Christ. In this vision they undergo an unceasing and progressive change into the image of the One 
whose glory they see. It is the Lord Himself, present and active by the Spirit, who brings about this change. " 
ibid. 
4 
conversion and the gift of faith, regeneration and sanctification, and in the East under the 
category of deification. The thesis will not offer an account of the nature of Christian 
transformation itself; hence it will not present a theology of conversion, regeneration and 
sanctification, although the thesis may aid in constructing a fully developed doctrine of the 
application of the work of redemption. 
It is important to consider in our future discussion of Christian metamorphosis what kind 
of change is being claimed. Aristotelian-inspired metaphysics has tended to predicate 
change to entities that are numerically enduring things ("primary substances"). What 
changes are the qualities or properties (traits) of an entity, such that if a change has taken 
place an entity will either possess or be dispossessed of a property, which it had at an 
earlier time. According to Aristotle changes in accord with an entity's persistence are 
"accidental" changes, whereas sufficiently extensive change may bring about a change in 
the "essence" or kind of entity that exists. 29 A caterpillar and a butterfly are only the same 
kind of thing, if the terms refer to an enduring, though admittedly, developing insect. 
Likewise the ship of Theseus, whose original parts have been replaced over time, is still 
the same ship, as long as the replacement of its parts was conducted in a way that no 
change was ever that extensive to put in question the continuant, the basic design of the 
ship. 30 
When is a change an ontological change? In philosophy 'ontology' is the discipline 
concerned with the questions: what do the concepts of 'being' or 'existence' mean? What 
exists or what general kinds of things exist? Or, what sorts of things ultimately exist? 
31 For 
our purposes if we talk of ontological change we are talking about a change in what exists, 
either in terms of kinds or particular entities. Accidental change, involving as it does a 
change in properties, qualities or relations of a numerically continuous existent are not an 
instance of ontological but qualitative change. If humankind becomes discontinuous, or 
28 D. Peterson, Possessed by God: A New Testament Theology of Sanctification and Holiness (Leicester: 
Apollos, 1995), p. 124. 
29 Saul Kripke has revived the Aristotelian concept of real essence in his concept of a "natural kind. " Real 
essences are discovered by science and picks out numerical identity, whereas 
"nominal essence" refers to the 
accidental features by which we may pick out instances of a kind on a naive 
level. S. Kripke, Naming and 
Necessity (Oxford: OUP, 1980). 
30 Bruce Aune, Metaphysics. The Elements (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 82. 
31 See, Edward Craig, "Ontology", Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol.?, ed. by E. Craig 
(London/New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 117. 
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Peter is killed and his body matter is made into a lamp, these would be examples of 
ontological changes to the order of existing things. In relation to human persons the 
category of personal identity refers to the continuation of numerical identity: 32 what it is 
for Peter to be the same person at time ti as at time t2. Hence a change of personal identity 
would involve an ontological change. Qualitative identity in the domain of human persons 
refers principally to human personality, for example, my development of an aggressive or 
generous disposition to my character. 33 This would not constitute a case of ontological 
change. 
It has become quite fashionable in some theological circles to conceive of ontology in 
purely relational terms, whereby 'being' is identified with relations. 34 Certainly we can 
accept that entities possess relations and relational properties. 
Relations are like properties, except that instead of applying to single 
things, they link pairs or triples (etc. ) of things in specific orders. Thus, if 
Jack loves Jill, then the love relation holds between Jack and Jill in that 
order. 35 
32 This distinction is very well applied to relational conceptions of personhood by Harriet Harris, "Should we 
say that Personhood is Relational? ", Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 51 No. 2 (1998), pp. 214-234. She 
argues that relational conceptions of personhood, which are currently in vogue, treat "discussions about 
personality or about the sense of one's self' as "discussions about personhood (what it is to be a person) and 
about personal identity (what it is to be the same person over time). " ibid., pp. 216-17. Harris argues that: 
"Persons can change qualitatively within and of themselves, but in changing themselves their numerical 
identity is unchanged. " ibid., p. 218. She writes further, "We do not want to say that a different personal 
identity is established every time one's personality changes... " ibid., p. 222. She continues, that logically 
speaking, "We cannot jump from recognising the relationality involved in being a person to affirming that 
persons are relational entities" ibid., pp. 221-2. 
33 Vincent Brummer draws a similar distinction when he writes, "my person is given in desires, character- 
traits, characteristics etc. which I endorse in my second order volitions and authentically want to motivate my 
actions. As object my identity is given; as a person I choose my identity. " V. Brummer, "Religious Belief and 
Personal Identity, " NZSTRP, Vol. 38 (1996), p. 157. He goes on to add that what I would prefer to call our 
relational or psychological identity is not just chosen by me (necessary but not sufficient condition) but 
constituted in the interaction between subject and world. The relational constituent of identity, "mutual 
identification, " is fundamental. ibid., p. 158. Harris accuses Brummer of conflating "personal identity with a 
sense of one's self. " ibid., p. 220. She argues that his concept of mutual identification, "presupposes that there 
is a continuous someone to whom it is important that affirmation be received.... Neither object identity nor 
personal identity as described by Brummer picks out the continuity of this someone to whom personal and 
moral development is important. Personal identity fluctuates according to our relation with others. Object 
identity, which comprises our actual personality traits as well as our physical characteristics, must also be 
subject to ongoing change. " ibid., p. 221. 
34 "To be and to be in relation become identical. " John Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in 
Personhood and the Church (New York, St. Vladimir's Seminary, 1985), p. 89. See also, Colin E. Gunton, 
The One, the Three and the Many. God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 
pp. 214; and Carver T. Lu, Being and Relation. A Theological Critique of Western Dualism and 
Individualism (Edinburgh, Scottish Academic Press, 1987). 
35 Michael Jubien, Contemporary Metaphysics (Oxford, Blackwell, 1997), p. 38. 
6 
A relational property is one that is predicated of an entity on the grounds of a specific 
relation obtaining, such as, Jack having the property of loving Jill. Relations act like 
properties in the sense that one may change a certain amount of relations ('accidental'), 
without bringing about a change of the kind of thing that exists (an 'ontological change'). 36 
There can be no doubt that the category of relation is an integral one to metaphysics. 
According to Justus Buchler's principle of ordinality: "To be is to be an order of traits and 
a constituent of other orders. It is to be a location of traits, located among the traits of the 
world. , 37 On Buchler's view: 
There can be no complex [i. e. ordinal location] without relations. For a trait 
to obtain, for it to be and be the (discriminable) trait that it is, is for it to be 
delimited. To be delimited is to be conditioned, environed by limiting and 
enabling conditions: It is to be located in an order that provides for this trait 
to obtain rather than any other. 38 
On the other hand, the category of relation although integral, is one out of many 
metaphysical categories and certainly not identical to being. A change of relation in most 
instances does not necessarily constitute an ontological change. 
1.0102) The Spirit. 
Why is the Spirit the key Divine hypostasis39 involved in bringing about Christian 
metamorphosis? According to St. Paul the gift of the Spirit is the arrabon ('down 
payment') of God in relation to the fulfilment of His promises. 
40 Building on this Pauline 
vision of the Spirit's eschatological role St. Basil the Great describes the Spirit as the 
"perfecting cause" of creation. 41 Colin Gunton explicates this idea: "The Spirit is thus the 
agent of the Father's determination to bring all things into relation to himself through 
Christ: the agent of God's perfecting of the creation. "42 As the "perfecting cause" the Spirit 
36 A relational change takes place if X has relation R1 to another entity 
A at a certain time and another 
relation R2 at a later point. H. H. Price, Thinking and Experience 
(London, Hutchinson University Library, 
1953), ch. 1. 
37 Quoted in Beth J. Singer, "Intersubjectivity without subjectivism, " Man and World, Vol. 24 (1991), p. 323. 
38 ibid., p. 323. 
39 I use the term "hypostasis" in line with the discussion of the 
doctrine of the Trinity by the Church Fathers, 
to refer to a particular member of the Trinity. 
Some theologians prefer the term "person. " I have argued 
elsewhere that such a use of the term can be unhelpful and therefore, 
for want of a better term, I stick with 
the Greek original. R. M. Fermer, "The Limits of Trinitarian Theology as a 
Methodological Paradigm, " 
NZSTRP, Vol. 41 [1999], p. 163ff. 
ao See: II Cor. 1.22; 5.5. 
41 St. Basil the Great, On the Holy Spirit, XV. 36 and 38. 




brings about new creation, which given the Spirit's role in creation (Gen. 1.2) is the reason 
why the Nicene Creed emulates I Corinthians 15.45 in calling the Spirit the "life giver". It 
is the Spirit who bestows and maintains faith, 43 and who grants sonship to the believer 
(Gal. 4.6) and integration into the body of Christ (I Cor. 6.11). Part of the Spirit's role for 
Paul is liberative in bringing about the subjective appropriation of Christian revelation. " It 
is quite clear from the Pauline corpus that one may interpret the Spirit's role as that of the 
pre-eminent Divine hypostasis engaged in accomplishing the application of redemption. 
Kilian McDonnell refers to the "contact function" of the Spirit, as the "universal point of 
contact between God and history" as leading from Christ to the Father, and hence, 
following the fourth century liturgical formulae, "from the Father, through Christ His Son, 
in the Spirit, to the Father, blessed Trinity, one God. 1145 He comments: 
Both Christ and the Spirit are at the center but in different ways: Christ as 
the 'what' and the Spirit as the 'how. ' And this 'how, ' the Spirit is a way of 
knowing Jesus and the Father; as a 'how, ' the Spirit is a way the Father 
through Christ has contact with history and the Church. The contact 
function is a mode of the 'how. ' 46 
This conception of the Spirit being the primary Divine hypostasis involved in Christian 
metamorphosis, is re-enforced in both Pauline and Johannine pneumatology by their 
reworking of the Hebrew concept of Shekinah, to talk of the mode of relation or presence 
of the Spirit. The Hebrew concept of the Shekinah, which stemmed from the cultic 
language referring initially to the "tabernacle", or tent, where God "dwelt" amidst his 
people, originally in the transportable Ark, and then, after the entry into the temple, the 
sanctuary, the "Holy of holies, " on Zion. It referred to the presence of God to His people, 
the particular indwelling of God in concrete space and time, an act of God precisely 
because God is by nature not to be contained. Through indwelling a particular space and 
43 See: II Cor. 4.13; I Cor. 12.3; Gal. 5.5. The gift of faith is associated with the language of the gift of the 
Spirit, the receiving of the Spirit and baptism by the Spirit (e. g. John 7.37-39; 
Acts 2.38; 11.15-17; Rom. 8.9; 
Gal. 3.2; Heb. 6.4). 
44 See: II Cor. 3.17; Rom. 8.21; cf. Isa. 42.1ff, 61.1ff. 
as K. McDonnell, "A Trinitarian Theology of the Holy Spirit? " Theological Studies, Vol. 46 (1985), p. 
227. 
46 ibid., p. 215. McDonnell continues this point, by displaying 
its wider meaning for theology: "In 
hermeneutic terms, pneumatology is the universal (because coextensive with the reach of 
Christ's work) 
horizon determining the interpretation of all reality. There is, therefore, a two-directioned 
hermeneutical 
function to pneumatology. In one direction, it is both the point of entry and the 
hermeneutical principle for 
the interpretation of Christology and Trinity, and 
in the other direction, it is the point of entry and 
hermeneutical principle for the interpretation of history and ecclesiology..... 
It does not threaten Christology 
or the cross. The reason: it is within the 
larger movement of life from the Father to the Father. As long as 
pneumatology is truly Trinitarian, the controls are 
built in. " ibid., p. 212. 
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time, God can identify with His people and with their struggles. 47 For Paul the Shekinah, 
God's Spirit filled sanctuary, becomes the very body of the Christian, 48 as well as the 
singular indwelling of the Spirit among God's people (I Cor. 6.19-20). The Spirit will lead 
His chosen people through the trials of the Christian life (Gal. 5.16ff), as the Shekinah was 
God's presence with His people during the Exodus. Echoing Ezekiel 36.26, this indwelling 
of the Spirit is to be an indwelling of the `heart' (II Cor. 1.22; 3.3; Gal. 4.6; Rom. 2.29; 5.5), 
the term which Hebrew scripture reserves for the union of the cognitive, the affective and 
the volitional aspects of a person. 
For John, writing at a time when the unfulfilled eschatological expectations of the first 
generation Christian community had to be addressed, 49 the Hebrew concept of Shekinahso 
is mirrored in his language of the indwelling (meno, menein) of the Spirit in the believer. 
This in turn is inextricably tied to his understanding of the bestowal of "another 
paraclete. i51 R. E. Brown writes that John presents "the Paraclete as the Holy Spirit in a 
special role, namely, as the personal presence of Jesus in the Christian while Jesus is with 
the Father. 02 The Spirit as that other "paraclete" is intimately bound to Jesus, yet is not 
47 Such language is linked with the Hebrew conception of a clean heart, as Westermann comments in relation 
to Psalm 51: "[T]he clean heart and the right spirit are endangered when fellowship with God is destroyed 
(compare v. 4); so the speaker asks that he may always be one with God. " C. Westermann, The Living Psalms 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989), p. 98. 
48 See I Cor. 3.16; II Cor. 6.16; Eph. 2.22. As Gordon Fee comments: "What is significant for our purposes is 
that Paul specifically uses this imagery and the OT motif of God's presence in the context of the Spirit's 
presence in the midst of the people of God as they are constituted on the basis of the new covenant, effected 
by Christ and actualised by the Spirit. Here is how the living God is now present with his people, expressed 
most clearly in Eph. 2.22: the church is being raised up to become a holy temple in the Lord, built up together 
as `a dwelling for God by His Spirit'. " G. Fee, God's Empowering Spirit: the Holy Spirit in the Letters of 
Paul (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1994), pp. 844-845. 
49 C. K. Barrett, "The Holy Spirit in the Fourth Gospel, " Journal of Theological Studies, Voll (1950), pp. 1- 
15. 
50 It should be noted that Philo follows Stoic form in talking of the dwelling of the divine nous or logos in 
man. 
51 Don Carson explicates the term: "The Greek term parakletos.... is the verbal adjective of parakaleo, lit. 'to 
call alongside', and hence 'to encourage', 'to exhort'. The verbal adjective has passive force, and is roughly 
equivalent to ho parakeklemenos, 'one who is called alongside'. " D. A. Carson, The Gospel According to 
John (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 1991), p. 499. Carson goes on to bring out 
the meaning of parakletos as advocate: "In secular Greek, parakletos primarily means 'legal assistant, 
advocate', i. e. someone who helps another in court, whether as an advocate, a witness, or a 
representative... . 
Moreover, the passive form does not rule out the possibility that the Paraclete may be an 
active speaker on behalf of someone before someone else. In John's usage, the legal overtones are sharpest 
in 
16: 7-11, but there the Paraclete serves rather more as a prosecuting attorney than as counsel for the defence. " 
ibid.. See also R. E. Brown, "Appendix V: The Paraclete, " in The Gospel of John XIII - XXI (Doubleday & 
Co., New York 1966), pp. 1135- 1143. 
52 R. E. Brown, (XIII-XXI), p. 1139. 
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identical with him. 53 This is what Kilian McDonnell refers to as the "mutuality between 
Christ and the Spirit. 04 The role of the Spirit here ensures the continuation and 
completion of the mission of revelation initiated by Jesus. 55 The Spirit as parakletos has 
echoes of the Hebrew portrayal of the Messiah as menachem, 'comforter, ' and helps to 
emphasise the intimacy of this new mode of presence or relation. The content of the 
Spirit's disclosure will not be Himself, but that of the Son and the Father, to "bring to 
remembrance all things that I [Jesus] said to you. "56 John Ashton compares the Spirit's 
function in John with the role given to the angelus interpres of the intertestamental 
writings of the Jewish Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha. The Angelus interpres is sent from 
heaven to clarify what could not be fully comprehended without him (cf. Uriel in 4 
Ezra). 57 Thus, the Spirit's role is not just to re-iterate what has already been given in 
Christ. 58 As in Paul, the Spirit has the eschatological function of completing revelation and 
will expound, "what is to come"(John 16.13). In sum, what I have attempted to show is 
that the Spirit, as primarily presented by Paul and John, is the pre-eminent Divine 
hypostasis engaged in Christian metamorphosis. 
Some explanation needs to be given of why I have set up the generating question in 
pneumatological terms given the history of theology. There has been in recent theology an 
attempt to redress the lack of attention that pneumatology has received in the history of 
theology. 59 In the history of theology the subject matter of this thesis would find its 
53 "I will come back to you" John 14.18, and yet the Paraclete is "another Comforter" John 14.16. 
R. E. 
Brown observes, "John insists that Jesus will be in heaven with the Father while the Paraclete is on earth 
in 
the disciples; and so the two have different roles. " Brown (XIII-XXI), p. 1141. 
54 He writes: "[E]very Christological statement has its pneumatological counterpart - something which seems 
to have been perceived as early as Ignatius of Antioch. A second aggregate of theological content 
in addition 
to Christology is not thereby proposed. What is recommended is that another dimension at the 
interior of the 
Christological mystery be recognised, just as being in the Spirit' is an interpretative 
imperative at the interior 
of 'being in Christ. ' The mutuality and reciprocity are at the very core of the mystery. 
Though there may be 
temporal priorities to the visible mission of the Son, as a matter of 
fact the invisible missions are 
simultaneous, to which corresponds the concomitance of 'being 
in the Spirit' and being in Christ, ' as also in 
the liturgical doxology 'through Christ in the Spirit. "' McDonnell, p. 213. 
55 "I am in my Father, and you in Me, and I in you. " John 14.19b. 
56 John 14.26b cf. 16.14. As R. E. Brown comments, "Virtually everything that 
has been said about the 
Paraclete has been said elsewhere in the Gospel about Jesus. " Brown, Vol. II, p. 
1140. Earlier he notes that 
the principle role of the Paraclete is to "speak through the 
disciples (xv 26-27) in defence of the absent 
Jesus. " Brown (XIII-XXI), p. 1136. 
57 J. Ashton, Understanding the Fourth Gospel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 
420-4; cf. R. E. Brown 
(XIII-XXI), pp. 1138-9. 
58 Gary D. Badcock, The Light of Truth and the Fire of Love: A Theology of the Holy 
Spirit (Grand Rapids: 
William. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), pp. 33-34. 
59 Augustine comments on the neglect of the doctrine of the 
Spirit in On the Faith and the Creed 8,19,20. 
G. S. Hendry comments that the creedal formulations of the 
Spirit are verging on being "slipshod. " George S. 
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closest, though not identical, home in the traditional grace-nature-freedom debate. One of 
the reasons why this thesis does not find its home perfectly within this debate is because 
the generating question is purposefully set up in pneumatological terms, rather than using 
the concept of grace. This is one of the differences between my work and that of John 
Oman's, Grace and Personality. Despite his wish for a doctrine grace which respects both 
Divine and human "personality, " he continues to use the language of grace out of 
conjunction with the hypostasis of the Spirit. In Scripture pneumatological language is 
clearly primary and the same is true of the Greek Fathers. 
Robert Jenson has argued that the priority of the language of grace over pneumatology is, 
in part, the outcome of Augustine's conception of the Trinity, which conceived of the three 
"persons" as "functionally indistinguishable": 
Thus Augustine could no longer conceptualize the saving relation between 
God and creatures by saying that the Father and the Son are transformingly 
present in the Spirit, as the Greek originators of trinitarianism had done..... 
Augustine was left with the standard position of Western culture-religion: 
on the one hand there is God, conceived as a supernatural entity who acts 
causally on us; and on the other hand there are the results among us of this 
causality. In the subsequent Latin tradition, God and the objects of God's 
causality are then both interpreted accordingly: they are 'substances', 
fundamentally self-sustaining and self-contained entities, who 'act' over 
against each other, the result of which action is in us a habitus, an acquired 
disposition to behave and react in ways obedient to the will of God. 60 
Interestingly John Oman too shares Jenson's judgement that an impersonal doctrine of 
grace is to be derived from the theology of Augustine, 61 but does not follow this up with a 
Hendry, The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), p. 13. Barth talked 
of the possibility in future theology of shifting theology's imbalance from Christology to pneumatology. Karl 
Barth, "Concluding Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher, " in The Theology of Schleiermacher (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1982). K. McDonnell takes up Barth's diagnosis, and argues that the lack of 
direction of much pneumatology results from the displacement of pneumatology from its trinitarian context. 
McDonnell, "A Trinitarian Theology. " Elsewhere, he writes: "In the West, we think essentially in 
Christological categories, with the Holy Spirit as an extra, an addendum, a 'false' window to give symmetry 
and balance to theological design. We build up our large theological constructs in constitutive Christological 
categories, and then, in a second, non-constitutive moment, we decorate the already constructed system with 
pneumatological bubbles, a little Spirit tinsel. " K. McDonnell, "The Determinative Doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit": Theology Today, Vol. 39 (1982), p. 142. 
A renaissance in pneumatology may be reflected in the decision of the seventh assembly of the World 
Council of Churches in Canberra, Australia, in 1990, to choose the topic: "Come, Holy Spirit - Renew the 
Whole Creation. " Papers from this meeting are to be found in the Ecumenical Review, Vols. 41 & 42 
(1989/90). 
60 R. W. Jenson, "The Holy Spirit", in Christian Dogmatics, Vol. 2, ed. by, C. E. Braaten and R. W. Jenson 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), p. 126. 
61 Oman, pp. 38,40ff. 
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reassertion of the importance of the personal nature of the trinitarian hypostaseis. 
However, this thesis is not into a historical theology blame game. If the salient points of 
Jenson's analysis are correct, 62 namely, that the language of grace has tended to displace 
pneumatology and that the language of causality has been dominant over the language of 
personal relations, then, this lends support to the construction of the generating question 
and the subsequent generating hypothesis of the thesis, which proposes a Personalist 
model of the Spirit-creature relation in metamorphosis. 
The other theological locus in which the relation of Divine and human freedom and agency 
has been discussed is the debate, which ensues from Thomas Aquinas' distinction between 
primary and secondary causation and the doctrine of general concurrence. 63 However, this 
theological discussion is also couched in non-pneumatological terms and has its central 
focus in the doctrine of creation. As will be argued in Chapter 7, this may constitute a 
useful move, for our purposes, in qualifying and contextualising the generating question 
within Christian doctrine, but cannot be considered to provide a direct treatment of the 
question. In addition, the largest and most influential treatment of the doctrine of the 
Spirit, certainly in catholic theology, in this century, Yves Congar's I Believe in the Holy 
Spirit, a three-volume work, has nothing to say on this issue. M One can only conjecture 
that Congar felt the matter was best addressed in the context of the traditional discussions 
of primary-secondary causation. Perhaps, he, like other authors, believed that this question 
is not one that may be profitably answered. That option shall be discussed later. 
62 Jenson is supported by C. E. Gunton, "God, grace and freedom, " in Intellect and Action: Elucidations on 
Christian Theology and the Life of Faith (Edinburgh: T&T. Clark, 2000), ch. 10. Fergus Kerr in a review of 
Gunton's book argues that the view that Gunton attacks, namely, grace as'some kind of substance imparted to 
creatures' is a straw-man. F. Kerr, "Reviews, " Blackfriars, 
Vol. 82,2001, pp. 197-200. Kerr argues: "Aquinas 
is familiar with the idea that grace is some kind of a substance. He 
insists.... that grace cannot be a 
substance.... grace can only be an accidental 
form of the soul.... Rather grace is 'a kind of quality of soul' - 
qualitatis quaedam animae .... 
in the same sort of way as beauty may be said to be a quality of the someone's 
body. He has nothing reified in mind. " ibid., pp. 198-9. This 
is a'supernatural quality' for Aquinas, but, as 
Kerr explains, "not a quality that would act upon the soul 
like some efficient cause.... but only on the model 
of a formal cause. " ibid. 
63 For example, although the modern Roman 
Catholic theologian K. Rahner has important discussions of 
human freedom and the relationship of grace and nature, perhaps the closest 
he comes to addressing the 
generating question of my thesis is 
in the Grundkurs where he examines briefly how human autonomy is 
compatible with creatureliness and 
dependence upon the Divine. Karl Rahner, "Creatureliness: Not a 
particular instance of a causal law, " 
in Foundations of the Christian Faith, trans. by W. V. Dych (New York: 
Crossroad, 1995 [1976]), p. 76ff (11.4). Here Rahner largely utilises the 
Thomist arguments concerning the 
relation between Divine and human causality. 
64 Yves Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit Vol. I-III (New York: 
Seabury Press, 1983). 
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Some readers may wonder whether my thesis' focus on the Spirit violates the Scholastic 
principle: opera sacrosanctae Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa. Such a fear is unfounded. It 
is Scripture that in its testimony to the work of the Son marks out the Spirit as the Divine 
hypostasis principally involved in the application of redemption. 65 To admit this, is not to 
violate the principle, for insofar as the trinitarian hypostaseis are a unity in perichoresis, 
then, while one hypostasis may be pre-eminently involved in one field of operation, the 
unity of the One God (ad intra) requires that all three be co-involved. The metamorphosis 
of the Christian believer is a created effect of the One God, and not of the Spirit alone. 
Bernard Lonergan explicates this by using the distinction between efficient causation and 
final causation: it is the One God and not the Spirit who is the efficient cause of Christian 
metamorphosis, but it is the Spirit, as the one sent by the Father and the Son who is the 
final cause. 66 Daniel Helminiak explains: 
`By the Holy Spirit' would entail efficient causality, disqualified by the ad extra 
rule. ' Because of the Holy Spirit' suggests final causality. The mission of the Holy 
Spirit is that because of which God effects transformation in the human. 67 
If the specific mission of the Spirit is not recognised, then, the danger is that we return to 
Jenson's point, that the Divine hypostaseis become "functionally indistinguishable. , 68 The 
Spirit, as J. V. Taylor puts it, is the "Go-Between God, "69 and as such is the "go-between" 
not only of the Father and the Son, but also of the Father, Son and the world. Hence the 
Spirit's function ad extra is precisely to make known the One Triune God, ad intra. If one 
65 Wolfhart Pannenberg wisely argues that the distinction of the Divine hypostaseis ought not to follow 
Origen's account in De principiis in founding them on the different spheres of operation of each: "One can 
know the intertrinitarian distinctions and relations, the inner life of God, only through the revelation of the 
Son, not through the different spheres of the operation of the one God in the world. Only subsequently can 
one relate specific aspects of the unity of the divine working in the world to trinitarian distinctions that are 
known already. " W. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol. I. trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1991), p. 273. 
66 Bernard Lonergan, De Deo Trino, Pars II (Rome: Pontifica Universitatis Gregoriana, 1964), pp. 226- 238. 
67 Daniel A. Helminiak, Spiritual Development: An Interdisciplinary Study (Chicago, Loyola University 
Press, 1987), p. 193. 
68 Colin Gunton supports this conclusion: "No objection can be taken to this principle if it means that 
everything that God does, He does in the unity of his 
being. But if it is taken to mean, as it sometimes 
appears to be, that no characteristic and distinctive 
forms of action can be ascribed to Father, Son and Spirit, 
there appears to be no point in distinguishing between them. 
" C. E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian 
3. Helminiak puts thmatter this wa "The difference among Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), pp. p Yý 
the Three in God does not lie in what they have or what they are. The difference 
lies in how they are and how 
they have what they have. " Helminiak, pp. 185. Likewise, K. 
McDonnell refers to the "mutuality" of the 
work of Christ and the Spirit, but comments: 
"Though one can say that Christ works through the Spirit, that 
cannot be turned around. The Spirit does not work through 
Christ. In some respects Christ and the Spirit are 
interchangeable, but not in all. " McDonnell, "A Trinitarian Theology", pp. 210-11. 
69 J. V. Taylor, The Go-Between God: The Holy Spirit and the Christian Mission (London: SCM Press, 
1972). 
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asks who is doing the transforming in Christian metamorphosis, the answer must be a 
trinitarian one. The Spirit as the "perfecting cause" mediates the Son, in whose image we 
are to be formed, without whose Incarnation the Christian life is void and the Spirit lacking 
a mission. The Son in turn mediates the Father, living a life in obedience to the will of the 
Father through the mediation of the Spirit. As the Triune God is one, all three co-inhere in 
the events of the Divine economy. As McDonnell writes: "Pneumatology is apart when it 
is divorced from the Trinitarian controls and principles. , 70 
1.0103) Common Intuitions Concerning Human Freedom and Personal Identity. 
Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, in search of "the highest of all practical goods, " 
adopts a methodology, to begin with at least, which examines what "ordinary and cultured 
people" say, to arrive at what might be considered to be basic human intuitions concerning 
the subject. 71 Likewise, the generating question is constructed by utilising, what may be 
considered to be some common human intuitions concerning freedom and personal 
identity, as articulated by the western philosophical tradition. 72 Just why I choose to adopt 
such a starting point will be made apparent in section II. 01, in my discussion of the 
methodology employed in this thesis. The claim is not that the concepts of freedom and 
personal identity explicated below are to be rigidly applied to the theological subject 
matter of the thesis, as if they were fixed a priori concepts. Rather, they are intended to be 
provisional definitions, for the purpose of setting up the generating question, which will 
subsequently interact with and undergo modification in relation to Christian conceptions 
of freedom and agency (Chapter 5). 
In adopting this approach I am purposefully avoiding the controversy in traditional 
philosophy between Determinism and Libertarianism, or Incompatibilism and 
70 McDonnell, "A Trinitarian Theology", p. 214. 
71 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics. Book I. iv. 
72 Philosophy depends on intuitions. Arguments are structures around intuitions and one can only avoid 
impasse if enough intuitions are shared or certain intuitions are relinquished. 
Although philosophical 
impasses look as if they may admit of no resolution, they seldom are so self-contained that all argument 
becomes impossible. If that is the case the revision of intuitions seems possible. My claim that there are 
common intuitions concerning human freedom and personal 
identity, is not to assume that people share a 
universal stock of intuitions, that clearly seems to 
be empirically inaccurate, or that "common sense" remains 
somehow unconditioned by culture. C. Geertz, 
Common Sense as a Cultural System, " in Local Knowledge: 
Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropology!, ed. by C. Geertz (New York: Basic Books, 1983). Rather a 
sharing of intuitions both within and across cultures and 
traditions is possible and something to be aimed at. 
Such a belief is consonant with the realist epistemology that 
I espouse. In the case of the claims to common 
intuitions above, these are held largely in the tradition of western philosophy. 
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Compatibilism. There is a layer of debate, at a more first-order level, which is not 
dependent on the outcome of that dispute, which Harry Frankfurt argues may offer wider 
acceptance. 73 Human freedom is a condition involving voluntary choice, defined as, "one 
which is in accordance with the agent's true nature and his or her desires. ' , 74 One is free if 
one wants to be moved by the motives or events, which do propel action. A fundamental 
criterion of freedom is that the source of a free action originate in a person's own mental 
system, the interaction between will and intellect. 75 Eleonore Stump argues that this 
criterion is to be found in Thomas Aquinas' conception of, what she calls, the will as part 
of "a dynamic feedback system composed primarily of the will and the intellect, but also 
the passions, "76 and it is the intrinsic origination of an act from this system, and not by an 
external cause, which captures the primary necessary condition for freedom. Hence, the 
definition of voluntary choice above needs to make reference to the role of the intellect in 
apprehending what is desirable. As Stump explicates Aquinas, this is action caused by an 
intrinsic principle: 
A voluntary act is thus a special case of being moved by an intrinsic 
principle. Whatever is moved by an intrinsic principle in such a way that it 
acts for an end which it cognizes as an end has within itself the principle of 
its action. 77 
73 H. Frankfurt, "Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person, " Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68 (1971), p. 20. 
R. C. Moberly in his critique of a definition of freedom that solely focuses on "an inherent capacity of equal 
choice between two alternatives" offers us another reason for making this move. As Moberly explains: 
"Unless a and b happen to be precisely equal in goodness, and also in wisdom, unless, that is to say, upon the 
improbable and unimportant hypothesis of an alternative which is absolutely indifferent from every point of 
view whatever, no man of any growth in wisdom or character can equally do a or b. " Atonement and 
Personality (London: John Murray, [reprint] 1924), p. 222. 
74 Ted Honderich, How Free Are You? (Oxford: OUP, 1993), p. 141. A more refined account of the 
relationship of freedom to desires and higher-order volitions will be presented in Chapter 5 in the discussion 
of Harry Frankfurt's definition of freedom of will. It should be noted here that both Frankfurt and E. Stump 
consider the ability of an agent to act on higher-order desires to 
be a condition of the identification of 
personhood. See: E. Stump, "Persons: Identification and Freedom, 
" Philosophical Topics, Vol. 24 No. 2 
(1996), pp. 200-202. 
75 Stump, "Persons, " p. 201. It is worth noting that this Thomist position has not simply been rediscovered by 
Stump. The early 20th century Anglican theologian R. C. Moberly made a similar point (and he was not 
untypical): "Free will is the power of so doing the things which we 
do, whatever their character, that when 
we do them they are really our own; and our own selves are really expressed 
in the doing of them. " Moberly, 
pp. 223 -224. He goes on to make the connection with 
theology, namely, that "our own selves" are only ever 
found in relationship with God. 
76 See: E. Stump, "Aquinas's Account of Freedom: Intellect and Will, " Monist, Vol. 80 (1997), p. 581. For 
Aquinas the will has been created as a hunger for the good, the good as represented 
by the intellect, 
influenced by passion and the will. Freedom is located 
for Aquinas in the will as subject, and the reason as 
the cause, as Stump explains: "That is, the property of 
freedom inheres in the will, which is the subject for 
the property, but it does so because of the 
intellect; will's relations to and interactions with the intellect are 
the source of the freedom of the will. " ibid., p. 
584. 
77 ibid., p. 584. 
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This is distinguished from action caused by an extrinsic principle: 
That the voluntary movement of the will be from an extrinsic principle, Aquinas says, is impossible. This is not an empirical claim but a conceptual 
one... If something extrinsic to the agent were to act on the will with 
efficient causation, then the tie of the will to the intellect, from which acts 
of will get their voluntary character, would be broken, and so the act of will 
would not be voluntary. 78 
She holds that Aquinas' position complements and can guide modern philosophical 
accounts of freedom and responsibility, which wish to give reason a role, such as John 
Fischer's reason-responsive mechanism in agency. 79 This criterion may be worked out 
differently according to an Incompatibilist8° or Compabitibilist position, 81 both attesting to 
the importance of ownership of the acts, with the difference being that for the 
Incompatibilist an act can not truly be said to originate in a person if it is causally 
determined, or at the very least not causally determined by something outside of the agent. 
The importance of such a criterion has been shown by the so-called "Frankfurt-style 
counterexamples" to the principle of alternative possibilities, 82 namely, the famous 
78 ibid., pp. 584-5. 
79 J. M. Fischer, "Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility, " in Responsibility, Character, and the 
Emotions, ed. by Ferdinand Schoeman (Cambridge: CUP, 1987). Fischer talks of "weak reasons- 
responsiveness" which amounts to the state where for an action A by P, there is a possible world in which P 
performs an alternative action to A, because there is a sufficient reason for doing other than A. He considers 
that for an agent to be responsible the actual mechanism on which freedom of action is based must be weakly 
"reason-responsive. " On Stump's own criticisms of Fischer's account of reason-responsiveness see her, 
"Intellect, Will, Principle of Alternate Possibilities, " in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, 
ed. M. D. Beaty (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 274-276. 
80 Thus, from an Incompatibilist position Linda Zagzebski explicates the criterion in the following way: "If 
the world is causally determined, my act does not really originate in me. For my act really to be my own, it 
must have a certain kind of independence of any conditions which make it the case that I cannot do 
otherwise. My act must be unaffected by the presence or absence of these conditions; the explanation for its 
occurrence must not include these conditions to any significant degree. If my act is causally determined, 
however, it would not have occurred without its causes (suitably described), and the explanation for its 
occurrence gives a central place to its causes. " L. Zagzebski, "Foreknowledge and Human Freedom", in A 
Companion to Philosophy of Religion. eds. by P. L. Quinn and C. Taliaferro. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 
p. 295. 
81 From a Compatibilist perspective a similar criterion can be perceived, as Galen Strawson explains: "Your 
character, personality, preferences, and general motivational set may be entirely determined by events for 
which you are in no way responsible (by your genetic inheritance, upbringing, subsequent experience and so 
on). But you do not have to be in control of any of these things in order to have compatibilist freedom. They 
do not constrain or compel you, because compatibilist freedom is just a matter of being able to choose and 
act in the way one prefers or thinks best given how one is..... It is compatible with determinism even though it 
follows from determinism that every aspect of your character, and everything you will ever do, was already 
inevitable before you were born. " G. Strawson, "Free Will, " in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward Craig, Vol. 111 (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 744. 
82 Harry Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, " Journal of Philosophy Vol. 66, (1969), 
pp. 828 - 839. 
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Libertarian criterion for freedom that a person has free will and moral responsibility only 
when s/he "could have done otherwise" in relation to their actual willed action. A 
Frankfurt-style counterexample to the principle envisages a case of action in which no 
alternative is in fact possible, but in which the agent involved presumes he could have 
done otherwise. Thus, I am driving a car, but unbeknown to me a villain has tampered 
with the brakes. I approach traffic lights that are just turning red and orange, yet I decide 
not to stop. I consider this to be a free act, for which I admit responsibility when I receive 
the indicting police photographs through the post. In actuality, I could not have done 
otherwise. Frankfurt draws the following conclusion: 
Now if someone had no alternative to performing a certain action but did 
not perform it because he was unable to do otherwise, then he would have 
performed exactly the same action even if he could have done otherwise. 
The circumstances that made it impossible for him to do otherwise could 
have been subtracted from the situation without affecting what happened or 
why it happened in any way. 83 
What this shows is that the principle of alternative possibilities is not a necessary 
condition for freedom of action or moral responsibility. 84 My decision not to stop at the 
traffic lights is not determined by a cause extrinsic to me, but is the result of my own 
deliberation and will. Rather, what is more fundamental is the origination of the act in my 
own mental system, from what Aquinas refers to as being moved by an intrinsic principle, 
to wit, the interaction of intellect and will. Some actions may be necessary, yet as long as 
they are caused by an intrinsic principle they can still be considered to be free. 85 
Such a criterion of freedom fits well with the distinction and interrelation between, what 
has traditionally been called, negative (freedom from) and positive (freedom for) freedom: 
83 Ibid., p. 837. 
84 John M. Fischer supports this position in his, "Responsibility and Control, " Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 89, 
(1982), pp. 24-40. See also Edward Wierenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attribute. (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 74-85; and, Eleonore Stump, "Libertarian Freedom and the 
Principle of Alternative Possibilities, " in Faith, Freedom and Rationality. eds. Jeff Jordan & D. Howard- 
Snyder (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996), pp. 73-88. 
85 Such a position has certain theological advantages, for it explains why the redeemed in heaven are free, yet 
necessarily cannot sin, and why God is impeccable. In both cases goodness is transparently apprehended by 
the intellect, and hence, there is no alternative possibility. At the same time, such an outcome is intrinsically 
caused, because the will seeks goodness, and the intellect represents a good which is transparent to the will 
which sets it into motion, and this interaction of the will and the intellect stem from intrinsic faculties of the 
agent. E. Stump, Beaty, pp. 270-4. 
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"Freedom is always of someone, from something, to do, have or be something. "86 Negative 
freedom is often termed "freedom from constraint (force majeure)", defined by Hobbes in 
this way: "a free agent is he that can do as he will, and forbear as he will, and that liberty is 
the absence of external impediments. "87 We might wish to add here, "within the limits of 
our factual parameters as human beings. " This need not refer only to external obstacles or 
constraints but also internal ones. One's freedom is constrained if one is forced to do 
something at gun-point that one does not wish, but equally if a person is on a mountain 
and totally gripped by fear of heights, he will be internally constrained. 88 Freedom from 
constraint allows for freedom of ability, hence positive freedom. Positive freedom holds 
that in the wake of freedom from constraint humans have the capacity to deliberate, 
choose, and act on the basis of reasons about ends as well as means, which as we have 
outlined above stems from the interaction of intellect and will. The Frankfurt-style 
counterexamples show that alternative possibilities are not a necessary condition of 
freedom, rather than maintaining that most human agency takes place in the absence of 
such possibilities. Indeed, a free society or a free individual is often considered to be one 
for whom there is a range of open possibilities, as a result of which positive freedom may 
be exercised, and hence, freedom to pursue one's worthwhile wants and desires. However, 
as Stump argues alternative possibilities are non-essential properties of freedom. 89 
Another useful distinction in philosophical discussion of the concept of freedom that will 
have import subsequently is a distinction that parallels that which can be made in 
explication of the concept of reason, between formal and substantive reason. Formal 
freedom, like formal reason, refers to the basic structure or conditions that allow us to 
exercise freedom. 90 In the case of formal reason, these basic structures refer to the 
fundamental laws of logic, such as the law of non-contradiction. Wolfhart Pannenberg 
defines formal freedom as "our ability to distance ourselves from objects of perception, 
86 P. H. Patridge, "Free Will, " in Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol. 3, ed. by P. Edwards. London, Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1967), p. 223. 
87 Thomas Hobbes, Of Liberty and Necessity, ed. M. Oakeshott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), 
p. 223. 
88 See: Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities"; cf. Fischer "Responsibility and Control", pp. 24 - 40. 
89 She uses the medieval term "an associated accident. " Stump "Aquinas' Account of Freedom", p. 592; 
"Libertarian Freedom", p. 88. 
90 H. W. Klement, "Freiheit und Bindung menschlicher Entschreidungen, " Conceptus Vol. 12 (1990), pp. 25- 
42. 
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from conceived objects, and from our behavior relative to them. "91 Substantive reason 
provides content to the basic structure of reason. Hence, the intuition that there are 
universal moral truths might be a claim of substantive reason. Likewise substantive 
freedom refers to the content and direction of the exercise of freedom, which in theological 
terms pertains to the true identity and destiny of human beings in relation to God. 92 
What we mean by freedom is conditioned by the framework of our particular existence in 
this world, what John Macquarrie calls, the polarity between "possibility" and "facticity". 93 
There are some things that are just "givens" of any particular existence, for example, our 
human equipment and the factual parameters of our world. Indeed, our very existence is 
initially "given" and not chosen. 94 In this sense, the human agent is passively constituted. 95 
The human subject is certainly not causa sui, the cause of itself, as Nietzsche once 
remarked, able "to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the swamps of 
nothingness. , 96 Human freedom is a conditioned freedom, a freedom intrinsically linked to 
human abilities and the factual parameters of existence. Our human capacities, such as our 
ability to use language, to reflect and stand back from our present circumstances, give us 
the ability to envisage possibilities which allow us to have a much richer freedom than 
many other species that share our planet. 
Freedom is related to another concept used in the generating question, namely, personal 
identity. We assign freedom or lack of it to an individual person; indeed, it is part of what 
91 Pannenberg, Vol. II, p. 259. Compare this to Pannenberg's discussion in Anthropology in Theological 
Perspective. trans. M. J. O'Connell (Edinburgh: T&T. Clark, 1985), pp. 111-115. 
92 Wolfhart Pannenberg argues that substantive freedom is importantly connected to the concept of the 
identity of the agent: "It is this which gives rise to the demand that agents acknowledge their actions as their 
own and thus accept responsibility for them. " Pannenberg Anthropology, pp. 113. Pannenberg connects the 
concept of identity with that of destiny, "Human beings owe it to themselves - that is, to the true self of their 
as yet realised destiny - to correspond to this destiny of theirs and so to themselves. 
" ibid., pp. 113-114. 
93 J. Macquarrie, In Search of Humanity (London: SCM Press, 1982). 
94 Oman, p. 69. 
95 This conception of passivity is to be distinguished from passivity within the operation of agency. For 
example, sensing things such as sublime aesthetic experiences, even some religious experiences, are 
considered to be passivity within agency. Of these experiences of passivity E. Stump writes: "An agent's 
intellect might take passivity in certain circumstances as a great good, and the agent's will would then desire 
that passivity in those circumstances. The agent's consequent passivity, even if it is a passivity in which 'all 
the motions of the soul are suspended, ' doesn't contravene the agent's own intellect and will but rather has its 
source in them. " Stump "Persons", p. 3. Passivity here is to be distinguished from the negative conception of 
passivity that Frankfurt sometimes uses: "insofar as a person's will is affected by considerations that are 
external to it, the person is being acted upon. To that extent, he is passive. The person 
is active, on the other 
hand, insofar as his will determines itself. " H. Frankfurt, "Autonomy, Necessity, and Love, " in Necessity, 
Volition and Love (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 133. 
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it is to be a person. As we have already seen volition and action which stems from a 
particular human intellect and will is a condition of freedom, but also a means of 
identifying a human person. 97 If my consciousness is taken-over by aliens with a loss 
freedom of will, my personal identity is also put under question. Less dramatically, if I am 
totally constrained, if my scope for action is severely limited, my personhood is affected, 
that is, what we shall define below as, our psychological identity. A bizarre example of 
this was the purported action of the Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick II, who took 
philosophical thought-experiments slightly too far, in ordering two newly born children to 
be locked away in a room in a castle, denied access to their mothers and the rest of the 
world. The result was that they died after a few years of life. This example does nothing 
more than indicate that our human flourishing depends on a certain amount of positive 
freedom, and ability to freely relate to others and the world around us. It indicates the 
intersubjective and interdependent nature of our agency, a matter to which we will return 
at another point in the thesis, 98 when an analogy is drawn between the "intersubjectivity" 
of Divine freedom and human freedom (Chapter 7). 
As we have already the issue of personal identity is that of determining numerical identity 
of a person over time, and philosophers have arrived at varied answers. Our task is not to 
produce a comprehensive answer on this matter, but to discern some criteria, which may 
be applicable to our subject matter. Some philosophers consider that criteria relying on the 
first-person point of view, rather than the third-person perspective (e. g. the body, the 
brain), are of primary importance in establishing personal identity. J. R. Lucas argues that 
in so doing, the crucial test of personal identity over time is whether a coherent story can 
be told of the mental life of a particular person. 99 As persons we have the ability to 
conceive of ourselves as agents that extend over the past, present and future; that is the 
nature of our first-person perspective of ourselves and of the world around us. To disrupt 
the coherence and cohesion of such pictures which we form of ourselves as agents, is to 
displace internal adhesion and congruity, to wit, to lead to a loss of our sense of 
96 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (1886), Sc. 21. 
97 "What is important is just that having this particular intellect and will is part of what it is to be this person, 
whether we take intellect and will as components of soul or as systems of brain modules. 
" Stump "Persons", 
p. 20. 
98 See Chapter 7. 
99 J. R. Lucas, "A Mind of One's Own, " Philosophy, Vol. 68 (1993), pp. 457-471. A person is not just a bundle 
of experiences, but is a subject capable of forming intentions about the 
future and acting upon them. 
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(qualitative) identity, possibly our numerical identity as well. Our qualitative identity is 
not "immutably stable, "100 but neither is it so fluid that it can withstand any degree of 
change or discontinuity. Hence, one may talk of the personal integrity of one's identity, as 
Brummer does by posing the question: "is my choice for this picture authentically my own, 
or has it in some way been imposed on me? "101 
In terms of numerical identity, a disruption of one's first-person narrative may be caused 
by the intervention of some agent exterior to one, bringing under question the continuity of 
one's personal identity. This leads Lucas to argue against Derek Parfit's theory of personal 
identity, which employs thought-experiments of brain-transplants and brain splitting, in 
arguing that there is nothing more to personal identity than psychological identity. '02 
Taking Parfit's example of brain fusion and fission from the first-person perspective, the 
result is chaotic and dissonant. In brain fission, for instance, what will happen to our prior 
intentions and plans for the future that were existent before the fission? Perhaps they will 
not survive the fission, if so, can we really say that we are the same person as before, or 
any sort of person whatsoever? The case of brain fusion leaves us with the possibility of 
two personalities in cohabitation. This begs the question of how two different sets of 
memories, desires, attitudes and intentions, fit together in any sort of coherent way? 
Having a coherent sense of personal identity, from the first-person point of view, is a 
crucial criterion of identity, and is at the core of human agency. 
What this criterion suggests, of course, is that there is a continuing subject that allows the 
person to tell a coherent story about him/herself. This is principally being considered as a 
criterion of numerical identity, not qualitative identity. Although I may be able to show 
that there is qualitative identity in the story I tell, for example, I may have similar 
intentions and plans now as I did five years ago, nonetheless, there will also, presumably, 
be instances of qualitative change of my personality. Hence, what is at issue is not whether 
I am qualitatively identical to the person I was five years ago, 
but whether I am 
numerically identical, viz. I am the same subject, illustrated 
by me being able to tell a 
coherent story about myself. In this thesis the concept of identity 
is used sometimes in the 
100 Brummer "Religious belief', p. 164. 
101 ibid., p. 162. 
102 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Part III. 
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qualitative and sometimes in the numerical sense, as defined above, without being 
interchangeable, and it shall be made clear what sense is being used on any particular 
occasion. 
Finally, both freedom and personal identity are interconnected with human 
responsibility. 103 In general we are held to be responsible for what we do when we are 
acting freely. This relates to our earlier point concerning the link between freedom and 
human agency. When we claim that we are not responsible for an action or an event our 
excuse usually has something to do with the impairment of our freedom. We could not 
claim the achievements of love if we were in no way responsible for our actions, and if we 
could not claim responsibility we would lose our sense of dignity. What we care about, 
what we take responsibility for, shapes and makes up our qualitative identity. John Oman 
argues that the "moral personality" of a person, so crucial for the personal relationship 
desired of God with His creatures, can only be formed in an environment that allows for 
relative autonomy and moral independence. There must be space for self-consciousness 
and conscious interaction with the world, relative self-direction and determination. 104 
Oman correlates the relation of independence and dependence of a person with moral 
reality to the relation of passivity and activity involved in the grace-freedom relationship: 
It is moral sincerity directed towards a reality beyond ourselves, in the 
midst of which we cannot be independent after any fashion we choose, but 
only by dependence on the guidance of truth. Yet this truth, which is of all 
things most independent of us, we can only follow by fidelity to our own 
insight. Thus, at the very spring of our consciousness, we find this 
inseparable demand to be dependent only by the right independence. 105 
1 . 02) 
A Restatement of the Generating Question. 
Galen Strawson writes in the light of the causa sui fallacy: 
103 Galen Strawson argues that to be ultimately morally responsible for one's actions, one would have to be 
causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects, and that this cannot 
be the case: "In order for one to be 
truly or ultimately responsible for how one is, in such a way that one can 
be truly morally responsible for 
what one does, something impossible has to be true: there 
has to be and cannot be, a starting point that 
constitutes an act or ultimate self-origination. " Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, p. 747. 
104 See Oman, Chs. VI & VII. Oman is distinctly against Divine Command Theory: "An order imposed by 
God otherwise than through our own sense of right, however, exalted 
its demands, would be no true moral 
order. " ibid., p. 54. He is also a moral realist, maintaining a moral order 
that is mind-independent. ibid., 
pp. 63-4. 
105 ibid., p. 65. 
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The claim, then, is not that people cannot change the way they are.... The 
claim is only that people cannot be supposed to change themselves in such 
a way as to be or become truly or ultimately responsible for the way they 
are, and hence for their actions. 106 
This thesis is about change, Christian metamorphosis, and the responsibility, freedom and 
identity involved in this change. In theological terms, the position critiqued by Strawson 
would constitute a hyper-Pelagianism, which is a heuristic extreme in theology. The 
question which a rejection of predicating causa sui to the human will and hyper- 
Pelagianism leaves us, concerns the role of limited creaturely responsibility and freedom 
in relation to Christian metamorphosis. The generating question can be restated. What is 
the place of human freedom and identity given the Spirit's agency in bringing about 
Christian metamorphosis? Is the personal identity displaced? Is human freedom bypassed? 
It is my contention that these are real questions, which require to be addressed seriously. It 
will be argued in Chapter 2 that some theological positions, in neglecting to address this 
question, result in a "Divine Fiat View" of Christian metamorphosis, one that is not 
compatible with our common intuitions concerning freedom and personal identity. 
II. ) Methodology. 
11 . 01) Strategy 1: The 
Interaction of Philosophy and Theology. 
In this sub-section the procedure upon which I have begun to rely in setting up the 
generating question is explicated, namely, the interaction of philosophy and theology. In 
this thesis philosophy will be used largely in the mode of conceptual analysis. In this way, 
philosophy can be considered to be supportive and complementary to theology. 
107 When 
no effort is made by systematic theology to show that Christian beliefs are true, other than 
from an internal perspective, there is a danger of producing an exclusive description, 
separated from the rest of human epistemic practices and enterprises, in short, "a ghetto of 
arbitrary commitment. 11108 There is another potential problem, namely, the very concepts 
106 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 747. 
107 "This support consists, in part, of critical conceptual analysis, of testing the consistency of theological 
arguments, and partly also of proposing alternative options 
for a doctrine while taking the same religious 
context or doctrinal questions into account. " Luco J. van 
den Brom, "The productive Interaction between 
Theology and Philosophy", NZSTPR, Vol 38 no. 3 (1996), p. 274. 
108 Roger Trigg outlines the difficulties of an approach which only asserts the truth of a particular revelation 
and whose grounds for doing so are purely intrinsic: "Even 
if it is to remain true to the object of faith, the 
question still remains as to why we should have 
faith in that, rather than something or someone else.... 
Otherwise theology will appear to rest on blind commitment. Asserting that it is made by the grace of God 
merely begs the question. How are we to distinguish 
between beliefs implanted in us by the working of the 
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that are utilised become unintelligible to the non-inhabitant of the Christian 'system'. This I 
take to be the problem with that theology which advocates the "commandeering" of 
language by theology, which would regard concepts such as, "freedom" and "personal 
identity" as having meanings that purely stem from Christian revelation. 109 This is to 
neglect the role that philosophy can play as a tool of conceptual clarification, ' 10 and is a 
sleight of hand in that theology employs extant terms to articulate Christian revelation, 
which are already embedded in networks of concepts at home in non-theological 
practices. ill This is not to prevent God's action in revelation radically redefining and 
redirecting our understanding of what is truly personal. 
Furthermore, it is contended that part, even if an indirect portion, of a justification or the 
critical controls which assess the validity of a systematic argument, should be based on 
grounds extrinsic (external) to internal (intrinsic) criteria of within systematic theology 
itself. 112 Such an approach attempts to extend the explanatory resonance of classical 
Systematic arguments, to the realm of shared human experience, based on the assumption 
that truth is exclusive and we live in a common world, in which truth claims should 
converge. 113 The success of science, for example, in explaining the nature of the physical 
universe, needs to be considered as part of the 'unity of knowledge' of which theology 
Holy Spirit, and those that merely appear to have been but are themselves the product of human corruption? 
.... 
Some process of discrimination between true and false beliefs is still necessary, and that would seem to be 
pre-eminently the role of reason. " R. Trigg, Rationality and Religion: Does Faith Need Reason? (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998), pp. 177-178. 
109 A proponent of this view may maintain that if Christian revelation is of a God who is "wholly other" and 
rescues God-talk from the dangers of anthropomorphic projection, then predetermined contexts of meaning 
cannot judge that which is revealed. As Alan J. Torrance advocates, "a commandeering grounded in a 
continuity established by God which is, therefore, from the divine to the human and which is to be found in 
that divine communion present with us in and through the human Jesus as the one who grounds, sustains and 
constitutes the Body of Christ. " A. J. Torrance, Persons in Communion. An Essay on Trinitarian Description 
and Human Participation (Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1996), p. 229. 
110 V. Brummer, Speaking of a Personal God: an essay in philosophical theology (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), 
p. 153. 
"' In order to be able to recognise revelation at all one requires some prior conception or understanding of 
what may constitute revelation. This position is compatible with the possibility of revelation introducing real 
novelty, whose content becomes a genuine epistemic control in our theology. It does not follow from this 
that one is able to deduce the content of revelation a priori, or even the weaker claim that Christian 
revelation is to be expected from purely "general considerations. " See, Richard Swinburne, Revelation: From 
Metaphor to Analogy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 210; William J. Abraham "Revelation 
Reaffirmed, " in Divine Revelation. ed. by P. D. L. Avis (London: Dartin, Longman & Todd, 1997), p. 205. 
112 Christoph Schwöbel talks of the need for "external coherence": "the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is 
the revelation of the creator and that it is the inherent rationality of his creative action which makes the 
rational structure of the world and of the human mind possible. " God: Action and Revelation], p. 20. 
113 See Paul Helm, The Divine Revelation. The Basic Issue (London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1982); and 
Trigg, pp. 178-186. 
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provides the answer to ultimate metaphysical questions, offering a 'higher level 
description'. 114 In this context, such a strategy is not strictly speaking that of philosophy of 
religion, which seeks to justify religious belief. It comes under the category of 
philosophical theology, although the distinction is often fluid, which is "the use of 
philosophy within theology, as distinct from when it functions as a preparatory 
justification for it. "1'5 As Alister McGrath writes: "Philosophical Theology is concerned 
with what might be called 'finding the common ground' between Christian faith and other 
areas of intellectual activity. " 116 As such it can examine the co-inherence and validity of 
specific Christian doctrines. In its full-bodied form this involves an endorsement of the 
validity of the 'philosophy of religion' project, viz. the need for the justification of religious 
belief. This is perfectly consistent with a strong conception of the 'mystery of faith', 
namely, that what is called special revelation cannot be deduced from the world. ' 17 The 
place of any natural theology, which is not the subject of this thesis, should be consonant 
with this. '18 My contention is merely that revelation and "external" truth claims should 
struggle to be consistent with one another, without undermining the integrity of either, and 
with the proviso that all human knowledge is provisional and fallible. 
114 Not to maintain such a "unity of knowledge" is to fall into, what C. F. H. Henry calls, using a term from 
George Orwell, "a double-truth theory. " C. F. H. Henry, God, Revelation and Authority, Vol.!. (Waco: Word 
Books, 1976), p. 233. Countering the Barthian-inspired point that as a result of sin we suffer noetic alienation 
and so require epistemic metanoia brought about by the Spirit, Henry, from a more traditional Reformed 
position responds: "If the noetic effects of the fall were totally and utterly damaging, thus making man 
incapable of thinking aright and immune to the rational validity of the basic categories of logic (e. g., the law 
of contradiction), then no rationally persuasive case could be mounted for or against anything whatever. 
There are but two ways of thinking - not regenerate and unregenerate, but valid and invalid. " ibid., p. 227. 
115 See David Brown, "Philosophical Theology", in Blackwell's Encyclopedia of Modern Christian Thought. 
ed. by A. E. McGrath (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 434; The Divine Trinity (London: Duckworth, 1985), p. x. 
116 A. E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd Edition, 1997), p. 151. 
117 Colin Gunton argues that much philosophy makes claims that are inimical to the Christian concept of 
revelation: "Here we reach the chief problems, which can be said to be those of ontology and capacity. Most 
philosophy which is prior to, or impatient of, Kant's phemonalising of metaphysics, supposes some kind of 
ontological continuity between the human mind and the divine, however understood; and a corresponding 
intrinsic capacity to come into relation with it - what I have, after Tillich, described as ontological reason. " 
C. E. Gunton, "Indispensable Opponent. The Relation of Systematic Theology and Philosophy of Religion, " 
NZSTRP, Vol. 38 no. 3 (1996), p. 299. This seems an unfortunate generalisation. Is the position of believing 
that one can make truth-claims in certain areas, and claim to possess provisional knowledge equivalent to 
"ontological continuity" with God? If this were the case the same brush would tar all forms of realist enquiry, 
such as science. For there to be "ontological continuity" philosophy would have to show that one could 
possess substantive knowledge of God independent of revelation. Traditional Natural theology has never 
made this claim. As Trigg says: "In other words, natural theology provides a case for thinking that, if there 
was a God, humans still need a further source of knowledge about the character of God.... Revelation is thus 
not a substitute for 'natural' reason. It is an answer to the question such reason produces. " Trigg, p. 185. 
118 Trigg, p. 182. Terrence Penelhum argues for the renewed importance of this approach given the reality of 
modern pluralism. T. Penelhum, "Revelation and Philosophy, " in Divine Revelation. ed. P. D. L. Avis, p. 84. 
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The belief that any position will have certain ontological attachments or assumptions, need 
not lead us to the conclusion that any process of interaction or appropriation of more 
widely held knowledge claims will somehow prejudice Christian theology with alien 
concerns. 119 It is the case that arguments on particular topics can be detached from the 
most fundamental (metaphysical) intuitions, and agreement might be possible because of 
consensus at a lower level of intuitions. For example, Harry Frankfurt is not a Christian, 
however, one might agree with parts of his analysis of freedom. One might favour his 
conception of freedom over and above that of Jean-Paul Sartre's. One might agree with his 
development of the concept of first and second order desires and volitions as a useful 
framework to talk practically about freedom. A theologian will then wish to apply and 
adapt such argumentation to the theological realm. The final use or appropriation of such 
concepts depends upon ultimate metaphysical intuitions and beliefs, but that does not 
mean that one can sensibly engage with lower level argumentation without either 
irreparable contamination from the outset by higher order beliefs, or entailing them. It is 
this lower order possibility of agreement that grounds the basis of translation and 
conversation. 
11.02) Strategy 2: The Use of Models. 
The use of metaphors to describe the Holy Spirit and the Divine-human relationship is 
rooted in Christian Scripture and subsequently employed within the tradition. 120 In the 
thesis this tradition will be utilised by using model theory to further our enquiry into the 
Divine-human relationship in Christian metamorphosis. The move from metaphors to 
models mirrors the move towards second-order reflection in theology. According to Ian 
Barbour models are simply metaphors that have been developed methodically: "a 
metaphor is used only momentarily, whereas a model is used in a sustained and systematic 
fashion. , 121 Vincent Brummer terms the use of such systematically developed models, 
conceptual models. 122 Models are an appropriate methodological tool in both theology and 
other disciplines such as science, because they give cognitive access to realities beyond 
19 Gunton in holding that philosophy is the "indispensible opponent" of systematic theology seems to 
envisage the relationship in adversarial mode, as two competing advocates. "Indispensable 
Opponents", 
p. 305. 
120 For a summary of such metaphors used of the Spirit, both personal and non-personal, see Jürgen 
Moltmann, The Spirit of Life. A Universal Affirmation (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1992), pp. 269-289. 
121 I. G. Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms (London: SCM Press, 1974), p. 16. 
122 Speaking of a Personal God, p. 60. 
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our first order means of acquiring knowledge about the world. Nelson Goodman 
understands metaphors as involving a "transfer of schema", referring to schema as a 
complex or "family" of labels. 
When a metaphor is employed... a schema, `a set of terms, of alternative 
labels, is transported' from its customary realm to a new realm.... inviting 
the exploration of the new realm in terms of the entities, structures and 
relationships of the realm from which they are borrowed. 123 
Using Rom Harre's distinction between the source of a model (what the model is founded 
upon) and its subject (what the model represents), J. M. Soskice holds that the type of 
models which are of interest to theology are paramorphic models where source and subject 
are separate. 124 In the case of paramorphic models, there is rupture, novelty, creativity, and 
conflict, what Goodman refers to as "attraction as well as resistance. "125 There are limits to 
this transfer, and the success of a particular metaphor depends upon the ability of the user 
to recognise, at least to some extent, the limits and boundaries of the transfer. 126 Mary 
Hesse talks of this in terms of the need to identify the negative analogies and positive 
analogies of the model, 127 where a transfer of schema does or does not take place. 
Furthermore, models are not intended to be exhaustive or infallible. 128 
123 This is Iris M. Yob's description of Goodman's approach in her, "Religious Metaphor and Scientific 
Model: Grounds for Comparison", Religious Studies, Vol. 28 (1992), p. 477. 
124 J. M. Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985). 
125 Yob, p. 482. 
126 Sallie McFague writes, metaphorical statements "always contain the whisper, `it is and is not. "' S. 
McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 
1982), p. 13. 
127 According to Hesse, there are not only positive and negative analogies involved in a model, but also what 
she calls neutral analogies: viz. schema from the source of the model which have not yet been transferred to 
the subject of the model, because they have either been seen to date as irrelevant or secondary features, or 
simply have not been discovered or been drawn to the attention of the researcher. This would constitute a 
reason for considering models to have potentially long lives as methodological tools. 
128 Another important issue in model theory is the debate as to whether models are in fact dispensable. Those 
who argue that models are dispensable, hold that once the positive and negative features of the underlying 
analogy have been specified, the model has fulfilled its purpose and can only have a pedagogical function in 
the future. J. M. Soskice, on the other hand, argues that a theory that can be generated without a model is 
impotent. Abstract calculi and mathematical logic cannot move a theory forward unless there is some bridge 
with experience and natural events, a role which metaphors fulfil. Further, metaphors and models have an 
open-ended nature, which allows them to have a continued power of suggestion and a capacity to unfold over 
the long term, which is crucial in theory development. If we accept these arguments we should also be able to 
accept Soskice's conclusion that: "The model or analogue forms the living part of the theory, the cutting 
edge of its projective capacity and, hence, is indispensable for explanatory and predictive purposes. " 
Soskice, p. 115. 
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11.0201) Arriving at the Generating Hypothesis. 
The initial generating hypothesis129 of my thesis is supported by a premise that is well 
established in Christian theology: 
a) God is a personal being. This is part of "background theory" stemming from the 
character of God testified to by the Incarnation, and represents an established and accepted 
Christian truth claim. In this thesis this premise will be assumed. From this premise a 
second ensues: 
P) If God is personal and given our knowledge of His actions, He will be involved in the 
process of metamorphosis in a personal manner. This premise is derived from 
"background theory, " to wit, the character and actions of God as testified to in the 
Incarnation, and in subsequent Christian experience. It is not my intention to argue for the 
strict entailment of premise ß from premise a, rather the point is that premise a and ß set 
up the key generating hypothesis: 
1*) If God's action in relation to His human creatures is personal, then, we have prior 
reasons, alongside the use of existing metaphors given in Scripture, for the hypothesis that 
the most suitable model of Divine-human relation in Christian metamorphosis is a 
Personalist one, by which is meant a model based on interpersonal human relationships as 
the source. 130 The hypothesis sets out to examine whether a Personalist model provides the 
greatest explanatory force in relation to the subject matter of the generating question, viz. 
the compatibility of Christian metamorphosis with human freedom and personal identity. 
The key generating hypothesis will be examined in Chapter 3 and 4. 
Identifying the extent of the "transfer of schema, " the sorting out of the positive and 
negative features of the Personalist model, and purging of what is irrelevant and 
detrimental, will be undertaken in Chapter 3 (A Personalist Model) and 4 ("Negative 
Analogies of the Personalist Model"). The Personalist Model may be judged by, what 
129 Again this term is taken from the philosophy of science (Lamb, ch. III). From the generating question a 
process of abduction or retroduction takes place in which a promising and relevant hypothesis or set of 
hypotheses are arrived at by credible conjecture which may be moulded by accumulated knowledge to date 
and research and background theory. 
130 If one is to claim that God is personal and that human relationships can be personal in an analogous sense, 
then, the conditions of human interpersonal relationships may be used in an analogical way to explicate the 
Divine-human relationship. This can only be considered to be an imposition of false concerns (often referred 
to as a priori concepts) upon the knowledge of revelation if the model is not truly interactive, that is, if it 
seeks to make truth claims which do not correspond with the epistemological sources of Christianity or seek 
to be governed by them. 
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Christoph Schwoebel has called, the criteria of adequacy. 131 The criterion of adequacy 
refers to the fit between of the model with Scripture, which is in turn witnesses to the 
revelation of God in the person of Jesus Christ. In addition, adequacy is judged by 
conformity of the model with Christian tradition. 132 As regards Christian tradition, this 
thesis will not attempt to engage comprehensively with the entire discussion of matters 
similar in character to the subject matter of this thesis throughout the history of Christian 
theology, for example, the grace-nature-freedom debate. My dialogue partners from the 
Christian tradition will thus be selected on the grounds of direct relevance to the 
construction of the Personalist Model or other models under examination. 
A comparison with competing models will be undertaken in Chapter 6 ("Impersonal 
Models: The need for complementary models). Such a strategy is evident in the application 
of model theory to contemporary science. Quantum Theory has provided many examples 
of patterns of behaviour that can only be explained by using two or more models, which 
have the same referent. Wave-particle duality of the quantum atom is such an example. 
Although no unified model can be given, the use of two models can not be accused of 
falling into the trap of a formal contradiction, because the positive analogies of both do not 
conflict as they bring out an aspect of the phenomenon in question, and the negative 
features relate to the positive features of the other model. 133 This led Niels Bohr to 
articulate the so called "complementarity principle". Einstein found this principle difficult 
to reconcile with what he considered was a demand of scientific method, namely, 
conceptual unity. For Bohr the complementary models were demanded by the need to 
explain the behaviour of light and matter, and had only instrumental value. 134 
131 God: Action and Revelation, pp. 17-21. 
132 This is similar to Vincent Brummer's four criteria for selecting adequate theological models. 
"Consonance with tradition" refers to concordance with Scripture and the cumulative Christian tradition, the 
recognition that theology is a "co-operative enterprise. " Speaking of a Personal God, p. 23. 
133 Alistair McGrath explains the point in this way: "The fundamental principle is that the behavior of certain 
entities can be completely described by using either one of two mutually exclusive 'classic' models. One 
aspect of its behavior may be described using model A, others with model B; yet there is no aspect of its 
behavior which allows or requires both A and model B to be true; nor are there grounds for saying that the 
entity in question 'is' A or 'is' B or 'is' A and B. " A. E. McGrath, The Foundations of Dialogue in Science and 
Religion (Oxford: Blackwells, 1998) p. 197. 
134 See H. Krips, The Metaphysics of Quantum Theory. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 22-4; H. Folse, 
The Philosophy of Niels Bohr: The Framework of Complementarily (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1985), 
p. 152ff. McGrath holds that Bohr maintained "a non-realist approach to the specific models" McGrath, 
p. 204. McGrath then goes on to apply this thinking to the "two natures" of Christ, to Christology. Does 
McGrath wish to carry over Bohr's "instrumentalism" or non-realism to the Christological terms "human" 
and "Divine"? He seems prepared to countenance it when he concludes: "A number of modern writers have 
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Christian Scripture teems with a variety of metaphors, so it would be hardly surprising if a 
multi-model approach to the generating question of the thesis was found to be necessary. 
Ian Ramsey pointed out a long time ago that the Christian conception of God was 
constructed by the interaction of different models, which composed a cumulative picture 
of God. 135 Moreover, if models are not seen as exhaustive, but rather as analogical, always 
containing negative analogies, it should not cause great consternation if models are 
required to complement one another. However, any two complementary models should not 
formally contradict each other, for the positive features of each model attempts to explain 
an aspect of the explanandum which the other has failed to embrace. 
11.03) Strategy 3: Systematic Contextualisation. 
There are at least two reasons for wishing to employ a third methodological strategy in this 
thesis. As we have seen, both Brummer and Schwoebel point to the importance of a 
criterion of coherence, suggesting that the primary model adopted be compatible and 
coherent with the larger canvass of Christian doctrine. 136 The second reason is more 
immediate to the very nature of models themselves. If with any model there are negative 
and neutral analogies, then, some explanation should be attempted as to why the model 
does not function in a positive way in these areas in relation to the subject of the model. 
The negative import of these analogies may be qualified by showing why it is one would 
not expect the model to function in a positive manner, given the nature of its subject. 137 
argued that it is not necessary to draw such ontological conclusions (which may reflect a particular interest in 
ontology in the patristic period); it is quite possible to rest content with the assertion that Jesus behaves in 
divine and human ways" ibid., p. 205. However, if Jesus is to have the soteriological significance that 
Christians suppose, and if the concept of the Incarnation is to have any weight, then christological 
propositions must have ontological import. The Christian Creeds do not just claim that Jesus behaved as if 
He were Divine, but that He was Divine, in fact, specifically the Son of the Father. 
135 I. T. Ramsey, Christian Discourse: Some Logical Explorations, 1965. 
136 As Gabriel Fackre remarks, "what makes a 'systematics' is: comprehensiveness, the coverage of the 
standard places of Christian teaching; coherence, a demonstration of the topics' interrelationships; and 
contextuality, the interpretation of the sweep of doctrine in terms of current issues and idiom. " Fackre, "The 
Revival of Systematic Theology", Interpretation 49 (1995), p. 230. 
137 Nicholas Rescher writes on this: "A painting or piece of architecture - any good design - must combine a 
variety of potentially conflicting elements in the conjoining synthesis of a cooperative harmony, and this sort 
of rational unification is exactly what a system is all about. " N. Rescher, Cognitive Systematization: A 
Systems Theoretic Approach to a Coherentist Theory of Knowledge (Totowa: N. J. Rowman and Littlefield, 
1979), p. 14. One might add that there are degrees of "rational unification" and "cognitive systematization, " 
which will be dependent upon the nature of one's object of knowledge. 
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"Systematic contextualisation" essentially means placing the generating question and the 
generating hypothesis in the context of other loci of Christian doctrine, hence adopting a 
non-linear coherence theory of justification. 138 Such a procedure may also qualify the 
import of the negative analogies of the primary model and thereby, help to offer further 
explanation, even if this were of a negative kind, viz. providing reasons why the question 
cannot be fully answered. The methodological strategy of Systematic contextualisation 
commences in Chapter 5 which relates the generating question to Christian conceptions of 
freedom, agency and sin. Chapter 7 will set the question in the context of the issue of 
human intersubjectivity and the doctrines of General Concurrence and Providence. The 
Systematic context will also be furthered in Chapter 8, in relation to the doctrine of 
revelation, as the framework of Divine grace, and the Covenant as the condition of loving 
personal relations between God and humankind. 
III. ) Second Prolegomena: Dealing with False-Starters and Initial Queries. 
III. 01) Theological Determinism. 
Is Theological Determinism incompatible with the approach adopted in this thesis? I take 
Hard Theological Determinism to be the view that holds that God determines everything 
that happens, as Acts 2.23 tells us, all events determined according to "the determinate 
counsel and foreknowledge of God. " Theological Determinism is also addressed, as it is in 
much contemporary philosophy of religion, 139 in terms of God's perfect foreknowledge 
about the universe, which is taken to mean that only the states of affairs that He knows 
will occur can occur. According to the Hard Theological Determinist human freedom is 
strongly determined by the Divine, hence seen by some as an illusion, with evil being an 
instrumental part of God's plan. In contrast, Soft Theological Determinism or Theological 
Compatibilism is traditionally the view that God as the first cause determines the created 
order, but that this is not incompatible with genuine human freedom, as God can also 
determine the mode in which events happen, viz. He may determine that human actions are 
free. Such thinking would, for example, underlie Thomas Aquinas' distinction between 
138 Again, Rescher describes the search for coherence as a "network model": "This network model sees a 
cognitive system as a family of interrelated theses, not necessarily arranged in a hierarchical arrangement (as 
with an axiomatic system), but rather linked among one another by an interlacing network of connections. " 
ibid., p. 44 
139 For survey articles on this subject see, T. P. Flint, "Providence and Predestination, " in A Companion to 
Philosophy of Religion. eds. by P. L. Quinn and C. Taliaferro. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 569 - 576; and 
Linda Zagzebski, "Foreknowledge and Human Freedom", pp. 291 - 298. 
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primary and secondary causation, which we shall return to in Chapter 7. Equally, a Soft 
Theological Compatibilist may suggest that although God has overall determining control 
over the order of creation, human beings have local or "proximate control" in relation to 
their own acts. 140 Luther makes a similar distinction by distinguishing between "necessity 
of immutability" and "compulsion, " and maintaining spontaneous and voluntary nature of 
human action alongside Divine providential governance. 141 
How do these two positions stand in relation to the approach adopted in this thesis? 
William Hasker argues that "Calvinism, " a category that lumps together hard and soft 
theological determinism, is deficient in that it fails to explain adequately the phenomenon 
of "divine-human dialogue" and also the problem of evil. 142 Let us consider the first claim, 
as it has specific relevance to the generating hypothesis of this thesis, namely, that a 
Personalist model will provide the best explanation in relation to the Spirit-human 
relation. William Alston makes the following points concerning Divine-human dialogue: 
Dialogue requires two independent participants, neither of which wholly 
controls the responses of the other.... If there is to be genuine 
communication, each participant must be over against another participant 
that is responsible for one end of exchange. Otherwise I am as misguided in 
regarding it as genuine communication as I would be in eagerly looking 
forward to receiving a letter I wrote to myself. 143 
Alston goes on to provide us with a good example of his point: 
Consider a 'conversation' between hypnotist and subject, in which the latter 
is doing nothing but carrying out post-hypnotic suggestions.... Here the one 
party, the hypnotist, really is effectively deciding what the other says, and 
the other is as complicated a being, in fact is a human being. Here we have 
as close an analogy to divine omnidetermination as we are likely to find, 
and the verdict, I suppose, would be clear. This is a charade, not a genuine 
case of communication. 144 
What Alston's case shows is that Divine-human dialogue is incompatible with 
"omnidetermination, " that is, Hard Theological Determinism. If God determines 
14(' This suggestion is outlined in T. P. Flint, "Providence and Predestination, 
" pp. 572. Some Theological 
Compatibilist may question whether such a position is really a species of determinism. 
On the other hand, 
stronger forms of theological determinism have to show that they 
do not collapse into Hard Theological 
Determinism. 
141 Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. J. I. Packer and O. R. Johnston. (Grand Rapids, Fleming H. 
Revell, 1957), II (viii) ["Of the spontaneity of necessitated acts"], pp. 102- 4. 
142 W. Hasker, "Providence and Evil, " Religious Studies, Vol. 28 (1992), pp. 91-105. 
143 W. P. Alston"Divine-Human Dialogue and the Nature of God, " Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 2,1985, p. 8. 
'44 ibid., pp. 9. 
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everything in a strong sense the key features of a Personalist model, such as, exchange, 
reciprocal identification, receptivity, response, are all emptied of any intrinsic efficacy and 
meaning. Indeed, the generating question of this thesis becomes a gaping non-question. 
For this reason the generating hypothesis of this thesis excludes Hard Theological 
Determinism. 145 
Is Soft Theological Determinism also excluded? It depends how soft is soft. Theological 
Compatibilism may not be excluded if it is prepared to give the human agent space for 
self-determination within the larger determination of God, or in other words, to grant 
human agents local or proximate freedom/control. Let us relate these issues to the 
distinction within Catholic theology between general, God's action in conserving creation 
and special concurrence, God's special action within history. 146 Soft Theological 
Determinism may hold that God determines in a general way through the act of creation 
and conservation, but that special concurrence is not generally determining, but requires 
the free interaction of human creatures, the domain of local/prximate control. Hard 
Theological Determinism has to explain the apparent anomaly in its system, namely, that 
despite the reality of hard determinism, God still requires His Spirit to engage in special 
actions to bring about the salvation of the elect. As was stated in my discussion of the 
concept of freedom in sub-section 1.0103), this thesis does not aim to settle the debate 
between compatibilists and incompatibilists, and hopes that its substantive claims may be 
acceptable to versions of either position. 
111.02) Community and Individual. 
Another source of objection to the very way in which I have set up the generating question 
may come from those who would reject the focus on the individual person in considering 
the action of the Spirit. Rather, this objector might maintain that the Spirit is given to and 
operates within the Christian community; therefore, the generating question is 
wrongheaded from the start. I argue in Appendix 1, that a false 'either/or' appears to have 
145 I shall leave the pursuit of the other prong of Hasker's critique of "Calvinism", to wit, that it is unable to 
show that God is opposed to evil as strongly as Scripture claims Him to be. See: Hasker, pp. 93-94; J. S. 
Feinberg, Theologies and Evil (Washington, D. C.: University of America Press, 1979). For a general critique 
of Theological Determinism from a Libertarian position see, W. S. Anglin, Free Will and the Christian Faith 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). 
146 See, A. J. Benedetto, "Divine Concurrence, " in New Catholic Encyclopaedia, VoI. IV (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), pp. 125-7. 
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been constructed by this objection: the community versus the individual. The Scriptural 
witness shows that when the Spirit bestows life and power it does so at an individual and 
community level, and the two are not set-up in contradistinction. 
111.03) Paradox, Apophaticism and the Agnostic Option 
In God Was In Christ, D. M. Baillie argues that at the heart of theology are irreducible 
paradoxes. Thus, he writes of the Incarnation: 
It is indeed the central paradox: how can the same life be explained as a 
completely human life in the continuum of history and as the life of God 
Himself? But there is similar paradox whenever in Christian thought we 
introduce God as the ultimate source of anything in our experience: He 
comes in, as it were, on the vertical line from the eternal world ('senkrecht 
von oben) to touch the horizontal line on which we inevitably have another 
explanation in empirical terms. And the mystery of the Incarnation is the 
climax of all the Christian paradoxes. They all point to it, they all have an 
organic connection with it, and indeed they are all revealed by it. 147 
This strategy seems to represent an apophatic turn, the mystery of the way of God to His 
creatures. Equally, as the "paradox of Grace", as Baillie calls it, has existential import, it 
becomes a means of illuminating the Incarnation. He concludes: 
If then Christ can be thus regarded as in some sense the prototype of the 
Christian life, may we not find a feeble analogue of the incarnate life in the 
experience of those who are His 'many brethren, ' and particularly in the 
central paradox of their experience: 'Not I, but the grace of God'? If this 
confession is true of the little broken fragments of good that are in our lives 
- if these must be described on the one hand as human achievements, and 
yet on the other hand, and in a deeper and prior sense, as not human 
achievements but things actually wrought by God - is it not the same type 
of paradox, taken at the absolute degree, that covers the whole ground of 
the life of Christ, of which we say that it was the life of a man and yet also, 
in a deeper and prior sense, the very life of God incarnate? 148 
Setting aside the adequacy of this approach in Christology, 149and the slightly Gnostic 
overtones, Baillie's reflections challenge the legitimacy of seeking to answer the 
147 D. M. Baillie, God was in Christ: An Essay on Incarnation and Atonement (London: Faber & Faber ltd., 
1947), p. 110. 
148 ibid., p. 129. 
'49 I certainly think that Baillie's systematic comparison of grace and Christology is insightful. It seems quite 
appropriate that if we are, to use the Pauline phrase, to "take on the mind of Christ, " then, the pattern of His 
life will in some way be the pattern of ours. Whether Baillie's strategy adequately deals with the central 
Christological issues is another question. For example, how does Baillie intend to distinguish a Christian 
believer (an "adopted son") from Jesus Christ (the Son of God)? Is Baillie's analogy really strong enough to 
do justice to the Chalcedonian belief that the subject, the "who, " of Jesus Christ is the eternal Son? The 
reason why Jesus' actions were good is not simply because Jesus was in a faith-relationship with God, who 
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generating question of my thesis. Have I not posed and set out to answer a question about 
which one ought to settle, a priori, for a paradox, as a result of the very nature of Christian 
revelation and theology? Does the generating question seek an answer where "there is no 
solution which is rationally coherent"? 15° This position may be described as agnosticism in 
relation to the generating question. 151 Robert Jenson also appears to agree with this 
position, as part of his rejection of an Augustinian-inspired theology of "grace": 
For one thing, it may well be doubted that there is any vantage from which 
thus to observe the entities God and creature, so as to be able to describe 
the process between them. 152 
There are problems with this position. First, Baillie's own way of constructing the position 
is problematic, for it appears to rather uncritically appropriate the epistemology of Martin 
Buber and the, so-called, Dialogical Personalists. 
The reason why the element of paradox comes into all religious thought and 
statement is because God cannot be comprehended in any human words or 
in any of the categories of our finite thought. God can be known only in a 
direct personal relationship, an 'I-and-Thou' intercourse... God cannot be 
legitimately 'objectified. 153 
Many have criticised the fallacy of starkly opposing, what is called, knowledge by 
acquaintance and knowledge by description. 154 Secondly, Baillie fails to draw a sharp 
bestowed the capacity to do good action, but that Jesus was, in some sense, God. It is not merely the case that 
"the divine is always prevenient"(ibid., p. 130), but that Jesus' Divinity is a result of the prevenient Logos 
becoming man. 
150 John McIntyre adopts Baillie's position on the paradox of grace: "The theme is universally acknowledged, 
but what is not so often accepted is that there is no way round the apparent contradiction, no dissolution of 
the paradox. " J. McIntyre, The Shape of Pneumatology: Studies in the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit 
(Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1997), p. 247, cf. p. 190. So too does the Anglican Leonard Hodgson: "Since our 
growth into existence as persons is one of those ongoing processes of scientifically knowable change of 
which we cannot expect to be able to get a clear picture or logical definition of cross-sections, the same is 
true of the changing gradations in God's modes of relationship to us. All we can say is that God is personally 
at work in us promoting our growth in freedom into the persons that He wills us to be. " L. Hodgson, For 
Faith and Freedom. The Gifford Lectures, 1955-1957 (London: SCM Press, 1968), p. 155. 
151 McIntyre uses the term agnosticism: "At this point I find a form of agnosticism not unattractive and not 
unholy. " McIntyre, p. 186. 
152 He continues: "And be that as it may, the attempt to think from such a vantage has created in Western 
theology an alienation of the third article, a transformation of the biblical discourse about God's Spirit into a 
stipulation of method for our spirituality. That is, the traditional doctrine of 'grace' is a works-righteous 
structure lodged at the heart of the chief theological concern and achievement of the Western church. " 
Jenson, p. 128. One may wish to ask Jenson if we ever should hope for a transcendent vantage point even in 
the eschaton? 
153 Baillie, p. 108. 
154 The point is that knowing by acquaintance usually involves knowledge by description. As David Haymes 
argues: "I could not meet or encounter anyone except on the basis of what I take him to be and what I 
observe him to be doing or judge him to be thinking.... The notion of encounter does not afford us a way of 
avoiding the question of how we know that some things are true about God and His dealings with us. " D. 
Haymes, The Concept of the Knowledge of God (London: Macmillan, 1988). See also: S. T. Katz, "Dialogue 
35 
enough distinction between a paradox and a contradiction. It is precisely part of the 
theological endeavour to show that theological paradoxes are not contradictions, but only 
apparent contradictions. 155 Baillie appears to hold, following Sergius Bulgakov, that 
paradoxical Christian concepts are not contradictions because at an existential level they 
are resolved through lived experience, 156 it is only when we attempt to tackle them 
conceptually, to "objectify" them, that "all our judgements are somehow falsified. 057 The 
claim of contradiction is defeated at an existential level, so that despite the fact that "every 
good thing he does somehow is not wrought by himself but by God, " yet, "Never is human 
action more truly and fully personal, never does the agent feel more perfectly free, than in 
those moments of which he can say as a Christian that whatever good was in them was not 
his but God's. , 158 I wonder if the experience is really so stark. The real point is that Baillie 
again draws a too rigid and unhelpful distinction between lived experience and human 
explanation. Is it actually the case, as Baillie assumes, that Christians experience without 
any problem virtuous action, or the creation of a wonderful piece of artwork, say, as "Not I 
but the grace of God"? The artist has a strong sense of her own personal involvement in 
the act of creativity and of the final piece of art as deeply connected to her sense of 
identity. Equally a virtuous action requires effort and a certain disposition of the person, 
which has developed over a number of years. To appeal to the level of human experience, 
as Baillie does, hardly produces the simple supportive verdict that he desires. Even if 
and Revelation in the Thought of Martin Buber, " Religious Studies, Vol. 14 (1978), pp. 57-68; "Martin 
Buber's Epistemology: A Critical Appraisal, " International Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 21 (1981), pp. 133- 
158. 
155 Indeed, one may say that the methodology of model theory utilises paradox in drawing an analogy 
between the source and subject of a model. It may not be literally true that "God is a person, " hence the 
paradox. Yet one may also derive negative and positive analogies, whose propositional content is not 
paradoxical. A contradiction invalidates the rationality of a belief, and a counter-intuition can be dispensed 
with once the truth of the matter is discovered, but a paradox, again rather like a long-lasting model or 
metaphor, endures even after clarification or an initial resolution, for the paradox is required to gain 
illumination into the matter. The negative and positive analogies of the paradox, "God is a person, " may be 
reduced to a series of propositions, but that does not eliminate the puzzlement that is experienced in 
attempting to conceive of a reality, radically different from any categorical object of our experience, for 
which these propositions are true. See John Wisdom, Paradox and Discovery (New York: Blackwell, 1965); 
Ian T. Ramsey, "Paradox in Religion, " in Christian Empiricism, ed. by J. H. Gill (Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974); Mary A. Stenger, "The Significance of Paradox for Theological 
Verification: Difficulties and Possibilities, " International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 14, 
No. 3 (1983), pp-172 - 182 
156 This seems to me what Baillie is saying when he writes: "the higher truth [of the 'direct faith-relationship'] 
which reconciles them [the paradoxes of Christian theology] cannot be expressed in words, though it is 
experienced and lived in the 'I-and-Thou' relationship of faith towards God. " Baillie, p. 109. The contention 
seems to be that the paradoxes of Christian theology are not really paradoxes at all, certainly at the "higher 
level", but only appear so at the "lower level" of Christian explanation. 
157 ibid., p. 109. 
158 ibid., p. 114. 
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people were prepared to "live with" the paradox at the level of their personal lives, that is 
no reason to claim there is in fact either no paradox at the heart of the matter, or that it 
should not be addressed at a cognitive level. 
Finally, the view of theology that may be said to lie behind Baillie's remarks has a 
tendency towards theological resignation, if much explanation of Christian doctrine is a 
priori to be ruled as paradoxical. This does not seem to be in line with the Anselmian view 
of theology as always pressing onwards, "faith seeking understanding. " There are limits of 
the comprehensiveness of Christian knowledge: we can never have full knowledge of the 
nature of God. The Spirit-believer relationship, however, is not solely about the nature of 
God. It is about God as He relates to us, how God continues to impinge upon our world, 
which is, of course, His world. It does seem that we can have substantive knowledge, all 
be it provisional knowledge, about our selves and our world, even if we may not know our 
true telos independent of revelation. We have, for example, common intuitions concerning 
some of the conditions of human freedom and personal identity that hold in our 
experience. We have knowledge of how personal relationships function, their basic 
dynamic and conditions. On top of this, we have substantial knowledge of God as given in 
revelation and consequently affirmed in Christian experience. These are the grounds to 
press on theologically, in the endeavour of "faith seeking understanding. " This may not 
give us the vantage point that Jenson talks of, a transcendent vantage point, but it gives us 
some kind of viewing point. Nonetheless, Baillie has made a cautionary point, that insofar 
as the nature of God is not to be fully grasped, and is of a quite different order to any other 
reality we encounter, indeed is the very ground of our being, then, the intent of eradicating 
all paradox appears naive and overconfident. As Austin Farrer would say, we can never as 
a result examine the causal joint of the God-human relationship, and so can never describe 
it in fully precise terms. We may not eradicate paradox, we may end with paradox, but we 
should not assume it. 
It might be relevant at this point to draw a comparison with Kant's thought. Kant was in 
one sense quite agnostic; he did not wish to "venture with speculative reason beyond the 
limits of experience. "159 His adoption of a transcendental method sought the necessary 
conditions of the very possibility of experience. The method consists in ascertaining 
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various matters of experience that he took to be undeniable, and then asking what they 
necessarily presuppose. In my methodology I am also assuming certain experiences as a 
valid starting point: the experience of Christian revelation and the claims it makes, our 
intuitions concerning human freedom and identity. Given this, a provisional knowledge of 
who we are and the testimony regarding who God is and His actions in the world, we 
might employ Kant's transcendental method to ask what the conditions of the very 
possibility of Christian metamorphosis are. Karl Rahner has used such a methodology in 
relation to our reception of revelation in his book Hearer of the Word. This thesis may be 
considered as an attempt to offer the basic conditions or presuppositions of the Spirit- 
human relationship in Christian metamorphosis, which may be deduced from our initial 
assumptions. 
111.04) A Trinitarian Methodology. 
Recent theology has witnessed a veritable renaissance in trinitarian theology. Some 
theologians have been interested in developing a trinitarian theology160 which extends 
beyond a mere discussion of the specific doctrine, and moves towards becoming "all- 
inclusive, referring to the whole network of Christian doctrine elaborated in a trinitarian 
way, " and which is "something approaching a methodological principle for the whole 
systematic agenda". 161 Trinitarian theology, it is held, constitutes a structural principle for 
theology, so that the Trinity is applied analogically across the subject matter of theology. 
One moves from an ontology of God to a general ontology of (new) creation. 
162 In this 
strain, Colin Gunton has revived and re-directed the Ancient Greek and Mediaeval concept 
of transcendentalia (transcendentals), to refer to those things which can be predicated of 
all being, both personal and non-personal, given God's role as Creator of the world. 
163 
159 Immaneul Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Manmillan, 1978), p. 26. 
160 See: Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian and The One, the Three and the Many; Christoph Schwöbel & 
C. E. Gunton, eds., Persons, Divine and Human (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991); C. Schwöbel, ed., 
Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on divine being and act (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995); A. J. Torrance 
(1996); John Zizioulas, "Human Capacity and human incapacity: a theological exploration of personhood", 
Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 28, No. 5 (1975), pp. 401-447; Being as Communion. 
161 Alistair I. McFadyen, "The Trinity and Human Individuality. The Condition of Relevance, " Theology 
Vol. 95 (1992), p. 10 n. 1. 
162 The analogy, which is applied by many of these writers, is the analogia relationis. 
163 "They are not then the 'forms through which being displays itself, ' because that might suggest a priority of 
'being' over God, but notions which can be predicated of all being by virtue of the fact that God is creator and 
the world is creation. " Gunton The Promise of Trinitarian, pp. 136-7. 
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There are three transcendentals which reflect the trinitarian being of God: perichoresis, 
substantiality and relationality. 164 
I am arguing for a doctrine of analogy, of an understanding of the being of 
the created world by analogy with the being of God, which affirms rather 
than calls in question the reality of the many. The world may be understood 
as a universe of interrelated substantial particulars, because God its creator 
may in the first place be so conceived. 165 
I have argued elsewhere that the limits of such a trinitarian project have not been 
sufficiently well drawn. 166 Setting these general concerns to one side, let us consider the 
possibility of an application of a trinitarian analogy to the subject matter of our thesis. 
There are two grounds for thinking this a plausible avenue. First, John's Gospel clearly 
draws some kind of comparison between, what might be called, trinitarian indwelling and 
the Spirit's indwelling of the believer. In the "Farewell Discourses" the concept is first 
used of the indwelling (menein) of Father and Son (Jn. 14.9-14), which is intra-trinitarian 
indwelling. It is only then used in relation to the Spirit's indwelling of the believer (Jn. 
14.17). 167 Then, at the third level the unity of believers also minors the 'abiding in, ' 
'remaining in, ' or 'residing in' of the Father and the Son. 168 A comparison clearly operates 
between these three levels. 169 What is critical here is to determine the nature of the 
comparison being made. Leon Morris comments on these verses, "This does not mean that 
the unity between the Father and the Son is the same as that between believers and God, 
but it does mean that there is an analogy. 070 Certainly interpretations in terms of mystical 
'64 ibid., pp. 129-141. 
165 ibid., p. 15. 
166 Fermer, pp. 158 - 186. 167 R. E. Brown comments on the last verse: "since he remains with you. Again this is not really a reason or 
cause: the indwelling and recognition are coordinate. As Bengel has put it: the lack of recognition rules out 
indwelling, while indwelling is the basis of recognition. " Brown, (XIII XXI), p. 639. 
168 John 17.21-23. 
169 R. E. Brown describes this in terms of the vertical and horizontal dimensions of Johannine statements 
about unity: "The unity involves the relation of the believers to the Father and the Son (vertical) and the 
relation of the believers among themselves. " Brown (XIII-XXI), p. 776. He goes on to describe the nature of 
this unity in the following manner: "Some type of vital, organic unity seems to be demanded by the fact that 
the relationship of Father and Son is held up as the model of unity. The Father-Son relationship involves 
more than moral union; the two are related because the Father gives life to the Son (vi 57). Similarly the 
Christians are one with one another and with the Father and the Son because they have received of this life. 
The fact that unity has to be visible enough to challenge the world to believe in Jesus (21,23) seems to 
militate against a purely spiritual union. " ibid.. 
170 Leon Morris, The Gospel According to John (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1971), p. 649. 
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absorption can be ruled out. 171 Moreover, it is not clear that the language of 'indwelling' or 
'remaining in' is equivalent to that of incorporation, which is Pauline in origin and appears 
to be a stronger conception of inclusion. From the later perspective of the Church's 
trinitarian formulations of the faith, it is clear that whatever the analogy may be, one clear 
disanalogy is the fact that the three hypostaseis of the Trinity are traditionally described as 
one being or one essence (mia ousia). 
Those who argue for a form of "Social trinitarianism", as for example David Brown does, 
may hold that the Trinity is to be conceived of as a "divine society": one "corporate 
personality", one "self-consciousness and three conscious persons. "172 If one were able to 
accept such accounts, this may appear to open the door for the re-assertion of the claim 
that intra-trinitarian and Divine-human indwelling are not really so different after all. 
However, the disanalogy with these kind of sociological examples of human corporate 
identity, is that within such a corporate understanding of self-consciousness the society or 
community is made up of distinct, individual beings, whereas in the case of the Trinity, 
God is one being. The 'corporate' nature of the Trinity is ontological, whereas Brown's 
'analogy' is social and functional. 173 It is noteworthy that key parts of the mystical 
tradition, which Brown wishes to enlist on his side, are very careful to make the distinction 
between the ontological unity of God and the unity of the Divine and human, which is a 
unity of love and will, "a communion of wills and the agreement in charity". 174 
There is another angle from which this trinitarian methodology may be pursued, and that is 
the Spirit's relationship with Jesus of Nazareth, the God-man, in acting as the paradigm 
171 In commenting on John 14.10, Barnabas Lindars excludes a mystical interpretation: "This is excluded by 
the fact that the context is not at all concerned with the inner life of Jesus. " B. Lindars, The New Century 
Bible Commentary: The Gospel of John (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972). pp. 
474. On 14: 23, the Father and the Son making their home with the believer, Lindars comments: "It must, 
then, be an interior apprehension of Jesus and the Father in the hearts of those who love Jesus. This can 
hardly be mystical experience of an esoteric kind, which would not be accessible to all. It is more likely to be 
something akin to the Pauline concept of being 'in Christ', a faith-union maintained by the imagination and 
the will. " ibid., p. 483. 
172 D. Brown, "Trinitarian Personhood and Individuality, " in R. J. Feenstra and C. Plantinga, eds., Trinity, 
Incarnation and Atonement (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. 48-75. 
173 ibid., pp. 72-3. 
174 For example, Bernard of Clairvaux writes: "there must be at least two wills for there to be agreement, and 
two essences for there to be combining or uniting in agreement. There are none of these things in the Father 
and the Son since they have neither two essences nor two wills. " St. Bernard of 
Clairvaux, "Sermons on the 
Song of Songs, " 71.9 in Bernard of Clairvaux: selected writings, trans. by G. R. Evans (Mahnah, NJ.: Paulist 
Press, 1987). 
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case for explicating Divine-human indwelling. 175 Let us set to one side the controversial 
subject of, what is called in contemporary theology, a "Spirit-Christology, " which at its 
worst threatens the very doctrine of the Trinity itself. Rather, the above proposal seems to 
face immediate difficulties in relation to the doctrine of the Incarnation. If Jesus is not 
merely a human being, but also Divine, He cannot without qualification act as the 
exemplar of Divine-human indwelling. Thomas Weinandy explicates the position of 
Chalcedon on this point: 
Jesus is a full human person in the contemporary sense, that is, possessing a 
human self-consciousness, with all its concomitant attributes, such as 
freedom. Jesus possesses a human T. What the Incarnation demands, and 
the Councils have defined and the tradition has articulated, is that the 
identity (the who) of this human `I' be the eternal Son..... If the subject (the 
who) of the human `I' is not the divine Son, then Jesus differs from us in 
his relationship to God only in degree and not in kind. 176 
The last sentence is crucial, there is a difference in kind between the incarnate Jesus and 
the rest of humanity: both parties share their humanity but are related to God differently. 
Jesus as the Divine Logos does not need to undergo the process of metanoia, although His 
human awareness grows in recognition of His Divine mission. Although Jesus is not 
immune from the facticity of his human existence with its pulls and temptations, 
traditionally Jesus is considered to be sinless, and there is no rupture between Jesus' will 
and that of the Father's, even if Jesus' human nature struggles in His obedience. 177 Mark's 
sensitivity to the humanity of Christ sits perfectly well alongside John's version of Jesus' 
prayer for Himself, which emphasises the glory of the Logos. 178 
An appeal to the Jesus-Spirit relationship hardly provides a panacea to the issues 
underlying the generating question of this thesis. In fact, although the Spirit is integral to 
Jesus' birth, ministry, death and resurrection, little illumination is given to the relation of 
the Spirit with Jesus' subjectivity or questions of freedom and identity. As I have argued 
175 I am thinking of Brian Gaybba as a possible advocate of such a position. He writes: "While it is true that 
their common divinity is an unbreakable link between the Father and the Son, it is not their common divinity 
that unites them as persons. It is the Spirit of their love that does that. Their common divinity is, if you like, a 
merely `physical' unity. True unity between persons only exists where there is love. " B. Gaybba, The Spirit 
of Love. Theology of the Spirit (London, Geoffrey Chapman, 1987), p. 149. 
176 Thomas G. Weinandy, The Father's Spirit of Sonship. Reconceiving the Trinity. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1995), pp. 117. It should be noted that Weinandy adopts, in some respects, an Augustinian position as regards 
the relationship of Jesus and the Spirit. ibid., pp. 66-77. 
177 Take, for example, Jesus' prayer to the Father at Gethsemane, Mark 14: 36. 
178 John 17: 1-5. 
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elsewhere, 179 the fruits of a trinitarian analogy are at most structural and of a general 
nature. This is important, nonetheless, in offering guidelines to theological exposition in 
other loci of theology. 
In the role of offering general guidelines, a trinitarian analogy can provide a prima facie, 
although insufficient, case for holding that the generating question of this thesis may 
receive a constructive outcome. As we have seen, John's Gospel clearly suggests such an 
analogy, although being indistinct about the way the analogy is to be exactly understood. 
The Christian tradition explicated the relationship of the Father, Son and Spirit as that of 
three Divine hypostaseis who co-inhere one another (perichoresis) in communion 
(koinonia) in a way that respects the distinct personal particularity of each other, neither in 
a relation of absorption, nor subordination. Applying this analogically, if God acts in a way 
consistent with His being, then He will act towards His creatures in such a way that 
preserves and indeed, enhances the distinct personal particularity of each human creature, 
rather than frustrates it. 180 This constitutes a prima facie reason for supposing that human 
freedom and identity are respected in God's action. We should recall the negative 
analogies of this strategy, namely, that God is three hypostaseis, yet one being, whose 
being we can never fully grasp, whereas we are many individual beings. 
Augustine famously associated the Trinity with the dialectics of love, and Richard of St. 
Victor, Bonaventura, Aquinas and modern theologians, including Bernard Lonergan, have 
subsequently developed this approach in different ways. This tradition is worth 
considering for two reasons: first, it may help us to clarify a little the intra-trinitarian role 
of the Spirit; and secondly, the dynamics of love have clear associations with the 
179 Fermer, p. 184ff. 
180 Karl Barth suggests that a christological analogy can argue along similar lines, drawing on the 
significance of the ascended humanity of Christ. Gunton explicates the point: "[T]here must be in God, 
despite the apparent absurdity of the claim, a kind of spatiality understood on the basis of his becoming 
spatial in Christ, but apophatically: 'God possesses space, His own space, and.... just because of this 
spatiality, he is able to be triune' (CD, 11/1, p. 468f. ).... There is a distance within the inner-trinitarian 
relations, a kind of living space in which God is freely himself. " C. E. Gunton, "The triune God and the 
freedom of the creature, " in Karl Barth: Centenary Essays. ed. by S. W. Sykes (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), 
p. 48. One infers that spatiality in the human context creates the necessary boundaries to 
distinguish particular 
entities that possess freedom and personal identity. The ascended Christ introduces "spatiality" 
into the being 
of God, and re-enforces a metaphorical understanding of "spatiality" in the Trinity, whereby 
"space" is given 
to the distinctness and particularity of the Divine hypostaseis. Gunton seems to be using the concept of 
spatiality more clearly in a metaphorical way later, when he writes: "the triune 
God.. 
. 
because he has space to 
live in himself, can therefore give to his creatures space to live in. " ibid, p. 58. 
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Personalist model that shall be examined in Chapters 3 and 4.181 In Chapter VIII of De 
Trinitate Augustine offers interpersonal love as an analogy of the Trinity. 182 He 
distinguishes a triadic structure to love, which may work at an interpersonal level, but also 
in self-love (amor sui): amans (the lover), quod amatur (the beloved), and amor (love 
itself). This is not just an analogy for Augustine. If God is Love, our love flows from the 
fount of God's being and is enabled by it. Loving has a circular movement, for in loving 
our neighbour two things occur: we love from God's love, and we love loving, and hence, 
we love God. Love has an orientation to the transcendent; it moves from and to God. 183 
He later goes on to appropriate amor to the Spirit; the Spirit is the bond of love between 
the Father and the Son. 184 Augustine has been criticised for de-personalising the Spirit by 
making this identification, undermining the hypostatic distinctness of the Spirit. 185 
Nevertheless, one may maintain the specific hypostatic uniqueness of the Spirit, while 
contending that the function of the Spirit is indeed as Augustine saw it, a unitive and 
mediatorial role within the Trinity. As J. V. Taylor argues the Spirit is the "go-between 
God, " mediating the Father's love for the Son and returning the Son's love to the Father, 
not as Love as a relation but as hypostasis. Further, this intra-trinitarian role is mirrored in 
the function of the Spirit in the economy of salvation. As Dumitru Stanislav has argued: 
The Holy Spirit is what unites the Father and the Son, not as essence, but 
precisely as Person, leaving Father and Son at the same time as free 
persons. Hence the Spirit is also the one who unites men among 
themselves, but as a Person himself he leaves other persons free. '86 
181 For example, Ewert Cousins writes: "Richard's [of St. Victor] concern for interpersonal relations and his 
exploration of human love as self-transcendence link him with twentieth-century personalism... Richard's 
method shares a common point of departure with contemporary theological humanism and theological 
anthropology.... It is by being immersed in human experience that Richard is able to reach the point where 
the human interpenetrates the divine, where anthropology becomes theology. " E. Cousins, "A Theology of 
Interpersonal Relations, " Thought, Vol. XLV (1970), pp. 56-7. 
182 "[T]hou dost see the Trinity if thou sees love. " Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, VIII, 8, no. 12. 
183 "Therefore we love God and our neighbour from one and the same love; but we love God for the sake of 
God, and ourselves and our neighbours for the sake of God. " ibid.. 
184 De Trin., IX, 12, no. 17; VII, 10, no. 14. 
185 "By attributing to the Spirit the kind of love that he does, Augustine thus attracts attention away 
from the 
economy of salvation in two major ways: he minimizes the part played 
in the development of the doctrine of 
the Trinity by the incarnation - for an incarnational conception of 
love is scarcely to be found - and he 
obscures the specific hypostatic uniqueness of the Holy 
Spirit. Because, we might also say, he has an 
inadequate conception of love as love for the other as other, he is unable to conceive true otherness 
in the 
Trinity, another feature which can be seen to be a function of too strong an emphasis on the unity of 
God. " 
Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian, p. 51. 
186 D. Staniloae, Theology of the Church, trans. Robert Barringer (New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 
1980), p. 67. 
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Here we have a conception of the Spirit as mediating personal particularity and 
distinctness, in the exchange of love and communication, without either subsuming or 
confounding. 187 An analogy here with the Spirit-human relation would suggest, that if the 
Spirit acted in a way concordant with the Spirit's function ad intra, then we should expect 
the Spirit to act in a way which respects and enhances human particularity and freedom. 
Richard of St. Victor developed Augustine's analysis of the dynamics of love further in a 
Trinitarian context. His theological method accepts the priority of faith, but seeks for its 
interaction with experience and reason. 188 Richard extends the personal and self- 
transcending nature of ecstatic love, which Augustine begins to draw out in his account of 
love of one's neighbour. The central bi-polar structure of the mutual love of the amans 
(the lover) and the quod amatur (the beloved) remains the same, but Richard explicates the 
third feature of love in a different way. If love as self-transcending charity is not to turn in 
on itself in a selfish insularity, love of a third is required. 189 The insularity may be 
considered to be a love that loves the other because of the other's love for one; it becomes 
a form of self-love, a love that is a mirroring or correspondence. 190 A third movement of 
187 C. E. Gunton also pursues this line, although to a different outcome which may be questioned. He writes: 
"The Holy Spirit is then indeed the dynamic of the divine love, but one that seeks to involve the other in the 
movement of giving and receiving that is the Trinity: that is, to perfect the love of Father and Son by moving 
it beyond itself. Corresponding to the eschatological movement of the Spirit ad extra there is within the 
divine eternity one who perfects the love of God as love in community. To be God is to be intrinsically 
related to the other in communion, and the Spirit is the one who enables this communion to be. " "The Holy 
Spirit, " p. 127. My concerns relating to this position are twofold. First, I am not comfortable with the 
language of "otherness" in God. The concept, at least in its use in Continental Philosophy, indicates that 
which comes from beyond one's consciousness, in the words of Emmanuel Levinas, "beyond being. " This 
sense of radical alterity is simply inappropriate for the Divine hypostaseis, who all share the one ousia. 
Secondly, it seems to me that if one holds, as Gunton does, that God's love is only "perfected" outside of 
itself, despite his denials, one is in danger of making creation necessary. Gunton maintains that one can say 
both that God's love is "self-sufficient" and that it is perfected in an "outward-going" movement without 
explanation of the apparent contradiction. 
188 E. Cousins comments on Richard's method: "In the epistemology of illumination, man is seen as the image 
of God, with the divine light shining in his soul as a mirror. The divine light brings man in contact with 
eternal and necessary truth..... As the image of God, man is turned toward and reflects God, his Exemplar. " 
Cousins, p. 64. 
189 "[N]o one is properly said to have charity on the basis of his own private love of himself. And so it is 
necessary for love to be directed toward another for it to be charity. " De Trin., III. ch. 2. 
190 It is of interest to note given the part that his work will play in Chapter 4, that Emmanuel Levinas also 
employs a concept of "the Third" in his writings, which is not as far as I am aware 
derived from Richard of 
St. Victor, but has more to do with etymology. Levinas invents a term, "illeity, " which is derived from the 
third person form, "illille. " Illeity refers to our encounter with God, whom we may not address as "toi" nor 
"vous, " which imply too much familiarity. Illeity here safeguards the alterity of God. Yet, illeity also refers to 
the "the third party"(le tiers), in a sense much closer to Richard of St. Victor, as that which prevents the 
encounter of the Self and the Other from becoming introverted. There are others with whom the 
Other I 
encounter is already in relationship and whom disabuse me of the 
illusion that the Other is just there for me. 
Levinas talks of "the third party" as the one whom the Other "already serves" prior to his encounter with me. 
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love is required: the mutual love of the two is bound together in such a way that a "shared 
love" is possible which goes out to the third (condilectus, the mutually beloved of the 
Father and Son): 
Shared love is properly said to exist when a third person is loved by two persons 
harmoniously and in community, and the affection of the two persons is fused into 
one affection by the flame of love for the third. 191 
Shared love is not a disguised form of self-love (amor privatus); 192 rather a mutual loving 
is a love of the love that is in the beloved and the lover (as in Augustine's account of love 
of one's neighbour). For Richard this love of loving brings about the shared love, which 
overflows to the third (caritas consummata), and one might add, the return of that love by 
the Spirit to complete the circle (perichoresis). 
This analysis of the dynamics of love need to be distilled from Richard's more ambitious 
claim, namely, that the triadic structure of love provides "necessary reasons" for the 
doctrine of the Trinity, 193 and whether the sequential view of the development of love can 
provide an adequate account of the origin and procession of the Divine hypostaseis. 194 
Neither is there really any "necessary reason" in Richard's account of why self- 
transcending charity should halt with love for the third. One can only say that there is no 
necessity in God's love expressing itself in creation, because His very being is a triune 
love, a relational and personal communion of the Divine hypostaseis in perfect love. 195 
E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity. trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 213. 
"The third party" represents the community of others or society, who refuse to fall into a species or class. It 
also enables the Self to think in terms of social justice. These two points are connected by Levinas' 
contention that God is the ultimate condition of the Self's encounter with the Other: "... the response to an 
Enigma or morality, is an intrigue with three personges: the I approaches the Infinite by going generously 
toward the You, who is still my contemporary, but, in the trace of Illeity, presents himself [the You] out of a 
depth of the past, faces and approaches me. " E. Levinas, "Enigma and Philosophy, " in Levinas: Basic 
Philosophical Writings. ed. A. Peperzak, R. Bernasconi & S. Critchley, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 1996), p. 176. 
191 De Trin., III, ch. 19. 
192 "The supreme level of goodness seems to exist there, when supreme love is given and nothing is obtained 
in return for the fullness of its own happiness. " ibid., III, ch. 18. 
193 For Aquinas the psychological analogy of the production of the word in the mind and the consequent love 
as an act of will are for Aquinas not proofs of the doctrine of the Trinity, as one cannot prove the mysteries 
of faith, ad demonstrationem fidei but only act as ad manifestationem Lidei. Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae, I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2. 
194 William J. Hill, Op., The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation (Washington, D. C., 
Catholic University of America Press, 1982), pp. 230-1. 
195 Having said this, God's overflowing love in creation is characteristic of His being. Christoph Schwöbel 
distinguishes between God's primordial self-sufficiency in His triune love and His consequent "need, " I 
prefer the term "wish or intention, " for the response of creation in love. C. Schwöbel, "God is Love. The 
Model of Love and the Trinity, " NZSTRP, Vol. 40, no. 3 (1998), pp. 307-328. 
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One also needs to be aware of the dangers of anthropomorphism and tri-theism. 
Nonetheless, if Augustine's claim is correct that there is a triadic structure to self-love 
(amor sui), and we can maintain an analogical distance between the Divine hypostaseis 
and human persons, then we may conclude that the character of intra-trinitarian love is an 
overflowing, movement of love between the distinct hypostaseis. The individual Divine 
hypostaseis when they love one another always love with a love which love's beyond a 
mere duality. Hence, the Father's love for the Son is also at the same time a love reaching 
beyond the Son to the Spirit. This not only re-enforces the conclusion that the Spirit has an 
intra-trinitarian unitive and mediatorial role between the Father and the Son and ultimately 
in relation to creation, but it also shows that the doctrine of the Trinity has a "constitutive 
function, "196 even if only at a general level, in helping to construct any Personalist model 
we may wish to employ in our argument. The ecstatic nature of trinitarian love also points 
to the necessity of the Christian community as the context of love of God. 
In sum, a trinitarian analogy, in and of itself, does not constitute a sufficient response to the 
generating question, but offers us only guidelines and a framework to aid our enquiry. It is 
insufficient because the doctrine of the Trinity, in the final analysis, is a doctrine about the 
nature of God and not about the relation of the Spirit to the human in the application of 
redemption. Claims concerning Christian metamorphosis are part of Christian revelation 
and are open to further exploration and explication. At best this application of a 
trinitariananalogy provides us with a prolegomena to the search for a response to the 
generating question, it does not provide us with the sole or even central methodological 
tool to obtain such a response. Now, we must move from prolegomena to the attempt at 
explication. 
196 ibid., p. 328. 
46 
CHAPTER 2 
THE DIVINE FIAT VIEW OF THE SPIRIT-HUMAN RELATION. 
Chapter 1 provided an initial, although not sufficient, 197 reason for thinking that God does 
grant His creatures relative autonomy, namely, the fact that particularity and distinctness is 
to be found within the being of God Himself, the triune communion of the three 
hypostaseis. It was reasoned that if God acts towards His creatures in a way which is 
consonant with His own being, then God will act in a fashion which seeks to safeguard 
human particularity and distinctness, to the end of personal union in relationship. This 
provides us with an prima facie case, from the doctrine of God, for supposing that the 
generating question of this thesis may admit a constructive outcome. 
In this Chapter the contention of the thesis that the generating question has been neglected 
in much theological literature will be examined in relation to two modem accounts drawn 
from very different theological traditions: David Brown undertaking "philosophical 
theology" from the Anglo-Catholic tradition, and Karl Barth, from a Reformed position. 
The Chapter will stake out the type of theological position, the "Divine Fiat view, " to 
which the thesis wishes to offer an alternative, by proposing a Personalist model. The 
criteria of human freedom and personal identity arrived at in Chapter 1 will be applied to 
argue that the two accounts considered provide a less than satisfactory resolution of the 
generating question. Both result in variants of a "Divine Fiat" view. Brown's position it 
shall be argued involves the displacement of the human subject by the Spirit, whereas 
Barth offers a christological determinism, which lacks pneumatological specificity. 
The term "Divine Fiat" I derive from the work of John Oman's, Grace and Personality, 
which he specifically uses to refer to Divine grace conceived as an irresistible power of an 
omnipotence, directed by omniscience, which overrides the human spirit: 
198 
[A] direct force controlling persons as things is no personal relation 
between God and man; and the religion which rests on it does nothing to 
maintain the supreme interest of religion, which is the worth of persons 
over things, of moral values over material forces. God might so act upon 
197 It is insufficient because the doctrine of the Trinity is a doctrine about the nature of God and not about the 
relation of the Spirit to the human in the application of redemption. 
Thus, it may only guide the construction 
of theology in other loci, not determine them. 
198 Oman, pp. 39,42. 
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men and still be a person, but there would be nothing personal in His 
acting. ' 99 
The Divine Fiat view, in this thesis, maintains that the Spirit "takes over" or displaces the 
human subject, at least temporarily. The metamorphosis of the human by the Spirit is 
brought about in a causal, rather than a personal manner. The substance of this distinction 
will be further explicated when a Personalist Model is explicated in Chapter 3. For our 
purposes here all that needs to be said is that a personal relationship is by nature dialogical, 
requiring response and interaction of both parties at a level of psychological complexity. 
The way of persons is that of persuasion and personal presence. On the other hand, as 
Marcel Sarot writes: "If something or someone is causally influenced, it does not have the 
choice to react or not. It just has to do what the causal influence makes it do. "20° The 
"Divine Fiat" view is the position that this thesis most directly reacts against, and it will be 
argued that it is opposed to the model of explanation which I consider best accounts for the 
Spirit-human relation, namely, a Personalist model to which we shall turn in Chapter 3. 
I. ) David Brown on the Spirit as "God pressing to become subject". 201 
The problem which Brown attempts to address in his Chapter on the Spirit in his 
monograph, The Divine Trinity, is not the same as the generating question of my thesis. 
His argument seeks to establish the divinity and, more significantly in the light of early 
church history, the personhood of the Spirit. His argument is, in large part, a historical 
one, involving analysis of the New Testament data. His additional, more philosophical 
arguments, are based on the experience to be found in the New Testament, from the 
testimony of Christian mystics and from non-Christian religious sources. The bulk of his 
historical argument is, therefore, not to be contested but may be considered a necessary 
precursor to the question posed by this thesis. Rather, our attention will focus on a 
particular philosophical argument that Brown mounts as an attempt to explain the Spirit's 
'indwelling' of the believer. Although, this is a philosophical development, Brown claims 
the argument is "already implicitly in the New Testament, , 202 which is rather odd given its 
199 ibid., p. 26. 
200 M. Sarot, God, Passibility and Corporeality (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1992), p. 28. 
201 The reason I give for selecting David Brown's account for analysis is that his position has provoked the 
primary author whose work on the Spirit was most influential to me in the inception of this thesis, namely, 
William Alston (see Chapter 4). 
202 D. Brown, The Divine Trinity, p. 203. 
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distinctly Cartesian turn, and he seems especially influenced, in this view, by his reading 
of the Pentecost narrative in Luke-Acts. 
Brown's argument has four parts. 
Part 1) He establishes a "parallel" between the indwelling of the Spirit and "the presence 
of other spiritual beings. X203 The question is then posed as to whether the structure of the 
experience of the indwelling of the Spirit is more like, (a. ) being assailed by demons, or 
(b. ) demon possession. Brown plumps for the latter: 
The difference surely amounts to this: the former still feels that his person 
is intact but that it is clearly under attack from without, whereas the latter 
sees himself as no longer in full control of personhood. .... clearly 
indwelling is comparable to possession in this respect at least, namely that, 
as we have seen especially with regard to the definitive experiences, the 
only possible subject is not the human individual but the indwelling divine 
power, the Holy Spirit; for in calling the experience impersonal the 
individual in acknowledging that he sees himself as no more than a vehicle 
or a channel for the Spirit's power in action. 204 
Part 2) Indwelling conceived of in this way trumps any prima facie concerns that the 
indwelling of the Spirit involves a localising of the God in space and time: 
Thus the point of the terminology of indwelling is neither to localise the 
divine presence nor merely to indicate divine activity per se, but rather to 
describe a special form of divine activity, in which God is seen as the true 
subject of the individual's actions. 205 
Part 3. ) It follows from the comparison with demon possession that, once the Spirit 
becomes subject, one is unaware of His presence. 
Part 4. ) Whereas in the case of demon possession there is a fraught transition from the 
state of experiencing the demon as an object (i. e. the struggle of being assailed by a 
demon), to the demon becoming the subject, "in the case of the Spirit.. . he at least 
is 
wanting to be the subject of good actions but does not wish to become the subject through 
overriding the individual's free will. "206 
Brown draws the conclusion: 
203 ibid., p. 200- 
204 ibid., p. 201. 
205 ibid., p. 201. 
206 ibid., p. 201. 
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Now, if this is what is happening, the appropriate description for indwelling 
becomes something like the following: God as or pressing to become 
subject (though a pressing that is without compulsion). 207 
Is Brown's account of the Spirit's indwelling compatible with the conceptions of freedom 
and personal identity presented in Chapter 1? One might consider that Brown's account 
ensures the integrity of human freedom and personal identity by his employment of the 
saving clause, "though a pressing that is without compulsion. " However, this is neither 
explained, and on inspection, appears to be of little relevance. First, Brown does not show 
how the Spirit, unlike demons, relates to the human in a personal manner, to the point 
where a Divine "take-over" is acceptable to the human subject. Secondly, suppose, for the 
sake of argument, one adopts a Searlean position in the philosophy of mind, viz. mind- 
brain identity. If I freely agree to having my brain removed from my body, and liquidated, 
and then another brain transplanted in its place, I will have made a free choice, but I will 
no longer be said to be free, for I simply will not be in a position to exercise my will 
through my body any longer! Drawing upon one of the criteria of freedom outlined in 
Chapter 1, if the Spirit is subject, then, my volitions are not engendered by an intrinsic 
principle, viz. the interaction of my intellect and will, but by an extrinsic principle. 
Now, I do not quite know what Brown thinks happens to the human subject when the 
Spirit becomes subject. However, if the Spirit is subject, both my freedom and personal 
identity seem to be irrelevant. It is no longer "I" who is doing the experiencing. The 
comparison with demon possession does not really placate one's worries at this point: I am 
possessed by the Spirit, in Brown's words "taken over". During the possession the human 
subject is not aware of the Spirit's activity. This suggests further that the human subject's 
freedom and identity is being compromised. Brown quotes some of Andrew Louth's 
exegesis of Plotinus to support his case. We are not commonly aware of good health, or of 
the act of reading when we are involved in the subject matter of activity. Yet, such 
circumstances in our lives seem to have a completely different status to possession by 
207 ibid.. The place of this thesis in Brown's overall argument for the distinct personhood of the Spirit is as 
follows: since the Spirit aims to be permanently functioning as subject of the human being's experience, 
thoughts and actions, we can hardly suppose that He is the same person as either the Father or the Son, whom 
we experience as other persons, "over and against ourselves", as the objects of experience. However, my 
concerns do not relate to the success of Brown's overall argument for the distinct personhood of the Spirit, 
which is assumed. For a critical examination of Brown's main argument in his Chapter, see William Alston, 
"The Holy Spirit and the Trinity", in Philosophy and theological discourse, ed. by S. T. Davies (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 102-123. 
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Now, if this is what is happening, the appropriate description for indwelling 
becomes something like the following: God as or pressing to become 
subject (though a pressing that is without compulsion). 207 
Is Brown's account of the Spirit's indwelling compatible with the conceptions of freedom 
and personal identity presented in Chapter 1? One might consider that Brown's account 
ensures the integrity of human freedom and personal identity by his employment of the 
saving clause, "though a pressing that is without compulsion. " However, this is neither 
explained, and on inspection, appears to be of little relevance. First, Brown does not show 
how the Spirit, unlike demons, relates to the human in a personal manner, to the point 
where a Divine "take-over" is acceptable to the human subject. Secondly, suppose, for the 
sake of argument, one adopts a Searlean position in the philosophy of mind, viz. mind- 
brain identity. If I freely agree to having my brain removed from my body, and liquidated, 
and then another brain transplanted in its place, I will have made a free choice, but I will 
no longer be said to be free, for I simply will not be in a position to exercise my will 
through my body any longer! Drawing upon one of the criteria of freedom outlined in 
Chapter 1, if the Spirit is subject, then, my volitions are not engendered by an intrinsic 
principle, viz. the interaction of my intellect and will, but by an extrinsic principle. 
Now, I do not quite know what Brown thinks happens to the human subject when the 
Spirit becomes subject. However, if the Spirit is subject, both my freedom and personal 
identity seem to be irrelevant. It is no longer "I" who is doing the experiencing. The 
comparison with demon possession does not really placate one's worries at this point: I am 
possessed by the Spirit, in Brown's words "taken over". During the possession the human 
subject is not aware of the Spirit's activity. This suggests further that the human subject's 
freedom and identity is being compromised. Brown quotes some of Andrew Louth's 
exegesis of Plotinus to support his case. We are not commonly aware of good health, or of 
the act of reading when we are involved in the subject matter of activity. Yet, such 
circumstances in our lives seem to have a completely different status to possession by 
207 ibid.. The place of this thesis in Brown's overall argument for the distinct personhood of the Spirit is as 
follows: since the Spirit aims to be permanently functioning as subject of the human being's experience, 
thoughts and actions, we can hardly suppose that He is the same person as either the Father or the Son, whom 
we experience as other persons, "over and against ourselves", as the objects of experience. 
However, my 
concerns do not relate to the success of Brown's overall argument for the 
distinct personhood of the Spirit, 
which is assumed. For a critical examination of Brown's main argument 
in his Chapter, see William Alston, 
"The Holy Spirit and the Trinity", in Philosophy and theological discourse, ed. by S. T. Davies (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 102-123. 
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another subject of agency. I may not be self-conscious of reading when I am engrossed in 
my novel, but it is certainly me as subject who is having the experience of reading. One 
need not have something in the forefront of one's consciousness to be the subject of the 
experience, one may, to use M. Polanyi's concept, be 'tacitly' aware of the experience. 208 
It is conceivable that the Holy Spirit's "becoming subject" could be merely episodic. Such 
episodes of being "filled" with the Spirit could be sanctioned prior to the filling, depending 
on the circumstances, and would be compatible with human freedom and personal identity 
precisely because of their episodic nature. They do not deprive the human subject of 
agency for long enough to threaten his/her personal identity, and do not instigate radical 
qualitative change of identity. The experiences may be considered to be analogous to 
sleep. Human beings do not choose, as such, to sleep, and during the period of sleep 
cannot tell a consistent story about their subjectivity. Sleep involves a loss of 
consciousness, yet does not entail a loss of personal identity or a fragmentation of the 
person. Another example would be the case of a medical operation. The doctor gives me 
general anaesthetic with my consent, and I trust the doctor in the period of its efficacy. 
Yet, both these analogies do not quite fit our case as they are instances of our subjectivity 
being temporarily suspended, rather than "taken over. " Moreover, Brown is purporting to 
give a description of the indwelling of the Spirit, but indwelling is precisely not episodic, 
but continuous, the gift of the Risen Lord . 
209 
Brown's claim that such a thesis has a proto-structure in Scripture is not followed through. 
It is noticeable that when Brown presents his explication of indwelling, he does not refer 
back to his discussion of Scripture, but in fact, only quotes Plotinus and the mystics 
directly to support his case. William Alston points out in relation to the Biblical support 
for the "pressing to become subject" thesis, that: 
208 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1958); The Tacit Dimension (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966). 
209 See John 14.16 "he may abide with you for ever. " An interesting comparison here is with Paul's 
conception of the Spirit's role in prayer (Rom. 8.26-7). The 
Spirit "intercedes for us". But this, in the context 
of verses 18-27, seems to be a point primarily about 
God's triumph taking place, notwithstanding our 
weakness and the sufferings of the world, "but also in the midst of and 
because of our weakness and 
suffering". Moreover, intercession is very different 
from 'take-over'. Compare to the "overshadowing" of 
Mary in Luke 1.35. Again, this is a different concept from "take-over". Mary has been informed and 
accepted the Divine intervention, and it does not constitute a complete 
"take-over" or subjugation. 
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... it is by no means clear from the allusions to such matters in the New 
Testament, including the account of Pentecost in Acts 2, that this is what 
the participants thought was happening, much less that they took 
themselves to be experientially aware of such a situation. Nor can I see that 
Paul's many references to the Holy Spirit as 'bearing witness', 'interceding', 
'teaching', 'giving life'.... are in terms of the Spirit's taking over the normal 
subjective functions of the human person. 210 
Such activity implies the interaction of two subjects, not one person "pressing to become 
subject always". By describing the Spirit's role as "subject" of sanctified human action, 
Brown undercuts the very New Testament language that he was drawing on to make his 
case for the distinct personhood of the Spirit. As for the outpouring of the Spirit at 
Pentecost, the disciples' subjectivities would only have been 'taken-over' had they become 
mere automata of the Spirit. Yet the text describes the Spirit as 'enabling' them (v. 4), not as 
overpowering them. 
It is often forgotten that the bulk of the Pentecost event in Acts is taken up by Peter's 
address to the crowd. 211 It is only after Peter's address to the assembled gathering that large 
numbers of people are converted - surely the main fruit of the outpouring of the Spirit. 
Peter's address most definitely involves his subjectivity, which can hardly have been 
bypassed or 'taken-over', yet no doubt was enabled and empowered by the Spirit. The key 
word in the text is "filled", as Howard Marshall notes. 212 The event of "filling" is not 
identical with "take-over" or displacement, which is why the German poet Erich Fried can 
use it as a metaphor for intimate personal relationships in his poem "Breathing Space". 
The Pauline corpus testifies to the enabling function of the Spirit which "assists the human 
subject to do and be the things in questioni213 rather than displaces it. If one takes 
Scripture as a whole, as a symphony so to speak, then Pentecost is the counter-point to the 
story of Babel, 214 which is an event which fragments personal communion. The Pentecost 
narrative in Acts, on the other hand, is an event which brings about personal communion, 
210 Alston, "The Holy Spirit and the Trinity", p. 117. Alston cites Romans, 8.9-11 and Romans 8: 15-16 as 
evidence of his claim here. He goes on to argue that in the Pauline passages where a "take-over" reading 
seems more explicit, the Holy Spirit is not mentioned (Phil. 2.13; Gal. 2.20: "my point is that such a 'not I but 
God is doing it' is not typical of Pauline pronouncements on the work of God as indwelling. " ibid., pp. 118. 
One would also want to supplement Alston's point here with testimony from John's Gospel, where the Spirit 
is said to "teach", "bear witness", "speak" (16.4-15). 
21 Acts 2.14-36. 
212 I. Howard Marshall, "The Significance of Pentecost, " Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 30 (1977), p. 369. 
213 Alston, "The Holy Spirit and the Trinity", p. 118. 
214 Genesis 11. 
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as shown by the Spirit's gift of communication across linguistic barriers, and the 
possibility of universal mission, which augurs the re-uniting of human kind with the 
personal God, revealed in the person of Jesus Christ. 
I. 01) An Argument From Mystical Experience. 
To fully allow Brown to explain what happens to the human subject when the Spirit 
"presses to become subject", we must consider his second argument, from mystical 
experience. It rests on a distinction which has already come into play in the differentiation 
between subject and object, and is here rendered as "a distinction between immanent and 
transcendent, aspects of deity, between what in Christian terminology may appropriately 
be called Spirit and Father. , 215 From the mystic Jan van Ruysbroeck Brown draws the 
following conclusion, which he subsequently argues is supported by his very brief tour 
through other assorted mystics and alternative religious traditions: 
[T]here is such identification with the indwelling of the Spirit that he can 
speak of himself as God, while through such identification there comes a 
union of intimacy with the Father, being 'God with God' so that here some 
216 sort of separate identity is still being maintained. 
This does provide some clarification of what Brown intends by his thesis that the Spirit is 
always "pressing to become subject. " He wishes to draw on the support of the autotheistic 
sayings of the mystics ("to be God with God"). Unlike the case of the brain transplant 
given above, the indigenous human subject is not annihilated, Brown wishes to maintain, 
although the human subject is called "God", which does present some questions 
concerning continuing human personal identity. There is identification, but not in principle 
substitution or absorption. The identification is couched in the language of interpersonal 
human relations, "Spiritual Marriage". Brown continues: 
If this is so and this is the correct account of the experience, then what we 
seem to have is a record of a human individual himself experiencing a 
distinction within the Godhead, with the Spirit so catching him up into his 
own life as to make him part of his own experience within the Godhead in 
relation to the Father. 217 
215 Brown, The Divine Trinity, p. 207. This description seems a rather unfortunate parcelling out of the 
functions of the trinitarian hypostaseis. The Spirit's action is immanent in the indwelling of the Christian 
believer, but it is an immanence which maintains transcendence, not least because it is an immanence which 
mediates the presence of the Father. 
216 ibid., p. 209. 
217 ibid.. 
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Being "caught up" in the Spirit's own life hardly amounts to the Spirit becoming the 
subject of my experiences and action. One cannot be 'intimate, ' or have a 'separate 
identity, ' or "participate in his [Spirit's] relation to the Father, " if it is the Spirit who is 
subject. 
What the human seems to 'experience' on Brown's model of mystical experience is not its 
own relation to God, but the Spirit's relation to the Father. In fact, Brown wishes to argue 
that mystical experiences reveal a simultaneous dialectic of identity and intimacy: "there is 
such identification with the indwelling of the Spirit that he can speak of himself as God, 
while through such identification there comes what is rather a union of intimacy with the 
Father, being 'God with God' so that here some sort of separate identity is still being 
maintained. , 218 Brown interprets such a dialectic as a reason for saying that the two 
experiences of identification and intimacy, have different objects of reference: the former 
relating to the Spirit's "take-over", and the latter (intimacy) "an experience of the 
identifying agent [I take this to refer to the Spirit? ] relating one to some third 
thing[Father]. i219 
However, this explanation does not placate fears as to the place of the human being in this 
dialectic. In the first stage, the Spirit becomes subject of the human, conceived on the 
model of take-over. As we have seen this seems to be contrary to human freedom and 
personal identity. Secondly, there is the experience of the distinction within the Godhead. 
This could only be so if it was an experience of the Spirit relating to the Father, but given 
the Spirit has become subject, how may a "human individual himself' experience such a 
distinction? Surely it would then be the experience of the Spirit, which is an experience of 
God, experiencing Himself and not the human individual as the subject of the experience. 
Brown's position leads to confusion and blurring of the human and Divine identity. 
It will be the argument of this thesis that a "Personalist model" could remedy the problems 
which Brown faces. Moreover, although some mystics such as Ruysbroec and 
Eckhart may 
appear to lend support, with their tendency to conceive of the 
human spirit as subsumed in 
some way into the Divine, it is far from clear that the "mystical tradition" would 
218 ibid.. 
219 ibid., p. 211. 
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universally support Brown's thesis. For example, those mystics who fall under the category 
of "Bridal mysticism, "220 explicate the unio mystica in personal terms, derived from an 
analogy between the relationship of God and man, and the Bridegroom and his bride, as in 
the Song of Solomon. Grace Jantzen answers the charge of monism often levelled 
customarily against the mystics, viz. that mysticism requires a unity of substance or 
essence between God and the soul, in which the distinction between subject and object is 
annulled. This is a misinterpretation based on a lack of sensitivity to textual context, and 
the way that some mystics use language. She argues that in Bernard of Clairvaux, for 
instance, the "merging of God and the soul is a union of charity and will, not a merging of 
substance. "221 The distinction between the Creator and creature in these mystics is not 
drawn on the basis of the metaphysics of substance, but on the created autonomy of will. 
It is no accident that Bernard, in company with many others in the Christian 
mystical tradition, uses erotic imagery to depict mystical union: the 
merging of wills and affections in loving sexual encounter is enhanced, not 
undermined, by the strength of personhood of each participant, and each 
bring their full selves to the partnership and are cherished in it..... In a 
healthy relationship, there is not obliteration of distinction, or a merging of 
subject and object, but a glad nurturing of the selfhood of each. If this is the 
model of mystical union, it can hardly be called monistic. 222 
This useful correction to the reading of some of the language of the mystics gain points to 
the problem of Brown's emphasis on the concept of the subject as the basis for 
Divine/human indwelling. For that implies substantial union, rather than the union of 
wills. Despite being a friend of the mystics, Brown appears to have interpreted them along 
220 Frans Maas, "A Personal or Impersonal God - An Old Problem of Western Mysticism? " in A Personal 
God? eds. by Edward Schillebeeckx and Bas van lersel (New York: The Seabury Press, 1977), pp. 94-104. 
221 G. Jantzen, "'Where Two are to Become One': Mysticism and Monism, " in Philosophy in Christianity, ed. 
by Godfrey Vesey (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), p. 157. She says of John of the Cross' metaphors of the log and 
the flame, and the light shining on the pure crystal: "John is speaking, not of diminishment of human 
freedom, but of its fullness, indeed of such total liberation that the quality of action can be compared to 
nothing less than the freedom of God. " ibid., p. 159. 
222 ibid., p. 158. This conclusion is also reached by J. A. Wiseman, O. S. B.: "From all that was written about 
the linguistic similarity between the autotheistic language of Ruusbroec and the language of human lovers 
who claim to "be" the one whom they love, it seems reasonable to accept as a working hypothesis the 
conclusion that the mystics' autotheistic claims can often be best explained as their attempts to put into words 
the intense experience of loving union with God which they have undergone, since, as psychiatrists like 
Freud and Gaylin have indicated, a sense of fusion or 'merging of the self with another person or ideal, 
creating a fused identity, ' tends to be an integral aspect of all love on the part of a human being. " James A. 
Wiseman, O. S. B, "'To be God with God': the Autotheistic Sayings of the Mystics", Theological Studies, 
Vol. 51 (1990), pp. 246-7. Willard Gaylin in Rediscovering Love writes that among the capacities he has 
found essential in human love is a "capacity for fusion", that is "the merging of the self with another person 
or ideal, creating a fused identity. " Quoted in Wiseman, p. 242. 
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lines which would substantiate rather than avert the charge of monism, and hence fuel 
common criticisms of them. 
In summation of this section, Brown's description of the Spirit as "pressing to become 
subject" founders on the rocks of a misplaced representation of the Biblical witness and 
the undermining of the identity and freedom of the human agent. Even if one replaced the 
controlling concept in Brown's argument, the Spirit "pressing to become subject, " with an 
alternative, for instance the Spirit as "directing subject, " further explanation is still 
required as to how the Spirit directs in such a way as to respect human freedom and 
identity. Positively, one can concur with Alston that "it is greatly to Brown's credit t, 223 to 
have brought into play the mysticism as an important source in this debate. It is in fact the 
mystical tradition which has developed to the greatest extent the "Personalist model", 
which shall be examined in the next Chapter. In his analysis Brown has touched upon a 
much larger issue, to which we must turn in later Chapters, namely the place of the Spirit 
within subject-object categories. Thus, Eric Schraeder argued that pneumatology is the 
ground of the non-objectivity of God, as Kilian McDonnell articulates it: 
The Holy Spirit cannot be objectified and viewed from a distance simply 
because, though distinct, the Spirit is not separable from the very processes 
by which an attempt is made to "define" Him. The Spirit can never become 
an object of theological reflection in the sense that the sacrament of baptism 
can, because the Spirit is the universal comprehensive horizon within which 
any and all theological reflection is possible. 224 
This is a version of the broader issue of the interplay between the transcendence and 
immanence of God, and does not rule out knowledge of the Spirit from His actions or 
operations towards us, what Moltmann calls "deductive knowing. , 225 
II. ) Karl Barth: Divine Determination And The Freedom Of The Creature. 
Another theologian from a different theological tradition, presents us with an alternative 
theology of Revelation, but with results for human freedom and identity which may 
equally be categorised as leading to a "Divine Fiat" view. Karl Barth has been selected not 
only because he is one of the pre-eminent theologians of the twentieth century, but because 
223 "The Holy Spirit and the Trinity, " p. 119. 
224 McDonnell, "A Trinitarian Theology", pp. 216. "The Spirit known (object) is discovered by the Spirit 
knowing (subject)" ibid.. E. Schaeder's monograph referred to is: Das Geistproblem der Theologie. Jürgen 
Moltmann makes a similar point: "We can only talk out of the Spirit. " Moltmann, The Spirit of Life, p. 157. 
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he, perhaps more than anyone in his theology, has stressed the radical discontinuity 
between God and humanity, between the old and the new. Colin Gunton provocatively 
writes of the question of the place of the freedom of the creature in Barth: 
Why are his [Barth's] words asserting the reality of freedom in the Spirit so 
widely disbelieved? Is it because they are empty rhetoric, and are 
overwhelmed by the logic of other things that he says? Or is it that the 
critics are simply operating with different preconceptions? 226 
These questions will be borne in mind as a critique of Barth's position is offered. It shall be 
argued that Gunton's two key questions can be answered in the affirmative. In addition, it 
will be maintained that Barth provides Brown's "Divine fiat" (or "take-over") conception 
of the Spirit's operation in the life of the believer with a theological undergirding, which is 
found to have weaknesses. Nonetheless, it shall be maintained that Barth's account raises 
some important theological issues which cannot be readily dismissed, but will be dealt 
with further in subsequent Chapters of this thesis. 
II. 0101) Exposition 1: The Outpouring of the Holy Spirit and Subjective Revelation. 
To understand Barth's view of Christian metamorphosis, one first has to have an insight 
into his basic theological epistemology. As is well known, Barth posits a radical 
discontinuity between humanity and God, upholding the absolute claims of the Divine 
subject in revelation, in reaction to the anthropocentric theology of the nineteenth century 
Liberal tradition. 227 There is no analogia entis, no "point of contact (Anknuepfungspunkt)" 
between God and humanity prior to the event of Revelation. The analogia entis of 
Aquinas is replaced by a revealed analogy, an analogia fidei, according to which faith is 
the result of God's Revelation of Himself in Jesus Christ, and the sending of the Spirit, to 
be the "teacher of the Word. "228 For the purposes of explication Barth distinguishes 
between, what he calls, "objective" and "subjective" revelation, which is clearly influenced 
225 Moltmann, The Spirit of Life, p. 285. 
226 "The triune God and the freedom of the creature", p. 55. Gunton's own answer to these questions are both 
negative and affirmative: "... criticisms of Barth, though mistaken if they simply repeat Enlightened and 
Pelagian conceptions of human freedom, do have justification in a lack of attention paid by him to the 
distinctness of the triune persons and in particular to pneumatological dimensions of incarnation and 
salvation. " ibid., p. 64-5. These may be valid conclusions to draw from Barth's account and I am prepared to 
accept them. However, as shall be argued, Gunton's conclusion that Barth has established a "real" human 
freedom is mistaken and hence, there may be other grounds for wishing to alter Barth's account. 
227 Particular debating partners were Barth's erstwhile teachers and pupils of Albrecht Ritchl, Wilhelm 
Hermann, Adolf von Harnack and Martin Rade. 
228 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/2, ed. by G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. by G. W. Bromiley 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1958), p. 235. 
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by Calvin's distinction between 'internal' and 'external' revelation. Simply put "objective 
revelation" refers to the objective reality of the person and work of Jesus Christ as the 
Self-revelation of God. The recognition, acknowledgement and acceptance of 'objective 
revelation' by human beings, through the work of the Spirit, is what Barth categorises as 
"subjective revelation, " and what concerns us. Calvin, too, taught that Scripture had to be 
"sealed by the internal testimony of the Spirit. " 
What is of particular interest here is Barth's treatment of human freedom in relation to 
'subjective revelationi229 and the 'outpouring of the Spirit, i230 what has been called "God's 
giving by the Holy Spirit as well as man's receiving in the Holy Spirit. "231 In objective 
revelation God shows that He is free for humankind, and so, with Barth's usual intellectual 
symmetry, in subjective revelation humankind is made free for God through the agency of 
the Holy Spirit. We have no natural capacity to reach God in the bondage of sin, or what 
Barth calls the "sleep of death, " so that, "To become free for God we must be convinced 
that we are not already free. , 232 This is why for Barth to become a Christian does not 
involve a choice between alternatives: 
The whole idea of a possibility of faith confronted by that of unbelief, the 
whole conception of man as a Hercules at the crossroads able to choose 
between faith and sin, is pure illusion. Whatever may be the possibility of 
faith, this Hercules has always already chosen unbelief. 233 
In these circumstances Barth talks of the "necessity of faith, "234 for it is precisely 
something which is not in our control. 
235 
We can only have a true conception of freedom in relation to God. Elsewhere Barth calls 
the creation of faith a "counter-movement of a free human act, " a "new freedom. , 
236 Faith 
229 ibid., p. 222ff. 
230 ibid., p. 204f. 
231 Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Introduction to the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1979), p. 28. 
232 Barth, 1/2, p. 258. 
233 ibid., IV/1, p. 746. 
234 ibid., IV/1, p. 746. 
235 It seems that for Barth this means a casting aside of our human intuitions concerning 
freedom: "For God 
to be revealed involves the dislodging of man from the estimation of his own freedom, and 
his enrichment 
with the freedom of the children of 
God. " Church Dogmatics 1/2, p. 260. 
236 ibid., IV/1 pp. 745-6. 
59 
and the acknowledgement of revelation which it represents, is not a human capacity but a 
gift, a "miracle, , 237 and an act of God: 
In faith it is the right, the accepted, the acknowledged acknowledgement, 
not because man in himself has the power of, not because he has of himself 
succeeded in achieving this right acknowledgement, but because what he 
actually can and does compass is acknowledged by the acknowledged Word 
of God, not as self-determination, but as self-determination determined by 
the Word of God. 238 
There is still enough continuity of personal identity and integrity for Barth to talk of the 
Spirit's action being "achieved in our own experience and activity, in that act of self- 
determination which we call our human existence. , 239 Certainly Barth is not advocating 
some divine-human mix, a change in the substance of which we are made: "This 
participation has nothing to do with a magical invasion of the interrelated totality of our 
psycho-physical human life by supernatural factors and forces. , 240 Nonetheless, it is 
clearly God who is active, the "Master, " giving Himself in His Son, who allows 
humankind to recognise His revelation, and through the Holy Spirit creates faith in His 
creatures, who assume a passive role. It is not simply a matter of God removing certain 
"internal constraints" to our freedom. 241 God does not remove sin and then allow His 
creature to choose whether to believe or not; such a possibility is an "illusion. " As we have 
seen, even the very acknowledgement of revelation in faith is God's determination. Barth 
gives every impression that this is an intervention in the established structure of creation, a 
form of hard determinism: 
It does signify a limitation and interruption of our existence. Our existence 
is confronted by something outside and over against it, by which it is 
242 determined and indeed totally determined. 
In a further passage Barth compares God to temporal masters and authorities, which he 
claims allow us more independence than God does. 
243 By implication Barth is claiming 
that as part of being "totally determined, " God even controls our thoughts, and 
"determines" our noetic structure. There are no "neutral zones" in the event of subjective 
237 ibid., I/1, p. 275. 
238 ibid., I/1, p. 263. 
239 ibid., 1/2, p. 266. 
240 ibid.. 
241 See Chapter 1, Sc. 1.013) above. 
242 Barth, 1/2, p. 266. 
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revelation. 244 The way He chooses to express this is in the strong language of the master- 
slave relationship: "This relationship consists in the fact that he [the human person] is 
taken and bound and ruled. "245 It ought to be quite clear from this language, to answer one 
of Gunton's questions, why some critics are given to disbelieving the reality of freedom in 
the Spirit. 
The general structure of Barth's account is one which is shared by many theologians. In the 
Anglican tradition, for example, Leonard Hodgson argues for the "mixed character" of 
God's gracious activity towards humankind. First, God acts at a "sub-personal" level which 
enables human creatures to evolve spiritually to the second stage, the state of full personal 
relations with the Divine "at the level of the conscious rational mind. "246 He writes, "We 
have seen that between God and His creatures there can be two kinds of relationship: 
onesidedly personal, as pictured in the analogy of the potter and the clay, and mutually 
personal. t, 247 This is in line with the traditional catholic (Augustinian) conception of the 
sequence of operative grace, followed by cooperative grace. A "greater good" style of 
argument is at work here. The Spirit's liberative action at a "subpersonal" level is justified, 
on this view, by the greater good of a personal Divine-human relationship that it brings. 
Little is then said about how such a position works in relation to the personal identity of 
the human creature. 248 One should also note the contrast between the nature of the end and 
means: one is personal, the other 'sub-personal'. 
243 "Our thoughts at least - even only our subconscious thoughts- are always 
free in relation to it [the choice 
as to whether or not to recognise a worldly authority]. But the outpouring of the Holy Spirit means that man 
is placed under the Word, because it is God's Word. " ibid., p. 271. 
244 ibid., IV/2, p. 503. 
245 ibid., 1/2, p. 273. 
246 Regarding his emphasis on "the conscious, " Hodgson writes: "It has been my thesis throughout these 
lectures that the specifically biblical Christian revelation comes to us at the level of the conscious rational 
mind. God has been educating us in knowledge of Himself by doing things and 
inspiring men to grasp their 
significance. The minds of the men before whose eyes He does them are possessed 
by ingrained habits of 
thought which colour their vision. The work of the Holy Spirit in the minds of men is never ending so long as 
the newly-acquired truth is entangled with persisting error and is itself in need of clarification. " Hodgson, p. 
209. 
247 ibid., p. 155. 
248 John Oman writing some years before Hodgson maintains that, "Experiences... are not personal merely 
because they happen to a person. " Oman, p. 68. He argues that those who wish to conceive of Christian 
transformation entering "through some trap-door in the subconscious" undermine relative human moral 
independence: "If conversion means an awakening to our true relation both to God and man, and not merely 
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11.0102) Exposition 2: The Hour Glass. Barth's Two Stage Movement. 
It was Hans Urs von Balthasar who used the model of an hour glass to describe the two 
stage movement in Barth's conception of the Divine-human relationship. 249 The idea is that 
the sand moves from the top, vertically downwards, signifying the sovereignty of Divine 
revelation and the Divine initiative. It flows through the constriction in the middle of the 
glass, which represents the paradigmatic significance of christology in revelation and for 
Christian anthropology. However, the second movement is the inversion of the glass, the 
flow from what was formerly on the "bottom, " viz. the human domain. It represents the 
human response to God's Revelation, again only mediated through the christological 
constriction of the hour glass. 250 The image certainly signifies classical Christian thought. 
Problems arise in its outworking. 
As we have seen, the only place in Barth's account of subjective revelation for voluntary 
action251 is in the acknowledgement of that which has already been chosen and 
acknowledged for us, and hence to obediently follow in the path of the Divine action, in 
repetition. 252 Indeed, it is only in this act of gratitude and acceptance for what God has 
done for us in Christ and in the Spirit, that a human person moves from being the object of 
God's action to become a subject in her own right, and hence, for the first time responsible 
for her actions. 253 
Some commentators point out that Barth in Church Dogmatics IV/4, in line with the "hour 
glass" movement, softens his language concerning the Divine-human relationship, 
adopting the language of "partnership", and "active" human contribution. Barth gives us a 
strong defence of the importance of the creature having "a place of his own, " to exercise 
some amendment of disposition, how can it be other than of conscious insight? Being a change of 
outlook... how can it be a sub-conscious change of nature? " ibid., p. 74. 
249 H. Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 210. 
250 The image of the hour glass proposed by von Balthasar needs to be complemented by the chiastic 
structure of Barth's doctrine of reconciliation found in Church Dogmatics Vol. IV/1-3. There the two stage 
movement is conceived less in terms of temporal succession. The first action of the Divine self-humbling 
(status exinanitionis, IV/1 "The Lord as Servant") is mirrored by human nature's elevation to true humanity 
(status exaltationis, IV/2 "The Servant as Lord"). The two movements are integrated by the mediating action 
of Jesus Christ as both God and man (hypostatic union, IV/3 "Jesus Christ, the True Witness"). 
251 For a definition see Chapter 1, section LOU). 
252 Barth, IV/1, p. 748. Barth's reason for this is given: "For how can he destroy himself as the old man, posit 
himself as the new, and free himself for the true freedom in which he can believe. " ibid.. 
253 ibid., 111/2, p. 168. 
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real freedom and responsibility, "man is not ignored or passed over. X254 Admittedly, in 
Volume IV/4 Barth has moved from epistemology and the ontology of God, to the ethics 
of dogmatics, ecclesiology, and specifically the character and nature of faith. The 
theological opponent is no longer Liberal theology, but those who conceive of the church 
as performing divine-human works as vehicles and means of saving grace. His intent is to 
steer a course between, on the one side, "subjectivism from above" or "Christomonism, " 
whereby Christ is the only true subject and humanity purely passive, and, on the other side, 
"subjectivism from below, " whereby the human subject is active and the Divine subject a 
mere anthropocentric projection. He does so, though, by positing a radical distinction 
between the realm of the Divine subject and human subject, which is designed to protect 
the sovereignty of the Divine subject in salvation history. This dichotomy works itself out 
in his compartmentalising the Divine and human action in baptism: baptism by the Spirit 
is the work of the Divine subject; water baptism is the work of the human subject. This 
anti-sacramental position means that there can be no mediation of the Divine activity, only 
a repetition and correspondence to the christological paradigm. This position is not bought 
without a theological cost. 255 
11.0103) Exposition 3. Analogia Relationis: A Christocentric Anthropology. 
An adequate account of how Barth deals with human freedom and "autonomy" cannot be 
given without turning to his christology and doctrine of election. God as sovereign, free 
subject elects humanity, in the person of the God-man, Jesus Christ, antecedent to and 
constitutive of any choice on the part of humanity. This Divine election establishes an 
analogia relationis, what J. Macken calls "a ladder of relationships" between God and 
man. 256 The relationships of the Trinity ad intra, are reflected in the relationship ad extra 
between God and the humanity of Jesus, the Incarnation as God's election of the "true 
man, , 257 in Jesus "God (vere Deus) is for man, and man (vere homo) is for God, "258 the 
pivotal "mediator of the covenant. , 259 Consequently, humanity is granted true autonomy 
through correlating with and corresponding to Jesus as "true man, " in the outpouring of the 
254 ibid., IV/4, pp. 22-23. 
255 Trutz Rentdorff argues that Barth's anti-sacramental position in IV/4 leads to the disintegration of the 
identity of the Church and the reduction of dogmatics to ethics. See J. Macken, The Autonomy Theme in the 
Church Dogmatics. Karl Barth and His Critics (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), pp. 11-13,125-33,177-80. 
256 Macken, p. 57. 
'`s' Barth IV/2, Sc. 64.3. 
258 ibid., IV/2, p. 582. Barth claims that this follows Calvin's doctrine of the dual dynamic in revelation. 
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Spirit. Only then, as a result of Divine election and action, may the human person be said 
to be able to, in a qualified sense, elect God '260 and exercise autonomy. Thus, human 
freedom and agency are defined by Barth in their christological form. 
When Barth writes on the "Miracle of Christmas, " he compares Jesus' conception by the 
Holy Ghost with the conception of the Christian believer by the Spirit, in that both are 
cases of the "same preparation of man for God by God Himself. "261 Again, when he 
explicates the claim that human creatures can never be "autonomous partners or 
workmates with God" in revelation and the gift of faith, he argues that, "man's existence is 
involved only as the humanity of Christ is necessarily involved in the doctrine of the 
incarnation. "262 This approach raises the concerns outlined in the section on "trinitarian 
methodology" in section 111.04) of Chapter 1, relating to the use of the Spirit's role in the 
Incarnation as the paradigm for Divine-human indwelling. As was argued there, the 
disanalogy with Jesus' relation to the Spirit as the exemplar of Divine-human indwelling is 
that in orthodox theology Jesus has been considered to be the Logos en sarx. According to 
Chalcedon the subject of the person of Jesus Christ is the Divine Logos, even if the mind, 
contra Apollinarius, is human. In one sense Jesus is just another human being, who shares 
our common humanity. In another sense, as Logos He differs from another human person 
in kind. In the relation between God and the believer there are two subjects and two 
centres of agency, with the qualification that the human centre is never wholly 
"independent" from the Divine ground of being. To project the Divine-human relation in 
the Incarnation onto the Divine indwelling of the human is to treat humanity in an 
instrumental way, and not to allow it to have a fully dialogical role. Barth's comparison 
relegates the role of humanity to the purely passive, without its own subjecthood. The 
instrumentality of Barth's concept of the place of the creature is clearly evident: "The 
creaturely is made serviceable to the divine and does actually serve it. It is used by God as 
His organ or instrument. "263 
259 ibid., IV/1, p. 36. 
260 ibid., 11/2, p. 177. 
261 ibid., 1/2 pp. 199-200. 
262 ibid., p. 235. 
263 ibid., IV/2, p. 557. 
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In Church Dogmatics IV/I Barth writes that, "it is not a matter of proposing and doing 
something for ourselves, but of following Him [Jesus], of repeating His decision. "264 
Hence, Barth says, "It is in His conversion that we are engaged. X265 Yet, how can Jesus 
require conversion as the Logos en sarx? For what does Jesus have to undergo metanoia? 
It is true that Jesus' humanity, as participating in humanity in general, does bear the marks 
of original sin, but the Logos en sarx restores the dislocation of the human from the 
Divine. Jesus is tempted but he does not sin. Jesus does not undergo a process of 
sanctification, although one may say that His awareness of His Divine mission develops 
throughout the Gospel narratives. 
The "repetition" of which Barth talks, is not a mere imitatio of Christ, if this means 
becoming a mere copy or clone of Jesus: "His [the human creature's] own nature and 
thinking and willing and feeling, both in general and in detail, is not lost. 1,266 Yet, Barth 
has not shown how this is the case. It is certainly difficult to square with his language of 
"compulsion, " "impelling, " "total determination" of the human creature by God. 267 
Christ's life is indeed normative for the Christian, a universal model, but one which is to 
be appropriated in a way which respects human particularity and agency. The question 
which is raised of Barth's account is, whether it really leaves enough room for human 
agency, identity and particularity. 
11.02) Critique. 
11.0201. ) "Determined self-determination" and "Total Determination". 
In the Church Dogmatics I/1, Barth argues in response to Heinrich Scholz's postulates of 
science, that although theology does not consider contradictions to be irremovable, he does 
not definitely opt for their removal. 268 For Barth theology must embrace contradictions and 
is incapable of total systematic representation. Prima facie "determined self- 
determination" appears contradictory, holding together a claim about the freedom of 
human agency with a form of determinism. Is this a mere form of Theological 
264 ibid, IV/1, p. 745. 
265 ibid.. 
266 The almost narcissistic overtones of Barth's view of the imitatio of discipleship comes out in this remark: 
"The master acquires a pupil, a servant, a scholar, a follower, in whom he finds himself again. " ibid., 1/2, 
p. 276- 
267 ibid.. 
268 See Carl F. H. Henry's discussion in God, Revelation and Authority Vol. 1, Chapters 12,14, p. 232ff.. 
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Compatibilism? When Barth talks of being "totally determined" he does not mean 
determination entailed by creation or conservation, but christological determination 
brought about by the Spirit. For the Compatibilist personal identity may, in part, be 
defined as ownership of a particular mental and bodily causal chain which constitutes the 
life of a person over a period of time. Yet Barth envisages intervention in this causal chain 
in a manner over and above the determination of the causal web of creation, Divine 
conservation and of the general conditions determining choice. 
Barth would fail to meet one of the criteria of freedom outlined in Chapter 1: freedom from 
constraint. Such a criterion is often illustrated in the philosophical literature by thought- 
experiments involving, what Dan Dennett calls, "the bogeymen" of human freedom: "the 
invisible jailer, " the "nefarious neurosurgeon, " the "hideous hypnotist, " and the 
"peremptory puppeteer. "269 In all these scenarios a person is controlled by the intervention 
of an external force, and this is agreed to result in a diminution of human freedom and 
responsibility. Barth's God appears to intervene in a similar manner, admittedly according 
to Christians for the good, but follows the pattern, as regards the means of intervention, of 
the "bugbears" and "bogeymen" of the philosophical thought-experiments. This kind of 
intervention 
Indeed, Barth appears to conceive of the Spirit's relation to the believer as a determining 
one, in an even more radical way than the constraints of a master or other temporal 
authority. 270 One's very noetic structure is determined by the special intervention of the 
Spirit. 271 By use of the term "intervention" here I do not intend to deny God's position as 
the ground of our being, but merely wish to maintain that God has granted human agency 
relative autonomy. Hence, the distinction between the determination of the general 
conditions in which free will is exercised, such as the created world, and human agency's 
proximate or local control of its action. The uninvited direct control of the latter would 
constitute an "intervention. " 
269 D. C. Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. (Cambridge (USA): MIT Press, 
1984), pp. 6-10. 
270 See Exposition I) above. 
211 See Exposition I. ) above. 
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Stuart D. McLean argues that the accusation that the human person is absorbed into God 
on Barth's account, is offset if we recall his position that: "1) the relationship of the Spirit 
to the whole man and 2) the distinction between the function of the Spirit in creation, 
providence (preservation), and redemption. X272 I do not see how this helps us here, for my 
argument is precisely with Barth's account of the role of the Spirit in redemption. 273 
McLean seems to be arguing that a period of "total determination" by the Spirit might be 
justified within the larger context of God's work in conserving human existence, which 
upholds the integrity of human agency. This merely raises the question as to how a relative 
autonomy granted to creatures may be upheld at one point and forsaken the next, without 
undermining creaturely integrity. The position also fails to draw a sufficient distinction 
between the nature of Divine action in conservation and redemption. 
Perhaps, Augustine's distinction between being forced to do something and being 
compelled to do it, 274 and his attempt to reconcile compulsion and freedom, will aid 
Barth's position at this point. According to Augustine, when one is forced to do something 
by a greater external power action (or happenings) takes place without will. I fall off the 
top of the mountain because I am pushed. My will is simply bypassed; the action or event 
is involuntary. This sounds very similar to description of the "Divine Fiat" view. Alistair 
McFadyen explains the second term of the distinction: 
Compulsion, on the other hand, does not overcome, but directs, constrains 
and utilises will Far from rendering will inoperative, compulsion engages 
will. Here the power which compels operates internally as well as 
externally; it engages internal motivations and the structure of intentionality 
in willing whilst constricting the range of possible actions. 
275 
McFadyen gives two examples. First, most people seem compelled to will their own 
happiness. 276 The second example involves a person who is compelled to shoot someone 
as a result of an overwhelming threat from a third party. In this case the will is engaged, 
272 S. D. McLean, Humanity in the Thought of Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981), p. 44. 
273 McLean is countering the position of Arnold Come who argues that Barth's doctrine of creation 
does not 
provide humanity with substantial created integrity. 
274 Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, 31. 
275 A. E. McFadyen, Bound to Sin. Abuse, Holocaust and the Christian Doctrine of Sin (Cambridge: CUP, 
2000), p. 183. 
276 "[W]ill is here engaged precisely where there is no choice. In short, Augustine's claim is that we do not 
suppose there to be an absence of willing to 
be happy when we suppose it to be a part of our human 
condition to be unable to will otherwise. " 
ibid., p. 181. 
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even if it is so unwillingly. 277 McFadyen describes the form of compulsion involved in 
faith: 
Faith is unlike the above example only in that its compulsion is not 
unwilling but consensual (on account of the spirit of love instilled by the 
Holy Spirit). In place of the restriction of choice through circumstances, in 
faith choice is restricted in the will's single-minded devotion which 
disempowers the power of competing attractions to motivate. In faith there 
is conformity between will and compelled desire. For there is no place 
outside of this orientation towards God and the good on which the will can 
stand to survey competing possibilities. In faith, the will is compelled but, 
claims Augustine, it is also free..... because it is compelled in movement 
towards God and the good. Freedom is here defined as freedom to do and 
will the good. 278 
I am less convinced than MacFadyen is that the "genius" of this distinction is able to 
reconcile grace and freedom. The outcome is at the least muddy. For a start the 
"consensual" nature of the relationship seems to be undercut by the appeal to an 
unspecified prior action of grace, the infusion of the spirit of love (prevenient grace). The 
question is therefore begged: how may the process be consensual when one's consent 
stems from a compulsion of the will which is directly caused by an external power, 
namely, the Spirit, without any prior consent? There is a very real danger that consensual 
compulsion will simply collapse into forced action and hence the "Divine Fiat" view. If my 
consent is compelled through direction causation, without any participation of the human 
personality in reaching that state, then my compulsion, although involving the will in its 
desire for an end, is involuntary in origination. Perhaps, the Spirit's moving of the will to a 
compulsion towards God and the good is carried out in a way which is consensual and 
participatory, but that needs to be specified. That is precisely what the Personalist model 
proposed in the next three Chapters attempts to do. 
Freedom defined as "freedom to and will the good" appears to introduce another type of 
argument, a "greater good" style argument. God is justified in causing humans (the means) 
to consent to a state of compulsion towards Him because the end is greater good. This type 
of argument in this context begs the question: why does God not simply create His 
creatures with such an unassailable compulsion instead of undertaking salvation history to 
277 "'Unwilling' denotes to Augustine, not absence of will, as if it were a synonym for 'involuntary, ' but a 
division of will, a situation wherein we are compelled to will against our will. " ibid., p. 182. 
278 ibid., p. 184. 
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do so? Finally, there is a third argument which comes into McFadyen's rendering of 
Augustine, namely, that contrary Pelagius, the human will is not poised in a state of 
"neutrality and equilibrium" with the capacity of equal choice between good and evil. 
Compulsion is not an exceptional state of the human will, but actually its norm. The only 
question is what power does the compelling, sin or God? If compulsion is the norm, then it 
would seem that some kind of causal change in order to alter human orientation, or 
compulsion to will the good, is actually a necessary Divine action. In this context, there 
appears nothing unpalatable about the Divine causal action which brings about compulsion 
without consent, as there is no alternative. Yet, does such a position, which offers an 
either/or choice between, on the one hand, a naive conception of the "neutrality and 
equilibrium" of the human will, and on the other, a view of the normative compulsion of 
the will, really meet the reality of the human condition? I am disinclined to think it does; it 
fails to capture the interactive and participatory nature of human relations with the Divine. 
A Personalist model of Divine-human relations will be developed precisely to cover such 
an explanatory hole, from which to return in more detailed fashion to these issues in 
Chapter 5. For now, one may conclude that Augustine's position as explicated by 
McFadyen has not offered Barth's position more explanatory clarity and power. More 
needs to be said, and perhaps differently. 
11.0202. ) Formal Human Freedom and Substantive Freedom of Proper Fulfilment. 
It will be recalled that Gunton at the outset posed the question of whether critics of Barth 
"simply operate with different preconceptions, " or, one might add, different conceptions of 
freedom. Perhaps, we ought to be clear what Barth's conception of freedom is: "Barth uses 
the term freedom for a special use of will - when thought, will, desire, and awareness are 
efficaciously related to the reality of God's redemptive action, as well as freedom as self- 
determination. "279 The question is left hanging as to how freedom as self-determination 
and a liberated freedom in relation to God, "freedom for, " are related when the Spirit 
appears to have such a determining role in subjective revelation. 
279 McLean, p. 53. 
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It is clear that the only freedom and autonomy that Barth is prepared to fully recognise is 
reconciled freedom, "freedom for God" created by God, 280 and the autonomy given in the 
Divine election of the human. 281 
The freedom and subjectivity of man is constituted in his being called to 
responsibility before God, in the act of his relationship to God... This 
statement is equivalent to saying that man's freedom and subjectivity is 
282 constituted in Jesus Christ, in whom alone man is related to God. 
Equally Barth would reject that this leads to a breach of freedom from constraint and is 
essentially causal in mode. 283 We are back to Gunton's question of why there is still 
disbelief! One reason is that Barth does not draw the distinction and hence does not 
explain the relationship between, what we have called, formal human freedom and 
substantive freedom of proper fulfilment. 284 Barth, as we have seen, only recognises the 
substantive freedom as "freedom for God" created by God. The fact that Christ and the 
Spirit present humanity with the true content and substance of human freedom, and hence 
its proper fulfilment, I take to be an incontrovertible claim of the Christian faith. The point 
that has to be reckoned with is that the Christian content and telos is bestowed upon a 
formal human freedom which has been granted to humanity at creation, which has its own 
relative autonomy. 285 
11.0203) Applying the Criteria of Freedom and Personal Identity. 
It has already been argued that Barth's account is not compatible with the criterion of 
freedom from constraint, elucidated in Chapter 1. In this section other criteria of freedom 
and personal identity, outlined in Chapter 1, section 1.013), are applied to Barth's account. 
The determination of the person by the Spirit in the gift of faith, does not stem from an 
280 See Gunton, "The triune God and the freedom of the creature, " p. 50. 
281 ibid., p. 51. Barth, 11/2. 
282 Macken, p. 59. 
283 "[God] affirms and approves and recognises the autonomous actuality and therefore the autonomous 
activity of the creature as such. He does not play the part of tyrant towards it. " Barth, Church Dogmatics 
111/3, p. 92. Compare this also to his earlier pronouncement: "... the sovereignty of His love, which did not will 
to exercise mechanical force, to move the immobile from without, to rule over puppets or slaves, but willed 
rather to triumph in faithful servants and friends, not in their overthrow, but in obedience, in their own free 
decision for him. " ibid. 11/2, p. 178. 
284 For definitions of these terms see Chapter 1, sc. 1.013). 
285 The mistake which some apologists for Barth make, is to assume that the only alternative to the Barthian 
position is a host of philosophical undesirables from Fichtean Idealism, Existentialism, to an Enlightenment 
libertarianism. See for example, Gunton, "The trinue God and the freedom of the creature, " p. 57. This is 
clearly a philosophical extreme, if not a straw horse, a version of the causa sui fallacy mentioned in Chapter 
1. The question is not a matter of the denial of the formation of human character or action, nor even its 
determination. The issue concerns the manner in which human character and action is formed or determined. 
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intrinsic principle of the agent. We are not free in any way to respond to God until faith 
has been bestowed, nor are we free to acknowledge the gift. These are both actions which 
are under the control of God to such an extent that his control extends beyond a 
determination of our motivational structures to our very noetic organisation. Hence, the 
integrity or relative autonomy of the agent's intellect and will, the very source of human 
free will, is put under question. 
Barth's account also has adverse effects in relation to the category of personal identity. In 
terms of qualitative identity, it is not clear, given the degree and manner of Divine 
intervention which Barth postulates, that a human subject could keep hold of her sense of 
self, or psychological stability, during subjective revelation. If the Spirit "totally 
determines" me for a period of time, some account needs to be given of how psychological 
coherence is maintained, that is, how a person's sense of self is not simply overwhelmed 
by the influx of Divine action. As regards numerical identity, if the Spirit "totally 
determines" me surely my identity is displaced by another subject. If there is such an 
intervention, a person would not be able to relate a coherent story about himself, as Lucas 
claims we must if we are to ensure personal identity from the first-person perspective. The 
controlling subject is the Spirit, the human subject is completely bypassed until a later 
stage. Hence, Barth's account can be said to render a similar conclusion to Brown's thesis 
that the Spirit becomes subject, admittedly not permanently, but in the event of 
conversion. The Spirit brings about a real qualitative change of identity without apparent 
invitation or sanction. 
The fact that Barth adopts a more participatory and active conception of human agency in 
Church Dogmatics IV/4, is a pyhrric victory. Not only does it lead to quite unorthodox 
ecclesiological conclusions concerning the sacraments and the identity of the Church, 
denying the human any mediatorial role in Divine action, but its claims for the "autonomy" 
of human agency are unsatisfactory. John Macken provides the reasoning to support this 
point: 
The human being has a proper sphere of activity [on Barth's account]. But 
this is admitted at the cost of allowing nothing of ultimate significance to 
happen within this sphere. Ultimate is the action of God alone. Barth takes 
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this principle so far as to deny to the concrete expression of Revelation 
itself within the human sphere its character as divine action. 286 
The conclusion to be reached is not that Church Dogmatics IV/4, by some dialectical 
manoeuvre, corrects a previous imbalance in Barth's conception of the Divine-human 
relationship. Rather it is an extension of his original position, and the unfortunate 
theological results of his position in IV/4, merely pass a retroactive judgement on the 
imbalance of his conception of the Divine-human relationship as a whole. 
11.0204) The Use of Causal not Personal Language. 
As has been argued above, a distinction can be drawn between bringing about change in a 
personal way, "to persuade" or "to affect, " and instituting change in an impersonal or 
causal mode, in the sense of efficient causation. It is my contention that Barth when he 
gives an account of the outpouring of the Spirit in subjective revelation adopts, 
intentionally or unintentionally, a causal model. This point seems quite evident, as we 
have seen already, from the nature of the language that Barth uses. For example, his talk of 
the human person being "totally determined, " "taken and bound and ruled, " and his use of 
the master-slave language. Moreover, Barth is quite happy referring to human persons as 
"objects" of God's action. Thus, he talks of human beings in Christian redemption as 
God's "property. , 287 Notice that this does not refer simply to God's relation to us as 
Creator and Conserver. 
Although Barth has avoided using the "semi-causal" concept of grace at a christological 
level, 288 as Colin Gunton has pointed out, the same is less clear at the pneumatological 
level. In terms of the Spirit's relation to Jesus he uses the language of compulsion, rather 
than liberation, at one point speaking of 'the Spirit who controls this man. 
289 Gunton 
comments that the hypostatic union requires that the Divine nature does not subvert the 
human: 
If the divine being, action and consciousness so pervade the human being of 
the saviour, the resources for characterising his action as free human action 
286 Macken, p. 181. 
287 K. Barth writes: "God now takes over the responsibility for us. We are now His property, and He has the 
disposal of us. " Dogmatics in Outline. (London: SCM Press, 1966), p. 151. Compare this with Church 
Dogmatics IV/3, p. 538: "His control, as that of the owner over his possession.... ". 
288 Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/3, p. 173. 
289 ibid., IV/2, p. 347. 
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are suppressed. But might not the same or similar be suspected of the Spirit 
who 'controls this man' ? 290 
For Gunton this is a sign of Barth's lack of a developed pneumatology. 291 It may equally be 
said that it is consistent with the causal language he uses in relation to the Spirit's role in 
subjective revelation. 
Stuart McLean defends Barth against the charge of operating with a causal model by 
referring back to, what I have called above, Barth's two stage movement in the application 
of Christian redemption. As a whole, McLean argues, this two stage movement does 
constitute a dialogical-dialectical model of the Divine-human relationship. Barth's term is 
"Entsprechung, " the correspondence between God's action in love and humanity's 
subsequent response. 292 That there is this structure in Barth should be noted, but it is too 
linear in form, too chronological to be truly dialogical. It involves the joining together of 
two "one-way" relationships. In, what I shall call stage 1 (subjective revelation), the human 
person is not treated as a subject but merely as an object. The Spirit's causal intervention 
occurs without any concern to first illicit consent or response: human subjectivity is 
bypassed with the intent of establishing the conditions for "true" exercise of one's freedom 
and agency. Barth means by "object, " not inanimate entity, but refers rather to a passive- 
active distinction. God is first active, the subject, the human passive, the object posited by 
God. Only then is the human active, responsible before God, able "to posit itself and 
therefore be subject. "293 However, the real question is how God is active and from my 
exposition of Barth above it should be clear that God's mode of action is causal. The 
required change in the human person takes place as a result not of persuasion or personal 
presence, but through direct, uninvited causal intervention which only makes room for a 
human response at a later stage. As John Oman writes, direct causal action fails to take the 
290 C. E. Gunton, "A Systematic Triangle. Hegel, Kierkegaard, Barth and the Question of Ethics, " unpublished 
paper (Written for a conference of the Research Institute in Systematic Theology, King's College London, 
March 1999), p. 7. 
291 The charge is expanded upon in Gunton, "God the Holy Spirit, " pp. 105-6. Thomas Smail argues that in 
Barth the Spirit is "functionally subordinate to the Son" T. Smail, "The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, " in 
Beyond Christendom Essays on the Centenary of the Birth of Karl Barth. ed. by Allison Park, 
(Pennsylvannia: Pickwick Publications, 1986), pp. 87-1 10. 
292 McLean explicates the point: "God is a subject, and man can be considered an object. On the other hand, 
man is subject, having been addressed by God, distinguished from Him, and given His grace, as He responds 
to God as object. Thus both God and man are subject in one sense and object in another. The 
intersubjectivity of the interaction of grace (charis) and thanksgiving (eucharistia) is the history of the God- 
man relationship and constitutes the content of the being of man. " McLean, p. 31. 
293 Barth, 111/2, p. 192. 
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workings of the human personality seriously or allow for it to appropriate external 
information to itself: 
No really personal aid can be of purely external operation, but must call 
forth a response from within. It cannot even be direct in any way, but must 
pass round so as to embrace the giver and receiver in one fellowship. 294 
Stuart McLean is persistent in his claim that Barth's model of the metamorphosis of the 
human is indeed personal: 
The action of the Spirit and the Word may evoke but do not necessitate a 
response.... Thus the "causal" connection between God and man is not a 
straight cause-and-effect schema but the peculiar interaction, analogous to 
the complex occurrence when words are used, when a person is called or 
named. This interpersonal, interverbal, and interactional nexus establishes 
the basis for subjectivity and spontaneity of the "call" and "answer" more 
characteristic of an exchange of words than anything else. 295 
However, the language that we have seen Barth employ and the account of subjective 
revelation is far from dialogical. When I "call" or "name" someone I do not first enter into 
their minds to condition their response. Yet, this is precisely what Barth's Spirit does. The 
Spirit does not call or exhort us in a way which gives us space to maintain the integrity of 
our agency. The Spirit actually intervenes without invitation at the heart of our personal 
being, to condition the response; the acknowledgement is an "acknowledged 
acknowledgement. " How can this be said to represent an "interpersonal, interverbal, and 
interactional nexus, " as we know it? The fact that a more dialogical model may be in 
operation at a later stage in Barth's account of the Divine-human relationship, hardly 
assists us in conceiving of the earlier stage as anything other than causal in operation. 
11.0205) Theological Difficulties: "Das Nichtige. " Barth on the Rejection of God. 
Barth's account also faces the theological problem of explaining why some believe and 
others do not. 296 He is prepared to shroud the whole process of subjective revelation in 
294 Oman, p. 47. 
295 ibid., p. 33. 
296 Eleonore Stump makes a similar point to the underlining problem in this section: if God could in fact 
make a person morally good, why would he not do so for all persons? How could a good God fail to impart 
such a benefit to all human beings, so that there would never be any moral evil on earth and no one would 
ever be brought to hell? " E. Stump, "Sanctification , Hardening of the Heart and Frankfurt's 
Concept of Free 
Will, " Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85 (1988), p. 412. Compare this also with John Oman thought: "If grace is 
this kind of strong hand upon the individual, we can no more approve its goodness and wisdom: because a 
grace which can ignore our moral independence can have no excuse for allowing our moral deficiencies. " 
Oman, p. 67. 
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mystery: "we do not know how it happened. , 297 The rejection of God's revelation and 
grace is inexplicable, relegated by Barth to the realm of "das Nichtige. " Das Nichtige is 
that which has been brought to nothing by God's declaration of "No" in relation to that 
which is not part of His good creation. This Nihil is what Barth terms, an "impossible 
possibility, " because the possibility of evil is excluded from God's work of creation, and as 
such has no positive reason for existence. The result of this line of thought is that a 
person's rejection of grace is for Barth an impossible and inexplicable abuse of their 
freedom. This in itself presents a contradiction, because Barth wishes to deny that a human 
person is free before being brought to faith. Such a position also contravenes Barth's own 
statement that the choice between faith and unbelief is an "illusion, " which begs the 
question how a person can actually then be free to reject God. 
Barth's reference to Das Nichtige as the "impossible possibility" is itself confusing. He 
cannot be referring to logical or conceptual impossibility, for it is still a possibility that a 
person rejects God. Neither is it a matter of factual impossibility, for it is an empirical fact 
that many people hear the Gospel and still do not believe. Perhaps, what Barth is referring 
to here is rational impossibility, namely, that to reject God's call goes against all good 
reason. This seems more plausible. However, it should be remembered that a person, 
according to Barth, has no choice in relation to the bestowal of faith and even the 
acknowledgement of the gift of faith is determined by the Spirit. Further, Barth refers to 
the "necessity of faith. " How is one in a position to reject the gift of faith once it has been 
given and acknowledged, after such a degree of uninvited intervention on the part of the 
Spirit? It appears that faith, once it has been bestowed, is not irresistible, and the efficacy 
of the Spirit, after its primary intervention, is not wholly efficacious. Yet Barth asserts that 
despite the account of subjective revelation that he has given, the work of the Word and 
the Spirit call forth and initiate a response, they do not necessitate it. 
298 If the rejection of 
faith from this perspective appears an "impossible possibility, " it is because Barth's 
account of the gift of faith and the role of the Spirit has made the rejection of God seem 
implausible, an impossibility. That this is the case and that people do appear to reject God 
suggests that it is Barth's account which is responsible for this apparent contradiction. 
297 Barth, 1/2, p. 267, cf. pp. 233-235. 
298 Barth writes that God "... has not therefore made obedience physically necessary or disobedience 
physically impossible. " ibid., 111/1, p. 
266. 
75 
However, Barth's concept of the possibility of the rejection of God is interpreted, he has 
not provided a particularly convincing explanation of how and why people reject God, 
which is directly linked to his inadequate account of human agency and identity in relation 
to the Divine in the event of subjective revelation. 
11.0206) Theological Difficulty: Equation of the Orders of Creation and Reconciliation. 
In terms of the context of Barth's discussion of the Spirit's involvement in subjective 
revelation in relation to Christian doctrine, his account presupposes a too radical division, 
as regards Christian anthropology, between created goodness and redeemed humanity, 
created freedom and redeemed freedom. This is not because Barth posits a separation as 
such between the doctrines of creation and redemption. Indeed, John Macken argues that 
Barth connects the two doctrines to the extent that the doctrine of creation is thoroughly 
subordinated to that of reconciliation: 
Barth's treatment of Creation and nature was also too narrowly conceived, 
that is purely in function of a relationship to grace and Reconciliation. Thus 
Creation was emptied of its complexity and richness and treated all too 
exclusively as a mere outer presupposition of the Covenant, as the bare 
stage (theatrum) on which a drama is played whose actors and plot belong 
exclusively to another order. 299 
This stems from Barth's rejection of the analogia entis in favour of the analogia relationis, 
and his determination to apply a "Christocentric principle" and "constrictioni300 to human 
freedom and identity. Freedom is only defined as freedom for God created by God, 
constituted by Jesus Christ, while created freedom is ignored and relativised. One might 
say the same of the whole created order. 
Barth saw too late that the universality of his construction, in which 
everything is derived from above, from Revelation in Christ, demanded the 
integration of human existence in the world, of history and empirical 
knowledge.... The fault does not lie in the assertion that we owe our being 
and our world exclusively to God, which is the doctrine of Creation, but 
in 
the ungenerous and anxious depreciation of God's gifts to us in Creation out 
of anxiety that we might claim them for ourselves. 
301 
299 Macken, p. 170. 
30° These terms are used by Macken, pp. 81,148. 
301 ibid., p. 170. Macken continues: "For Barth, the ontological and noetic orders 
had to run parallel. Thus his 
restrictive theses showed themselves 
in both areas, on the one hand in his axiomatic restrictions on human 
knowledge (of which his rejection of all natural theology was the cause and the symptom) and on the other 
in 
his ontology, in which he tried to derive all significant statements about 
human nature and worldly reality 
from statements about Jesus Christ. " ibid., p. 171. 
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The reason why the Spirit is required to have such a domineering role in the gift of faith is 
precisely because humanity is in a state of radical sin and true humanity is only to be found 
in the "true man". As created freedom and redeemed freedom are discontinuous, there is 
nothing left, but for the Spirit to intervene in the human by "Divine fiat. " As a result 
created humanity is bypassed in the move to redeemed humanity. This is also why Barth 
neglects an attempt to reconcile his theological conceptions of freedom with common 
sense intuitions concerning freedom and personal identity. Such a critique of Barth will 
only be properly substantiated when we turn, in Chapter 5, to examine the question of the 
extent of sin. 
11.0207) Theological Difficulties: The Charge of Gnostic Dualism. 
There is yet another problematic facet to Barth's account, in relation to the doctrine of 
God. The discontintuity between created and redeemed freedom, setting aside at one level 
his equation of the two orders, forces us to posit a distinction between God the creator and 
redeemer. This is precisely a tendency in Western theology which David Burrell warns 
against: the separation of the doctrines of creation and redemption, which Burrell claims 
leads to the dominance of a naturalistic attitude towards the world, 302 and inversely, one 
may say in the case of Barth, in relation to the question of subjective revelation, to a 
creation which can only passively wait for the second stage of Divine action, redemption, 
to which it contributes nothing. This leads to a form of Gnostic dualism, the positing of 
two orders of reality, the created and the redeemed, one of which, the created, is devalued, 
disconnected and subsumed by the true manifestation of reality in the redeemed order. 
Notice that what is being argued here is not that Barth intentionally institutes a separation 
between the doctrines of creation and redemption. This would clearly be mistaken in light 
of the pivotal role he gives to the doctrine of the covenant. What is being argued is that 
from the perspective of his account of subjective revelation certain theological 
presuppositions arise, which in practice lead to the separation of creation and redemption. 
The contradiction at the heart of Barth's theology, for although he explicitly argues for the 
relation of the doctrines of creation and redemption from the locus of his doctrine of the 
covenant, this is elsewhere undermined by his own theological epistemology, his emphasis 
on the transcendence of God, the depravity of humankind, his less than satisfactory 
302 David B. Burrell, Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1994). 
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account of the relationship of grace and nature, and his attempt to conceive of reality in 
terms of his christological principle. 
III. ) Conclusion. 
It has been the purpose of this Chapter to illustrate the type of theological position, 
regarding our subject matter, to which this thesis seeks an alternative. Both theologians in 
this Chapter have raised issues which will remain with us throughout the development of 
this thesis. Brown's contribution has been to highlight the importance of the mystical 
tradition in explicating the Spirit's indwelling and the employment of the subject-object 
distinction. Barth sets the parameters for the course that has to be plotted, avoiding the 
twin dangers of anthropocentrism, "subjectivism from below, " and christomonism, 
"subjectivism from above. " He affirms the place of revelation in Christian epistemology, 
and maintains a quite proper distinction between the Divine and human subject. His 
conception of freedom as a freedom for God, reminds us that the definitions of freedom 
and personal identity given in Chapter 1, need to interact with a Christian conception of 
substantive freedom, the telos of human freedom (Chapter 5). The relation of the doctrines 
of creation and redemption are raised, a subject to which we will have to return in Chapter 
8. Barth prompts us to keep in mind the liberative character of the Spirit's action and the 
disabling effects of sin. The substantive freedom granted by the action of the Spirit, and 
the prior human blindness caused by sin, both mean that a Divine initiative in transforming 
the human person is required. Pelagianism is not an option taken seriously in this thesis. 
Rather it will be argued that this Divine initiative is indeed integral, but may be expressed 
in terms other than those employed by Barth, ones which are more consistent with the 
personal nature of the relationship between the Divine and the human. In drawing the 
negative conclusion that the "Divine Fiat" view is to be opposed, we move forward in the 
hope of seeking an alternative, with which to engage many of the salient points raised by 
Barth and Brown. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
A PERSONALIST MODEL OF THE SPIRIT-HUMAN RELATION. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to begin to put forward an alternative to the "Divine Fiat" 
view. The alternative position to be elucidated in this chapter will be one which utilises the 
model-theory presented in Chapter 1, to advocate a "Personalist model" of Spirit-human 
relations, that is, one based on an extended analogy between interpersonal human 
relationships and that of the Spirit-human relationship. The term 'Personalist' is employed 
to signify that the model's source is in the domain of human personal relationships. No 
reference is intended to the specific school of philosophy called "Personalism, " initiated in 
America in the late 19/20th century, for which "person" is the ontological ultimate term 
and "personality" the fundamental explanatory principle. 303 The question which this 
Chapter poses is whether a "Personalist model" can offer a more satisfactory account of 
how the Spirit's activity in Christian metamorphosis is compatible with human freedom 
and personal identity. 
It is also important to emphasise that the Personalist Model which will be presented below, 
although influenced by the revival of personal categories in religious explanation in the 
work of Martin Buber, is certainly not advancing a thesis in the train of his "Dialogical 
Personalism. " Famously, Buber draws a distinction between "personal, " "I-Thou" relations 
between persons and with forms of nature, and "impersonal, " "I-It" relations. "I-It" 
relations refer to, what philosophers would call, "subject-object" relations, which have the 
following characteristics: an ordering and classification of the object, a lack of personal 
reciprocity, a functional relation, being general rather than unique and exclusive, set within 
a spatio-temporal causal context, measurable and common to all . 
304 In contradistinction, 
the "I-Thou" relation is a "subject-subject" relation, not mediated by categories or 
classification, not causally determined, hence not governed by spatio-temporal categories, 
303 Examples of philosophers who were in the forefront of American Personalism are: Borden 
Parker Browne 
(1847-1910), and Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1884 - 1954). For a survey article see Erazim 
Kohak, 
"Personalism: Towards a Philosophical Delineation, " Personalist Forum Vol. 13 (1997), pp. 
3 -11. It would 
be interesting to undertake a study of the use of the British theologians J. R. Illingworth's, R. 
C. Moberly's, J. 
Oman's and H. H. Farmer's use of the concept of "personality, " which 
is used in their work and to examine to 
what extent philosophical personalism was of 
influence. 
304 Martin Buber, I and Thou. trans. by Walter Kaufmann (Edinburgh: T&T. Clark, 1970), pp. 80ff. 
79 
but free, immediate and direct. 305 It cannot be fully analysed or described, but only 
exemplified. It is reciprocal and symmetrical, and involves the relation of the "whole 
person. "306 As we shall see below, this distinction does prefigure some of the 
characteristics of Vincent Brummer's and his followers' distinction between personal and 
impersonal relations, yet is also distinct from them. 307 
Critiques of Buber's position have effectively exhibited its limitations. Steven Katz has 
argued that Buber's religious thought is tainted by an epistemology, which follows the 
pattern of Kantianism, leading to the subjectivism of a "species or mutant of idealism. 008 
At the heart of this is Buber's radical dichotomy between "I-Thou" and "I-It" relations. Yet, 
interpersonal relations require knowledge by description or objectivity concepts, what 
Buber wishes to confine to "I-It" relations, so that, as Katz writes, "a minimal condition for 
employing dialogical language meaningfully [necessitates] some identifying skeleton of 
the notion of Thou must be given and this will require understanding the indissoluble tie 
between what the other is and who the other is. "309 Let us note that the distinction made in 
Chapter 2 between a causal and a personal modus operandi, and hence the similar move 
made by Brummer and his followers, is in no way dependent upon Buber's extreme 
dichotomy, positing, as he does, the "personal" as "a-spatial, a-temporal, wholly non- 
sensual, and non-experiential, " that is, "divorced from all behavioural material 
predicates. 010 In this thesis, the "personal/impersonal" distinction does not refer to 
ontology or metaphysics, as such, but to the modes of operation of an agent, with 
particular reference to the Spirit. 
I) The Personalist Model and the Christian Tradition. 
It is one of the presuppositions of this thesis that Christian Scripture provides strong 
evidence not only for the distinct reality of the Spirit, but also the personal nature of the 
Spirit, and the other Divine hypostaseis. The term "personal" is taken to refer to the ability 
305 ibid., p. 59ff. 
306 ibid. 
307 See the "personal conception of God" set out in, G. van den Brink & Marcel Sarot, "Contemporary 
Philosophical Theology, " in Understanding the Attributes of God, eds. van den Brink 
& Sarot (Frankfurt: 
Peter Lang, 1999), pp. 27-8. 
308 Katz, "Martin Buber's Epistemology", p. 147; "Dialogue and Revelation. " 
309 Ibid., p. 151. Katz goes on to comment that in personal relationships, 
"I do not just have a spontaneous, 
content-less, Thou relation to 
her in some space time vacuum. " ibid. 
310 Ibid., p 152. 
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to have certain intentional states, analogous to human intentional mental states, to be able 
to relate to human persons or other personal existents in a dialogical manner, without the 
need to revert to the language of consciousness. 311 My concern in this section is not to go 
over such well-trodden ground, but to examine whether or not a "Personalist Model" has 
any pedigree within the Christian tradition. 
As we have seen in chapter 1, in explicating the doctrine of the Trinity, Richard of St. 
Victor and later Bonaventura used analogies with interpersonal human love. They wrote at 
a time when there was a development of a theology of love. 312 David Brown's work, 
examined in the last chapter, highlighted the importance of the Christian mystical tradition 
in the debate. Mysticism is not all of a kind, but an identifiable strand within the Christian 
mystical tradition, "bridal mysticism, "313 readily employs personalist metaphors. It finds its 
inspiration partly in Scripture: 314 
In the Hebrew Scriptures, God is described as the unfailing lover of his 
people Israel, while in the New Testament, God, the Father of Jesus, not 
only is loving, but is identified with Love itself (1 John 4: 8). Both 
Christianity and Judaism, then, conceive of God not just as some 
impersonal Highest Good, but as the transcendentally personal Creator and 
Goal of human beings. 315 
It is especially the Song of Songs and Hosea, in Hebrew Scripture, which classically gave 
inspiration to the development of "personalist" language in the Christian tradition as 
regards the God-human relation, although there is some debate as to whether this was the 
311 In trinitarian theology I prefer to use the term "personal" in conjunction with a suitable noun (e. g. 
subsistence) to refer to the trinitarian hypostaseis, rather than using the term "person, " which has too many 
anthropomorphic connotations. See Fermer, p. 178 n. 86. 
312 See the Cistercian tradition, for example: Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones in Cantica Canticorum; Liber 
de Diligendo Deo; Aelred of Rievaulx, Speculum Caritatis and De Spirituali Amicitia; William of St. 
Thierry, De Natura et Dignitate Amoris. 
313 Maas, p. 94. Examples of this tradition are: Bernard of Clairvaux, William of Saint Thierry, Ramon Lull, 
Thomas Gallus, Jan van Ruusbroec, John of the Cross, Teresa of Avila. See also Bernard McGinn, "Love, 
Knowledge and Mystical Union, " Church History, Vol. 56 (1987), pp. 7-24; "God as Eros: Metaphysical 
Foundations of Christian Mysticism, " in New Perspectives on Historical Theology: Essays in Memory of 
John Meyendorff. Ed. Bradley Nassif. (Michigan/Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdman Publishing Company, 1996), 
pp. 189-209; Andrew Louth, "Eros and Mysticism. Early Christian interpretation of the Song of Songs", in 
Jung and the Monotheisms: Judaism, Christianity and Islam, ed. by Joel Ryce-Menuhin (London/New York: 
Routledge, 1994), pp. 241 - 255. 
314 As McGinn comments on the use of the language of human love in "Bridal mysticism": "They did this not 
only because such language was found in the Scriptures, notably the Song of Songs, but also because sexual 
language offered them a unique set of symbols to present experiences that were, at least according to the 
mystics themselves, incapable of being fully circumscribed by language. " B. McGinn, "The Language of 
Love in Christian Mysticism and Jewish Mysticism, " in Mysticism and Language. ed. S. T. Katz. (Oxford: 
OUP, 1992), p-225- 
315 McGinn, "God as Eros", p. 205. 
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Song of Songs' original intention. 316 The metaphor of marriage is used widely throughout 
Scripture to depict the relation of God and His People, 317 and equally marriage is seen as a 
covenant analogous to the Divine-human covenant. 318 St. Paul uses the concept of 
marriage in terms of the relationship between Christ and the Church. 319 Finally, the Book 
of Revelation describes the exalted and returning Christ, the Lamb, as the bridegroom and 
the church, the new Jerusalem, as the bride. 320 These themes within Scripture have been 
most thoroughly pursued in "bridal mysticism. " Colin Thompson makes the following 
remark about the use by Christian mystics of "personalist" language: 
Though transcendent, God is also personal, and has established the 
possibility of a deep relationship of love between himself and the 
individual. Such an experience drives the mystic who attempts to express it 
into a bold language in which love raises and binds him into union with 
God. He is driven to proclaim this even though it is in tension with the 
infinite distance between God and his creation, because he has experienced 
both moments of insight, celebrating in one breath the unreachable mystery 
of God, and in the next the closest sharing of the divine love. There is no 
reconciliation possible or necessary: there are the two extremes of the 
Christian experience of God, transcendence and immanence, and the mystic 
is profoundly aware of both. 321 
Louis Dupre argues, in addition, that the language of human love is used by the mystics to 
reflect the path to mystical union which is experienced as a dynamic "process", mirroring 
the often slow and painful passage of human interpersonal love. 322 The mystics are not 
'literalists', 323 hence the use of paradox, and the dialectic. To translate this insight into the 
316 Bernard McGinn, Review Article, "With the 'Kisses of the Mouth': Recent Works on the Song of Songs, " 
Journal of Religion, Vol. 72 (1992), pp. 269-275. 
317 Examples in the Hebrew Scripture of God as faithful lover to the faithless, apostasy and prostitution of 
Israel are: Hosea 1.2-3.5 (the most common Hebrew root of the word love, aheb, is first used in Hosea); 
Isaiah 1.21,50.1,54.4-10,62.4-5, Jeremiah 2.2,32f., 3.1-13; Ezekiel 16.1-63,23.1-49. In the New 
Testament the marriage motif Mark 2.19f., Matt. 22.2, Rev. 19.7,9,21.2,9,22.17. 
318 See Adrian Thatcher, Marriage after Modernity: Christian Marriage in Postmodern Times (Sheffield, 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), pp. 68 - 77,222 - 225. He writes: "The use of the terms 'image' and 
'symbol' to describe the relation between the human covenant of marriage and the divine covenant between 
God and God's people bears an ontological reference. The couple participate in the divine covenant. One 
becomes an expression of the other. When Christ is spoken of as the 'Bridegroom of the Church, ' nuptial 
imagery borrowed from Eph. 5.25-27 is used as a way of achieving experiential continuity between the two 
covenants. " ibid., p. 224. 
319 See Eph. 5.23-32; II Cor. 11.12. 
320 Rev. 19.7; 21.2,9; 22.17. 
321 Colin P. Thompson, The Poet and Mystic. A study of the Cantico Espirituel of San Juan de la Cruz 
(Oxford: OUP, 1997), p. 164. 
322 L. Dupre, "The Christian Experience of Mystical Union, " Journal of Religion, Vol. 69, (1989), p. 12. 
323 "Literalist" is being used of someone who wishes to apply, for example, sensual terminology directly to 
God. This, however, does not prevent some language from being used "literally", "in expressing a 
comparative concept of a mode of appearance. " W. P. Alston, "Literal and Nonliteral in Reports of Mystical 
Experience, " in Mysticism and Language, ed. by S. T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 99. As 
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methodology of this thesis, they provide warrant for developing a "Personalist Model, " 
without ever forgetting its limitations as a model. As we have already seen in our 
criticisms of Brown, Bridal Mystics, such as Bernard of Clairvaux, talk of a unity of will 
not of being. By using the metaphor of human romantic love an ontological distinction is 
accepted that is analogous to the separateness of human persons, which is a necessary 
condition of love. 324 
It is not my intention to dispense with the contributions of "bridal mysticism" in one block, 
but to integrate insights which may be gained from the mystical tradition within the 
conceptual development of a Personalist Model. There is one matter, though, with which 
we must immediately deal. This is the fact that in "Bridal mysticism" the Personalist 
model is used to describe the relationship of Christ and the believer; it is Christ who is the 
Bridegroom, and the soul who is the bride. This presents a problem for the subject matter 
of this thesis which is specifically pneumatological. Now, this problem might be able to be 
side-stepped if the Bridal Mystics just used personalist metaphors to describe the Divine- 
human relationship undifferentiated, but they do not. Let us take St. John of the Cross as 
an example. In his work he describes the Spirit in terms of a "flame of love", 325 
"breath", 326 "the gentle breeze", 327 "amber", 328 and a "torrent of love". 329 None of these are 
personalist metaphors, but impersonal ones. How can St. John of the Cross combine such 
impersonal metaphors with his central personalist model of the Bride and the Bridegroom? 
Alston argues, in his paper, "Mysticism and Language": "The general conclusion is that certain relatively 
abstract and unspecific terms can be used literally of God, and indeed can be used univocally of God and 
creatures. But this abstract and sketchy core must be supplemented by healthy doses of metaphorical, 
analogical and symbolic language before we have what is needed for a functioning religion. " ibid., p. 100. 
324 Separateness as a necessary condition of love is the thesis of Ilham Dilman: "I cannot really love 
someone with whom I have identified myself to the extent that I do not feel her to have an identity apart from 
mine... Without it, where the other person becomes a mere shadow or extension of one, one only loves 
oneself in her; and in the opposite case, where one has become no more than an extension of her one merely 
participates in her love of herself. " I. Dilman, Love and Human Separateness. (Oxford: Basil Blackwells, 
1987), pp. 105-6. 
375 St. John of the Cross, The Living Flame of Love, in The Collected Works of St. John of the Cross, trans. 
by K. Kavanaugh, O. C. D., and O. Rodriguez, O. C. D. (Washington, D. C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 
1991), 1.3: "This flame of love is the Spirit of its Bridegroom, who is the Holy Spirit. " Notice the distinction 
between the Spirit and the Bridegroom (Christ); notice too, the appropriation of the Pauline pattern of 
describing the Spirit as the "Spirit of its Bridegroom", as Paul sometimes refers to the Spirit as the "Spirit of 
Christ". 
326 See The Spiritual Canticle, in The Collected Works of St. John of the Cross, 17 passim; 39.2,3. 
327 
ibid.. 
328 ibid., 18.6 
329 ibid., 26.1 
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There are two points which may be brought out here. First, the Holy Spirit so described 
has the function of preparing the ground for the relationship with the Bridegroom, and 
hence the personalist model is the centre-piece, whereas the impersonal metaphors are 
secondary, the means to a personalist end, one might say. In this way, St. John's 
description of the relationship of the Spirit and Christ fits well with the Johannine 
portrayal of the content of the relationship with the Spirit being principally christological 
("take what is Mine and declare it to you"), and hence, of the mutuality between Christ and 
the Spirit . 
330 Secondly, although impersonal metaphors are employed, they are deployed in 
such a way that there is a personal quality to the action. Hence, the language is that of 
extreme intimacy and personal delicacy. 
When this divine breeze strikes her [i. e. the soul, the bride], it wholly 
enkindles and refreshes her, quickens and awakens the will, and elevates 
the previously fallen appetites that were asleep to the love of God. 331 
This aura of intimacy is created by the imaginative use of sensual language, which is 
person-involving. The language of sense is the language of human beings. The imaginative 
power of poetry can turn that which is non-personal into the personally affecting, and into 
symbols of personal exchange. Further, what goes on in these descriptions comprises of 
effects on the very heart of the human personality, such as the will and knowledge. The 
action appears to have a personal quality because it has personal effects. This is most 
beautifully described in, perhaps, St. John's most powerful pneumatological metaphor, that 
of the breath blowing through the garden of the human soul and opening up its buds, and 
causing the blossoming and flourishing of its flowers: 
With his Spirit he breathes through her flowering garden, opens all these 
buds of virtues, and uncovers these aromatic spices of gifts, perfections, 
and riches; and, disclosing this interior treasure and wealth, he reveals all 
her beauty. And then it is something wonderful to behold and pleasant to 
feel: the richness of her gifts unveiled to the soul and the beauty of these 
flowers of virtues now in full bloom. And the fragrant scent each one with 
its own characteristics gives to her is inestimable. 
332 
A wonderful metaphor for one of the principal roles of the Spirit 
in the New Testament, 
namely, the bringer of 'new life' and recreation. 
33° See chapter 1 of this thesis, Sc. 1.0102. 
331 Spiritual Canticle, 17.4, cf. 37.8. 
332 ibid., 17.6. 
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However, there need be no necessary connection between personal effects and a personal 
source of those effects. To use St. John's own examples from nature, it is often the case 
that people are "refreshed" and "rejuvenated" by their experience of nature. So people say, 
"He is so much more relaxed and lively after that holiday. " Or there may be personal 
effects on somebody who is suffering from depression when that person takes anti- 
depressant drugs. Non-personal causes can bring about personal effects, so there can be no 
rule that the presence of personal effects must be stimulated by a personal cause. 
Nonetheless, St. John sees the mutuality of the "two hands" of God, to use Irenaeus' 
phrase, the Son and the Spirit, as assuaging this difficulty and the further concern that an 
impersonal metaphor implies a return to a Divine Fiat view. Thus, he posits a reciprocity 
and mutuality between the Bridegroom and bride. It is also the soul (bride) who is very 
much pictured in search of the Bridegroom. Union is union of will, not nature or essence. 
Finally, the controlling metaphor is that of spiritual betrothal and marriage which implies 
free consent. Thus, St. John writes of, what he calls, "spiritual betrothal": 
The bride must first be a door in order to receive the reinforcement of cedar 
wood; that is, she must hold the door of her will open to the Bridegroom so 
he may enter through the complete and true 'yes' of love. This is the yes of 
betrothal that is given before the spiritual marriage. 333 
Although, this equality is not granted to the Spirit-human relationship, sometimes it is not 
clear that the soul is actually aware of the action of the Spirit at all. The activity is 
described as 'secret, '334 there are also occasions when the soul invites the Spirit to act: "she 
invokes the Holy Spirit; it is he who will dispel this dryness and sustain and increase her 
love for the Bridegroom. "335 One might say that the Spirit's action is sanctioned by the 
search for the Bridegroom. The Spirit and the Son as the "two hands" must be seen in 
operation together. Thus, the Bridegroom despite being the "principal lover", 336 the focus 
of attention and adoration of the soul, remains "hidden" and withdrawen, even in spiritual 
betrothal. 337 Likewise, the functions usually predicated of the Bridegroom are sometimes 
predicated of the Spirit as well, and vica versa. 338 On other occasions no distinction is 
333 ibid., 20.2. 
334 Living Flame of Love, 3.50, Spiritual Canticle 1.17; 29.4. 
335 Spiritual Canticle 17.2. 
336 ibid., 19.6; 31.2; 32.4-5. 
33' ibid., 1 passim; 11.4: "For even in the state of union he is still hidden from her, in the bosom of the Father 
as we said, which is how she wants to enjoy him in the next life. " ibid., 1.11. 
338 ibid., 33.4. 
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made, and the name "God" is used, where the activity could be predicated either to the 
Spirit or the Bridegroom. In sum, it is possible, despite the fact that personalist metaphors 
are not directly applied to the Spirit, to say that St. John safeguards the personal reality of 
God and the relationship with God by primarily using a personalist model 
(Bridegroom/Bride model). This is complemented by impersonal metaphors used of the 
Spirit, though not exclusively of the Spirit, which is a reminder that personalist language is 
limited and attempts to describe a greater reality. This conclusion will be further examined 
when, in Chapter 6, the matter of impersonal models and metaphors of the Spirit will be 
directly treated. 
II. ) A Personalist Model: Vincent Brummer and the Model of Love. 
In recent philosophical theology a conceptual analysis of a Personalist model, although in 
a theistic not pneumatological or trinitarian form, has been offered by Vincent Brummer in 
his monograph, The Model of Love. 339 Brümmer's inclinations are generally theistic, and 
his commitment to the trinitarian nature of God at best "incomplete. "340 For example, there 
is no discussion of Augustine's account of love, nor of Richard of St. Victor or 
Bonaventura's analogy between the Trinity and interpersonal human love. Brümmer's 
initial assumption is that God is a person. 341 However, one need not find oneself caught up 
in this assumption, as the argument could equally take a trinitarian form, founded on a 
conception of a triune God of three personal hypostaseis in one being. Some of Brümmer's 
theistic points are amenable to such a position. Apart from wishing to set Brümmer's 
Personalist model in a trinitarian setting, other problems with his account, such as his 
failure to give full weight to the asymmetry involved in the Creator-creature relationship, 
will be brought out in the next Chapter. 342 
339 V. Brummer, The Model of Love. A philosophical theology (Cambridge: CUP, 1993). It must be noted 
that Brummer follows in the footsteps of J. R. Lucas, Freedom and Grace (London: SPCK, 1976). See also 
V. Brummer, "Bestowed Fellowship. On the Love of God, " in Understanding the Attributes of God, eds. G. 
van den Brink & Marcel Sarot (Frankfurt, Peter Lang, 1999), pp. 35-52. 
34° Brümmer's Speaking of a Personal God is written from a general theistic perspective. C. Schwöbel has 
argued that Brümmer's The Model of Love displays an "incomplete doctrine of the Trinity" which fails to 
draw out the ontological implications of a conception of a triune God, which would in fact strengthen his 
account of the model of love. Schwöbel, "God is Love, " pp. 307-28. 
341 Speaking of a Personal God, p. 139. Note that in the introduction to this chapter a distinction was made 
been "person" and "personal". I do not favour Brümmer's claim that the triune God is a person. 
342 One issue which C. Schwöbel focuses on in his critique is Briimmer's belief that God needs our love in 
order to be love: "It is not quite clear in which sense we can still say without qualification that 'the source of 
love is God' (1 Jn. 4.7).... Quite apart from the implications this has for a view of divine perfection it would 
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The triune God can be called personal because the three Divine hypostaseis possess 
attributes similar to those which are predicated of persons, such as having purposes and 
intentions. 343 This is hardly surprising when Christians claim that God is the fount of the 
truly personal or true 'personality'. 344 God is said to possess knowledge, agency, goodness, 
and love, all attributes which are analogous to properties of personhood. He is able to enter 
into a relationship with human persons, with their own rational consciousnesses and 
'reactive attitudes. '345 Scripture teaches us that we have been created to become "children 
of God". The life of the believer, described in the New Testament as living coram Deo, 
has all the qualities that we associate with human personal relationships: love, intimacy, 
sharing, interrelationship and self-sacrifice. 346 Believers are to be called 'friends , 
347 and 
later 'sons of God'. It is also assumed that the Spirit as a hypostasis of the One God is 
personal, and hence, when the Spirit is described in Scripture as another parakletos, who 
will `be alongside' or 'abide' with the believer, `teach' them (John 14.15-27) and lead 
them, 348 these are actions of a personal being. 
Brummer wishes to base his conception of the Creator-creature relationship on the model 
of loving personal human relationships (henceforth referred to as LPR), which are 
relationships of a particularly valuable kind, the highest form of relationships we can enter 
into within God's creation. The constitutive elements of LPR are that the initiative of both 
parties is required, and that in this sense, LPR are mutual and symmetrical. 349 Further, it 
must be factually possible, according to Brummer, for either side to refuse to enter into a 
relationship. Thus, compulsion cannot be at the basis of the relationship. This is in 
seem that we could not say that God is eternally relational, that God is eternally personal and that God is 
eternally the God of love. " "God is Love, " p. 322. 
343 See Keith Ward, "Is God a Person? " in Christian Faith and Philosophical Theology. eds. by G. van den 
Brink, L. J. van den Brom and M. Sarot (Kampen: Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1992), pp. 258-266. 
344 See R. C. Moberly, Atonement and Personality (London: John Murray, 1901), chs. Vll, VIII. 
345 These are: love, respect, gratitude, resentment, indignation and hatred. The concept of 'reactive attitudes' 
comes from the work of Harry Frankfurt and has also been used by J. M. Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free 
Will. 
346 See I John 4.7ff., John 10.7ff, 15.9ff. 
34' John 16.15. 
348 Gal. 5.16,25. The Spirit is said to search the hearts of believers and reprove. Scripture also refers to `The 
Spirit said' (Acts 13.2: 21.11; lTim. 4.1). 
349 The criteria of symmetry will be critically assessed in chapter 4. 
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contrary to Barth, and the Divine Fiat view, for whom, "There is necessarily a compulsion" 
of the human. 350 
Let us pause in the explication of Brummer's Personalist model, to note another reason for 
pursuing this avenue as an alternative to the Divine Fiat view. A paradigm example of 
LPR, romantic love, embodies the very apparent contradiction or paradox351 that is at the 
heart of our generating question. Robert C. Solomon explains: 
Here is the paradox: the independent individual is the presupposition of 
love, and this independence is just what love wants to overcome and deny. 
The individual insists on self-definition; love demands mutual and shared 
definition. The individual occupies his or her space and time, but love 
breaks down all distance and denies the integrity of the isolated body. Love 
invades and occupies the body, subverts it with its own needs. Time is 
redefined as time together. 352 
For Solomon, Aristophanes not Diotima in Plato's Symposium, came closest to describing 
the nature of romantic love, as long as we demythologise the story. Reformulated by 
Solomon, the goal of romantic love is fusion between two persons, but there is no 
matchless "Aristophanic fit, " nor possibility of complete fusion. Rather, it is a question of 
re-envisioning oneself in relationship to another person: "an attempt to create for ourselves 
a sense of wholeness or completion through a union - of both body and soul - with another 
person. "353 We shall address the issue of how these paradoxes may be resolved when we 
examine Brummer's concept of "reciprocal identification, " which bears a likeness to 
certain trinitarian concepts. For now, it is important to note the similarities between the 
350 Barth, IV/2, p. 578. 
351 What Baillie terms the "paradox of grace" (see chapter 1 of this thesis). 
352 Robert C. Solomon, About Love: Reinventing Romance for our Times (Maryland: Littlefield Adams 
Quality Press, 1994), p. 65. From another angle, the case of human love provides us with a further paradox, 
let us call it the paradox of intimacy: "Intimacy is derived from the Latin intima, meaning 'inner' or 
'innermost'. Your inside being is the real you, the you that only you can know. The problem is that you can 
know it only when you are being intimate with something or someone outside yourself. " T. P. Malone & P. T. 
Malone, The Art of Intimacy (London: Simone & Schuster, 1987), p. 19. This version of the paradox makes 
controversial play of an inner-outer dichotomy. Its point, though, about self-knowledge coming from 
interacting with others is fairly intuitive. 
353 Solomon, p. 194. Solomon's account of human love is altogether very persuasive. Many of its theses are 
not so distant from Brümmer's. However, Solomon is too constructivist in holding (a. ) that apart from the 
meta-principles underlying the nature of love which he has expounded, the basis of love can be continually 
re-invented. This may have some truth as referring to the flexibility required in relation to the uniqueness of 
every relationship, however, it comes with (b. ) a radical pragmatism and relativism: there are "no absolute 
authorities or standards", "whatever 'works' is enough", "what is moral is determined by a negotiable set of 
demands"(ibid., pp. 344,346). He holds up as an exemplar of this "re-invention" of love, the relationship of 
J. P. Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, rather neglecting de Beauvoir's own account of the unsatisfactory nature 
of this relationship. 
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paradox involved in romantic love and the paradox contained in the generating question, 
which gives us a prima facie reason for thinking that the Spirit-human paradox may be 
usefully addressed by applying a Personalist model. 
Brummer provides greater explication of the LPR model by contrasting it with other forms 
of human relationship: contractual relations and manipulative or causal relations. LPR are 
to be distinguished from contractual human relationships, such as those between King and 
baron, or employer and employee. Such relationships are often asymmetric: one party is in 
a greater position of power, and one party is subordinate. The parties enter into the 
relationship for their own calculated benefits and needs. The contract or agreement settles 
what is required of each partner, and lays down their stipulated rights and obligations to 
each other. No further commitments are required. In contractual relationships one does 
things for the other party whose interests are more means to the greater ends of my 
interests. On the other hand, in LPR one achieves, what Brummer calls, reciprocal 
identification: "Each partner in the relationship identifies with the other by making the 
interest of the other his or her own, and by pursuing this as his or her own interest. "354 My 
interests become your interests and vice versa. Your interests and value to me are no 
longer instrumental, as in the case of contractual arrangements, but intrinsic and unique. In 
comparison to contractual relationships where value is empirically quantifiable, and 
bestowed for services rendered, LPR grants value to the whole person, not to particular 
capacities possessed by that person. As J. R. Lucas writes: 
To be esteemed by another secures one's own sense of self-esteem, and 
gives body to one's own sense of identity.... It means that my actions matter, 
not only to me but also to someone else in the outside world, and that 
therefore, they have a significance which is not solely solipsistic. 
355 
In this way LPR are even more significant to one's sense of qualitative identity, because 
they cannot be earned. 
Finally, Brummer also distinguishes LPR from what he calls "manipulative relations". 
However benevolent the manipulator, the manipulated are still treated as objects of a one- 
sided relationship, not as personal agents able to enter into the dynamic of reciprocity. 
Paul 
Helm argues against J. R. Lucas' view that Augustine's conception of freedom and grace 
354 Speaking of a Personal God, p. 81. 
89 
involves manipulation of men by God. He claims that the use of the word "manipulation", 
in this context, is dangerous, given its negative connotations. 
But there are many other concepts of causal sufficiency which do not carry 
such unfavourable connotations as 'manipulate'. For example: 'rescue', 
'rehabilitate', 'remove', 'restore', 'cure' and 'free'. 356 
This is all true, but what is at stake here is the extent to which some second agency is 
involved in a person's life, and whether such activity is compatible with freedom and 
personal identity. All the activities that Helm has highlighted above look prima facie 
benevolent, but there are times when their benevolence may fall into question. Ought one 
to cure someone when they do not want to be cured? This may be acceptable in the case of 
a child, but not so in the case of an adult. This raises the question of the status of the 
human person in a state of sin, to which we shall return in Chapter 5. The nub of the issue 
concerns the extent and nature of the intervention into another person's life. In Barth's 
account of subjective revelation, more than people's wishes are overridden, for God 
appears to change our very motivational and noetic structures, without our invitation or 
acceptance. The activities mentioned by Helm above, would in their human form involve 
some level of consent or acceptance. A person cries out for rescue. Rescuing the suicide 
attempt is not to tackle the intention to commit suicide. The addict accepts rehabilitation, 
without which the intention to pursue his addiction will probably survive. 
The key conceptual tool in an account of metamorphosis which is inspired by Brummer, is 
that of reciprocal identification, of which similar concepts can be found in the works of 
psychologists and in trinitarian theology. 357 Thus, psychologist Barry Schlenker writes: 
Relationships develop when people's identities are or become 
interconnected..... Based on the identities that have evolved in the 
relationship, the parties can anticipate how each will interpret situations, 
the evaluations and outcomes preferred by the other, and the actions the 
other will proffer. The closer the relationship, the greater the extent to 
which the evaluation of experiences and outcomes shifts from individual to 
joint criteria, the interests and needs of the other weigh more heavily as the 
actor can experience vicarious rewards and costs, and the behavioral plans 
that exist for a wide variety of situations are based on co-ordinated team 
performances, not solitary, individual acts. In especially close relationships, 
the other becomes an extension of one's own identity, as people come to 
ass Lucas, Freedom and Grace, pp. 60-1. 
356 Paul Helm, "On Grace and Causation, " Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 32 (1979), p. 111. 
357 Jürgen Moltmann refers to the 'persons' of the Trinity 'in a reciprocal relationships'. J. Moltmann, The 
Trinity and the Kingdom of God, trans. by Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1981), p. 172. 
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define themselves partially in terms of their roles in the relationship and 
their associations with the other. 358 
Let us be clear that when Schlenker talks of an "extension of one's own identity" the 
identity in question here is not numerical identity, but qualitative identity, that is 
psychological identity, the identity of one's personality. One negative analogy of the 
Personalist model, which arises immediately from Schlenker's account, is that in human 
interpersonal relationships accommodation has to take place, what Schlenker calls 
"identity bargaining" between the parties. 359 In the Divine-human relationship there is an 
undeniable asymmetry, the condescending of the transcendent God, who abides in "the 
high and holy place"(Isa. 57.15) to establish a relationship with His creatures. Divine 
accommodation is not that of "identity bargaining, " but choosing a mode of revelation 
which is accessible to His creatures. 360 Joint activities such as "trading concessions" or 
"negotiations" are wholly inappropriate to be predicated of the Divine-human relationship, 
and would undermine the sovereignty of Divine grace. The real process of change takes 
place on the side of the creatures, whom are called to participate in the Divine identity. 
Change comes about through identification with the Divine, so that the believer becomes 
an "image of God, " a "son" or "daughter of God. " 
In the theology of Charles Williams, there is a concept which is close to Brummer's 
'reciprocal identification', which Williams calls "the way of exchange", a "pattern" or 
"principle" which is to be found across life, especially in its partial realisation of the 
Kingdom of God. Thus, he writes: "From childbirth to the divine Trinity itself the single 
nature thrives; there is here no difference between that natural and that supernatural. "361 It 
is a pattern of the "co-inherence" of all things, or what Williams calls a "web of universal 
power towards substitution, " to be found archetypally in the Christian doctrines of 
trinitarian perichoresis, the Atonement, the Eucharist, but also in natural realities such as 
pregnancy, human society, friendship and romantic love. 
358 B. Schlenker, "Identities, Identifications and Relationships", in Communication, Intimacy and Close 
Relationships, ed. Valerian J. Derlega (Academic Press, Inc., Orlando/New York, 1984), pp. 73-4. 
359 ibid., p. 92. 
360 Hendry, pp. 96-117. 
361 C. Williams, "The Way of Exchange", in Charles Williams: The Essential Writings in Spirituality and 
Theology, ed. by C. Hefling (Cowley Publications, Cambridge, 1993), pp. 204-215. Martin Buber talks of 
reciprocity in similar way, as: "Inscrutably involved, we live in the currents of universal reciprocity" I and 
Thou, pp. 66 cf. pp. 58,84. 
91 
At the root of the physical nature of man lie exchange of liking, 
substitution, inherence. The nature of man which is so expressed in the 
physical world is expressed after the same manner, only more fully, in the 
mental and spiritual. 362 
The Personalist model being considered envisages such co-inherence, substitution and 
exchange precisely as the means of qualitative transformation. 
Although, William's concept of "exchange" has resonance within several theological loci, 
it has particular affinity to the Patristic concept of perichoresis, which has an equally wide 
range of theological reference, ranging from the unity and distinction in the Trinity, the 
Incarnation and the new creation. G. L. Prestige shows that the concept of perichoresis was 
linked by the Church Fathers to the word xwpELv (contain) which was used to designate 
Divine omnipresence, as containing the whole of creation. 363 In Gregory of Nyssa we see 
that: 
.... the Father and the Son are receptive and permeative (xwpi tLxo(Y )of one 
another, and, as thus 'containing' one another, would be equal in extension; 
the one is enveloped in the other (3tEpLcXE(Y6aL), but not in like manner 
with human instances of envelopment, in which the enveloping substance 
has an empty space in which to hold the substance enveloped; with God the 
relation is mutual. Here follows the simile of the sciences jointly and 
364 commonly pervading a single mind... 
This a conception of mutual extension in and containing by each other. Other words which 
Prestige has analysed as integral to the formation of the concept of perichoresis are 
"encircle" or "encompass"(jtF- pLxwp£w), "reciprocate, " "interchange. " In pseudo-Cyril the 
term is re-employed from a Christological to a trinitarian setting. 365 The three co-inherent 
hypostaseis are united by 'self-giving' love, not in a manner which confounds their 
particularity, viz. co-inherence without mixture or absorption. 366 The concepts of 
362 Williams, "The Way of Exchange", p. 209. 
363 G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, 2nd ed. (London: SPCK1956). Prestige holds that perichoresis 
only develops the sense of "interpenetration" by the time of Pseudo-Cyril, other research claims that this 
meaning was in place from the adoption of the term by Patristic Fathers. On this difference see Verna 
Harrison, "Perichoresis in the Greek Fathers, " St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly, Vol. 35 (1991), pp. 53- 
65. 
364 Prestige, p. 290. 
365 "It is no longer perichoresis 'to' one another [as in Christology to explain the reciprocity and unity of 
action of the two natures], but perichoresis 'in' one another [trinitarian use].... Perichoresis 'to' one another 
might imply that the Persons were equivalent or alternative; perichoresis 'in' one another implies that they are 
coterminous and co-extensive. " ibid., p. 298. 
366 Harrison writes: "This relationship among the persons is an eternal rest in each other but also an eternal 
movement of love. " Harrison, p. 64. 
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"reciprocal identification" and "exchange" which we have found to have such import in 
interpersonal human relations, are analogous to the concept of perichoresis used in the 
doctrine of God. 
The negative analogy between the two is that in the case of the Trinity, the three 
hypostaseis comprise one, numerical identity of being. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, in 
relation to the charge of monism directed towards mystical union, God and the human 
person are united at the level of will and love, not of essence or being. The Divine-human 
perichoresis is more like the reciprocal identification that takes place in human 
relationships, an identification that occurs at the level of qualitative or psychological 
(subjective) identity, rather than the unity of being in the Trinity. 367 There is plenty of 
scope for the trinitarian analogy to be complemented by others, as Williams does, 
especially as the term perichoresis is used by the Church Fathers in more than one 
domain. 368 
The concept of reciprocal identification could be said to have an interesting precursor in 
Aquinas' employment of the activities of loving and knowing as analogies of the Trinity. 
When someone loves what she knows, argues Aquinas, her will receives a "kind of 
imprint" of "the reality loved" and "the object loved is present in the lover even as the 
object known is present in the knower. "369 As Bernard Lonergan explicates Aquinas, to 
love is for the presence of the beloved to be in the lover: "the presence of the beloved in 
the lover is exactly the same entity as the act of love in the lover. X370 The concepts of 
exchange and indwelling resonate here. The affect of the beloved on the lover, almost as 
367 Michael Lawler has argued that marriage be conceived in terms of perichoresis, which is indeed 
appropriate. However, he extends the analogy too far by holding that a couple become "one marital person, " 
when trinitarian doctrine maintains the distinctness of the three hypostaseis. M. Lawler, "Perichoresis: New 
Theological Wine in an Old Theological Wineskin, " Horizons, Vol. 22,1995, p. 49 - 66. 
368 Thus, Harrison writes of Maximus' use of perichoresis in ways which echo Charles William's conception 
of the "exchange" of the "great web of being": "He [Maximus] sees it[perichoresis] first of all as a kind of 
interconnectedness and commingling among created things themselves. Added to this is the mutual 
indwelling of God and the saints, who, in an ever-active repose that is both static and dynamic, become 
identical to him in energy as far as possible. By extension, life in the Kingdom can perhaps be envisaged as a 
mutual interchange of energies, i. e., of the free and conscious personal life and self-manifestation of all who 
participate in it. There is, in other words, a radical giving of one's own being to God and to all other persons, 
as far as is possible, and a receiving of theirs in return. " Harrison, p. 65. 
369 Summa Theologiae, Ia. q. 36, a. 3. Aquinas also sees the same principle applicable to self-love. It is an 
application of the Scholastic principle, intellectus in actu fit intellectum in actu. 
370 B. Lonergan, Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas. ed. by David. B. Burrell, C. S. C. (London, Darton, 
Longman & Todd, 1968), p. 203. 
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indwelling him, motivates the lover to love. This sets up an interesting connection with the 
asymmetry of the Divine initiative of love for human creatures: in order for the creature to 
love God, they must first be loved by God, to have His very presence within them. 
Our discussion of love and the Trinity in Chapter 1, also suggests a point of critique of 
Brummer's thesis. Reciprocal identification is indeed the mutual love (amor mutuus) about 
which Augustine and Richard of St. Victor talk, in the relation to the love of the Father 
and the Son. Yet, what of the self-transcending charity of ecstatic love? What of the 
"shared love" for the third (condilectus) in Brummer's conception? What prevents 
Brummer's reciprocal identification from becoming a selfish, insular love? Is this another 
lacunae due to Brummer's "incomplete" trinitarian theology? To respond to the Spirit in 
love is to love one who loves others, namely, Christ, and who in turn loves another, the 
Father. The Spirit is the mediator of this movement of ecstatic love first from the Father 
and the Son to the creature, and then in return from the creature to the Divine. In doing so, 
the Spirit aids us to love with God's ecstatic, overflowing love, which finds love in our 
fellow creatures and through them to love God. Reciprocal identification can never be a 
love caught in a dual exchange, for God's love is an ecstatic love that is a love beyond the 
dyad of a comfortable correspondence. Ultimately, if our Personalist model is to be shaped 
by "trinitarian controls, " and others intrinsic to a range of Christian doctrine (such as the 
Incarnation and the Eucharist), then we will want to combine a concept of reciprocal 
identification or exchange with that of ecstatic love. 
It is through this conception of reciprocal identification and exchange of subjective 
identities, that we can best resolve both the paradox of love, which Solomon has drawn 
our attention to, and the apparent contradiction embodied in our generating question. In 
LPR the boundaries of one's qualitative identity are expanded. Through reciprocal 
identification each party embraces, by degree, the (subjective) identity of the other party, 
adopting it as their own. This is not achieved by "take over" or fiat. Rather one adopts the 
other's identity, not by quashing one's own. One remains a subject, with a numerical and 
subjective identity. Yet through loving the other, empathising with the other, granting the 
other intrinsic value, the boundaries of one's self-identity open to include the other. Insofar 
as LPR with others is of supreme importance and fulfilment to the lovers, it 
is correct to 
say that one finds oneself in that love. One achieves reflective distance upon oneself 
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through encounter with another, "our 'seeing' happens in the presence of the other. "371 
Through connection with others, one receives the resources to change, 372 to overcome 
inertia, addiction, habit and familiarity. 373 One may be animated by the challenge of the 
encounter with the other person and the flow of intercommunication. 
Secondly, one realises a state of being which was not previously existent (new life), which 
offers fulfilment and meaning to one's life. It is not simply the case that one assumes 
another's subjective identity, but that in reciprocal identification, in the ectasis that this 
requires, one releases possibilities within oneself which were previously latent, and realise 
a new identity, an enlarged identity, as a 'being in communion. 374 Ultimately, being in 
communion with God would be the state of greatest realisation, and deepest relationship. 
In such a relationship, to lose oneself would be to find one's true self. The trinitarian 
concepts of perichoresis and koinonia guide us to this conclusion. To be intimate is, then, 
to be in communion, and the opposite of that is disintegration and dislocation, which are 
concepts at the heart of the Christian understanding of sin. 
As regards Solomon's paradox of love, we can say that the dialectic between love and 
individuality is not vicious. Indeed, the paradox was never of an ontological kind. The 
fusion envisioned is only one of will and identification not of being, and the "conflict" 
between love and individuality which Solomon talks of, is a psychological or social 
conflict, not an ontological one: the threat is never that of the absorption of one numerical 
identity by another, but the struggle of how two different personalities seek to share their 
lives together. 375 On the Divine Fiat view, the Spirit does threaten to change the nature of 
371 Malone and Malone, p. 19. 
372 "The energy and spirit to be different are provided by the self-intimate experience... The capacity to be 
different enables us to be creative... To be creative is to be different, and to be different is to be a more 
sensitive me, a more aware I, and more my self. " ibid., pp. 62-3. 
373 ibid., pp. 61-63. The Malones talk about intimacy under four categories: "connectivity" (defined as: "... the 
self experienced in intimacy connects us psychologically, interpersonally, and spiritually.... The psychological 
connections appear to be both spatial and temporal, providing enormously important ties to our past and our 
future" ibid., p. 54); "animation; " "reverence for life; " "acceptance"(see below). 
374 The implicit trinitarian analogy is intentional (cf. John Zizioulas, Being as Communion). Robert Solomon 
also emphasises the importance of the enlargement and expansion of the self in love: "One learns and grows 
by caring, by expanding one's interests outward, by making others not the object but the subject of one's own 
interests, by making their interests one's own" Solomon, p. 256. 
375 That this is the conclusion to be drawn from Solomon's account may be inferred from the following 
passage: "Love and individuality are necessarily in conflict even while they mutually support one another.... 
love is always an open question (individuality never fully resigns itself to be merged, and there is nothing 
guaranteed about the merger that is never fully completed). " Solomon, pp. 250-251. 
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the paradox into an ontological one, one of numerical identity, by displacing the human 
subject. If we conceive of the operation of the Spirit in Christian metamorphosis in a 
Personalist mode, then the ontological paradox may be dissolved. The task of Christian 
sanctification takes on the semblance of the struggle of long term romantic relationships, 
to be attentive to the other and to seek a shared identity. 
Applying the LPR model to Divine-human relations, it is he Spirit who brings about the 
metamorphosis of the human through personal presence. God provides the conditions of 
entry into this salvific relationship, by His initiative of Self-revelation in the person of 
Jesus Christ and the Atonement, and subsequently through challenging and calling us by 
thepresence of the Spirit. This model of personal presence, challenge, and transformation 
through exchange, requires some degree of human acceptance, response and consent. 
Brummer's comment, "God cannot bring about our choice without it ceasing to be ours, 076 
needs to be counterbalanced by the doctrines of Divine concurrence and providence. 377 
God's action is primary in establishing the conditions of the choice, for after all God is the 
initiator as Creator and Revealer. Nonetheless, Bernard of Clarivaux aptly strikes the 
balance between the Divine initiative and human freedom when he writes: 
Take away free choice and there is nothing to be saved. Take away grace 
and there is no means of saving. Without the two combined, this work 
cannot be done.... None but God can give it, nothing but free choice can 
receive it. What, therefore, is given by God alone and to free choice alone, 
can no more happen without the recipient's consent than without the 
bestower's grace. 378 
Through God's gracious will there is an interdependence of grace and human freedom. If 
the Divine presence is accepted by the human person, metamorphosis proceeds through the 
dynamic movement of reciprocal identification and exchange, which is founded in ecstatic 
love. 
According to Brummer's interpersonal model the choice of an agent is a necessary though 
not sufficient condition for an agent to act. Hence, one cannot say A caused act E, if a 
person other than A was the complete cause of that act. For Barth, God is the complete 
376 Speaking of a Personal God, p. 76. 
3" See Chapter 7. 
378 Bernard of Clairvaux, Bernard of Clairvaux: on Grace and Free Choice, trans. by D. O'Donovan, OSCO 
(Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1988), 1.2. 
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cause of the person's coming to faith, and the act of acknowledgement. However, another 
person may be a contributory cause of act A, without being the complete cause. On this 
account, then, there could be room for some decision, on the part of man, to respond to the 
Spirit's call to bring about metanoia and accept the need for the Spirit's regenerative action 
in one's life. God would be the primary, initiating cause, whereas the human, in the act of 
acceptance and response, would be a subsidiary, ancillary cause. In relation to this 
question of the action of another person in someone else's life, Brummer argues: 
... he or she can certainly create the conditions for the other to be able to 
realize his or her choice. One person can also offer motives or reasons for 
another to make specific choice. Reasons are not causes, and the other will 
always have to decide for him or herself whether the reasons given are a 
sufficient motive for the act in question. 379 
One may question whether Brummer's slightly discursive or rationalist conception of 
personal change is sufficient, but the general point is taken, that in cases of personal 
change a model of direct causation is not applicable. Metamorphosis results from the 
dynamic movement of reciprocal identification and exchange in ecstatic love between God 
and the human person brought about by the Divine initiative. 
To come full circle, the metaphor of the embrace, employed by bridal mystics such as 
Bernard of Clairvaux, has recently been renewed by Miroslav Volf to describe the 
reconciling relationship of the Divine with the human. 380 "The drama of embrace, " as Volf 
terms it, may be considered to be an emblematic metaphor for the Personalist model which 
has been advocated above. It involves a fourfold movement of opening, waiting, closing 
and re-opening, a movement which complements the dynamic of love in Augustine and 
Richard of St. Victor. The first opening of arms represents the Divine initiative in reaching 
out to the Other in ecstatic love; a gesture of invitation, but also the making of room for 
the Other. 
More than just a code for desire, open arms are a sign that I have created 
space in myself for the other to come in and that I have made a movement 
out of myself so as to enter the space created by the other. 
381 
379 Speaking of a Personal God, p. 74. 
380 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness and 
Reconciliation (Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1996). When Volf comes to explicate the metaphor of embrace, 
he does so in terms of the relations of self and other. How readily this can be mapped onto the Divine-human 
relationship in the application of redemption he does not make clear. 
For my purposes, the arguments 
marshalled above in favour of a Personalist model, give me reason to appropriate 
it in such a way. 
381 ibid., p. 141. 
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Then there is the stage of waiting, a holding in check which respects the integrity of the 
person and the need to elicit a response. 
The waiting self can move the other to make the movement towards the 
self, but its power to do so is the power of signalled desire, of created 
space, and opened boundary of the self, not the power that breaks the 
boundaries of the other...... Waiting is a sign that, although embrace may 
have a one-sidedness in its origin, it can never reach its goal. 382 
The closing is a movement together which requires the action of both parties, and is a 
symbol of reciprocity and communion. However, the embrace must avoid both crushing 
the other in an act of assimilation, or passively allowing oneself to be absorbed. The 
boundaries of both parties must be respected. This is why Volf also includes the possibility 
of re-opening the embrace to avoid the absorptionist model: "the self must take itself back 
into itself so that its own identity, enriched by the traces that the presence of the other has 
left, may be preserved. 083 This is so, Volf argues, because of the "underdetermination of 
the outcome. 084 If the person is to be granted relative autonomy, then she must be given 
the possibility of withdrawing or even rejecting the embrace. One may also add, following 
our discussion of Richard of St. Victor's conception of ecstatic love that one must also 
open the embrace to reach out still further, for love is love for the third as well. 
III. ) Developing the Personalist Model: The Concepts of Presence, Encounter and 
Acceptance. 
III. 01) Presence. 
In this section of this chapter, three central concepts will be focused on which seek to 
explicate the Personalist model presented above, namely, 'presence, ' 'encounter' and 
'acceptance. ' Let us begin with presence. The concept of presence is to be used to help 
explain how the Spirit can enable and re-orientate human action, in a manner which does 
not displace the human subject. The concept of presence is a biblical term found in both 
the Old and New Testaments. Hebrew Scripture refers to the presence of God in quite 
physical terms, which conveys the "full and living personality" of the God encountered. 
385 
382 ibid., pp. 142-3. 
383 ibid., pp. 144-5. 
384 ibid., p. 147. 
385 L. H. Brockington, "Presence, " in A Theological Word Book of the Bible, ed. by A. Richardson (London: 
SCM Press, 1957), p. 172. In the Hebrew Scriptures the presence of God is mediated through different 
means: the face, the sanctuary, the ark, the cloud, the Shekinah and His glory (Kabod). 
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Thus, famously Moses and Jacob are said to meet God "face to face. 086 J. A. Naude writes 
of God's panim: "The face of God denotes the very person of God, not just that side of him 
that is turned towards us. "387 Further, coming to the Temple for worship to attend the 
sanctuary, where God was ascribed to be present, 388 was described as "to come to see the 
face of God. 089 Seeing God's face rests first "on being seen by God, "390 and God's 
choosing to make his presence known. 
It is quite clear that the effect of God's presence is a means of initiating change. 
In Deut. 4: 37 Moses said that God led the people from Egypt through his 
face and his great power. His face is equated with his power as the means 
through which God did his mighty deeds. 391 
Light in Hebraic and Christian thought is not only an attribute of God, 392 but also a means 
of indicating God's presence. 393 The effect of such a presence is quite literally suggested in 
the case of Moses: after meeting God "the skin of his face was shining. "394 God's anger 
('ap) is often predicated of the effects of God's face or nostrils. 395 The effect of God's 
presence is also intrinsically linked with the Hebraic concept of the glory of Yahweh 
(Kabod), which is extended by Ezekiel from its roots in the idea of the wealth, substance, 
diginity and honour of a man, to include the feature of God's brightness, 396 a theme which 
is taken up in the New Testament to describe of the Kingdom of God and the person of 
Jesus Christ. 397 Yahweh's kabod is something which can be seen (r'h), 
398 
and like His 
panim is said to accompany Israel during the exodus. Kabod is also associated with other 
386 Exod. 33.11 and Genesis 32.30. Other places which use the term "face" to designate the personal presence 
of God are: Deut. 4.27; Isa. 63.9. In both Greek (prosopon) and Hebrew (panim) the word for face also means 
'presence. ' 
387 "r'h" in The New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis [NIDOT], Vol. 111, ed. 
W. A. Van Gemeren, (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1996), p. 1010. See also, Mark S. Smith, "Seeing God in 
the Psalms" Catholic Biblical Quarterly, Vol. 50 (1988), pp. 171-183. 
388 Gen. 12.6,7; 28.10ff; 32.24ff; I Kings 8.12f. 
389 Hence the priestly benedictions which petition God to "make his face shine upon thee" and to "lift up his 
countenance upon thee"(Num. 6.25f. ), and the desire of worshippers to 'seek' Yahweh's face (Ps. 24.6; 27.8). 
39° Hans Urs Von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord. A Theological Aesthetics. VI: Theology of the Old 
Covenant. trans. B. McNeil, and E. Leiva-Merikas, ed. John Riches. (Edinburgh, T&T. Clark, 1991), p. 68. 
See Job 28.24; Sir. 39.19f. 
391 H. F. van Rooy, "Panim, " in NIDOT, Vol. 111, p. 639. 
392 Ps. 104.2; Dan. 2.22. See M. J. Selman, "'Or" in NIDOT, Vol. 1, p. 325. 
393 Ps. 89.15, cf. Ps. 90.8. 
394 Thus, the shining face, in the Hebrew tradition, was considered to be a sign of joy and favour (e. g. 
Ps. 31.16, cf. Pss. 27.9,102.2; 104.29). 
395 Ps. 18.15: "at the blast of the breath of your nostrils. " 
396 Ezekiel 1.28, cf. Exod. 24.17. 
397 See for example, I Tim. 6.16, Acts 22.6,7; John 1.14,17.1. 
398 Exodus 16.7,10. 
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symbols of God's presence such as light, the cloud and the consuming fire. 399 Thus, C. J. 
Collins writes: "this is called the glory of the Lord because it reveals his person and dignity 
and the proper response to such a revelation is to give God honor and glory. r400 We have 
also touched upon the use of the Hebraic concept of shekinah to describe Yahweh's 
personal presence on earth and its influence on the New Testament concepts of menein and 
oikein in Chapter 1. Let us note that all these means of speaking of God's presence and its 
effect transcend the anthropomorphisms of their formulations. Thus, God's face can 
destroy upon sight, 401 it is therefore seen and not seen by Moses. 402 Perhaps, the best way 
Hebrew Scripture represents this dialectic is in the image of the Divine presence as a 
burning fire. 
The juxtaposition of bright burning fire and thick black darkness highlights 
the paradoxical nature of the divine presence. Yahweh is both present and 
hidden, accessible and mysterious, immanent and transcendent. 403 
Luther was one theologian who utilised the metaphor of the face in his central concept of 
the coram -relationship, being "before the face of.... " There are many coram-relationships: 
coram meipso, being in my own sight, coram hominibus, being in the sight of people, and 
coram mundo, being sight of the world. However, for Luther all these relationships are 
only put in their proper context through the central relationship of coram Deo, whereby 
human creatures find the centre of their existence outside of themselves. As Gerhard 
Ebeling comments: "The most important element in the situation that is implied by the 
preposition coram is not the way in which someone else is present before me, in my sight, 
but the way that I myself am before someone else and exist in the sight of someone else, so 
that my existential life is affected. "404 We are before God not only as creatures whose very 
existence is dependent on God's presence, but also as self-giving Word and as Judge, who 
presents humanity with the reality of its situation. 405 
399 Isaiah 4.5; 60.1-2. 
400 "Kabod" in NIDOT, Vol. 11, pp. 581-2. 
401 Exodus 33.18; 33.20. 
402 Exodus 33.23. 
403 Robin Wakely, "b'r" in NIDOT, Vol.!, p. 686. 
404 Gerhard Ebeling, Luther. An introduction to his thought. trans. R. A. Wilson (London: Collins, Fontana 
Library, 1972), p-196- 
405 Ebeling writes: "[T]he face of a person, at least when it is looking towards me, does not give me room or 
time to observe or describe it. For I experience myself in it, as one observed, as one looked at, which results 
either in my looking away or in my being completely preoccupied in holding my own against the gaze 
directed towards me. " ibid., pp. 194-5. 
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Nor for that matter am I reliant on the concept of presence developed by Buber. 406 Rather, 
I refer to the concept of presence one might find in Social Psychology, the presence of two 
or more people to each other. Thus, my methodology in this section will be more 
phenomenological in approach, an attempt at a description of presence in interpersonal 
human relations and its application to our subject matter. 407 The presence of another 
person, body and mind, affects us. For example, we walk into the room and a person is 
there who is in a bad mood and is "secretly" antagonistic towards us, but says very little 
(certainly not expressing his antagonism in any explicit linguistic form). Thus, we are 
confronted by a personal presence that affects us, and affects us in a particular way. We 
experience, as people often say, "a bad feeling", "a bad atmosphere", "bad vibes", to wit 
that something is wrong, or, more specifically, that we are not welcomed by this person. 
This is communicated not so much through language, as by non-verbal communication. 
For example, there is no eye contact, there is nothing other than a cursory gestured 
welcome, etc. Likewise, a person's presence, sometimes just the sheer presence of a 
person, can affect us in quite positive and constructive ways. Thus, people report simply 
feeling good in a particular person's presence; they do not need to engage in verbal 
communication. People experience being enabled and empowered by the presence of 
406 As we have already pointed out, Buber's position is tainted by his radical distinction between the realm of 
"I-Thou" and "I-It, " present in the distinction between personal presence and "content" (I and Thou, pp. 158- 
159). S. T. Katz comments on this: "it is not enough to assert that revelation understood as 'Presence' means 
'event' and not content and thus that all logic and criteria is out of place, for an 'event' is also something that 
has to be made sense of and it too clearly is grounded in the necessary conditions of our experiential life. 
Likewise, any valid account of what it is to be a person will involve bodily criteria and objectivity. " Katz, 
"Martin Buber's Epistemology, " p. 152. Similar comments could be addressed to Levinas' work. 
407 Gabriel Marcel is one Existentialist/Phenomenologist for whom the concept of presence plays an 
important role. G. Marcel, Presence et Immortalite (Paris: Flammarion, 1959). Presence can only be spoken 
of, according to Marcel, when there is communion between persons, a bond between persons, a sharing and 
enjoyment of presence, a being-with each other (Mitsein). For Marcel presence is precisely not to be located 
in the physical world of objects, because objects do not have the power of ectasis, they cannot reach out to 
us, and be with us. Whereas presence is engaging and brings about communion and the growth of 
personhood: "A presence refuses to allow us to posit it in a definite region of space, as if it were a 'solid, 
flawless mass' (a Parmenidean sphere). The space of presence is more like musical space than geometric 
space: it fills the room, overflows the person, plays between persons or lingers around our persons. Presence 
goes out from one person to another and will be the possession of no one..... We know whether someone is 
present or not, because when the other is present, he renews us in some way and makes us more fully 
ourselves than we should have been alone. It is not so much what the other says, but that he puts himself into 
his words and sustains his words by all he is. " Joe McCown, Availability: Gabriel Marcel and the 
Phenomenology of Human Openness (Missoula: Scholars Press, AAR, 1978), p. 41. The metaphor of music 
has quite evocative connotations for our attempt to describe the activity of the Spirit, who is also said to "fill" 
and "overflow". However, problems arise with Marcel's account in his radical epistemological dichotomy 
between "mystery" and "knowledge, " which mirrors my difficulties with Buber's dichotomy between the 
"Thou" and the "It. " As regards Marcel's explication of the concept of presence in relation to communion 
with the dead, I would draw a distinction between metaphorical presence and actual presence, and wish 
something said about the mediation of presence. 
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others: enabled to endure suffering after the touch or re-assurance of another; willing to 
undertake the risk of love. 
Although I am not concerned with what contemporary Continental Philosophy terms the 
"metaphysics of presence, " one modern continental philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, 
interestingly uses the metaphor of the "face" (Le Visage), in a way which echoes both the 
biblical use and Luther's coram-relationship. The face draws the attention of the viewer, it 
is that part of the body which confronts the onlooker most readily with the other person's 
personality, and it is the most expressive part of the body. In the same way, "the Other", 
whether it be another person or God, arrests our attention, examines us, and expresses 
itself towards us, revealing itself to us. It disrupts the order of the self and challenges its 
complacency. 
For Levinas the face is a metaphor for encounter, not a possible object of representation. 
Levinas chooses to use the term "expression" to signify that the meaning which comes 
from the epiphany of the face, is "exterior, " originating from beyond the self's meaning- 
construction. Levinas' concept of "expression" comes from the Greek xa6 auto, 
suggesting the immediacy and directness of the encounter with the Other, in the same way 
that Plato's philosopher immediately attends the beautiful. 408 The encounter with the face 
of the Other takes place before representation, at the affective level, of what Beavers calls 
"felt meaning. "409 It is the exposure to the stare of the face of the other, that affects the self 
as the "passivity of vulnerability", awakening one to the reality of an Other independent of 
one. 410 In the process of calling the self into question, the face demands a response. 411 This 
408 Merold Westphal elaborates the allusion to Plato: "In Plato and Aristotle kaq auto (per se, through or by 
means of itself) often designates the ontological immediacy of forms or substances that are self-sufficient 
with regard to their existence. But it can refer to an epistemic immediacy, as in Republic 476b. Here 
knowledge and opinion are being distinguished in terms of the difference between the philosophic few who 
can apprehend Beauty itself, and the lovers of sights and sounds who never get beyond `beautiful sounds and 
colours and shapes. ' The former must be able not only to apprehend Beauty itself (auto to kalon), as distinct 
from beautiful things; they must also apprehend it directly, through itself (kaq auto) and not through the 
mediation of those things. It is clearly this epistemic sense to which Levinas appeals. " M. Westphal, 
"Levinas and the Immediacy of the Face, " in Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 10, no. 3 (1993), p. 495. Note, 
however, that Levinas would be distinctly unhappy that kaq auto is an "apprehension" of the theoretical 
mind. 
409 Anthony F Beavers, Levinas beyond the Horizons of Cartesianism (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), p. 89. 
410 John Burke comments: "The passivity of astonishment is to be understood in the etymological sense of 
surprise, `super-prendere', to be taken over or taken up, with no hope of return through the power of thought. 
The face of the Other has invaded my solitude, disturbed the egoism of happiness and lifted me toward what 
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is not because of some contract drawn up, or a commitment given. The obligation stems 
from the encounter with the Other. Its ability to disturb, contest, refuse to be subsumed, to 
call into question, and its very alterity, demand a response. The meaning of the alterity of 
the Other is not to be "re-presented" as a phenomenon in the mind, but to be found in the 
relational matrix of encounter and response. 412 
How do the issues of human freedom and personal identity, which are of concern to us, 
relate to personal presence as explicated above? Can one choose to be exposed to and 
affected by the personal presence of another? One may have the choice as to whether or 
not to stay in this person's presence and hence, continue to be affected by this person's 
presence. However, as a presence which confronts one as part of the 'givenness' of the 
world, one can seldom choose a priori not to be exposed to and affected by the presence of 
this person. One simply encounters people as the result of the course of my life. In a like 
manner, one cannot choose to be exposed to and affected by the world, only to cease to be 
affected by it altogether in suicide. This does not contravene a person's freedom from 
constraint. One is affected by the presence of the other, but not determined by them, as in 
the "bogeyman" who causally determines my mental states. Although a person's presence 
may become constraining in a strong and negative sense, this is usually the result of an 
extensive relationship with a person of a manipulative kind, and hence, transgresses the 
criteria of freedom within personal relationships, outlined above. A person's presence may 
be powerfully seductive, but such a presence only becomes controlling if the intent of the 
person in her subsequent action is intentionally manipulative and requires the perceiver to 
have such a disposition that she cannot stand back from the source of attraction. Thus, in 
most cases personal presence can affect, but it cannot determine; it leaves room for 
response and for the space required to maintain one's personal identity. 
Let us apply such thinking analogically to the Spirit-human relationship in Christian 
metamorphosis. The claim is that it is the effect of the Spirit's personal presence that 
is radically not me. " J. P. Burke, "The Ethical Significance of the Face", Proceedings of the American 
Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. 56 (1982), p. 198. 
411 Totality and Infinity, p. 203. 
412 As Levinas puts it, "His exteriority [the Other's], that is, his appeal to me, is his truth. " ibid., p. 291. A. 
Beavers comments: "The truth of the other person is produced in my response... This is to say that the 
meaning of otherness is `understood' by me in my obligation and response, not in any conceptual knowledge. 
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initiates change in the person. St. Augustine in his commentary on John's Gospel talks of 
conversion in terms of the attraction (trahere and attrahere) of the heart by God. By 
conceiving of conversion in terms of Divine attraction of the human, by 'gentleness and 
sweetness, ' Augustine emphasises its personal and non-coercive quality. 
Do not think that you are drawn to God against your will, because your soul is also drawn by His love. The heart delights in the sweet bread from 
heaven 
.... It is not necessity nor obligation, but pleasure, that draws the heart 413 to God. 
Augustine actually uses analogies based on the attraction of physical objects and sensory 
perception to elucidate the attraction of God, revealed in Jesus Christ. 414 He talks of the 
Spirit as the one who "gives us motivation, a delight [delectatio] and a love [dilectioj. "415 
Peter Brown refers to Augustine's "psychology of delight": 
'Delight' is the only possible source of action, nothing else can move the 
will. Therefore, a man can act only if he can mobilize his feelings, only if 416 he is 'affected' by the object of delight. 
Augustine also conceives of the heart as "the base of the traction and attraction of the 
Father, cor uniculo trahitur. , 417 Interestingly M. Cleary believes that this theology of love 
and delight stems from Augustine's own experience of friendship, citing his description of 
the loss of a close friend in Book IV of the Confessions. 418 This suggests that Augustine is 
utilising a form of Personalist model or analogy: "Show me a person who loves and he will 
understand what I am saying. "419 This is not to maintain that other aspects of Augustine's 
conception of grace and Christian anthropology do not undermine a Personalist model. 420 
Furthermore, this meaning is not found in the content of my response, but in the very act of responding. " 
Beavers, p. 99. 
413 In Ioannis evangelium tractus, 26,4, quoted in, Jose Oroz Reta, "The Role of Divine Attraction in 
Conversion According to Augustine, " in, From Augustine to Eriugena: Essays on Neoplatonism and 
Christianity in Honor of John O'Meara, eds. F. X. Martin, O. S. A, & J. A. Richard ()p. 158. 
414 In Ioannis evangelium tractus, 99,4. 
415 The Spirit and the Letter, 56, XXXIII. 
416 P. Brown, Augustine of Hippo. A Biography (London: Faber, 1967), pp. 154-155. 
417 Reta, p. 164. 
418 M. Cleary, "Augustine, Affectivity and Transforming Grace, " Theology, Vol. 93 (1990), p. 209-210. 
419 Io. euang. tract., 26,4. 
420 For example, Augustine's emphasis in his later theology on the extent of sin, the polarisation of grace and 
nature, and what Rudolf Lorenz has termed his "insistence on the 'innerness' of grace. " Rudolf Lorenz 
"Gnade und Erkenntnis bei Augustinus, " Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, 75 Band (1964), p. 76. Cleary and 
Reta do not make it clear that Augustine held that "by a secret, wonderful, and ineffable power operating 
within, that God works in human hearts not only revelations of the truth, but also good dispositions of the 
will. " De. grat. Chr. et de pecc. orig. I, xxv, 24. This raises the question of whether human consent is 
involved in this interior work. Certainly human beings are free and morally culpable, because they "fail to 
seek the knowledge that they do not have. " De Libero Arbitrio, Ill. 19.53. Free will also appears to play a part 
in the request for Divine aid ("... this is why we ask for help, when we say, 'Do not bring us into temptation, ' 
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Nonetheless, our focus is not on Augustine, but on the development of a Personalist 
model. To that end, it may be noted that Cleary concludes: "true freedom of action is to be 
found in being supremely attracted to someone in such a way that love becomes so 
gradually unimpeded that nothing will hold us back; no alternatives, no matter how 
superficially attractive, can take the place of delighting in the presence of someone to 
whom we are naturally drawn, for we were created for him. "421 
The reality of the Spirit's presence, like the reality of the persons whom we encounter in 
our life in the world, is not something that we choose, only something we can ignore and 
reject. Just as the fact of this "given -ness" of presence, in the case of human presence, 
does not by itself determine us, likewise the presence of the Divine, by Himself, does not 
determine us, or infringe our identity. The presence affects us, challenging, questioning 
and disrupting our cosy egocentrism. How we respond to being affected, is a matter for us. 
We can either utilise the constructive affect of God's Spirit, which is an enabling love, to 
further open ourselves up to God's presence, or limit and abjure that presence. 
111.02) Encounter. 
Presence brings forth the possibility of encounter and much has already been said on that 
above. Other facets of the concept of encounter need to be noted. To be with another 
requires one to encounter the other, to draw up alongside the other, 422 but coterminous 
with such a movement is also the need to withstand absorption by the other. F. J. Smith 
shows how this dialectic is evident in the etymology of the concept of encounter: 
... the Anglo-Saxon wid means 
both for and against. This becomes evident 
in the verb, withstand, which is different than to stand with but 
complements it, existentially speaking. In encounter we come to stand and 
therefore can stand with the other; but in order to preserve our own stand 
we must withstand the otherness of the other, which may never be allowed 
and we would not plead for help if we believed that there was no way to resist it. " De natura et gratia, 
LXVII. 80. Yet, overall it appears as if Augustine is caught between the position that the will of faith is 
controlled by God, His gift, yet ultimately in the hands of human free will. Further, to say as Augustine does 
that God knows the circumstances under which we would freely will, begs the question why God does not 
arrange such circumstances for everyone. Augustine does not solve this dilemma argues Eleonore Stump, 
"Augustine on Free Will, " in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, eds. by E. Stump and N. Kretzman 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2001), pp. 124-147. 
421 Cleary, p. 209. 
422 Martin Buber writes: "The You confronts me. But I enter into a direct relationship to it. Thus the 
relationship is at once being chosen and choosing, passive and active. For an action of the whole 
being does 
away with all partial actions and thus also with all sensations of action - and 
hence it comes to resemble 
passivity. " I and Thou, pp. 124-125. 
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to predominate or absorb us. Not to withstand, while standing with means 
to lose one's personal stance and thus be incapable of encounter. 423 
We should note the resemblance of this conception of encounter as some form of being- 
with to the Johannine understanding of the Spirit as parakletos, the "one who is called 
alongside. 024 
Prior to personal encounter, we are already shaped by the shared world and shared human 
community within which we participate, our intersubjective environment. 425 We have 
already noted, what the Malones term, the relation of intimacy and "connectivity, "426 and 
as Solomon comments, our connection with other people and the environment around us 
supplies the right context for thinking about the paradox of love: 
Our selves are underdetermined by the facts about us - our appearance, our 
physical and mental abilities, our past history of accomplishments - and 
they are mutually rather than individually defined, defined with and through 
others. So conceived, the idea of sharing selves is not so implausible. 427 
F. J. Smith adds that the experience of alterity within the self and human capacity for self- 
reflection is also fundamental to encounter: 
The individual is both the one and the other, and can be so because even in 
itself it can be an other to self. The one can look on itself as the other, and 
that in many ways. And perhaps for this reason it is capable of admitting 
the other into itself. 428 
What is this "otherness" in the self which allows for interpersonal identification? On the 
one hand, it may refer to what Charles Williams calls, the "great web" of the co-inherence 
of things that precedes the individual subject, hence to the prior sharing which is the 
intersubjective precondition of all relationships. What is it for the self to experience 
otherness in itself? Smith might also be referring to the elusiveness of the self, as a 
complex phenomena, which assumes multi-faceted roles, hence the open-ended nature of 
429 self-knowledge , 
423 F. J. Smith, "The Phenomenology of Encounter", Philosophy Today, Vol. 7 (1963), p. 206. 
424 See Chapter 1, sc. 1.0102. 
425 We shall return to this subject in Chapter 7. 
476 See ft. 352 above. 
427 R. C. Solomon, About Love, p. 197. 
428 Ibid., p. 200- 
429 The Malones write: "All humans have spaces. We exist in several different ways with ourselves, and we 
can think of each of these ways as a 'space'.... Being able to 
have space and go there is most important to our 
staying healthy and sane. " Malone, p. 21. Freud's concept of the unconscious 
is a candidate for alterity within 
the self. Could a comparison be made here with the three 
hypostaseis of the One God? Is there "otherness" in 
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The point of the matter is that this prior sharing is part of the bridge of successful 
encounter. First, there is the fact of another's presence, in the case of the Spirit this 
represents a Divine initiative and invitation. This intiative of presence affects without 
violating the "boundaries of the other; " it offers a challenge, a call, an enabling power. 
Then there is the form of mediation which allows the encounter and communication to 
take place: the intersubjective space, the natural world and so on. The test of a successful 
encounter with the Divine is whether a person can open themselves up and respond to the 
initiative. 
111.03) Acceptance. 
The mind, is not forced to believe in the existence of anything. That is why 
the only organ of contact with existence is acceptance, love. 43 
The concept of acceptance which will be outlined here is an attribute of God's personal 
presence. It is an accepting presence, not an acceptance which eliminates judgement or 
disagreement, but an acceptance which gives loving intent precedence. This follows from 
the Johannine conception of the Divine purpose (John 3: 17), that the Incarnation is not a 
condemnation of the world, but its means of salvation. The Incarnation is an acceptance 
by the Divine of human form and atonement for human sin. Such accepting love is 
testified to in an exemplary way in the parable of the prodigal son. As Paul tells us in 
Galatians 4, it is because of the Son's "Abba-relationship" with the Father, that we may be 
His adopted sons. This is the relationship in which the Father says to the Son at the 
baptism, and hence to his adopted children, the words of acceptance: "You are my Son, the 
beloved; with whom I am well pleased. "431 Acceptance enables metamorphosis: 
432 
An alien, a person who does not feel accepted for who he or she is, cannot 
change, for he or she cannot exist in the real world, the world in which 
change is possible.... Unless I am loved and cared for as I really am, 
however, much my being that way distresses you, then I cannot change. 
433 
God? The 'negative analogy' would be that the hypostaseis have a degree of distinctness which our 'roles' do 
not have. Thus, the Father as distinct from the Son and enters into dialogue with 
Him. The Son and Spirit are 
sent by the Father. At the same time, the perichoresis within the Trinity 
is complete. 
4-30 Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace (London: ARK Paperbacks, [1947] 1987), p. 57. 
431 Mark 1.11 cf. Mtt. 3.17 which uses the less personl form: "This is my Son... " 
432 "The power of true acceptance is like a miracle. It can make things that 
have been stuck for years change 
in a moment. " Malone, p. 71. 
433 Ibid., p. 70. 
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This implies a mode of change which is personal, in the sense we have defined above. The 
change is initiated from outside the self, yet it is precisely not a transformation predicated 
on imposition or absorption. Rather it is a creation by the presence which encounters the 
other person, of a "space of empathy, "434 a loving acceptance, which bestows self-worth, 
allows for self-perception and reflection without despair or self-destruction. This is also a 
key feature of a Personalist Model, as this "empathic matrix, " as Ralph Ellis terms it, is a 
condition of successful romantic love: 
There is a need for someone in relation to whom we can express the felt 
sense of our present state of consciousness in such a way that they can be 
intensified, focused, explicated, and therefore can unfold into the future 
directions of consciousness in such a way that they are brought into 
focus. 435 
Empathy for Ellis creates the possibility of change, of an unfolding of consciousness 
through identification with the other person, and living the shared life together. It is a 
metamorphosis in which the subject can truly participate, and make her own. Such an 
experience is at the heart of intimacy, because it is an acceptance of one's real intima, one's 
'innermost' self. 436 
God's attitude of acceptance towards us, prefigures the nature of His creatures' response to 
the Divine initiative. "Who am I? " asks Dietrich Bonhoeffer in a poem in which he 
wrestles with the tension between, on the one hand, the public perceptions of his fellow 
prisoners who witness his humanity and fortitude in prison, and, on the other, his own 
interior perceptions of his state, which fail to match up. He ends with a resolution: 
Who am I? They mock me these lonely questions of mine. 
Whoever I am, thou knowest, 0 God, I am thine. 
This is the point where Divine acceptance enables self-acceptance. Rowan Williams 
comments on the poem: 
The 'answer' is the simple self-commitment to God: the wholeness of 
Bonhoeffer's selfhood lies in its belonging to God, a wholeness achieved in 
trust and hope rather than analysis.... My own identity's 'ungraspable' 
quality thus becomes not an elusive level of interiority, but the unknowable 
presence of the creator's absolute affirmation, the mysteriousness of grace, 
past, present and future, not of the 'true self as a hidden thing. My unity as 
434Ralph D. Ellis, Eros in a Narcissitic Culture (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), p. 60. 
aas Ibid. 
436 Ibid., p. 73. The connection between intimacy and self-worth 
is also made by Solomon, p. 239. 
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a person is always out of my field of vision (I can't see my own face), just 
as the divine condition for there being fields of vision at all, for there being 
a world or worlds, is out of my field of vision (I can't see my own 
origin). 437 
What does the human have to accept? In short, the reality of the Divine loving and 
accepting presence, the offer of relationship with the Divine, and the enabling of the Spirit 
which results from that relationship. It is out of God's acceptance of us that we accept 
Him, and we do so, concomitantly, by accepting ourselves as grounded and guided by 
Him. This is at the basis of real repentance, the metanoia at the birth of metamorphosis. 
Acceptance requires a growth in self-knowledge, which as Ilham Dilman has argued, is 
also connected with the possibility of change. 438 Self-knowledge he defines as knowing 
what one cares about, and being behind one's actions and in a "relation to what belongs to 
[one's] history, " an acceptance of one's "talents, limitations, background, experiences, 
allegiances, " having found "a way of living one can go along with, be oneself in. "439 The 
acquisition of self-knowledge requires change and movement: a resolution of inner 
conflicts, an accepting of past failures, a rejection of delusory goals and expectations. It is 
the combination of Divine acceptance and self-acceptance, as Bonhoeffer acknowledges, 
which provides the unity of self. 440 This is a recognition that the Divine acceptance of 
oneself is the ground and source of the possibility of true transformation. As Bonhoeffer 
writes: 
One must completely abandon any attempt to make something of oneself, 
whether it be a saint, or a converted sinner, or a churchman.... By this- 
worldliness I mean living unreservedly in life's duties, questions, successes 
and failures experiences, discoveries and perplexities. In abandoning 
ourselves like this we throw ourselves completely into the arms of God, 
taking seriously, not our own sufferings, but those of God in the world - 
437 Rowan Williams, "The suspicion of suspicion: Wittgenstein and Bonhoeffer, " in The Grammar of the 
Heart, ed. by R. H. Bell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988), p. 43. 
438 I. Dilman, "Self-Knowledge and the Possibility of Change, " in Rules, Rituals and Responsibility: Essays 
dedicated to Herbert Fingarette. ed. M. I. Bockover (Open Court: La Salle, Illimois, 1991), pp. 137-152 
439 Ibid., pp. 139,144. He goes on to write: "Self-knowledge, 
in the sense under discussion, involves 
authenticity, emotional learning and growth, and that 
includes the resolution of inner conflicts, the 
achievement of greater unity of self. It is through such 
learning, resolution, and growth that a person moves 
towards autonomy. To be in charge of one's life means to 
be in control of oneself, in the sense in which 
Socrates meant this, not to be in control of the different things that 
impinge on one's life: all the things that 
one cares for and all the things that make a difference, 
for good or ill, to the things one cares for. Much of 
this is beyond one's control and often a source of deep pain and 
distress to one. To come to know this is the 
beginning of wisdom, to learn to live with it is an important part of self-control. 
" ibid., pp. 149-150. 
44" One may note the similarities and differences between 
Bohoeffer/Williams position and Simone Weil, 
when she writes: "My 'I' is hidden for me 
(and for others): it is on the side of God, it is in God, it is God. " 
Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 53. 
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watching with Christ in Gethsemane. And that, I think, is faith; that is 
metanoia; so it is that one becomes a human being and a Christian. 441 
Simone Weil sees human acceptance as a reflection of God's renunciation (kenosis) and 
self-giving in creation. In the act of creatio ex nihilo God abdicates His claim to be 
everything. Hence, the human is called to respond to God in an event of "decreation": 
Renunciation. Imitation of God's renunciation in creation. In a sense God 
renounces being everything. We should renounce being something. That is 442 
our only good. 
By reversing the natural tendency of the ego, the grasping "I am, " to expand, to consider 
itself an autonomous "I", one again makes room for the presence of God, to be "all in 
all. "443 
It is necessary to uproot oneself. To cut down the tree and make of it a 
cross, and then to carry it every day. 444 
To uproot oneself is to detach oneself from one's desires, fantasies and self-propulsion, 
and to live with an attention, not attached to the objects of our imagination, but to the love 
of God. Acceptance means accepting the "void" of self-renunciation and detachment, 
which is not, according to Weil a form of nihilism, for, "Grace fills empty spaces, "'5 and 
hence one has the paradox that "this void is fuller than all fullness. "446 Even writers on 
romantic love talk of the need for a limited deconstruction of one's identity, which enables 
an openness to the other person, and which can lead to a heightened consciousness, 
aal Dietrich Bonhoeffer, "Letter 21st July 1944, " Letters from Prison (London: SCM Press/ Fontana, 1968), 
p. 125. 
442 Gravity and Grace, p. 29- 
443 What concerns me about the outcome of Weil's thinking is that it does appear to end up in some form of 
absorption mysticism, rather like the relationship between the Hindu Brahma which absorbs the atman. 
Thus, Weil writes: "The sin in me says 'I. '// I am all. But this particular 'I' is God. And it is not an 'I. '// Evil 
makes distinctions, it prevents God from being equivalent to all. " ibid., p. 27. J. P. Little comments: 
"Ultimately, then, in Simone Weil's vision of the decreated being, there is only God as a willing being, and 
matter which is entirely docile to law. The creature when decreated is merely the passage of the love of God 
for the Son which passes through creation. There is then no autonomous self set up in opposition to creation 
itself, the emphasis is on withdrawal, on not following natural inclinations, on not exercising power 
everywhere one is able to. " J. P. Little, "Simone Weil's concept of 
decreation, " in Simone Weil's Philosophy 
of Culture. Readings Towards a Divine Humanity. ed. 
by R. H. Bell (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), p. 42. Such a 
position appears to be in tension with a Personalist Model which per 
definitionem, predicates a distinction 
between those in a relationship and while affirming reciprocal identification, wishes to maintain the 
particularity of both parties and the distinctiveness of their contributions and creativity. 
444 Weil, Gravity and Grace, p-34- 
445 ibid., p. 10. 
446 ibid., p. 13. 
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renewed personal creativity and a deeper self-knowledge. 447 Such a position need not be 
read as self-nihilation. As Miroslav Volf points out in his explication of Galatians 2.19-20, 
it is not a question of dissolving the self as a centre, but re-centring the self in a process of 
being de-centred from the power of sin, to be truly centred in Christ. 
Paul presumes a centered self, more precisely a wrongly centered self that 
needs to be de-centered by being nailed to the cross: 'I have been crucified 
with Christ. ' Though the self may lack an 'objective' and 'immovable' 
center, the self is never without a center; it is always engaged in the 
production of its own center...... 'It is Christ who lives in me'.... suggests 
that the de-centering was only the flip side of re-centering. The self is both 
'de-centered' and 're-centered' by one and the same process, by participating 
in the death and resurrection of Christ through faith and baptism. 448 
Such a rooted, if de-centred self is able to open itself up in ecstasis and enter into relational 
exchange, "in [the] self-giving love made possible by and patterned on the suffering of the 
Messiah, "«9 and, one may add, the intra-trinitarian dynamic of love. 
IV. ) Conclusion. 
The purpose of developing these three concepts has been to suggest an alternative 
conception to the Divine Fiat view, regarding the Spirit-human relation in Christian 
metamorphosis. It has built upon the Personalist model put forward by Vincent Brummer, 
and re-orientated it in a trinitarian direction. Personal presence is affective, as Augustine 
points out. Personal encounter can bring about personal change without the non-initiator 
having first chosen deliberately to seek out such a path. The person encounters the Divine, 
through no choice of her own, just as we encounter the presence of people on a daily basis 
through no choice of our own. Many of the people we encounter affect us very little, 
because we lack the time, or the disposability to be in their presence. Our exposure to 
God's presence is over a lifetime. Does this mean that God is the archetypal stalker, the 
unwanted presence? A stalker is, etymologically speaking, a hunter, someone who is 
threatening and intrusive. God is not intrusive or threatening, his presence is that of 
ecstatic love, consistent with His essential nature. Although, God is always present, He 
sometimes decides not to make His presence felt; He does not overpower or manipulate 
aas Ellis, p. 129. 
4" Volf, pp. 69,70. As we shall see in Chapter 7, Volf grounds such a perception 
in the dialectic of 
"separating out, " differentiation, and "binding, " interrelation, which 
is to be found in the Divine act of 
creation. 
449 ibid., p. 71. 
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us. As the very ground of our being, God's presence is the ever present personal presence 
which affects but does not overwhelm us; which challenges but does not intrude; which 
gives us the space to have our own identity, but will always appeal to us to be more than 
an introverted identity, to find fullness of life with Him and with others. 
From initiative of the Divine presence and encounter stems Christian metamorphosis in 
response and acceptance of the need for repentance. Once such a human response occurs 
in relative autonomy, without dissolving the boundary of the self, sanctification can flow 
through a process of exchange or reciprocal identification in ecstatic love from the Divine 
to the human. The Spirit is the mediator and aid, first carrying the ecstatic love of the 
Father and the Son to the human creature, and then enabling its return to the Son and the 
Father, often through love of neighbour, so binding the love of the Christian community. 
The image of the embrace, as first adopted by the bridal mystics, acts as a summarising 
metaphor of the Personalist model presented. To further examine the extent of the 
explanatory efficacy of the Personalist model advanced above and to strengthen it, we 
shall investigate the possible "negative analogies" of this model. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
THE NEGATIVE ANALOGIES OF THE PERSONALIST MODEL. 
In this chapter the explanatory power of the Personalist Model developed will be tested 
and qualified by considering the potential negative analogies. 
I. ) The First Negative Analogy: Divine-Human Asymmetry. 
1.01) The Asymmetry between Creator and Creature. 
The last Chapter found that the use of trinitarian theology fulfilled both a critical and 
constructive function in the development of a Personalist model, in contrast with Vincent 
Brummer's use of an "incomplete doctrine of the Trinity" in his model of love. Brummer's 
account may be further criticised for failing to give full weight to the ontological 
distinction between Creator and creature. His account of the Personalist model45° 
presupposes an anthropomorphic symmetry and mutuality of relationship between the 
Divine and the human, whereas the reality of that relationship is asymmetrical. This may 
be traced back to Brummer's deficient ontology of God, and his belief that personal 
relations are fundamental to establishing identity, a point which when applied to God 
results in a position of God needing human love in order to be truly personal. 451 The 
reasons for holding such an asymmetry are clear: God is creator, human beings are His 
creatures; God's nature is "almighty, " whereas human nature is finite and limited. Whereas 
God can freely choose to relate to humankind, sin presents an obstacle to human relations 
with God. Brummer's account does not deal directly with the question of sin. 
452 For Barth, 
as we have seen, it is precisely the alienating effect of sin which makes him posit the 
450 Note that Martin Buber also posits such equality and symmetry in the "I-Thou" relationship (I and Thou, 
p. 66). 
451 For a development of these criticisms see, Schwöbel, "God 
is Love, " pp. 307-328. 
452 Paul Helm criticises John Lucas' "Freedom and Grace", from which 
Brummer draws heavily, arguing that, 
"Lucas puts people in a position of neutrality with respect to 
divine grace, " whereas in fact they are 
indifferent and hostile until turned around by grace. " "On 
Grace and Causation, " p. 112. However, Lucas 
writes: "The metaphor of personal relationships may mislead, 
because we naturally think of these as between 
two persons on an equality with each other, 
but with God, although it still is a two--way affair, it is also 
heavily one-sided. There are two parties, but the 
human party is not up to much, and it is God who makes 
most of the going. " Freedom and Grace, p. 
48. Lucas is not denying that we are sinners, and that sin is a form 
of alienation from God. Neither is he claiming that we can reach 
God on our own. If we were truly neutral 
towards grace, grace would not be very potently gracious. 
God is still gracious for Lucas, because 
presumably it is God who reveals Himself 
in His Son, and who refuses to be put off by our indifference or 
hostility towards His Gospel, and continues to offer 
Himself in relationship to us through the Spirit. We are 
loved into acknowledging Him, not force-fed. 
This conception of the Divine-human relationship allows us to 
preserve our freedom, identity and 
integrity. 
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intervention of the Spirit in the life of the believer. We shall explicitly treat the issue of sin 
453 in Chapter 5. The existence of sin means that God's initiating and enabling action is 
required if the Divine-human relationship is to be brought to fruition. 
John Macquarrie presents the negative analogy of Divine-human asymmetry as follows: 
A second reason against the equation of revelation with an 'I-thou' 
encounter is that in the latter, as we have seen, reciprocity and give-and- 
take are essential. There is no mastering of one side by the other. In the 
revelatory experience, however, the person who receives the revelation is 
utterly transcended by the holy being that reveals itself; and this utter one- 
sidedness again implies that a personal encounter could only be a very 
remote analogue. 454 
However, Macquarrie just assumes that a Personalist model does not have the resources to 
accommodate Divine-human asymmetry. It will be argued, following certain philosophical 
insights from Emmanuel Levinas, that all interpersonal relationships are constituted by a 
degree of asymmetry. Brummer's his account is compatible with God being the initiating 
and primary cause of human salvation, with human beings taking only a secondary and 
contributory role. Further it can be modified employing the doctrine of creation and the 
Trinity to give asymmetry an ontological basis. 
I. 02. ) Levinas, Interpersonal Relations and Alterity. 
Emmanuel Levinas' philosophy of alterity seeks to show that the relationship of 
asymmetry is actually at the heart of interpersonal human relationships, and hence, may be 
considered less threatening to the Personalist model. It is hoped that Levinas' insights in 
this matter may be appropriated in terms of their observations regarding psychology. This 
is to more or less bracket off his metaphysics, or what may aptly be described as his "meta- 
phenomenology, " which would unnecessarily intrude upon the substance of my thesis. 
455 
453 There is a debate to be had here on (a. ) the extent of sin, and 
(b. ) how God deals with sin. On the latter 
point, the Personalist model proposed in the last 
Chapter conceives of re-orientation in terms of a 
combination of encounter and challenge, initiated 
by Divine presence, alongside attentive acceptance and 
repentance. 
454 J Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (London: SCM Press, 1977), p. 
93. 
ass My reasons for doing so would begin with the point that 
Levinas' treatment of the philosophical tradition 
is less than adequate. As William Desmond says, "Levinas shows a tendency to 
identify the assumptions and 
analyses of Cartesian and transcendental idealism with essential possibilities of philosophy. 
" W. Desmond, 
"Marcel, Jaspers, Levinas, " in Continental Philosophy in the Twentieth 
Century: Routledge History of 
Philsophy VIII. ed. by R. Kearney (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 
160. Levinas tends to demonise the 
epistemological efforts of the rational mind, as 
being "totalising. " If all our knowledge is neither revisitation 
(anamnesis), nor imbued with quite the constructive activity of the mind as some 
Post-Kantians might 
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Levinas is concerned with the tendency in Western philosophy and, one can say, a 
tendency of human relations in general, to reduce the "Other" (e. g. the alterity of another 
person) to the orderings or representations of the subject. 456 This act Levinas marks out by 
the use of the verb, "to totalize. " Drawing on Husserlian phenomenology, Levinas argues 
that the representations of the conscious subject reduce the other to the conceptualisations 
of consciousness and in doing so strip away the character of otherness that one is seeking 
to understand. 457 One does not have to accept Levinas' overarching "meta- 
phenomenological" framework, to recognise that his thesis has a certain plausibility at the 
level of the psychology of human relationships, in terms of the dangers of ego-centricity 
and the oppression of other peoples' identities. Levinas' account of the radical exterior 
alterity of the Other may be considered too extreme, discarding as it appears to do the 
important role of shared language, culture and capacities which allow for the revelation of 
the Other to take place. However, the most important facet of Levinas' account to grasp is 
his emphasis on what is required for the Other to be able to relate without being subsumed 
by the self, "taken over" by fiat. 
Levinas' explicates his thesis, that there is an asymmetry in human relationships, by using 
the metaphor of "height: " the Other "comes from on high". "Height"(hauteur) refers to the 
fact that for Levinas the Other comes from "beyond being"; the Other transcends the limits 
of the representations and ordering of consciousness. Levinas writes, "It is necessary that 
the other person be nearer to God than I. " What Levinas means by this is that if the Other 
is to reveal herself and is not to be absorbed by the self, then the relationship must be 
suggest, why should our knowledge acquisition be so tainted, damned even, by the circularity of the 'Same'? 
The fallacious results of Levinas' dichotomy between theoretical consciousness, which is to be regarded with 
suspicion, and the affective realm of sensibility, sensitivity to which can lead to true encounter, can be seen 
in his designation of the Other as "teacher. " As he has cast suspicion on the theoretical consciousness, we 
seem to be unable to reflect on our experience of the Other, which is necessary to learn something from the 
encounter. We are left with a non-cognitive, affective encounter, about which we can say next to nothing, and 
a refusal to explain how our reflective consciousness can be positively brought back into play. 
456 "The Other" can refer to the human other (l'Autrui) or to the natural world (l'Autre). In contrast to the 
"Other" is the concept of "The Same" (le Meme), which can refer to the Self, the transcendental ego of 
phenomenology, which is narcissistic, a commitment of the self to itself, construing all knowledge as 
reminiscence and subsuming all particularities under neutral generalities. The term, "the Same", can equally 
be seen, for Levinas, to be synonymous with what Levinas sees to be the ontology of the Western 
philosophical tradition with its monism and "totalizing" dominance: "The itinerary of philosophy remains 
that of Ulysses, whose adventure in the world was only a return to his native island -a complacency in the 
Same, an unrecognition of the Other. " E. Levinas, "Meaning and Sense, " in Emmanuel Levinas: Basic 
Philosophical Writings. eds. by A. Peperzak, R. Bernasconi and S. Critchley (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 1996), p. 48. "The Other" is not the opposite of the Same, for that would be, according to 
Levinas, to set up an ontological order, which would be illegitimate. 
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unconditional: 458 neither dependent on what the Other does for me, nor conditioned by an 
expectation of the Other's obligation or responsibility towards me. The Other is not one of 
a kind or class, about which I can establish certain conventions or a set of responsibilities. 
The asymmetry is something, which can only be seen from the experience of encounter 
with the Other, not from a perspective outside it. The Other "from on high, " beyond my 
ability to represent her, is always to a certain extent unknown and unpredictable. 459 The 
Other that 'faces' the self disrupts and questions the order of the self, and in so doing calls 
for a response. The Other has ethical import, and as such is required to be separate from 
the Same. 
Ethics maintains the space between self and other after separation, thereby 
allowing the self to emerge as a self in reference to the other without 
possessing the other. Thus, ethics is the possibility of social interaction. 460 
Yet, the Other also has ethical 'authority' in her very "nakedness" and "nudity, , 461 the terms 
Levinas uses for the Other's vulnerability in face of the potential exploitation by the self s 
domain. By possessing this asymmetry the Other can "command. " There is asymmetry too 
in the Other's "role" as my teacher, 462 another designation given by Levinas. The teacher 
will teach something which is not a recollection (anamnesis), but something previously 
unknown, which I do not possess. It is in this asymmetry of the encounter with the Other 
that the true meaning of "the subject" is revealed: "The self is a sub jectum; it is under the 
457 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity. trans. R. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), p. 91. 
458 Such a statement appears problematic from a theological as well as philosophical perspective. From a 
philosophical position it is difficult to conceive of human relations which are wholly "unconditional, " in the 
sense that relations are enabled by conditioning and mediation. Although every person may be considered to 
be unique, without conventions, rules and language, that uniqueness would remain undiscovered and 
unexpressed. From a theological perspective, only God the Creator is unconditioned, creation is creatio ex 
nihilo and therefore can offer love unconditionally, whereas creaturely life is conditional and dependent. 
459 One must not gain the wrong impression that "height" for Levinas implies distance, although the metaphor 
is not employed in spatial terms. As Robert Gibbs comments: "This paradox of height and lowliness only 
shows further what sort of height Levinas is describing: neither stars and the heavens nor the high and mighty 
(rich and famous) but the one who, in standing up, rises above me, with an ethical demand. " R. Gibbs, 
"Height and Nearness: Jewish Dimensions of Radical Ethics, " in Ethics as First Philosophy. The 
Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion. ed. by A. T. Peperzak, London/ 
New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 15. In his later work, Levinas employs terms such as "proximity, " 
"neighbour, " and "the approach" to refer to the self's relationship with the Other, which again do not refer to 
spatial contiguity. E. Levinas, Other Than Being or Beyond Essence. trans. by Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), pp. 48,101. Although, there remains separation between the Self and the Other, 
ethics takes place in the approach towards the Other, in the ever moving forward towards the Other, and in 
opening of the self to the Other. ibid., p. 84. 
460 Beavers, pp. 92. He adds: "Contact with a transcendent alterity is ethical contact because the relation 
between self and other (that does not succeed in merging self and other) is maintained precisely as the 
obligation not to reduce the other to the self, that is not to kill the other" ibid., pp. 103. 
461 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 200. 
462 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 171. 
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weight of the universe, responsible for everything. "463 This picks up on the importance of 
the concept of encounter and challenge, and of finding oneself in relation to the Other, that 
was developed in the previous chapter. 
If we apply this thinking to the Divine-human relationship, we are perfectly justified in 
holding to the asymmetry of the relationship, the "height" of God. God, as Levinas says, is 
the "Most High" (du Tres Haut). 464 Levinas' position here will be appropriated along 
Christian lines, contrary to his opposition to the concept of the Incarnation. 465 It may be 
said that God's "height" comes from not only the fact that in traditional theology God is the 
creator and we are His creatures, but also from our inability to grasp Him fully with the 
representations of our consciousness. In addition, asymmetry arises from the unconditional 
nature of God's Self-offering. God too is "naked" and "nude" in the face of our idolatry and 
ultimately exposed to our violence on the cross. We live in the proximiity of God's 
commands, of His calling of us to respond to His reality. His Spirit disrupts, calls into 
question, but is also, in the words of John 16, our true "teacher. " In our relationship with 
Him we are rightly sub jectum, that is, the true meaning of our subjectivity is revealed as 
beings destined to be in relationship with Him. Thus, God's asymmetry as "the Most High" 
is at least analogous with the asymmetry which Levinas has noted in human relationships, 
which gives further credence to the use of the Personalist Model. 
There is, however, a legitimate negative analogy, which cannot be overcome. According to 
Levinas, although, an other person, P, has "height" in relation to the self, X, in P's 
463 Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 116. 
464 Levinas, "God and Philosophy, " in Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings. ed. A. Peperzak, R. 
Bernasconi & S. Critchley. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 141. cf. Totality and Infinity, 
p. 34. The term comes from the Hebrew El Alyon. 
465 Levinas claims that direct encounter with God is a Christian falsity. However, I doubt whether this is even 
a fair representation of the Jewish position. There is a dialectic in the Hebrew tradition between a physical 
conception of God's presence (both Moses and Jacob see God "face to face", Exodus 33.11; Gen 32.30), and 
a more apophatic strain, which emphasises the transcendence of God, that seeing God would obliterate a 
person (Exodus 33.20; Judges 6.22). What is clear is that there is a strong tradition of theophany in Hebrew 
Scripture of meeting with God's personal presence and one of the verbs used is r'h, to see or have visions. 
According to the Christian understanding we encounter God in the person of a particular human being, which 
does not banish the question of mediation, but is the only way in which substantial knowledge of the Divine 
is to be obtained. There is no reason to follow Levinas in holding that the Incarnation should bring about an 
infringement of Divine transcendence; after all, according to the Personalist Model, the Incarnate God would 
still be an Other, who by Levinas' own definition escapes the representing consciousness. Moreover, in the 
doctrine of the Trinity, there is always a hypostasis of the Godhead, which remains transcendent, namely, the 
Father. More generally, intimacy does not banish mystery and transcendence, rather it heightens or 
extenuates it. 
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encounter with X, X is also the "Other" for P, and hence, "comes from on high, " not as self 
but as Other. "Otherness" is to be predicated of both sides of the relationship. Here a 
negative analogy with human interpersonal relations is clear. God's knowing is different 
from our means of knowing, and as the omniscient creator of humankind God knows 
"what it is like to be" each human person. In this privileged position and as a result of His 
all-loving nature, the other person is not vulnerable to God, in the sense of being open to 
exploitation and oppression by the Divine. The human creature does not "teach" the 
Divine, nor reveal what is previously unknown, nor disrupt the Divine "subjectivity. " 
Nonetheless, the "otherness" of the creature, "the space to be a self, " is not absorbed by the 
Divine Other. This seems to be fundamentally compatible with the Christian telos, of a full 
relationship with the Triune God, one where particularity of the creature is respected just 
as are the distinctness of the tres hypostaseis in the Trinity. Moreover, God's human 
creation constitutes an ethical demand on the Divine, 466 which means that there is a sense 
in which God's creation does possess "height, " but in a much weaker sense than the 
"height" predicated at the interpersonal or Divine-to-human levels. 467 
1.03) Equality and Asymmetry. 
A less metaphysically charged position than Levinas', will help us to develop the 
relationship between asymmetry and mutuality. Robert Solomon argues that equality is a 
necessary presupposition for love, but his conception of equality is more nuanced than that 
of Brummer's. It is quite clear from a first glance at human relationships that equality does 
not equate to "egalitarianism": one person's job may be more important than their partner's, 
one person may be more in love than the other, one person may be more analytic, the other 
466 Some may doubt that creation does have this ethical pull on God. For example, see Brian Davies' 
treatment of the problem of evil in, B. Davies, Thinking About God (London, Geoffrey Chapman, 1985), 
ch. 8. 
467 Levinas' account of Divine-human asymmetry is even stronger than my use of his arguments. For 
example, he rejects Buber's Personalism on the grounds that the Ich-Du relationship assumes an unacceptable 
equality, familiarity and simple reciprocity with God. Neither toi nor vous are appropriate forms of 
addressing God. E. Levinas, "Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel and Philosophy, " in Outside the Subject, trans. 
by M. B. Smith (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 21-39; "Martin Buber and the Theory of 
Knowledge, " in The Philosophy of Martin Buber, ed. P. Schlipp and M. Friedman (La Salle, Illinois: Open 
Court, 1967), pp. 133-150. Levinas favours the third person of il/ille, hence referring to the otherness of God 
as illeity (He-ness). This indicates that God is not just another Other, but radically at the foundation of all 
alterity. The concept of illeity also refers to the mediated encounter with God, that God is always the "third 
party" mediated by some second party, which Levinas takes to be the human Other. As has been argued 
earlier, this position is denied by the Christian concept of the Incarnation. See also Andrew Kelly, 
"Reciprocity and the Height of God: A Defence of Buber against Levinas, " Sophia, Vol. 34 (1995), pp. 65- 
73. 
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more intuitive, and so on. Nevertheless, Solomon wishes to contend that equality is a 
precondition of romantic love: "Thus Stendhal says that 'love creates where it does not find 
equals, ' and we noted.... Cinderella must become a princess in the eyes of her prince in 
order to love and be loved by him, not as a matter of propriety but as a precondition of 
romance. "468 We have already argued in the previous chapter that in the Incarnation there 
is a Divine condescension and accommodation. 469 There is a movement in the other 
direction, namely, the exaltation of the human. His creatures are to become "God's 
children"(I Jn. 3.2), and through faith His adopted sons (Gal. 4.5). 
Such a dialectic between asymmetry and equality can be seen within the trinitarian 
relations of God Himself. An element of subordination seems inevitable in the trinitarian 
relations if we are to be faithful to the biblical account. This has traditionally been worked 
out in terms of the taxis (order) of trinitarian relations. 470 Thus, the Son is sent by the 
Father and is obedient to Him, humbling himself so that He may point to his Father. The 
Spirit is sent by the Father through the Son, and is self-effacing in revealing the Father 
through the Son, acting as their "go-between. " The Father is the transcendent locus of the 
Godhead; for the Eastern Church Fathers the Father is the principle of the Godhead 
(arche). For the Cappadocian Fathers an ordering of the Divine hypostaseis in the 
economy of salvation (ad extra) is founded upon an ordering within God ad intra 
represented by the terms ungenerated (agennesia), generated (gennesis) and proceeding 
(ekporeusis). Nonetheless, such an element of subordination does not forsake the equality 
of the trinitarian hypostaseis, in that both the Son and the Spirit are true God. It was the 
heresy of "subordinationism" which denied that; subordination without equality. Although 
the Son and Spirit constituted by the Father as arche are His "two hands, " to use St. 
Irenaeus phrase, they are also mutually constitute the Father. 471 The ordering of the 
468 Solomon, About Love, pp. 289-290. 
469 Phil. 2.8, cf. Mtt. 11.29. 
470 Taxis captures the Pauline understanding of subordination as order (Eph. 5.21), which assumes a social 
structure with responsibilities (see Delling, TDNT VIII, pp. 40f). T. F. Torrance opposes the hierarchical 
ordering of the Divine hypostaseis, claiming that any ordering is soteriological not economic. T. F. Torrance, 
Trinitarian Perspectives: toward doctrinal agreement (Edinburgh: T&T. Clark, 1994), p. 32. However, this 
threatens to divide the economic from the immanent Trinity. 
471 On this point Colin Gunton writes: "the Father is what he is not only because he begets the Son, but also 
because the Son responds in the way made known in his obedience as incarnate, and so can be understood to 
be the one who shares in the constitution of the being of God by means of his eternal response of obedience 
and love. " The same is true of the Spirit who "ensures that the love of the Father and Son is not simply 
mutual love. " The Promise of Trinitarian, p. 165. 
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relations are never one-sided, which would be to adopt a Neo-Platonist position. Rather 
there is the eternal reciprocity of perichoresis, which means that the ordering of the 
Godhead is never a torpid hierarchy of temporal origination, but an eternal movement of 
return constituting communion (koinonia). As Karl Barth has pointed out, this pattern is 
followed out elsewhere. Just as Jesus' humility was part of His divinity, so too, in the area 
of ecclesiology, it is only when the church truly serves the Lord that it has attained its true 
identity. 
Solomon's first condition of equality is that there be "no pre-established hierarchy in the 
relationship, i472 or at least, no major one, which would undermine true reciprocity. 473 
Surely there is a "pre-established hierarchy" and "superiority" in the relationship between 
the Divine and the human? It might be helpful to distinguish between a "pre-established" 
ontological difference or hierarchy and the intentionality of both parties involved. God is 
altogether ontologically distinct, the font of all truth, goodness, and being, our creator and 
redeemer. However, the intention and action of God is both a movement towards humanity 
in the Divine accommodation of the Incarnation and the intended raising up of redeemed 
humanity to full relationship with the Divine. Thus, God's intention is not hierarchical; as 
Ephesians 5.21ff shows, Christ is "head" of the church, but because he does so in 
submissive love (v. 25) a demeaning subordination is avoided. This fulfils Solomon's 
second criteria of equality, "mutual respect, "474 which is re-enforced if we conceive of 
God, contrary to the Divine Fiat view, acting in a way which respects the relative 
autonomy of creatures. Reciprocal identification in the Divine-human relationship is only 
truly defining in the case of the human creature, not in the case of the Divine. Although 
God has become human and taken the human up into His very intra-trinitarian being in the 
Ascension of Christ, as the Logos en sarx this is an expression, rather than an alteration of 
the Divine nature. The Councils of the early Church tell us that God's nature is constant 
and self-sufficient; God creates not out of need but 
from His sovereign free will. 
472 Solomon, About Love, p. 297. 
473 "The teacher who becomes involved with a student quickly elevates 
him or her to an equal -whether this is 
warranted or not - and the role of teacher 
becomes an insignificant role in a script that is primarily romantic. " 
ibid., p. 290. 
474 ibid., p. 293. 
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In conclusion, asymmetry in personal relationships does not necessarily lead to its 
dissolution into a form of impersonal relationship, such as a contractual or manipulative 
relationship. Differences do not outlaw mutuality and respect. Levinas teaches that 
asymmetry stems from the very possibility of the vulnerable self-revelation by the Other, 
in such a way that the Other is not subsumed or "totalised" by the self, but disrupts the 
order of the self and offers novelty. Asymmetry resides in the ontological fact that two 
parties with-stand each other. Yet it is also epistemological in that the self-revelation of the 
Other is not open to our manipulation. Despite the unambiguous ontological asymmetry 
between Creator and creature, in salvation history God initiates a movement of 
accommodation towards humanity (Incarnation), with the intent of exalting the human to 
full relationship with the Divine (theosis). Ontological asymmetry is compatible with 
levels of equality by intent, such as wishing to have a relationship of mutual exchange. 
This argument also re-enforces the position that God would respect the relative autonomy 
of creatures in Christian metamorphosis. 
II. ) The Second Negative Analogy: William Alston and the Problem of Internality. 
A further apparent negative analogy of the Personalist model arises when we consider the 
Divine-human relationship specifically in its pneumatological form and expressly the 
biblical language of the Spirit "indwelling" or "abiding" (menein/ oikein) in the Christian 
believer. 475 Such language of indwelling refers to what Yves Congar describes as, "a 
definitive relationship of covenant with God and of enjoying communion with him on the 
one hand and, on the other, of being in a state in which one is the true temple in which 
God dwells and where he is given spiritual worship. 
076 This type of communion is, prima 
facie, quite different from human interpersonal relationships. The Spirit is not embodied, 
so His actions, communication and presence are not directly recognisable to us in the way 
we can discern human communication and presence, 
by reference to a person's bodily 
behaviour. 477 
als See I Cor. 3.16,6.19; Rom. 8.9,11; Eph. 3.17; John14.16-17,14.23; I Jn. 4.12-13,4.16. 
476 Congar, Vol. 11, p. 80. 
477 J. Macquarrie argues this point against the Personalism of 
Buber: "in any meeting between persons, there 
is an actual physical meeting, for a person 
is not a disembodied spirit. This physical aspect of the meeting is 
essential to it, for this is how words are spoken and 
heard, looks and gestures communicated and understood. 
It is very hard to suppose what a personal meeting or encounter 
could be like in the absence of the physical 
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For William Alston such reflections lead him to suggest that the New Testament stress on 
the indwelling of the Spirit may be characterised by its degree of "internality" in the life of 
the believer. Such "internality" might provide a powerful "negative analogy" to the 
Personalist model: 
The distinctive thrust of the interpersonal model lies in its construal of the 
sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit on the analogy of the moral influence 
one human being can exert on another by speech, by provision of a role 
model, and by emotional bonds. But all this leaves the parties involved 
external to each other in a fundamental way; they are separate, distinct 
persons, each with his or her own autonomy and integrity. Of course, 
human reationships can be more or less intimate; and at their most intimate 
they are even spoken of, figuratively, in the language of mutual indwelling - 
"I just feel that you are part of me", "I carry some of you around with me 
wherever I go". Unless the talk of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit can be 
interpreted in just such a figurative manner, the interpersonal model does 
not embody the appropriate sort of internality. 478 
Alston notes the language of "internal" communion or relationship in the New Testament, 
in which the Spirit is said to "fill", "permeate", "pervade"(pleres pneumatos) the believer 
with the fruits of the Spirit. The Spirit is said to be "poured out" into the believer. He 
compares this with Old Testament references to the Spirit as the ruach of Yahweh, the 
"wind", "breath" and "life", which can fill and pervade all. This scriptural evidence 
indicate that there are not the same kind of boundaries of separation between the Spirit and 
the believer as there are between two human persons. Alston argues that the goal of 
Christian living is that, through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, believers "come to share 
in the very being of God. "479 
The 'new birth' can be understood as the initiation in us of the divine life, 
this life being grafted onto us, so that we are living this life480 
This Alston calls "life-sharing, " a concept that was used by some Patristic writers, such as 
Irenaeus of Lyons. Alston warns that this is not some mystical absorption of the individual 
swallowed up in the all-powerful one; it is a case of participation not ontological identity. 
One of the reasons why Alston calls this "life sharing" is that the word "life" does not refer 
exclusively to conscious relationships. 
events which mediate it. Thus at best the revelatory event could be only analogous to an 
'I-Thou' meeting, 
and remotely analogous at that. " Principles of Christian Theology, p. 93. 
4713 W. p. Alston, "The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit, " in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, ed. by T. V. 
Morris (Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1988), p. 137. 
479 II Peter 1.4. 
480 Alston, "Indwelling of the Holy Spirit, " p. 139. 
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The Personalist Model developed in Chapter 3 does have some resources to meet Alston's 
challenge. To begin with, there is a third option regarding one's conception of indwelling, 
which Alston seems to have neglected, that is neither substantialist, nor figurative. The 
concept of reciprocal identification explicated above offers an indwelling which is a real 
sharing of subjective identities. Statements of the form, "I just feel that you are part of 
me, " become more intelligible in this context if, as Solomon argues, romantic love 
involves "the intensive focus of mutual definition on a single individual, subjecting virtually 
every personal aspect of one's self to this process. i48' This is not a mere temporary engagement 
of the imagination and empathy, but refers to changes within my own subjective identity. 
Aiston's second point concerned the biblical language of "breath, " "filling, " "pouring out, " 
which challenges the boundaries of interpersonal human relationship. In their usual usage 
these "actions" or "events" would be considered to have impersonal referents: "He filled 
the bath"; "The water was poured out of the jug. " Moreover, they are one-sided actions. I 
am filled with the Spirit; the Spirit is poured out onto the believers. The question of the 
role of "impersonal" metaphors of the Spirit will be dealt with more thoroughly in Chapter 
6. For now let us note here the comparison between the concept of personal presence, 
which in the previous chapter I argued had the power to affect a person and this 
pneumatological language. Personal presence may exude energy, excitement, calm, 
reassurance, mediated through verbal and non-verbal communication. Thus, the concept of 
charisma, which refers to the quality or power a person has to influence people, is 
etymologically linked to the actions of the Spirit (Grk: kharis), the grace and favour of 
God, in bestowing gifts and inspiring the believer. This shows that such pneumatological 
language is not inimical to the Personalist model. 
The Christian conception of marriage, as the mystical union of two in "one flesh" 
(henosis), 482 also pushes personalist concepts to their bounds in an effort to describe the 
depth of interpersonal and Divine-human communion. Married life is the paradigm 
example of human "life-sharing, " involving not only the day-to-day venture of reciprocal 
identification, but also the symbol of unity and love in the sexual act, an act which opens 
48' Solomon, About Love, p. 197. 
482 John Meyendorff, Marriage: An Orthodox Perspective (St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1970), pp. 21-27. 
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the possibility of being totally affected by the presence of the Other. The personalist 
metaphor of dialogue ceases to be a sufficient description at this point. Roger Scruton 
describes the aim of sexual desire: 
I seek to unite you with your body. I seek to summon your perspective into 
your flesh, so that it becomes identical with your flesh; I thereby at last 
discover your true individuality (your self) as a constituent of the physical 
world in which I move and act. I wish you to be your body, not in the 
straightforward sense in which this is always true, but in the metaphysical 
sense in which it can never be true, the sense of an identity between your 
'unity of consciousness' and the animal unity of your body...... The burning 
of the soul in the flesh - the llama de amor viva of St. John of the Cross - is 
the symbol of all mystic unions, and the true reason for the identity of 
imagery between the poetry of desire and the poetry of worship. 483 
Mary Oliver argues that the Pauline language of "one flesh" opens up the possibility of talk 
of a "conjugal spirituality, " seeing marriage as the coming together of two persons in a 
"conjugal body" and a "conjugal soul, " which refer to the process of physical, 
psychological and spiritual reciprocal identification, with the de-centring of the self, the 
permeation of the two persons in each other's lives. What occurs in the ideal of marriage 
is: 
a spiritual reality which is both 'I' and 'not I, ' 'Thou' and 'not Thou, ' 
significantly and recognizably both two and one. When a pair goes from 
closeness to commitment, each comes to be partly other as well as self. It is 
no longer spiritually accurate to consider one alone, in isolation from the 
conjugal dimension which pervades it. 484 
From a theological perspective, union in marriage can be seen as an 'icon, ' a 'sacrament' 
and 'microcosm of the unifying love of God, " a reminder of Charles Williams' vision of 
the Kingdom of God as the "grand co-inherence of all things. 085 
The union of partners in marriage as held by the author of Ephesians is 
meant to anticipate the union of all things in Christ. Christ's work brings 
together 'everything in heaven and on earth'(Eph. 1.10; 2.6). Christ's 
483 R. Scruton, Sexual Desire. A Philosophical Investigation (London: Phoenix (Orion Books Ltd., 1986), 
p. 128. 
484 Mary A. Oliver McPherson, Conjugal Spirituality: The Primacy of Mutual Love in Christian Tradition 
(Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1994), p. 45. Equally, one may wish to add, the sacrament of marriage when 
properly undertaken involves, what Christos Yannaras terms, a growth of "personal 
distinctiveness and 
freedom. " C. Yannaras, The Freedom of Morality. trans. Elizabeth Briere (New York, St. Vladimir's 
Seminary Press, 1984), pp. 158ff. This involves the "transformation of the natural sexual impulse [and self- 
sufficiency] into an event of personal communion, " and ultimately 
"ecclesial communion. " ibid., pp. 161. 
Yannaras' conception of asceticism in marriage has an affinity with Oliver's concept of 
'conjugal spirituality. ' 
485 Compare this with C. Yannaras' comment that: "True eros - through self-emptying and self-offering - 
for 
one person in the communion of marriage creates a hypostatic possibility of relationship with all 
the 
members of Christ's body. " ibid., p. 167. 
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reconciling work brings into one body Gentiles and Jews 'so as to create out 
of the two a single new humanity in himself, thereby making peace'(2.16; 
3.6). 486 
The mysterion mega in Ephesians 5 of the association between marriage and the unity 
between Christ and His Church is founded on the sacrificial self-donation of Christ to His 
spouse the Church, an act which is brought to focus in the Eucharist. 487 Husbands are told, 
in a clear image of union, to "love their wives like their own body"(Eph. 5.28b), paralleling 
Christ's action in submissive love, cleansing, presenting, 488 nourishing and cherishing the 
church. 489 Despite the way that the imagery of "one flesh" pushes at the bounds of 
personalist language, it is still being employed in a relational context, in which although 
one party (the church) may be in a position of subordination (to Christ as the "head"), 
mutual self-giving love of both rules out absorption of one by the other. 490 Let us note that 
Christ's love for the Church is a covenant love, making love an 'icon' of that covenant, and 
ought to have the covenantal qualities of commitment, promise and obligation, durability 
and steadfast love. 491 Although this response to Alston's perceived "negative analogy" of 
the Personalist model does not remove all the complications of this difficult area of 
theology, it is hoped that it has been shown that the Personalist model can go some way to 
meet his point. If it does not do so perfectly, that merely shows the limit of precision or 
degree of fit that any model, by its very nature, can offer. 
Alston's discussion of this matter provides us with more material for reflection, for he 
gives us some further analogies to help us conceive Divine-human life-sharing. All the 
analogies envisage an extension of the boundaries that usually apply to interpersonal 
human relationships. The first analogy he gives revolves around imagining some neural 
486 Thatcher, p. 98. 
487 Christos Yannaras concurs: "The mystery of marriage saves natural eros - which means making it a 
hypostasis in the life of the Church - precisely because it grafts it into asceticism which is the eucharistic 
mode of existence. Under its guidance natural love becomes like the love of the Church, which accepted 
crucifixion. " Yannaras, p. 165 
488 Verse 26 refers to sanctification and cleansing both sacrificial motifs in Jewish thought. The washing in 
the "waterbath" most probably refers to the Jewish practice of a ceremonial washing of the bride before 
betrothal. The symbolism of baptism may also be alluded to: "The cleansing which takes place in Baptism, 
which is connected with the metaphor of the waterbath but is 
founded in the blood of Christ. " Rudolf 
Schnackenburg, Ephesians. A Commentary. trans. Helen Heron (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), p. 250. 
489 Verse 29 again a mixture of nuptial and sacrificial imagery. 
490 Adrian Thatcher argues that the analogy between the unity of Christ and the Church can be amended to 
remove "the offensive gender identification of the male marriage partner with the male 
Christ, and male 
initiative with divine initiative. " Thatcher, p. 92. 
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connection between brains so that our mental lives are shared: "When you are moved by a 
scene I will thereby be moved with your feelings; when you find a remark distasteful I will 
thereby find it distasteful. , 492 This analogy would only avoid the "take-over" model if it 
was possible to talk of two subjects and, hence, possible to distinguish my mental life from 
yours. Moreover there would have to be an acceptance by both parties of this form of "life 
sharing" and a growing convergence of goals, intentions and desires. These would be the 
minimum conditions for talk of real "sharing, " instead of positing the creation of a new 
mental entity, which could jeopardise both numerical and qualitative personal identity, 
rather like a case of Parfitian brain fusion. Yet it is unclear that given these qualifications 
of the analogy, it actually captures the degree of "internality" of the Spirit's action which 
Alston has highlighted. For example, is it always the case that we can distinguish between 
the Divine mental life and our own in the case of indwelling? 
This is why Alston describes the Spirit's action in relation to the human person as "carried 
on below the level of consciousness. "493 One of the ways that Alston conceives 
metamorphosis being carried out at an interpersonal level, is that the Spirit "could bring it 
about that facets of the person's present life appear to him in an unfavourable light and that 
the life of agape appears to him as highly attractive, without this being consciously taken 
by the individual as a communication from God. "494 This move appears to place the 
operation of the Spirit in the realm of manipulation, rather than personal relationship, and 
Alston seems to concur with such a categorisation when he writes of the Spirit's action as 
"'secret' manipulation of the subject's ideational processes. , 
495 It raises again the questions 
of the compatibility of such action with human freedom and personal identity, in short the 
issue of how such action may be called personal. It also begs the question, which Alston 
himself asks of the "Divine Fiat" position, namely: "If God is to transform me into a saint 
by a fiat why should he do such an incomplete job of it..... and why should the 
transformation be strung over such an extended period? "496 An appeal to a "greater good" 
argument at this point does not possess the advantages of a Personalist account. 
49' ibid., p. 93. The use of the concept of icon in relation to marriage 
is derived from Vigen Guroian, Ethics 
After Christendom: Toward an Ecclesial Christian Ethic (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1994), ch. 3. 
492 Alston, "The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit, " p. 142. 
493 
ibid., p. 134. 
494 ibid., p. 132. 
495 ibid., p. 133. 
496 ibid., p. 135. 
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III. ) The Third Negative Analogy: The Biblical Language of Incorporation. 
From another perspective, that of the Pauline language of incorporation, a negative 
analogy of a very like kind to that raised by Alston's analysis, presents itself. The language 
of incorporation raises the question of whether the Personalist model provides a strong 
enough conception of unity to do justice to such a biblical motif. The language of 
incorporation has theological breadth, for it could provide systematic connections between 
the doctrines of the Trinity, ecclesiology, the sacraments, and life after death. 
It has already been argued in Chapter 1 (section 111.04) that the link between the nature of 
intra-trinitarian relations and the concept of the indwelling of the Spirit in the believer, in 
the Johannine "Farewell Discourses, " is at best a weak analogy. Moreover, it is not clear 
that the language of indwelling is equivalent to that of incorporation, which is Pauline in 
origin and appears to be a stronger conception of inclusion. Paul famously talks of 
believers being "in Christ"("en Christo") (Gal. 3.28; Rom. 8.1; Phil. 3.8), and also the 
converse, that Christ is in believers (Rom. 8.10; Gal. 2.20). 497 Christ is not just an 
individual but in some sense an incorporating figure, contrasted by Paul with Adam. Paul 
says that the Church is one body in Christ (Rom. 12.4ff; I Cor. 12.12-30). One possible 
interpretation of this language is that Paul's "corporate Christ" motif stems from the 
Hebrew notion of corporate personality. Such a notion conceives of an individual (like the 
patriarchs, or the Messiah) as including other people within himself, and rests on a very 
49s strong view of the solidarity of the people of Israel. 
It is difficult to give plausibility to the idea of corporate or representative figures 
conceived of in ontological terms: 
What we do not have is any notion that such representative figures actually 
exist, and incorporate - without any loss of identity on either side - those 
whom they represent. Again, we can have very close relationships with 
others, but cannot be in them, especially without losing individuality. 
499 
497 Ziesler comments on this distinction: ".. believers exist in Christ, 
but Christ is active in believers, and so 
the notions are not exactly parallel. The acting nature of the second notion 
is particularly evident where 'in' 
is not a separate preposition but is a prefix to a verb. 
" J. Ziesler, Pauline Christianity, rev. ed. (Oxford: OUP, 
1990), p. 50). 
498 This would fit rather well with David Brown's sociological understanding of self-consciousness 
in his 
account of the doctrine of the Trinity. D. Brown, 
"Trinitarian Personhood and Individuality", pp. 48-75. 
499 Ziesler, p. 63. 
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However, the main reason for rejecting this interpretation is that it has been severely 
questioned by recent Old Testament scholarship. J. R. Porter showed that most of the Old 
Testament passages adduced to support 'corporate personality' proved on examination to 
support instead 'corporate legal responsibility'. 500 J. W. Rogerson argues that it is not the 
case that man in primitive society had no consciousness that he was an individual, but 
rather that he had no individual rights. 501 Ziesler sums up the research: 
while the Old Testament and later Judaism easily conceived of 
representative figures, it is not clear that they ever envisaged corporate 
figures, whether kings, patriarchs, Adam, or anyone else. We saw that 
Adam could be Everyman, but found no good reason to suppose that as an 
individual he could include other individuals. 502 
One of the clues to unravelling the meaning of the corporate language, Ziesler argues, is 
given in the equivalence of Paul's phrase "in Christ" and "in the Spirit", as shown in 
Romans 8. 
In Paul too the Spirit is power, divine power, which liberates from other 
powers such as Law, sin, and death , and which produces the ethical fruits 
and the gifts of service that mark the new life of the Christian community. 
To be in Christ now is to be in the Spirit, i. e. within the sphere of his 
power. That is to say, the equivalence of the two expressions indicates that 
Christ as exalted is now a centre of power, so that to be in him means, not 
to be in his person, but to be in his sphere of power. 503 
Such an understanding of the Pauline language of incorporation safeguards the identity of 
both the believer and Christ, it is not based on absorption, rather on a conception of 
"power" worked out in a relational way. Incorporation does not equate to ontological 
incorporation or identification, in the sense of numerical identity with the Triune God. 
500 J. R. Porter, "The Legal Aspects of the Concept of 'Corporate Personality' in the Old Testament", Vetus 
Testamentum, Vol. XV (1965), pp. 361-80. 
501 R. W. Rogerson, "The Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality: A Re-examination", Journal of 
Theological Studies., Vol. XXI (1970), pp. 1-16. 
502 Ziesler, p. 63. 
503 ibid.. The other clues that Ziesler finds to support this interpretation are, first, that the 'powers' or 
dominations opposing Christ are described in similar language (e. g. to be "under" or "in" the law[Rom3.19a] 
or sin [Rom. 3.9; I Cor. 15.56; Gal. 3.22]. Secondly, "en Christo" expressions often come with a stress which 
"frequently falls on belonging to Christ in the sense of being within his sphere of power and influence" ibid., 
pp. 64. cf. I Cor. 1: 30. He claims his proposal explains phrases such as 
"boasting in Christ" [Rom15.17], 
which has the best sense if all Paul's achievements "are 
done in his power and under his lordship, and thus 
reflect Christ's working in and through him. " ibid.. It explains the 
"body of Christ" language which " is in no 
way equivalent to Christ as a person, but is the community of those who 
live by and under the divine power. " 
ibid., pp. 65, cf. I Cor 12.12-31 where "the church is the body empowered and controlled and 
defined by the 
Spirit". Equally the concept of 'members of Christ' found in I Cor. 12 "means that Christians belong to and are 
parts of the corporate entity that derives its existence 
from Christ through the Spirit. It does not mean that 
they make up in the way that members of a football club make up that club. 
Otherwise the identity either of 
Christ or of members would be lost, and such a loss of 
identity is never contemplated by Paul. " ibid.. 
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Change is not ontological in kind, but qualitative and relational: the Christian is a new 
relation with God, has new relational properties, such as faith and undergoes a qualitative 
change of the orientation of her personality in sanctification. The Spirit's mediation of the 
power of Christ may be conceived to operate in terms of the Spirit's personal presence, 
rather than in a purely impersonal and causal manner. In sum, the theme of incorporation 
is compatible with the Personalist Model, and one may also note a greater similarity 
between the Pauline language of incorporation and Johannine indwelling than one may at 
first have thought. 
IV. ) The Fourth Negative Analogy: Death and New Life. 
Our fourth proposed negative analogy suggests that the Personalist Model is inadequate 
because it cannot capture the nature of the transformation of the person in conversion, 
regeneration and sanctification, in short, Christian metamorphosis. The state which 
humankind finds itself in, according to the Pauline conception, is that of death to sin 
(Romans 4.25; 6.11; Ephesians 2.1). The state, which the believer is changed into, is that 
of "new life" in both Paul and John. 504 The objection to the Personalist Model which arises 
is that the conception of transformation presented as a result of the schema of encounter 
and personal presence, plus acceptance or response on the part of the human, and 
reciprocal identification or exchange, fails to capture this radical transition from old to 
new, from death to life. The objector may not wish to dispute the fact of a change in 
personality occurring as a result of interpersonal human relationships, but s/he would wish 
to contend that in the case of the Divine-human relationship there is not only a change in 
personality, but a new creation. This metamorphosis has a central eschatological dynamic 
to it: the new creation is called into existence and is forged in the pull of the future glory 
and only fully re-created in the eschaton. The model of interpersonal relationships is 
incapable of being used as a tool to further explicate this reality. 
Much of the strength of this objection depends on the meaning of the word "new", in 
its 
biblical use. Does the word mean the creation of something wholly new, with no 
continuity with what has gone before, a new creation ex nihilo? 
Or is it that a new reality 
has been brought about in and out of the old, in a dynamic of discontinuity and continuity? 
This question may be adjudicated by looking more closely at 
Paul's theology surrounding 
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the concept of "new creation. " For Paul salvation is a matter of transition from the 
dominion of one power to that of another, from the dominion of sin and thus, a liberation 
from one's sinful nature (sarx), the power of the Law, from wrath of God, and the clutches 
of demonic powers, to the dominion of the risen Christ, to the state of being en Christos. 
The key to Paul's language of "death" and "new life" is the central and paradigmatic event 
of Christ's dying and rising. John Ziesler explains: 
In effect, dying with Christ is the way to become in Christ, for the first 
concerns transfer from the old domination, and the second concerns the 
consequent existence under the new power, Christ. The key is the faith 
which is response to Christ: by faith one is accepted by God and restored to 
right relationship; by precisely that same faith one dies to the old securities 
and goals and powers; and by faith one finds new life, in Christ. 505 
What is "new" in this state of liberation? As Ziesler analyses Paul there is a double 
soteriological effect, "both a new status, a new relationship, and a new existence, a new 
way of living. 006 The transfer from the old bondage of sin and death is a result of a change 
in relationship to God, a reconciliation and hence, a new status in relation to God 
(justification). What is required is a wholehearted following of the new Master, Christ 
(Rom. 6.12-14; 16-20), in the newly granted freedom to serve the Spirit (Rom. 7.6). The 
fulfilment of this new form of existence will mirror that of Christ's resurrection, and is 
eternal life (Rom. 6.21-3). This does not constitute an ontological change, as the change, as 
was noted in the last section, is in terms of relations, relational properties and qualities. 
New creation is not a re-creation ex nihilo. 
507 Rather the terms "old" and "new" have 
specific relational references, to the dominion of sin and Christ respectively. The person in 
Christ still has personal continuity with the whole span of his created existence; numerical 
identity is maintained. What changes is the relational context of one's being, now in 
relation to Christ and the Spirit, and no longer within the power of the matrix of sin. What 
follows is the gradual change of qualitative identity, in regeneration and sanctification, as 
the personality is re-orientated by its relation with Christ and the 
Spirit, to full relation 
5°4 Eph. 2.4-6; John. 5.24. 
505 Ziesler, p. 97. 
506 ibid., p. 95. 
507 This is also clear from John's Gospel. To be "born again", 
is not, as Nicodemus mistook the phrase, to be 
born "a second time"(John. 3.4). Rather the 
Greek anothen may mean 'from above' or 'again', and in John's 
Gospel anothen primarily has the former meaning 
(John 3.31; 19.11,23). What is meant is that "rebirth" is 
the work of the Spirit, and what is being 
focused upon is the need for spiritual transformation, a cleansing 
and renewal of the 'heart'(3.5). 
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with the Godhead. The process is gradual as extensive qualitative change, like 
instantaneous radical change to the ship of Theseus, would dissolve numerical identity. 
This dynamic of discontinuity, yet continuity, is an aspect of Paul's partially realised 
eschatology. Tension remains between the old and new order, which comes out 
particularly in Paul's ethics. Hence, a real need for vigilance and a struggle is required to 
continue to "walk by the Spirit" (I Cor. 10.12-13; Phil. 3.12). The new life in all its fullness 
is an eschatological reality. 508 When Paul does speak of the resurrection, he talks of a 
"spiritual body"(I Cor. 15.35-44). This is a concept which suggests both continuity and 
discontinuity. Continuity, indicated by the metaphor of the seed, is not by nature or by 
right, but by a Divine act reconstituting a person's soma and ensuring sameness of 
personality such that the numerical identity of this person remains the same. There is 
discontinuity, in that the soma is "spiritual. " That is its place is in the dominion of God, 
the new order not of flesh and blood. 
Prima facie this looks like a 'ship of Theseus' type case, with the parts being replaced but 
the form remaining constant (qualitative change). However, if Paul's account is correct, 
although personal identity is ensured, it is questionable whether a person would be exactly 
the same kind of thing, viz. a human being. For human beings do not have "spiritual" 
bodies, 509 and the nature of the physical constitution of a human being is part of the 
species' real essence. Nonetheless, it may be argued that a specifically physical body is not 
of the essence of human persons created by God. Whatever way one may wish to argue on 
that score, my point is merely that Christian metamorphosis does involve some ontological 
change. It is not a purely psychological or relational change. Yet, it is also change that 
does not put under question the continuity of personal identity. The resurrected person 
would still have the same personality/soul/spirit incarnate in a 'human-like' body. The type 
of relation that human persons now have with God is directly associated with the 
ontological outcome enacted in the eschaton, the re-ordering of God's creation. As Paul 
508 In his early epistles Paul talks of "suffering with Christ, " and "dying with Christ", but never "raised with 
Christ". In his later epistles he talks of "being saved", "we will be saved", which suggests a process of 
realisation, rather than a completed event. The gift of the 
Spirit is termed an arrabon (II Cor. 1.22; 5.5; cf. 
Eph. 1.14), a down-payment, a first-instalment of the future 
inheritance of the Kingdom. 
509 The nature of the "spiritual body" is testified to 
in the Johannine resurrection appearances. It may be 
touched, but it can also move through closed spaces. 
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writes, these ontological changes take place "in the twinkling of an eye, at the last 
trumpet"(v. 52a). 
Is the Personalist Model incapable of being used as a tool to explicate this Pauline 
language of "death" and "new life"? La Vita Nuova (The New Life) is the title of Dante's 
great "autobiographical" precursor to his famous Divina Comedia. It concerns his 
encounter with Beatrice, who is to become his beloved, and the new life that flows from, 
what is for Dante, this ephiphanic meeting. As an instance of romantic love it appears to 
be rather undeveloped and a candidate for infatuation. 510 Dante's purpose is not 
psychological realism as such, but to reflect on the significance of romantic love using the 
tools of theologically informed narrative and poetry. Infatuation involves self-deception 
and unrealistic expectations. 511 The fruits of Dante's encounter are not illusory and self- 
conceited. When Dante first meets Beatrice he is affected at all levels, spirit, mind and 
body (even the liver! ): "Ecce deus fortior me, qui veniens dominabitur mihi. , 512 According 
to R. D. Ellis at the heart of the "new life" experience of romantic love is the idea of the 
stimulation and provocation of the movement of consciousness, "consciousness must 
transcend itself in order to exist. "513 This idea may be compared to Richard of St. Victor's 
conception of the self-transcending charity of ecstatic love. Ellis' position is predicated on 
his phenomenological analysis of consciousness as a "process, " rather than something 
fixed: 
Living beings want not only to reduce their drives - to seek a state of rest, 
etropy, a low energy level, a condition of stasis - but we also want to 
continue existing with a certain degree of intensity, change, transformation, 
adventure, and 'aliveness. ' The reason for this is that consciousness by its 
very nature is a pattern of change which occurs in a physical substratum 
such as the human body in interaction with other bodies and its 
environment. If the ontological status of consciousness is a certain kind of 
510 It might be contended that this is not a fair observation, for it focuses on the events of La Vita Nuova 
alone, rather than the relationship of Dante to Beatrice over the whole range of his writings, and through 
Dante's pilgrimage toward ultimate salvation. Charles Williams makes such a point from the perspective of 
the Paradiso: "a state in which those first Beatrician encounters,... full of such a thrilling tremendum, seem 
almost paltry.... compared to the massive whole of single and exchanged Love. " C. Williams, He Came Down 
From Heaven (London, Faber & Faber), p. 91. However, even with such a perspective Dante's relationship 
with Beatrice is not described with the psychological realism of extensive reciprocity. 
511 According to R. D. Ellis a degree of infatuation is involved even in mature romantic relationships, a 
"fetishization of the other's presence, " but which is to be distinguished from infatuation experienced in a 
relationship which does not involve true reciprocity and exchange, by the inclusion of the "space of 
empathy" for the other person. Ellis, pp. 111,114-5. 
512 Dante, La Vita Nuova, trans. by Barbara Reynolds (Penguin, London, 1969), 11.18-19. 
513 Ellis, p. 48. 
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change and transformation, then consciousness cannot continue to exist by 
continuing to be what it is. It must continue to seek transformation. 514 
As transformation of consciousness has a direction or pattern, stasis equates to the 
inability to unify one's consciousness in an open-ended way, which relates past, present 
and future. 515 For Ellis romantic love is a paradigmatic case of such transformation, 
brought about through the symbolisation of sexuality, the idealisation of the Other, the 
nature of exchange or reciprocal identification all of which lead to a "heightened 
consciousness, " precisely what Dante describes as being affected at all levels of a person's 
psychosomatic unity. 
Although Dante talks of being "ruled over" by Love, this is not a return to a Divine Fiat 
model; he is affected but not immobilised. It is of note that Dante actually describes the 
experience in a way not so far removed from the Pauline conception of a transition to a 
new power or dominion: "Behold a god more powerful than I who comes to rule over me". 
One may also note the similarity with Levinas' conception of the asymmetry involved in 
encountering the Other. Charles Williams takes up the theme which we saw was central to 
understanding Paul's conception of new creation, that of "dying and rising": 
To love is to die and live again; to live from a new root. Part of the 
experience of romantic love has been precisely that; the experience of being 
made new, the 'renovation' of nature, as Dante defined it in a particular 
experience of love. 516 
This echoes Ellis' thesis that one key condition of romantic love is vulnerability, readiness 
and need to be transformed and a willingness to "deconstruct" one's identity both by being 
open for transformation, taking the risk and in making space for the other persons" 
514 ibid., p. 8. 
515 Ellis' analysis of behavioural patterns such as coquetry, sado-masochism, and romance addiction, 
maintains that they are motivated out of a 
fear of transformation, and of allowing an opening to a true space 
of empathy, and that by nature, they seek no 
lasting direction. For example: "The romance addict [the 
promiscuous] has too little sense of direction and 
thus meaning in life to overcome his own anxieties and 
fears - primarily fear of the unknown, of 
transformation, of the openness needed for a genuine space of 
empathy, and thus of genuine intimacy. 
" ibid., pp. 159-160. Their "inauthentic" behaviour is often a form of 
"temporary escape, " for Ellis this indicates that the person 
is unable to unify his consciousness, to discover 
meaning and direction. The form of 
behaviour adopted just adds to the "fragmentation of consciousness" 
ibid., p. 159- 
516 Williams, "The Practice of Substituted Love", in Charles 
Williams: Essential Writings in Spirituality and 
Theology, p. 221. 
517 Ellis, p. 129. 
133 
Moreover, the experience brings with it ego-transcending virtues: charity and humility. A 
new relationship achieves a new form of existence, in terms of the orientation of one's 
personality and the quality of one's relationships. 518 This is close to the ecstatic love that 
Richard of St. Victor describes, what Ellis would call, "a force which pulls us out of 
ourselves . "519 Ellis describes it as a transformation in which "one's motivational structure 
completely changes in the space of empathy" that one has created with the other. 520 For 
Dante there is an additional layer of meaning. In love one is changed into likeness with the 
source of love, a movement towards the "centre of the circle to which all parts of the 
circumference are in a similar relation"(XII. 15). The reason why romantic love is so 
revelatory for Dante, and has such salvific potential, is because it is not merely a human 
event, but charged with the Divine. The energy and revivifying effects of romantic love 
founded in the source of love itself, is what Williams calls, following Coventry Patmore, 
"the revelation of an 'unknown mode of being. 021 
Williams maintains that the epiphany of romantic love rediscovers a prelapsarian 
awareness (or one might equally say a preview of eschatological reality): 
The primal knowledge is restored, and something like pardon restores 
something like innocence.... if only for a moment it flashes for a moment 
into the lover the life he was meant to possess instead of his own by the 
exposition in her life of the life she was meant to possess instead of her 
own. They are 'in love. '522 
Charles Huttar comments this "gives one a double vision of the beloved, seeing through 
his or her ordinary humanness to the glory of a restored Imago Dei in that person". 523 As 
Williams puts it, "Both Beatrices are aspects of one Beatrice.... Beatrice then, so the quality 
of Love reveals, is the hope of the blessed. , 524 From his phenomenological analysis, Ellis 
518 "Whenever and wherever she appeared, in the hope of receiving her miraculous salutation I felt I had not 
an enemy in the world. Indeed, I glowed with a flame of charity"(Dante, Vita, XI. 1-7) 
519 Ellis, pp. 58,238. 
52° Ellis, p 63. He goes on: "The easiest way to understand the nature of this change is by means of careful 
phenomenological reflection on the way the lover's entire life erupts 
into seemingly unbearable existential 
crisis when deprived of the unconditionally empathic situation when 
it is urgently craved - i. e., of the 
experience of chagrin d'amour. " ibid., p. 63. 
521 C. Williams, The Figure of Beatrice: a study of Dante (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell & Brewer, 1994), 
p. 14 
522 C. Williams, "The Theology of Romantic Love, " in Charles Williams: Essential Writings in Spirituality 
and Theology, pp. 77-78. 
523 Charles A. Huttar, "Arms and the Man: The Place of Beatrice in Charles Williams's Romantic Theologyy", 
in Charles Williams: A Celebration, ed. B. L. Horne (Gracewing: Leominster, 1995), p. 65 
524 The Figure of Beatrice, p. 27. 
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notes a similar point when he talks of being motivated in romantic love by a "vision of an 
abstract possibility, " that is being transformed by the ideal potentiality latent in the other, 
as vulnerable (warranting compassion) and admirable (warranting adoration) and in 
oneself. The mutual vision of the lovers as potentially ideal, draws out both the possibility 
of the relationship, and helps to actualise transformation. 
The pull of love is thus the pull of the other's ideal potential, as yet 
unactualized or struggling to maintain its actual existence under hostile or 
unsupportive circumstances, which pulls us to relate to it as such and thus 
to assist its actualisation in a concrete sense, while by doing so we awaken 
our own consciousness out of complacent sameness and into transcendence 
and radical transformation. 525 
This connects with the concept of a creature's "latent true nature" to be developed in 
Chapter 5, and the analogy surely is that relationship with the Divine draws creatures 
towards their true destiny, as the image of God. My purpose here is not to develop, what 
Williams calls a "Romantic Theology, "526 but to show that LPR, such as romantic love, do 
have the potential to act as a metaphor or analogy for new creation. 
The essential constituents of what in romantic love causes transformation are all witnessed 
to by Dante. The physical presence of the beloved which affects; hence the role of desire 
and attraction. We have already argued for the importance of the encounter with the 
Divine presence, as the key initiating and affecting movement of the Divine-human 
relationship. Clearly in the case of Divine-human relations the physical constituents of 
romantic love are not in action: there is no physical attraction to a specific body, although 
the ecstatic experiences of mystics, of joy and bliss certainly are experienced physically. 
However, the desire for God is not a physical desire as such. The second constituent of the 
"new life" of romantic love is the element of self-transcendence, which is both an 
enlargement of our identifications and a dissolution of, what one psychologist calls, the 
boundaries of our ego, that is, the cognitive, emotional structures which define the self. 
527 
In a true response to the presence of another person one is taken out of oneself, and in the 
525 Ellis, p. 53. It is also interesting to compare R. 
C. Solomon's argument that idealisation of one's beloved 
aids transformation and mutual. Solomon, p. 
203. 
526 C. Williams, "The Theology of Romantic Love, " in He Came Down From Heaven, pp. 62-82. 
527 "The sudden release of oneself from oneself, the explosive pouring out of oneself 
into the beloved, and 
the dramatic surcease of loneliness accompanying this collapse of ego 
boundaries is experienced by most of 
us as ecstatic. " M. Scott Peck, The 
Road Less Travelled (London: Arrow Books, 1990), p. 92, cf. pp. 99ff. It 
is worthy of note that Scott Peck talks of the 
"pouring out of oneself', which has strong echoes of the 
pneumatological language of being 
"filled" with the Spirit. 
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process of exchange or reciprocal identification one's subjective identity is enlarged and 
transformed. 528 Following the insights of Richard of St. Victor, this process of 
transformation of one's qualitative identity is taken a stage further when one's reciprocated 
love for the other is conjoined in a shared love which moves out to a third. This reflects 
God's ecstatic love, that love is always love for another, and further that the process of 
coalescing in a shared love for a third is a deepening of love. When love ceases to be the 
wonder and bliss of the first stage of the presence of the Other, and knows itself well 
enough for two to conjoin in love, recognising the ethical reality of having allowed the 
Other to reveal herself, it moves forward in a further action of love towards a third. 529 This 
constitutes an additional enlargement of oneself and a dissolution of one's ego boundaries. 
If Christ is our beloved, then there is already a sense in which he has taken on our identity 
in the Incarnation (Charles Williams' theme of substitution 530), and our response to this act 
of love is to share in His identity, mediated through the personal presence of the Spirit. 
These changes bring about a "new mode of existence, " as has already be noted, a new 
relationship, a shared identity through reciprocal identification. Joseph Kupfer talks about 
ontological transformation, and distinguishes it from epistemological change: 
Ontologically, the lover collaborates in our transformation. 
Epistemologically, he or she inspires us to imagine ourselves better than we 
are... Our beloved helps us see our potential goodness and then promotes its 
realization. 531 
What can be said of this epistemological level of transformation. We have already seen in 
the case of Dante and Williams the way that love might be considered to cleanse the 
"doors of perception. "532 In romantic life this will consist of perceiving the ideal potential 
of the beloved, while in the Divine-human it is the openness and acceptance of faith which 
allows the Spirit to draw the believer towards their eschatological fulfilment. Acceptance 
528 Joseph Kupfer, "Romantic Love", Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 24 (1994), p. 117. 
529 The thought of Levinas is clearly evident in this, in his analysis of revelation of the Other as primarily an 
ethical issue. The origin of the face of the Other is "illeity", the 
foundation of all other "seeming alterity" 
which "assures the condition of the possibility of ethics as the very possibility of the 
beyond" Levinas, 
"Meaning and Sense, " p. 64. 
53° C. Williams, "The Practice of Substituted Love, " in He Came Down From Heaven, pp. 82- 95. 
53' Kupfer, pp. 115. I am unsure as to whether "ontology" is the best term to use here. What changes are one's 
relationships and one's subjective identity, but not the kind of things that exist. 
532 The phrase is from William Blake's Marriage of Heaven and Hell. For 
further reference on this issue see 
Huttar, p. 65. 
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involves a self-renunciation, an expansion of the boundaries of the self, and an act of, what 




is an exercise of .... really 
looking. The difficulty is to keep the 
attention fixed upon the real situation and to prevent it from returning 




The epistemological change is required for the qualitative and relational changes that the 
Christian undergoes: there cannot be real exchange unless one is patiently attentive to the 
other. On the other hand, qualitative and relational change is needed for an adequate 
personal epistemology: unless the initial encounter releases one to step out of the confines 
of an egocentric perspective, then the self-emptying which is "attention" could never take 
place. 
V. ) The Type of Personalist Model. 
Up until this point, the source of the Personalist Model presented has been loving personal 
relationships (LPR), which has been explicated largely employing an analogy with 
romantic relationships. However, romantic love is not the only possible interpersonal 
relationship which could be used as the source of the model, and the type of LPR adopted 
will effect the explanatory outcome of the model. In this section I wish to address the 
question of whether one type of LPR should be privileged as the primary source of a 
Personalist Model or whether different LPR should be used in a complementary fashion. 
The particular types of relationship we shall consider, in addition to romantic love, have 
often been associated with the classical Greek classification of loves, philia, storge, eros 
and agape, and are the parent-child relationship (storge, affection) and friendship 
(phllia). 534 
V. 01) The Model of Parent-Child Relationship. 
The Syrian Church Fathers' employ the metaphor of the Spirit as mother, to capture both 
535 
the life-giving power of the Spirit in Scripture and to explicate Christian rebirth. Jürgen 
533 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good (London: ARK Paperbacks, 1985), p. 66. 
534 On the classification of the Greek loves see C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves 
(London, Fontana, 1960). 
sss Jürgen Moltmann in his account of the use of the metaphor of "mother, " mentions as examples Aphrates 
and Symeon of Mesopotamia, The Fifty Homilies of Makarios. 
He writes: "If believers are 'born' again from 
the Holy Spirit, then the Spirit is 'the mother' of God's children... If the Holy 
Spirit is 'the Comforter' 
(Paraclete), it comforts 'as a mother comforts. "' Moltmann, p. 157, cf. pp. 157-160. 
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Moltmann suggests the metaphor which emphasises "giving birth, nourishing, protecting 
and consoling, love's empathy and sympathy" expresses the "mutual intimacy, not 
sovereign and aweful distance" of the Spirit. 536 Within the mystical tradition the bridal 
imagery used by many mystics to describe the union of embrace between the Divine and 
human, is also explicated using the metaphor of the nurseling or suckling soul, feeding 
from the breasts of the nurse, who represents God. 537 In the case of the bridal metaphor, 
"union" is advanced in terms of reciprocal identification between the lovers, but most 
vividly via the metaphor of the embrace in love making. Nelson Pike summarises what he 
considers to be at the heart of the bridal image of union in many of the mystics: 
In the sexual embrace, the bride is typically covered by her mate. She is 
then enwrapped by him and submerged beneath him. He penetrates her as 
well - he saturates her with his issue..... the love act is most importantly 
associated with its tactile element. She feels her mate in contact with the 
outside of her body. She also feels him on the inside...... the female is the 
receiver of action. The male initiates and sustains the act - her action is 
reaction.... involvement with another can become so intense and the 
relationship so close as to result in a loss of the distinction between oneself 
and one's partner. 538 
Here we have the key features of the Personalist model: both the asymmetry of the Divine 
initiative, and a metaphor for the opening of the boundaries of the self to allow for 
perichoresis, which in the Christian tradition is talked of in the language of "one flesh. " He 
believes that the mother-child metaphor has a similar pattern: 
At the moment of feeding, the child is wrapped in its mother's arms and 
pressed closely to her body. It is submerged in its mother's embrace. The 
child takes the breast into its mouth. It is thus penetrated both by the mother 
and her milk... . while the child can ask 
for (cry for) and anticipate the 
feeding, the child is fed by the mother. She initiates the action and it lasts 
only as long as she chooses to stay. 539 
Again, the perichoresis of the relationship is described, but the asymmetry is much more 
stark. Rather interestingly, Pike promotes the two metaphors as complementary. Thus, the 
bridal imagery, for example in John of the Cross, invokes an equality between the 
536 ibid., p. 159. 
537 In the employment of these two metaphors in conjunction there is, what Nelson 
Pike calls, "a gender 
jangle", because the soul is female, in line with the bridal metaphor, and suckles at the breast of the 
bridegroom, who is male. N. Pike, Mystic Union. An Essay in the Phenomenology of Mysticism 
(Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1992). 
538 ibid., pp. 77-8. 
539 ibid., pp. 78-9. 
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lovers, 540 which is qualified in the nursery metaphor by the asymmetry between the mother 
and the child: 
... the nursery metaphor, like the bridal metaphor, carries the message of a 
symmetrical exchange between equals - the exchange of love in the form of 
touches, caresses, and kisses. But, of course, the nursery metaphor has more 
to it than that .... The mother is not just the child's embracer, she is also its feeder - that is, more broadly, its nurturer, or, in a word, its sustainer. In 
this respect, the child is not an equal of the mother nor does it give a gift to 
the mother that correlates with the one received. 541 
What these examples of interpersonal metaphors show is that not only is a Personalist 
model able to capture essential aspects of the Divine-human relationship (the loss of the 
sense of the self of the unio mystica), but also that within a Personalist model of the 
Divine-human relationship, there may be many sub-models, using different types of human 
relationships to help describe the nature of the Divine-human relationship. 
What does the parent-child model have in its favour? Certainly the parent-child model has 
an important pedigree in Scripture, with God designated as Father and His creatures as 
children of God, not by nature, but by grace. 542 Parental affection can "love the unlovable, " 
and in the best cases does not love with expectations, "turns a blind eye to faults, revives 
easily after quarrels; just so charity suffers long and is kind and forgives. "543 It captures the 
primacy of the Divine initiative and underlines the asymmetry of the Divine-human 
relationship in a way intrinsic to the model. It is the parents who bring the child into the 
world and whose nurture is vital to the child's development. Moreover, on the parent-child 
model one can envisage parents being involved in the child's formation, shaping the 
motivational and noetic structures of the child without their voluntary consent. Thus 
parents shape their children by the nature of the rewards and punishment applied, 
controlling certain activities and exposure to the influences of the world, and using the 
pedagogical technique of selection and simplification of information given to the child. 
544 
Informed consent is not possible, the child is not fully mature and only a potential moral 
540 John of the Cross in the Spiritual Canticles (stanzas xxx-xxxv) talks of the 
God being "wounded" and 
"captivated" and made "prisoner" by the love of the human soul. 
541 Pike, p. 82. 
542 See Genesis 6.2ff; Hosea 11.1; Deut. 14.1; 32.6; Mtt. 5.48; Mtt. 6; Rom-8.15,23; Gal. 3.26; 4.5 etc. 
543 Lewis, p. 38. 
544 On this point, Origen uses the analogy of adult communication with a child to explain the compatibility of 
God's ineffability and impassibility, on the one hand, with the anthropomorphisms of 
Scriptural language, on 
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agent not an actual one. Intuitively we do not find such parenting immoral, even though, 
according to Brummer's analysis of personal relationships, it is in a limited way, benignly 
formative. The analogy with the Divine-human situation is clear: the human creature is in 
a state of incapacity as a result of sin, and therefore, requires the initiative of the Divine 
and enabling action of the Spirit to reform the image of God in the person. We are not 
perfect children of God, we are called to be perfect (Mtt. 5: 48), and require the Spirit's 
eschatological action to nurture us to that end. 
One may think that this model legitimises a return to a Divine Fiat type model. It is quite 
clear that the parent does not operate in a similar manner to, for example, Barth's 
description of the work of the Holy Spirit, in bringing about faith and its 
acknowledgement. Barth's conception of "total determination, " of the internal penetration 
of one's mental states by the Spirit, is a form of what Alston describes as "secret 
manipulation, " which a parent could never perform. It will be recalled that the Divine Fiat 
model failed to give a psychologically plausible account of how metamorphosis would 
affect the identity of the person. Bad parents may be excessively manipulative or 
controlling of their children, while good parents strike a balance between direction and 
freedom. It is useful here to draw upon some of the philosophical discussion of children's 
rights and the parent-child relationships. 545 Any idea that the lack of maturity of a child 
should sanction a carte blanche "paternalism, " which extensively intervenes to determine 
the child, as if children were the property of adults, 
546 is unacceptable. 547 A distinction 
between formation and determination needs to be maintained. As Joel Feinberg has 
argued, children should have a "right to an open future, " which precisely rules out certain 
forms of parental intervention. This is also termed "rights-in-trust": 
When sophisticated autonomy rights are attributed to children who are 
clearly not yet capable of exercising them, their names refer to rights that 
are to be saved for the child until he is an adult, but which can be violated 
'in advance, ' so to speak, before the child is even in a position to exercise 
the other. He draws a distinction between "adult" and 
"baby language, " the adult must utilise a form of 
language appropriate for the child (Homilies on Jeremiah 18,6). 
545 There is a growing literature on this topic. Two important collections of essays are: 
W. Aiken and H. 
LaFollette, eds., Whose Child? Children's Rights, Parental Authority, and 
State Power (New Jersey: 
Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1980). 
546 Aristotle in one place in the Nichomachean Ethics 8.12 holds that children are the possession of 
their 
parents, analogous with a tooth or a piece of 
hair! 
sal John Locke criticises the "property" view in Two Treatises of 
Civil Government, Book I, Ch. VI. See also 
Robert Young, "In the Interests of Children and Adolescents, 
" in Whose Child? eds. by LaFollette and 
Aiken, pp. 181ff.. 
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them. The violating conduct guarantees now that when the child is an 
autonomous adult, certain key options will already be closed to him. His 
right while he is still a child is to have these future options kept open until he is fully formed self-determining adult capable of deciding among 
them. 548 
The child must be allowed the possibility of self-fulfilment549 and the self-determination 
of being able to determine one's own "life circumstances" (e. g. career-type, life-style, 
religious attitude) and character. 550 Overbearing parental intervention stifles the 
development of character traits, such as self-confidence, deliberation, and discipline, 
which allow mature adults to be able to respond to the varying circumstances of life. 551 As 
Sharon Bishop argues, within the process of a particular habituation which is integral to 
the formation of a person: 
[I]t is not in general reasonable for us to aim for a particular outcome of our 
children's choices, but rather to develop their capacity to make choices, in a 
certain way, namely, autonomously... . We do not want their selections to be 
coerced, threatened or bribed, and we do not want them to succumb easily 
to seductive advice or the bare weight of tradition.... In short, we want them 
to have certain psychological strengths which will enable them to make 
sensible use of the right of self-determination. 552 
The model of the parent-child relationship requires the parent to treat the child as a 
developing person, for whom fully personal relations will be an end, for whom over- 
direction would be counter-productive. 553 
548 Joel Feinberg, "The Child's Right to an Open Future, " in Whose Child? eds. by LaFollette and Aiken, 
pp. 125-6. 
sag Feinberg defines the necessary elements of "self-fulfilment" as "the development of one's chief aptitudes 
into genuine talents in a life that gives them scope, an unfolding of all basic tendencies and inclinations, both 
those that are common to the species and those that are peculiar to the individual, and an active realization of 
the universal human propensities to plan, design and make order. " ibid., p. 143. It should be noted that in the 
Christian tradition "self-fulfilment" and "self-determination" are relative concepts. Fulfilment is only to be 
found in relation to the Divine, while "self-determination" if it is not to commit the causa sui fallacy, is 
relative to one's environment, one's intersubjective context and one's relation to God as Conserver of 
existence. 
550 Sharon Bishop gives the example of female children educated to fulfil certain domestic roles and uphold 
"feminine virtues. " S. Bishop, "Children, Autonomy and the Right to Self-Determination, " in Whose Child? 
eds. by LaFollette and Aiken, pp. 154 - 176. 
551 ibid., p. 173. 
552 ibid., p. 174. Again, from the Christian perspective the "autonomy" of the person is always a relative 
autonomy. 
553 Feinberg identifies two paradoxes in his account, which makes us recall Solomon's paradox of love and 
the paradox of grace discussed in chapter 3. First, the paradox of self-determination is that in order to beget 
an adult person who is self-determining one has to nurture the child, but the child has no determination over 
the nature of this nurture. In order for the child to consent to his formation, he would require values and pre- 
dispositions of his own, yet this begs the questions of how such predispositions were formed. The paradox of 
fulfilment takes a similar form. In order for a parent to discern what would be fulfilling for their child they 
need to perceive her skills, aptitudes, potentiality, yet these can be only fully apprehended when the person's 
141 
The very distinction between "adult" and "child" is a practical generalisation which should 
not hide the fact that human development is a process. A conception of early childhood as 
a form of blank slate, and adulthood as a fully formed personality is simply 
wrongheaded. 554 Development comes by degree. 
Right from the beginning the newborn infant has a kind of rudimentary 
character consisting of temperamental proclivities and a genetically fixed 
potential for the acquisition of various talents and skills. The standard sort 
of loving upbringing and a human social environment in the earliest years 
will be like water added to dehydrated food, filling it out and actualizing its 
stored-in tendencies.... At a time so early that the questions of how to 
socialize and educate the child have not even arisen yet, the twig will be 
bent in a certain definite direction. From then on, the parents in promoting 
the child's eventual autonomy and well-being will have to respect that 
initial bias from hereditary and early environment. Thus from the beginning 
the child must - inevitably will - have some "input" in its own shaping, the 
extent of which will grow continuously even as the child's character itself 
does. 555 
There is, therefore, no time at which a parent is entitled to act as if the child were just a 
blank slate on which one imposes one's own personality. The Divine Fiat model is ruled 
out by this understanding of the child-parent relation. For instance, Barth's version of the 
Divine Fiat view maintains that the person is entirely passive until the effects of sin have 
been reversed and the gift of faith bestowed. On the parent-child model this would be to 
treat the child as having no "'input' in its own shaping. " 
Part of the success of the parent-child model will depend on whether the status of child 
serves as a good analogue for the human being effected by sin. The child is only a 
potential moral agent, cognitively and emotionally immature, whereas the adult human 
person is an actual moral agent who, according to Christian doctrine, does have full 
responsibility for his actions and human relations. 
556 The response may come from a 
Feinberg-type position that the child is more than just a potential moral agent, but a 
nature is amply formed. Inversely the self-fulfilled adult requires 
formation, a formation which has to be 
informed and commenced before maturation. 
ssa Feinberg points out: "Any 'mere child' beyond the stage of infancy is only a child 
in some respects, and 
already an adult in others.. . 
In the continuous development of the relative-adult out of the relative-child there 
is no point before which the child himself has no part 
in his own shaping, and after which he is the sole 
responsible maker of his own character and life plan. 
" Feinberg, p. 148. 
555 ibid., pp. 149. 
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developing one and so may play some role in his/her determination. As Ann Palmeri 
points out: "The fact that we do sometimes hold children responsible for their actions and 
call upon them to justify their actions shows our willingness to recognize children's 
growing capacities and knowledge. , 557 On the other hand, the child is dependent on his 
parents from birth, and hence does not have a choice whether or not to relate to them until 
much later in their lives. The human creature, although dependent on the Divine for 
creation and conservation, does have a decision whether or not to respond to the Divine 
initiative. This presents a negative analogy in relation to the parent-child model. In 
Christian Scripture Christ is said to be our "friend. X558 This suggests a level of reciprocity 
and equality by intention, which is not to be found in a parent-child relationship. Joseph 
Kupfer argues that parents and adult-children cannot become "friends" in the way which 
they can with their peers. 559 If this is the case, then a parent-child model may be 
insufficient to capture the biblical language of friendship with the Divine. 
Although parents may have a powerful effect on their children's identity, by the very nature 
of child development, offspring are moving towards a life of independence from their 
parents. As C. S. Lewis observes, parental gift-love "must work towards its own 
abdication. "560 Although, this may in part mirror the element of kenosis in God's love, 
Christian metamorphosis is an eschatological movement of convergence, leading to a 
greater Divine-human communion, not less. Despite the uniqueness of the parent-child 
identification it can be selective, whereas we are seeking a model which captures the 
fullness of Divine-human exchange. During childhood there are some things that children 
556 The distinction between a "potential" and an "actual" moral agent is made in Kathryn L. Plant, "Personal 
Encounter and the Concept of Man, " Scottish Journal of Religious Studies, Vol. 1-4 (1980-83), pp. 54,59-60. 
557 Ann Palmeri, "Childhood's End: Toward the Liberation of Children, " in LaFollette and Aiken (eds. ), 
Whose Child? p. 116. 
558 John 15.13,14; James 2.23; cf. II Chron. 20.7; Isa. 41.8. 
559 J. Kupfer, "Can Parents and Children Be Friends? " American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 27 (1990), 
pp. 15-26. Kupfer argues this is so because the parent-child relationship even in its adult form lacks the 
equality and autonomy of friendship relations, because of the history of the inherent asymmetry of the parent- 
child relationship during early childhood. Certain ingrained habits of parent-early childhood relationships 
remain, such as those attitudes of "respect, " "loyalty, " "accommodation" and "deference" ibid., p. 17. Equally 
for parents a "parental" self-concept and habits and attitudes endure, all be it in a qualified form, beyond the 
passing of their child into adult life. He continues: [T]he union between infant and parent is primitive in the 
sense of primal. Theirs is an intimacy which begins on a pre-conscious level for the infant, and continues on 
both conscious and subconscious level for both parent and child. They experience a pre-verbal and non- 
verbal sensuous bond, the intimacy of immediate, sensory communication. 
" ibid., p. 20. This, on the other 
hand, may be a good analogy for the relationship of the Divine as Conserver and Sustainer of the human 
being, although, we can hardly say that this has the psychological effect of parent-child habituation. 
560 Lewis, p. 50. 
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do not wish to tell their parents. The same is the case for the adult offspring, for whom 
friends or partners are often the companions with whom certain disclosures are shared. 
Moreover, although the parental relationship, as Kupfner argues, helps to define who we 
are (our "self-concept") as adults we do not primarily choose to define ourselves in relation 
to our parents, and in our move towards independence we can critically stand back and 
choose whether or not certain habits or self-concept we inherit from our parent-child 
relationship are to be maintained. 561 Finally, C. S. Lewis notes that although parental 
affection is primarily a "need-love" on the part of the child and a "gift-love" on the part of 
the parents, "need-love" is also to be found on the side of the parents. 562 In both cases, 
there is a strong instinctive element. Traditional trinitarian theology would not maintain 
that God "needs to be needed, " although someone like St. Richard of Victor, might talk of 
the way that God's trinitarian nature is such that "gift-love" overflows God's ad intra 
being. Thus, the parent-child model is not free of negative analogies. 
V. 02) Friendship 
The model of friendship (philia) has biblical precedence in Jesus' relationship to his 
disciples. Friendship is also, as C. S. Lewis points out, "the least biological of our love, " 
and hence, the most "spiritual, " that is non-corporeal. 563 His point is that ideally friendship 
is not encumbered with the "need-love" of the parent-child relationship, nor the desire of 
romantic love. As friendship is freely assumed involving the mutuality and reciprocity of 
specific interests and projects, it can bracket off, to a certain extent, background, physical 
attraction and need. It can also be a less exclusive love than that of the parent-child 
relationship, or romantic love, in that a friendship should be open to the inclusion of a 
'third. ' All the elements of friendship are good analogues for the Divine-human 
relationship. Negative analogies remain. The asymmetry of the Divine-human relationship 
is less well represented than in the parent-child model. In addition, the reciprocal 
identification in friendship is not as encompassing as the model based on romantic love. 
561 Kupfner agrees: "Of course, it may be possible to break habits, dismantle our attitudes towards our 
parents, even rearrange our self-concept. But not without rebuilding our very selves. " "Can Parents and 
Children Be Friends? ", p. 18. 
562 Lewis, pp. 33-34. 
563 ibid., pp. 60,73. As Lewis is quite aware of the danger of pride in friendships, the potential for exclusivity 
and insularity, he proposes a reason why Scripture has infrequently used friendship as a metaphor for the 
highest love: "It is already, in actual fact, too spiritual to be a good symbol of Spiritual things.... God can 
safely represent Himself to us as Father and Husband because only a lunatic would think that He is physically 
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Solomon goes as far to say that friends "circumscribe our identity rather than define it as 
love does. , 564 He qualifies this remark by writing: 
"Friendship, like love, involves identity, but because we do not think twice 
about the possibility of having several or even many friends, the share of 
one's identity that is tied up in any particular friend is only a relatively small 
proportion, far less than that demanded by romantic love. 565 
As we have seen, Kupfer argues that the identification in friendship is also less intense, in 
some respects, than that involved in a healthy parent-child relationship. Kupfer provides a 
helpful example: 
Friends certainly can enjoy one another's children and become very close to 
them. But they don't have the kind of vested interest in their welfare that 
grandparents do. We neither delight in our friends' children the way the 
children's grandparents do, nor do we take such great pleasure in our 
friends' own enjoyment of their children. 566 
Different types of relationship render different types of love, none of which, we have 
found, may be positively excluded from a Personalist model of Divine-human 
relationships. 
V. 03) Eros: Romantic Love 
Much has already been said about the strength of romantic love as a model for the Divine- 
human relationship. For now let us focus on some further negative analogies. Although all 
three loves are particular, romantic love is specifically focused on just one other person. 
God's love, though, is a love shared for all His creatures and particularly for His church. 
The universality of God's love does not abnegate its particularity. In his Commentary on 
the Song of Songs (3.189-90) Origen argues that there are different "orders" of love 
appropriate to the object of love, so that one may love two parties equally, but not 
similarly. 567 Origen gives scriptural examples to make his case. Thus, God loves the 
Egyptians and the Hebrews equally, but the Egyptians as part of His general love for 
creation and the Hebrews from a particular love. Again, God loves His People Israel but 
has a specific love for Moses. The negative analogy with the model of romantic love is not 
our sire or that His marriage with the Church is other than mystical. But 
if Friendship were used for this 
purpose we might mistake the symbol for the thing symbolised. 
" ibid., pp. 81-2. 
564 Solomon, About Love, p. 322. 
565 ibid., p. 318. 
566 "Can Parents and Children Be Friends? ", p. 22. 
567 Catherine Osborne, Eros Unveiled. Plato and the God of Love (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 82, 
168. 
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so much with the particularity of the nature of its love - as Origen makes clear, different 
kinds of love are compatible with God's universal love - but rather with the relation 
between eros and sexuality. 
Anders Nygren in his classic study of love, Agape and Eros, maintained that the Christian 
concept of agape was quite distinct from concepts of love in cultures contemporary or 
prior to it. One of his arguments was that the concept of eros had no place in the Christian 
account of love, being an acquisitive love, and that those Patristic thinkers who employed 
the term brought about a distorting synthesis of Hellenistic and Christian ideas. 568 Others 
have challenged Nygren's general thesis, 569 and his narrow definition of eros as selfish and 
acquisitive. 570 My concern is to examine whether eros is really an appropriate concept 
with which to describe the Divine-human relationship, given its associations with 
sexuality, desire, attraction and beauty. It is certainly plausible to predicate a desire on the 
part of humans for the Divine, whether it be natural or a gift of grace is not our present 
concern. Although God is incorporeal it is still reasonable to predicate the much neglected 
attribute of beauty to God, 571 that He meets our essential needs and that faith in Him 
promises eternal life. It is more difficult to talk of Divine desire or attraction for the 
human. Nygren was suspicious of positing acquisitive eros to God for that would be to 
presume that there was a lack or need in God, when traditional theology has maintained 
that God's love for the world is an overflowing love. If we are to have a broader 
understanding of eros than Nygren's and are not to posit a detached God who remains 
apathetic to His creatures, then one may suppose that God desires and takes delight in 
creatures who live in right relationship with Him. This is not an appetitive need, but 
superabundant to God's being. As Catherine Osborne writes: 
There obviously are certain things that God obtains from no other source; 
he cannot obtain the worship of human beings unless they perform it..... 
Hence if we are to attribute any love or concern for humanity to God it had 
better be an interest that appreciates what is good in human works, and is 
hurt by what is bad or undesirable. 
572 
568 Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros. trans. P. S. Watson (London, SPCK, [1930] 1954), Part II, ch. 6. 
569 See Osborne, p. 5. 
570 J. M. Rist, Eros and Psyche: Studies in Plato, Plotinus and Origen. (Toronto: Phoenix suppl. vol. 6,1964) 
challenges a purely appetitive reading of eros in the Platonic tradition. 
571 See Psalm27.10; 90.17. Patrick Sherry, Spirit and Beauty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) and James 
Alfred Martin, Beauty and Holiness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
572 Osborne, p. 65. She adds later, "We are hardly in a position to provide for the essential needs of 
God; what 
we offer is more a token of affection, as one might give someone a rose, not 
because she needs a rose but as a 
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This form of eros involves both non-appetitive desire and the ability to be other- 
regarding. 573 The ontological asymmetry between God and His creatures, in the fallen state 
exacerbated by sin, rules out the possibility that God's desires towards His creatures could 
ever be for a superior quality. Indeed, God's love for the fallen is a generous love for the 
unlovable and for the redeemed, a love which Osborne considers to originate in a form of 
Divine self-love: "If God finds humanity lovely, then, it will be his own loveliness, the 
loveliness of his own beloved Son, that he finds there. "574 
Osborne's general thesis is that, contrary to Nygren and also C. S. Lewis, one should not 
always understand love in terms of a motivational analysis of desires and benefits. She 
argues that the Classical myth of Cupid proposes "a kind of explanation of why someone 
loves; one loves because one is wounded with the arrow sent by the god of love. "575 This 
conception of love as unmotivated devotion, she holds, is to be found in Origen and 
Gregory of Nyssa. 576 As eros on this model is not essentially caused by properties 
possessed by the beloved the focus of desire is not so much on property-dependent beauty, 
but a willingness to "see beauty created and brought to perfection in the beloved. X577 On 
this model desire and appreciation of the beloved originate from love, and are not the 
cause of it. God loves the unlovable and even those who cannot respond to his gift of love. 
Osborne observes: 
God's love for the world may be a devotion not so much to the goodness 
and beauty that the world already possesses as to the realization of his 
vision of what it might be. It reflects God's attitude towards the world he 
created, not some feature of the world that evokes that response. 578 
mark of one's own interest in her; doubtless it is important that she likes roses. In the same way we must 
believe that God will value our service and miss it if it is neglected. " ibid., p. 67. 
573 Actually C. S. Lewis was well aware of the self-giving nature of eros: "In one high bound it [eros] has 
overleaped the massive wall of our selfhood; it has made appetite itself altruistic, tossed personal happiness 
aside as triviality and planted the interests of another in the centre of our being. " Lewis, pp. 104-5. 
574 Osborne, pp. 11-12. 
sus ibid., p. 73. 
576 Special attention is paid to Origen's Commentary on the Song of Songs ("Hence it is of no consequence 
whether God is said to be the object of eros or agape, nor do I think one could be blamed if one were to call 
God Eros just as John called him Agape"[Prologue, 71]) and Gregory of Nyssa's Homilies on the Song of 
Songs ("For heightened agape is called eros"[Sc. 13]). 
577 Osborne, p. 22- 
5713 ibid., p. 23. 
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God, one may hasten to say, on this model is the sufficient cause of love, not the one 
wounded by love: "We are to love because he is love and the inspiration for love. "579 
Two concluding comments must be made in regard to Osborne's arguments. First, 
Osborne's position does not permit the return of the Divine Fiat view, just because the 
arrows of eros affect without consent. The model of metamorphosis argued for in the 
previous chapter held that God's personal presence was an affecting presence. It might be 
countered that Osborne considers love to be inexplicable in terms of motives, so the idea 
of consent is redundant. If God is love, and given the nature of God as a self-sufficient 
being, God's love may indeed be unconditional. In the human case, it is certainly not. 
Although we may not undergo a process of rational deliberation prior to falling in love, we 
may be expected to give reasons, if not sufficient reasons, as to why we love this person. 
These reasons are dependent on prior inclinations that are part of our personality. Insofar 
as a person is self-reflective and in Franfurt's sense possesses freedom of will, he has 
chosen to identify himself with such preferences; they are not just arbitrarily held. 
Moreover, the emotion or attitude of love is fickle; one may easily fall out of love. 
Continuing commitment or separation require deliberation and consent. 580 Osborne claims 
that a person may love equally but have different kinds of love. We are entitled to ask why 
a person has this kind of love for X rather than Y. Secondly, it is difficult to see what 
maintains the distinctiveness of the concept of eros, now that it is stripped of reference to 
sexuality and desire, apart from its being caused by an affecting God ("the arrows"). Does 
this do justice to the ecstatic quality of eros, upon which the bridal mystics draw, or its 
involvement in sexuality and desire? Clearly the sexual nature of eros does not transfer 
univocally to Divine-human relations, although the intensity, comprehensiveness and 
ecstatic quality of love expressed sexually is precisely why romantic love has been used as 
a metaphor by so many in the Christian tradition. 
579 ibid., p. 74. 
580 It is doubtful that Osborne really has considered well enough the case of the "properties view" of 
love, 
that we do love for reasons. See Simon Keller, "How 
do I love thee? Let me count the properties, " American 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 37 (2000), pp. 163- 173; Neil Delaney, 
"Romantic Love and Loving 
Commitment, " American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 33 (1996), pp. 338-340. 
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VI. ) Conclusion. 
Each different type of Personalist model, whether it be romantic love, friendship or the 
parent-child relationship, has both negative analogies with the Divine-human relationship 
and complementing features. In as much as we recognise that their epistemological status 
is as models and not univocal statements, 581 the interweaving and complementarity of 
these Personalist models ought to point to the greater reality beyond, which one is 
attempting to describe. Such complementarity may even be seen to have its roots in the 
doctrine of the Trinity, as long as we see that God is the ground of all love not the mere 
receptacle of projections of human loves. After all, the terms "father, " "son, " "friend" and 
"lover, " although they may have more than one meaning, are all predicated, in part, 
analogically of the Divine hypostaseis of the Trinity. The Father as the eternal begetter of 
the Son fulfils the analogous parental role, 582 whereas the incarnate Son is described 
biblically in filial terms as and as "friend" and "Bridegroom"(lover). The Spirit as "another 
parakletos, " ensures the continuity of such fellowship and intimacy. Such a trinitarian 
solution has to remain within the limits of the principle, opera sacrosanctae Trinitatis ad 
extra sunt indivisa. The unity of the Divine being means that insofar as the Father abides 
in the Son's actions, one might say analogously that a believer's relation to the Son as 
"friend" or "lover" is also a relation to a "parent". 
The romantic love in its fullest form, because of its duration, element of consent, and 
intimacy, can embody the highest degree of interpersonal human reciprocal identification, 
or 'life sharing. ' As Solomon commented: "Love is the concentration and the intensive 
focus of mutual definition on a single individual, subjecting virtually every personal aspect 
of one's self to this process. "583 As the reciprocal identification orperichoresis of God and 
the believer is that of an ever growing likeness to Christ, we require a model which does 
justice to the defining quality of our relationship to God as regards our identity. In 
addition, the romantic model, in contrast to the parental model, emphasises the 
involvement of our human agency in responding to the Divine initiative, and captures the 
relative autonomy granted creatures. Whereas parents and children move apart to 
lead 
581 As C. S. Lewis writes of the eros, storge and philia: "there is a real nearness to God 
(by Resemblance); but 
not, therefore and necessarily, a nearness of Approach. 
" Lewis, p. 101. It is the resemblances which are used 
above as models or metaphors, not as direct 
descriptions. 
582 The term "Father" predicated to the first person of the trinity has not only an analogical component, 
but is 
primarily a proper name. 
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independent lives, lovers come together, and it is this communion which is the Divine 
intent for His relationships with humankind. For these reasons, the romantic love model 
will be taken to be the primary model, but also complementary model to other Personalist 
models which may be presented. 
In this Chapter the Personalist model proposed has been defended against a series of 
negative analogies which claim to undermine its explanatory potential. It has been seen to 
offer a response to each criticism, and insofar as minor negative analogies remain it may 
be held that this is to be expected, given the epistemological status of models, which by 
their very nature can never produce a perfect explanatory fit. Within the umbrella of the 
Personalist model proposed, different types of interpersonal relationships - parent-child, 
friendship and romantic love - offer complementary models of the Divine-human 
relationship. If a primary model is to be selected from them, then romantic love, in its 
paradigmatic form, offers the most intense mode of life-sharing, and hence the best 
analogy with the eschatological call of the Spirit to enter into full relationship with God in 
exchange and ecstatic love. 
583 Solomon, About Love, p. 197. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
METAMORPHOSIS AND A CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM AND 
AGENCY. 
I. ) Introduction. 
Martin Luther in his De Servo Arbitrio writes: "our purpose is to investigate what free will 
is capable of, where it is passive and how it is related to grace. , 584 This is our question too, 
to examine the relation of passivity and activity of the human in relation to the Divine 
initiative. In one sense our task is different from Luther's, for our focus is less on the 
soteriological primacy of the Divine initiative, that is accepted. Rather, the focus is upon 
how the Spirit in the Divine initiative affects human identity and freedom. This is a 
question which Luther would consider to trespass the hidden purposes of God. 585 It was 
proposed in the Prolegomena, contrary to the position of Luther, 586 that philosophical and 
theological analysis ought to be brought into interaction with one another. In this Chapter 
such a method will be applied by relating the philosophical concepts of freedom and 
personal identity, outlined earlier, to the demands of a theological account of freedom and 
identity. Some of the basic requirements of a Christian account of freedom and identity 
may be set out as follows. 
1. ) The role of God in constituting human freedom. As Creator God is the architect of the 
conditions of formal human freedom. 587 The relationship between God and His creature is 
584 Luther, p. 78. 
5M ibid., p. 170. 
586 In his debate with Erasmus, Luther takes a quite anti-philosophical stance, insisting on the separation of 
philosophy and theology. Thus, when he calls human freedom a "fabrication" or an 
"illusion, " he does so in 
comparison to God, who is perfectly free (it is a "divine name and 
is appropriate to no one except the divine 
majesty alone"), and to salvation, which is the result of grace not 
human works. At the same time, he 
recognises the psychology of human freedom, the intuition of 
free will, moral responsibility and our ability to 
choose between alternatives in our world (part of our 
dominion over nature that has been given by God): 
"We are discussing, not nature, but grace: we ask, not what we are on earth, 
but what we are in heaven before 
God. " ibid., p. 309. I am questioning whether such a separation is necessary. 
Part of how we are constituted in 
heaven before God will be in continuity with our earthly existence, and some plausible account needs to be 
given of what happens to the human person affected 
by the Divine initiative. 
587 To assert that God's status as Creator does justify subsequent soteriological metamorphosis of 
the human, 
as Paul sometimes does, would be to place the sovereignty and 
transcendence of God over and above the 
purpose of creation which is to be given 
in revelation. Udo Schnelle points this out in her account of Paul's 
anthropology. For example, in Rom. 9.19-21 
Paul tackles the sceptical question of how God can hold sinners 
responsible if all is dependent on his will and 
humans cannot alter the shape of their destiny: "Paul meets this 
objection in verses 19-21 by holding the questioner's creatureliness 
before their eyes and thereby making 
clear the inappropriateness of their question. 
Whether consciously or unconsciously, the questioners are 
placing themselves on the same 
level with God, but they are God's creatures and therefore not at all justified 
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asymmetrical, a dynamic of dependence and freedom, creatureliness and personhood. 588 
This rules out any false conception of human freedom as causa sui, absolutely self- 
determining. Hence, a Christian account of freedom seeks a conception of the Divine- 
human relationship not as two competing agents whose freedom is to be measured on one 
scale. The Divine-human relationship is not a zero sum game whereby the exercise of 
freedom for one party involves a restriction of freedom for the other. However, God's role 
as Creator does not in and of itself justify a Divine Fiat position, which bypasses created 
freedom (formal human freedom). 589 In addition, God may be said to constitute 
substantive human freedom by disclosing and enabling the conditions of the exercise of 
true human freedom, in the revelation of Jesus Christ, 590 and drawn to eschatological 
fulfilment by the Spirit. 591 
2. ) Christian faith liberates human action and bestows true freedom. The biblical witness 
contrasts freedom with bondage or slavery. 592 The theme is most prevalent in Galatians 
and Romans. The believer has been freed from the yoke of the Law (Gal. 5.1; Rom. 7.6) by 
the death of Christ and the activity of the Spirit, and with that release comes also liberation 
from the power of sin and death (Rom. 6.18,22; 8.2; I Cor. 15.26). The Christian is freed 
from fear of condemnation (Rom 8.1), and in place of the spirit of bondage s/he now 
enjoys the spirit of adoption, and lives as a free child of God (Rom. 8.14-17; cf. Mtt. 
17.26). In terms of positive freedom, the believer has been liberated for love (Gal. 5.13) 
and for righteousness (Rom. 6.18). Freedom in Paul possesses a strong apocalyptic note, 
the nature of life in the future cosmic glory of God and true human destiny. 593 
in accusing God. Here the apostle anchors anthropology in creation theology. For him the qualitative 
difference between Creator and creature is indissoluble and provides the positive basis for the sovereign 
activity of the Creator, who can choose and reject according to his will. " U. Schnelle, The Human Condition: 
anthropology in the teachings of Jesus, Paul and John, trans. by O. L. Dean, Jr. (Edinburgh: T&T. Clark, 
1996), p. 79. 
588 Anthony Hoekema calls the balance between ontological dependence and self-determination the "central 
mystery" of human beings. A. Hoekema, Created in God's Image (Grand Rapids/Exeter: W. B. Eerdmans/ 
Paternoster, 1986), p. 6-7. 
589 The human creature is granted in creation 'space' with which to pursue his/her own goals, and to have a 
relative degree of control or self-determination over their own lives (cf. Gal. 6.7-8). 
590 John. 8.36; Gal. 5.1. 
591 11 Cor. 3.17. 
59- Exod. 21.2; Jer. 34.9ff; I Cor. 12.13, Gal. 3.28; Rev. 13.6. 
593 See J. Christiaan Beker, Paul the Apostle (Pennsylvannia, Fortress Press: 1980), p. 269ff. He summarises 
Paul's position on freedom in the following way: "'Freedom' has a threefold connotation. It denotes the past 
act of liberation from slavery to the powers of sin and the 
law; the present status of liberated believers in 
Christ in their joyful freedom and access to God; and the future eschatological horizon of the Christ-event as 
freedom from death and freedom in glory (Rom. 8.21). " ibid., p. 270. He goes on: "Freedom's negative aspect 
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3. ) The effect of sin on human freedom. Without the Christ-event and the action of the 
Spirit, the human person is unable to overcome the effects of sin, which are universal, to 
be born into true freedom in Christ. The question of debate involves the extent of sin and 
its efficacy. This issue will be discussed in greater detail below. 
In the light of our conclusions from Chapter 2, two extremes need to be avoided. On the 
one hand, an account which is so purely theological, as some Divine Fiat positions tend to 
be, that a plausible account of created freedom is bypassed on the move to redeemed 
freedom. Such an account would fail to do justice to our common intuitions concerning 
human freedom. On the other hand, a simple assertion of philosophical intuitions 
concerning freedom would disregard the remit of revelation and be in danger of falling 
into a form of Pelagianism. If we are to take seriously the role of God as creator in 
constituting our freedom and shun the fallacy that human freedom is causa sui, then it will 
be recognised that human freedom is experienced as an interrelationship between the 
voluntary and the involuntary, the active and the passive. 
The philosophical analysis of freedom and identity outlined in the Prolegomena will be 
brought into interaction with the theological loci described above, by first examining an 
application by Eleonore Stump of Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical theory of the will to the 
subject matter of Christian sanctification. In doing so it is hoped that a more plausible 
account may be given of the psychology of Christian metamorphosis. 
II )The Hierarchy of the Will: Stump's Application of Frankfurt on Freedom. 
According to Frankfurt's account of free will, one has free will if one wants to be moved 
by the motives that do in fact move one to action. Desires or wants are at the origin of 
human volition or willing. Frankfurt offers a hierarchical account of desires. "First-order 
desires" to will something (e. g. to want Bran Flakes), and "second-order desires" to have 
specific first-order desires (e. g. I want to eat healthy food). Although, an action may only 
be based on first-order desires, Frankfurt considers the capacity to form second-order 
is inherent in the defeat of the powers, that is, in our freedom from the power structures of the old age 
through the intervention of God's act in Christ. And freedom's 
'affirmation' stresses our present status in 
Christ that frees us to serve our neighbor in love and makes us sigh 
for the freedom of creation from death in 
the coming glory of God. " ibid., p. 271. 
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desires to be constitutive of personhood. One possesses freedom of the will, on this 
schema, when one's first-order and second order desires are in conformity, the first-order 
volitions are sanctioned by second-order volitions. 594 For instance, I will to eat Bran 
Flakes, because I have a first-order desire to eat them, which is sanctioned by my higher 
level volition, originating from my second-order desire to eat healthy food and hence this 
cereal. On Frankfurt's account one may also differentiate between acting freely or freedom 
of action and freedom of will. Freedom of action refers to cases where the person does 
what he desires, there is no discord between first and second order desires, but whose 
volition is determined and not free. For example, a drug addict has a second-order desire 
to take drugs, but his volition is actually compelled by his chemical addiction. Even if he 
had a second-order desire to cease drug use, he could not act upon it. 
Stump revises Frankfurt's account a little, which she contends does not give due place to 
the role of the intellect in decision-making. Following Aquinas on the relation of intellect, 
desire and will, she argues that an agent wills to do x not only because s/he desires to do it, 
but because the agent's intellect would hold x to be a good worth pursuing, even if the 
agent does not hold this at the time of the choice. 
Aquinas' view requires only that some chain of reasoning (even if invalid 
and irrational reasoning) representing p as the good to be pursued would 
figure in the agent's own explanation of his action. 595 
Stump's revision of the Frankfurt position is formulated in the following way: 
An agent has a second-order volition V2 to bring about some first-order 
volition V1 in himself only if the agent's intellect at the time of the willing 
represents V1, under some description, as the good to be pursued. 
596 
What is of interest is that Stump goes on to apply this concept of freedom to the 
theological issue of sanctification and hardening of heart. However, there is no reason why 
594 Eleonore Stump offers a useful revision of Frankfurt's thesis: "On this revision, when an agent wants to 
make a certain first-order desire his volition, then he 
has a second-order desire; and when this second-order 
desire is effective, that is, when he succeeds in making that first-order 
his volition, then he has a second- 
order volition. " "Intellect, Will and the Principle of 
Alternate Possibilities" p. 259. Stump wishes to posit 
higher and lower order volitions and desires, so that it explains, 
for example, the difference between a. ) a 
'willing' drug addict (first and second order volitions and desires 
in accord), b. ) a conscience-stricken drug 
addict (s/he has a second-order desire not to take 
drugs, the desire is not effective and hence, does not 
become a volition which results in a first-order volition not to take 
drugs), and c. ) the addict who overcomes 
his addiction (unlike case b. ) he possesses a second-order volition). 
For Stump's extended argument on this 
point see her, "Sanctification, Hardening of the 
Heart and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will", pp. 399-402. 
Hardening of Heart", p. 400. 595 "Sanctification, 400. 
596 ibid.. 
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the account could not also apply to conversion and regeneration, and therefore have a 
direct application to the generating question of this thesis. 
According to Stump, sanctification may be described as the process of freely orientating 
all one's desires towards God, of bringing about concord in the personality directed to 
God. Discord and lack of harmony of one's first and second order desires is slowly turned 
around by the grace of God. However, a human person could only be a morally responsible 
participant in the process of sanctification, if willing ever closer relationship with God 
was, at least in some sense, caused by an intrinsic principle within the human subject. 
Hence, for Stump, God can act graciously within the human personality to sanctify, only 
when the human person has a second-order desire which would be in accord with the 
Divine action. 597 Without Divine grace the human person suffers from internal discord 
between first and second order desires, and only if a higher -level of second order desire is 
in place does God intervene to change the rebellious first-order desire(s) and bring the 
personality into a state of harmony. Such an account holds together the efficacy of grace 
and human morality responsibility for the change, the need for Divine action and yet 
human consent stemming from a higher-order desire. From the previous explication one 
may infer that a person acted freely, when she does what she wants to do, even though this 
could not be called a typical case of human willing as the first-order volition is only 
brought in line due to the action of an "external" agent, God. In fact, Stump claims that 
God's changing human first-order desires "enhances" human freedom of will, because it 
allows the second-order desire to be effective, to be willed, and hence, for there to be 
concord of higher and lower order desires. When there is discord in the personality Stump 
wishes to hold that the person is not fully free, and volition is not fully the agent's own, for 
either the will is frozen, or it is hi-jacked by the impulses of first-order desires. 
598 One 
could also add to Stump here and say that where concord within the personality leads to an 
enhancement of qualitative personal identity, one is no longer divided against oneself. 
599 
59' J. Oman concurs with this caution about the efficacy of direct 
Divine intervention into the human 
personality. If the human person is not to be overridden, as 
in the Divine Fiat view, a "spiritual gift" will be 
of limited value unless it is appropriated by a person as a moral subject: 
"It might deliver us from desire, 
reinforce resolution, dispel the clouds of evil 
imagination, yet, if it remain mere gift not turned into humility 
towards God and service to His children, in no way forward 
in us the ends of religion. " Oman, p. 72. 
598 For more on this see Stump's discussion of J. M. Fischer 
in "Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate 
Possibilities", pp. 260-2. 
599 Stump says as much: "What Frankfurt's account of 
free will adds to Fischer's conditions for 
incompatibilist free will is the requirement that the agent care about what 
his will is, and in a way which 
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Such an account envisages typically a gradual, rather than sudden, metamorphosis of the 
person, precisely because the human personality cannot be bypassed. There must be a 
relevant second-order desire as an intrinsic principle to sanction Divine grace. Some may 
not have the required second-order desire in the first place or the strength of it may 
fluctuate. 
As Augustine tells the story, when he prayed to God to give him a will for 
sexual continence, he made the mental reservation 'But not yet...... it is clear 
that, if God had given Augustine a will for sexual continence on that 
occasion in response to such a prayer, he would have been acting against 
Augustine's own second-order desires. The result would not have been to 
evoke or enhance Augustine's free will but to undermine it, because the 
consequent first-order volition for sexual continence would have been 
against Augustine's second-order desire to have continence 'but not yet. 600 
Stump also claims that her solution addresses the question of moral responsibility: 
In being sanctified, the agent does not become God's puppet, a simple 
adjunct to God's will; on the contrary, in sanctifying him, God is helping 
that agent to have the will the agent himself wants to have. The consequent 
moral goodness has its origin in the agent's own volitions, not just in God's, 
as the objection to the doctrine of sanctification had supposed. 601 
At the same time she claims the position avoids Pelagianism: 
Instead, this account holds that all the work resulting in moral improvement 
is done by God in response to the agent's recognition that he needs God's 
help and is willing to have it..... It is true that, on this account of 
sanctification, an act of free will on the agent's part is necessary for God's 
work of sanctification, but such a view was also held by Augustine and 
Aquinas, who are scarcely noted for their adherence to Pelagianism. 
602 
We have an account, then, which goes some way to meeting three of the requirements 
outlined above for a Christian conception of freedom. As God brings about the 
concordance of first and second-order desires, one can say that there is a sense in which 
God constitutes true freedom (requirement [1]) and liberates human action (requirement 
[2]). Stump's account also involves an interaction between philosophy and theology, and 
by involving itself in the philosophy of mind, presents an account which has a certain 
degree of psychological plausibility. We appear to have a via media between the Divine 
doesn't produce pyschological discord in him. " "Intellect, 
Will, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities", 
pp. 265-6. 
600 "Sanctification, Hardening of Heart, " p. 413. 
601 ibid., pp. 413-14. 
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Fiat view and Pelagianism, which posits a role for the Divine as constituting freedom and 
liberating human action, while still ensuring that human willing is moved in part by an 
intrinsic principle within the person. However, certain concerns with Stump's account 
remain. 
11.01) Criticisms of Stump. 
To begin with, Stump's account applies to sanctification not to conversion and 
regeneration. As such Stump's account does not capture the importance of the Divine 
initiative in effecting the relationship between the Divine and human. In her articles on 
freedom to date, Stump fails to address the relationship of grace and freedom head on. 
Thus, in her discussion of Aquinas, although she notes the integral association of his 
conception of grace and freedom, she decides to deal with only the question of freedom on 
the grounds that: "According to Aquinas himself, his account of grace should not alter the 
conclusions we reach about his theory of the nature of the will, independently 
considered. "603 As an exposition of Aquinas, this is far too convenient, and hides the 
tension which Aquinas' account of the relation of freedom and grace might bring to her 
position. 
It may be justified to argue that this tension is in fact already extant in Thomas' position. 
On the one hand, Aquinas states that God only moves the person as prime mover, that is in 
general concurrence, 604 and otherwise, anything that moves the will as an "extrinsic 
principle" "without the concurrence" of the person, commits an act of "violence" against 
that person. 605 Yet he also thinks that there are exceptions to the rule that God only moves 
a person as prime mover: "sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of 
something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those He moves by grace, as we 
shall state later on. "606 He supports this position later in his discussion of grace, arguing 
that preparation for grace which is divinely "moved" is required, 
607 and then "infused 
grace, " which falls under the category of operative grace, at conversion. Aquinas argues 
for the legitimacy of the Divine moving the will in grace by using an analogy with a sick 
602 ibid., p. 414. 
603 Stump, "Aquinas's Account of Freedom, " p. 5. 
604 ST la2ae. q. 9. art. 4. 
605 ibid.. 
606 Summa Theologiae la2ae. q. 9. art. 6. 
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person: "In the same way, a sick man can of himself make some movements, yet he cannot 
be perfectly moved with the movement of one in health, unless by the help of medicine he 
be cured. "608 
However, Aquinas offers no explanation as to why his version of the principle of freedom 
from constraint (the moving of the will by an "extrinsic principle" does violence "without 
the concurrence of him that suffers violence") ought not to apply to God's action in 
moving the will to accept grace. On Stump's account this could only not constitute an act 
of violence against the will, if there was some "intrinsic principle, " such as an ineffective 
higher order desire, which required Divine assistance to effect it. Just because God has the 
unique position as prime mover to move the will in general concurrence, it does not follow 
from that alone that the Divine may legitimately move the will towards particular ends, 
such as the acceptance of grace. We shall revisit this matter in Chapter 7. 
According to Stump, freedom ensues from being moved by an intrinsic principle of the 
agent. Yet she never tells us whether God's agency is to be considered intrinsic or extrinsic 
to the human agent. From her work on sanctification she leads us to suppose that God's 
activity straddles the boundaries: it is intrinsic in that it can alter a first-order desire to 
bring about concord within the human personality, yet extrinsic in that an element needs to 
be retained, to wit a second-order desire, which originates from the human agent alone. In 
assuming that one can deal with the question of freedom in separation from the issue of 
grace, she is in danger of failing to embody the interaction of philosophy and theology 
which is our aim. 
First, she fails to give a satisfactory account of the effects and extent of sin. Is the Spirit's 
work only confined to the transformation of first-order desires? Sin encompasses second- 
order desires as well, and not only in cases of the hardening of the heart. Jesus calls for 
repentance, a repentance (metanoia) which requires a change of mind and direction 
(epistrepho [turning]). 609 Paul says that believers must purify themselves "from every 
defilement of flesh [sarx] and spirit [pneuma]"(II Cor. 7.1 cf. I Cor. 5.5). Thus, the "but not 
607 ibid., la2ae. q. 112. art. 2. 
608 ibid., la2ae. q. 109. art. 2. 
609 See Luke 5.32; Mark 1.15; and on epistrepho: Acts 3.19; Acts 26.18 ['from darkness into light']; 26.20 
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yet" of Augustine's desire for sexual continence, may be plausibly considered to be 
because of competing second-order desires, not just the lust of his first-order desire, and 
the sinful second-order desire gains ascendancy and is on this occasion efficacious. In this 
light, it is not just the case, universally, that people act on sinful desires, but also that they 
want to (second-order desires). Sin has effected their hearts (seat of human's 'think-feel- 
act' nature), the whole person sarx, nous and pneuma. 
If there is discord between second-order desires, or degrees to which second-order desires 
are held, then this would appear to require the intervention of Divine grace at a higher 
level, or some sort of explanation as to how one removes the effects of sin at the higher- 
order level of one's desires. Yet Stump's undertaking to safeguard human freedom and 
moral responsibility was precisely based on the integrity of human second-order desires as 
constituting an intrinsic principle from which free action could flow, which allowed her to 
talk of an 'enhancement' of human freedom, rather than a 'take-over' of human freedom. If 
my criticism is at all valid, then it would not follow, from Stump's account, that the 
intervention of the Spirit would 'enhance' human freedom, because the Spirit's action 
would select one second-order desire rather than the alternative which had governed the 
person's behaviour. Some alternative explanation would have to be given as to why Divine 
grace so conceived enhances human freedom. 610 
Bennett Helm wishes to develop Frankfurt's account by employing the concept of 
"freedom of the heart. "611 Although Helm does not make this a mainstay of his argument, 
the concept clearly has theological roots, as we have seen.. In cases where someone wishes 
610 Stump's position assumes that it is not only necessary that a person have the required second-order desire, 
but also have acted on this to ask God for his help. This seems to present an exception to her rule that one 
requires Divine assistance to act on a second-order desire, if it is made ineffective as a result of sinful first- 
order desires. Thus, Augustine is simply unable to will his desired sexual continence, and requires Divine 
assistance to end his enslavement. In the typical case of 'bondage to sin' the human being is unable to act on 
any contrary second-order desire to turn against sin, but Stump wants to hold on to the aberration of an 
instance where one may act on one's second-order desires, namely, in the case of asking God for assistance. 
Why should such an act of will not be affected by the same conflict of desires as in Augustine's case above? 
Stump has left it unclear as to the extent of the "bondage of sin". Is it the case that all human first-order 
desires conflict with second-order desires when it comes to willing what is truly good? Or, alternatively, 
is it 
the case that only some choices to will the truly good are effected by sinful first-order 
desires? This is a basic 
theological question regarding the extent of the fall or the efficacy of sin. It would be possible for Stump to 
retreat to the position that the required second-order desires were all that was necessary 
for the intervention 
of God, and that one did not explicitly have to act to ask 
for God's grace. This would still be in line with the 
idea that the Spirit enhances human freedom of will, because the Spirit would be enabling the second-order 
desire of a person to come to fruition. 
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to change what they want to care about, as opposed to changing what they desire and will, 
he argues that Frankfurt's conception of freedom of will is insufficient. The reason for this 
is that caring about something is more than an act of will, more than just a desire to will x, 
but is holistic, involving the emotions, as well as desires and deliberation. Emotions need 
to be taken into account. 
Emotions themselves are essentially intentional responses to things one 
cares about, and so having particular emotions seems to presuppose that 
there truly are things one cares about. Conversely, it seems that it does not 
make sense to say that one cares about something if one did not or would 
not respond emotionally no matter what when it is affected favorably or 
adversely, and so caring about something seems to presuppose having the 
capacity for emotions. 612 
This is in line with the Reformers' stress on the importance of the affections in the 
orientation of a person. 613 Augustine talks of the heart as the organ of reception of Divine 
grace, a conceptaculum. 
614 
Emotions have, as Helm points out, a "projectible pattern of rationality": "for example, to 
care about some goal is not only to want it but also (other things being equal) to be afraid 
when its accomplishment is threatened, to be angry at those who impede one's progress, to 
be frustrated at repeated failures, etc. "615 Something one cares about is a suitable object of 
one's emotions, but it is also an object of one's desires, that is, "worth pursuing or 
avoiding. "616 The two are intertwined, as what is "worth pursuing or avoiding" is usually 
something which provokes an emotional response, and vice versa, emotions generate 
desires if the emotion is grounded in what one cares about. Helm defines the "heart" as the 
rational coherence between one's desires and emotions: "To care about something, then, 
one's emotional and desiderative responses to that thing must be by and large 'in synch'; 
611 B. W. Helm, "Freedom of the Heart, " Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 77 (1996), pp. 71-87. 
612 ibid., p. 76. 
613 For example, John Calvin talks of work of the Spirit 
in both illuminating the mind to the Word of God, 
but also transforms our hearts, being the inner seal of our 
hearts. J. Calvin, Institutes of the Christian 
Religion Vol.!, ed. by J. T. McNeill, trans. by F. L. Battles (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, MCMLX), Bk. 
III. ii. 8,33,36. He differentiates between cerebrum and cor, brain and 
heart: "we are called to knowledge of 
God: not that knowledge which, content with empty speculation, merely 
flits in the brain, but that which will 
be sound and fruitful if we duly perceive 
it, and if it takes root in the heart. " ibid., Bk. I. v. 9. 
614 "My heart, not my feet, brought me to Christ. " Augustine, 
Sermo 129,7, in, Jose Oroz Reta, "The Role of 
Divine Attraction, " p. 155. 
615 Helm, "Freedom of the Heart, " p. 76. 
616 ibid., p. 77. 
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failure to display this kind of coherence is..... a kind of irrationality. "617 A person is 
someone who is concerned about what s/he cares about and one has freedom of the heart, 
according to Helm, when "one is able successfully to control what one in fact cares about, 
what heart one in fact has. , 618 This is to take the long term view of considering what one 
shall be, rather than the short-term perspective of attempting to change a particular action. 
How according to Helm's account may one change what one cares about? Helm's answer is 
that one may do so not by a single effective volition in which higher and lower order 
desires are at one, as in Frankfurt-Stump thesis; rather it may be achieved only indirectly 
via the exercise of one's will to control one's behaviour. 
What is important now is that successful and consistent control of one's 
behavior over a period of time can result in the acquisition of new habits 
and consequently a change in the kinds of motives for action that are 
natural for one. This is important because it is by doing so that one can 
change one's emotional make-up and so where one's heart lies. 619 
Helm gives as an example of this method Pascal's counsel that the first step to believing in 
God is to behave as if one believes. One may equally cite as another philosophical 
example, Aristotle's contention in the Nicomachean Ethics that true altruism comes from a 
process of instituting altruistic habits which at first may be willed against the grain, so to 
speak, but later are willed as part of one's disposition. Desires express dispositions (hexis), 
and these can be educated by imitation and habit. The difference between simulation of 
habits and a genuine disposition is that the latter is the appropriate response to an object, 
stemming from genuinely held emotion and desire, not a passing desire to simulate. 
[I]f the habit one acquires through the exercise of one's will in simulating 
emotions when they are appropriate is one in which the mediating desire 
drops out, so that one is habitually motivated to act in the characteristic 
ways because such emotions are appropriate, then one is being motivated 
passively for the right reasons, and this is to have genuine emotions. 
620 
Helm's account may be seen as a development, as opposed to a replacement of the 
Frankfurt account, by making room for the role of emotions and desires, and hence 
offering a reconciliation between the mind and the heart. We may provisionally conclude 
that Helm's position will contribute to our account aiding us in raising the concept of the 
617 ibid.. 
618 ibid., p. 79- 
619 ibid., p. 81. 
620 ibid., p. 82. 
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heart to its true centrality in Christian anthropology. Secondly, it may be that his account 
of the redirection of one's heart by the adoption of new habits will be most applicable to 
the doctrine of sanctification, rather than that of conversion. Questions still remain in the 
wake of the Stump's thesis and Helm's theory of the heart. How may sin effect the freedom 
of the heart? How may conflicts of desires, emotions and intentions within the personality 
be overcome? Finally, what is the origin of the desire to change one's heart? 
III. ) Excursus: The Efficacy of Sin, the "Image of God" and the Concept of a Latent 
True Nature. ' 
As a way into the subject of sin, the Platonic account of the way that the will is constrained 
by evil is examined. This reveals, in some respects, a similar pattern to the Christian 
account of sin and redemption, drawing as it does on distinctions between: freedom and 
bondage, compulsion and determination, and the discovery and loss of identity. The work 
of one of Plato's Christian interpreters, Simone Weil, will be utilised to draw out the 
implications for and connections with Christian theology. The intention is to provide a 
bridge to link the doctrine of sin with Stump's theory analysed above. 
One of the central ideas of Plato is his identification of the asymmetry between evil and 
good action. In the Phaedrus, Plato compares the soul to a chariot being pulled by two 
horses, one black ('evil') and one white ('goodness'). 621 This is a clear image not only of an 
essential choice that confronts the human, but also a metaphor for the potentially divided 
self. For Plato the choice for evil is essentially self-deceiving, the object of wanting but not 
willing, which may only come from a position of knowledge of the Good. 622 The evil 
person in a state of self-deception cannot fully comprehend the path of virtue. An evil 
621 Plato, Phaedrus (London, Penguin Classics, 1973), Letters VII and VIII, pp. 61-2. Interestingly Luther, 
from Augustine, employs the image of a horse and a rider, but unlike Plato the human self/soul is not the 
rider of the horses but either God or Satan: "So man's will is like a beast standing between two riders..... Nor 
may it choose to which rider it will run, or which it will seek; but the riders themselves fight to decide who 
shall have and hold it. " Luther, pp. 103-4. Luther's point here is that the human will is never in a neutral 
position, it is always determined by something, whether the necessity of sin, or determination by God. Thus, 
Gerhard Ebeling writes of Luther that, "the question of the freedom of the will is really the question of the 
power of the will. " Ebeling, p. 120. Although, Plato and Weil wish to talk of necessity and bondage, both 
consider the possibility of a redemption which builds upon the fact that a person is never totally determined 
by evil. 
622 For a greater elucidation of Plato's position here found in the Gorgias, see Ilham Dilman, Morality and 
the Inner Life: A Study in Plato's Gorgias (London, Macmillan Press, 1979), pp. 31-49. Dilman writes 
elsewhere of the evil person: "He may be a 'wilful' person and may have organized and settled 
desires, but he 
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disposition impairs one's capacity to choose the good. The virtuous person, on the other 
hand, knows the temptations and pitfalls of moral evil from the trials of establishing virtue 
as his/her disposition of will, and so, in a sense, is free to will both evil and good. 623 Weil 
recasts this position using the language of egoism. The ego is not a synonym for the self or 
human subject, but a particular stance of the subject towards itself (an excessive sense of 
self-importance) and its relations to impulses and instincts. When a person chooses evil 
the ego has a tendency to quasi-automatically "expand. "624 Weil describes the energy of 
the 'I' as self-assertion, exhibited in the expansive will (volonte) of the ego in exertion, 
effort and the pursuit of ends (finalte). It is not an expansion which opens up to others. The 
ego remains self-centred, hence Luther's dictum concerning human evil: "Homo in se 
incurvatus. " It is an expansion at the expense of others. This draws on Plato's conception 
of evil as essentially self-indulgent and self-gratificatory. 
In contrast, Weil talks of the good only being accomplished by a "contraction" of the ego, 
a renunciation, to make room for grace. In the Phaedo, Plato talks of "the purification of 
the soul" and "dying to the self. " One becomes subject to the Good, the standards of 
absolute value which do not find their origin in the self. This is only a yoke when morality 
is external to a person's will and not when it becomes an internal disposition, "part of a 
coherent pattern of life, , 625 or freedom of the heart. Far from this "contraction" 
representing the "incurvatus" of Luther, it is an opening to others. One of the chief 
characteristics of the good life is love, which is precisely being compassionate towards 
others, forgiving, trusting, being grateful and sharing. While evil constricts the freedom of 
others, by expansion of the ego, good action enhances both the freedom of oneself and 
has no will of his own for it to be said that he does what he wills. " I. Dilman, Free Will. An Historical 
Introduction. (London, Routledge, 1999), p. 55. 
623 The possession of the moral knowledge is not episteme understood as a set of beliefs or propositions, 
but, 
for Plato, virtue as a state of the soul, that is the Good has developed an internal relation to the will. This 
is 
similar to Bennett Helm's point about concerns becoming embedded 
in one's heart: the relation of beliefs, 
desires and emotions. Dilman describes Plato's conception of the love of the 
Good: "It is in that love that the 
good man is both at one with the good and knows goodness. The 
knowledge in question is not intellectual 
knowledge applied, and in that sense practical knowledge, but affective knowledge 
lived by the person who 
has it. " Free Will, p. 61. Dilman argues that it is because Aristotle operates with a different conception of 
moral knowledge, and does not recognise that moral 
knowledge is internally related to the will in Plato's 
philosophy, that Aristotle criticises Plato in the 
Nicomachean Ethics on the question of whether vices are 
voluntary and on the issue of the nature of weakness of will. 
ibid., pp. 54 -67. 
624 "To harm a person is to receive something from him.... We have gained 
in importance. We have expanded. 
We have filled the emptiness in ourselves by creating one in somebody else. " Weil, 
Gravity and Grace, p. 6. 
625 I. Dilman, Morality and the Inner Life, p. 141. 
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others, because in the space which one has opened for the other, 626 new possibilities of 
choice present themselves. 627 For Weil true moral action is done for its own sake, not for 
the sake of intermediary ends generated by the self, not out of attraction but compulsion. 
Another illuminating asymmetry which Weil makes between willing the good and doing 
evil, is that a person "falls" into evil becoming subject to "moral gravity, , 628 but "one does 
not fall into the good. " The idea is that one becomes evil by yielding to temptations and 
affective inclinations, what Plato describes as self-indulgence, which pulls one down so 
that one becomes governed by the natural necessity of affective appetites. For Plato, evil 
action is involuntary, for such action stems from moral ignorance and consent to the cycle 
of natural necessity, what Augustine would later refer to as "the chain of habit. "629 The 
will becomes constrained by affective appetites, making the person passive. In one sense, 
the person has ceased to own his will, because the will has become internally constrained 
by the assertion of the ego and natural appetites. Weil uses the metaphor of "mechanical 
laws" to describe such constraint, as well as impersonal and deterministic language of 
"falling" and being subject to the "law of moral gravity. " The result of evil action is a 
repetitive pattern of choice, what Weil describes as the "monotony of evil. 
030 
[A] man's disposition of will keeps him from turning towards the good and 
so moving towards it.... So from the point of view of his will he cannot be 
said to be under any constraint. But from the standpoint of the good what 
he wills is itself the very thing which prevents him from responding to the 
demand of the good. From that standpoint, which is obviously not a morally 
neutral one, he can be described as unfree. 
631 
According to both Plato and Weil, although there are levels of evil, which make virtuous 
action more difficult by degree, one is never irredeemably evil, nor exempt from 
responsibility. 
626 Simone Weil calls this the "void. " Gravity and Grace, p. 10. 
627 One may take as an example of the 'contraction' and 'expansion' model the case of a person who acts out 
of revenge and one who does so from charity. In the case of revenge, the action always 
has a reference to the 
self: "He wants to return to this man the evil he has done to 
him, the agent, for himself. " Dilman, Morality 
and the Inner Life, p. 159. In contrast, genuinely willing the good of 
the other is action without reference to 
the self: "Where one wants another person's good..... if one's 
desire is satisfied one will be pleased for him. " 
ibid.. 
628 As she poignantly writes: "Those whom we call criminals are only tiles 
blown off a roof by the wind and 
falling at random. Their only fault is the initial choice 
by which they became those tiles. " S. Weil, On 
Science, Necessity and the Love of God. trans. and ed. Richard Rhees 
(London, Oxford University Press, 
1968), p. 177. 
629 Augustine, Confessions, trans. by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), VIII, 5. 
630 Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 62. 
164 
Behind this all is the paradox close to that which Jesus expounds (Mtt. 10: 39), namely, he 
who grasps and desires to fill the self is empty ('expansion'), and she who restrains, who 
empties herself to that which comes from outside is full ('contraction'). Dilman explicates 
this point in relation to the Platonic tradition: 
[I]f it makes sense to talk of what a man wants in life he must have interests 
and care for things. This brings in his relation to activities and concerns that 
exist independently of him. A man who does not so relate himself, one who 
has no commitments and feels no responsibilities, is a man who has no way 
of life, nothing he can describe as what he wants. He will, of course, have 
various appetites and desires, and he may respond to promptings.... But he 
has no rudder, and he can hardly find sustenance in these momentary 
satisfactions..... This is a life in which a man can develop no identity; one 
which is destructive of any identity he has. The more it destroys a man's 
identity, the more does the man become dependent on pleasure as a means 
of filling in the void left by its destruction. 632 
The extreme outcome is the despair of the drug addict, or the series of empty tomorrows of 
Macbeth, where one has lost freedom of the heart, freedom to care about what one's cares 
are. 
633 
In contrast, one "does not fall into the good, " according to Weil, because the good requires 
the active participation of the person in constraining the ego, through practice, discipline, 
self-restraint, affliction and self-awareness. This involves another conspicuous 
convergence of freedom and necessity. For Plato the restraint of the ego is accomplished 
via an attachment to the Good, thus one's actions become morally necessary, that is 
634 compelled by moral beliefs. This is not the "natural necessity" into which Weil tells us 
one "falls, " for having a virtuous disposition is neither a state of ignorance (one knows evil 
and rejects it), nor is it a compulsion which is externally related to the will. The virtuous 
631 Dilman, Morality and the Inner Life, p. 167. 
632 ibid., p. 143. 
633 Bennett Helm calls those who have lost the ability to be concerned with what they care about, 
"emotional 
wantons": "Emotional wantons are creatures 
like dogs and cats that have the capacity for emotions and 
desires and so genuinely do care about things 
in the world. But they do not - indeed cannot - care about what 
hearts they have and so can have no motivation to change their 
hearts. " "Freedom of the Heart, " p. 78. 
634 Dilman compares this to a practitioner of arithmetic 
for whom the rules of the discipline determine his 
practice, but who nonetheless is still 
free to choose to cheat. Morality' and the Inner Life, p. 139. The person 
with moral knowledge is compelled 
by the Good, and ultimately the Good has become a "state of the soul. " 
Yet even here the person may still 
he free to do evil and to he tempted, but this would constitute a "lapse" of 
his moral character: "Such a man 
has not lost his knowledge; he has lost touch with the love of the good that 
is still in him. " ibid., p. 153. 
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person is in a state of what Plato calls "self-mastery, " of "being moderate and in control of 
oneself and master of one's own passions and appetites. "635 As virtue is not ego-centrically 
motivated, for Plato, there is no "motive" for being good; goodness is its own reward. 636 
Where Weil would diverge from Plato is on the question of "self-mastery, " which for Plato 
is achievable by the self being internally related to the Good, whereas for Weil it requires 
Divine grace. She writes: "We possess nothing in the world, except the power to say T. It 
is this that we should give to God: the only free act. "637 
The self-assertive energy of the ego is impotent, and not the source of energy which 
achieves human metamorphosis. It is only Divine grace which bestows upon us the 
"wings" to surmount moral gravity. This act of renunciation of the ego, the placing the "I" 
in the loving hands of God, requires attitudes of will or intention: obedience, service, 
patience, attention, openness. It is a "passivity" which "involves renouncing an attitude of 
seeking and tenacity, exemplified in the pursuit of goals, to make room for greater 
receptivity to the good. x, 638 It is not the passivity of internal constraint, like the person 
caught up in evil, but an active passivity which allows for the passivity of reception: "The 
purest motives appear as something exterior. "639 To receive and express truth takes work, 
while evil occurs almost effortlessly. In this sense, there is no bypassing the subject, no 
getting away from the internal involvement of the subject in her divinely-given orientation 
towards God. 
In summary, according to Frankfurt's conception of freedom as a harmony between first 
and second-order desires, there is no distinction between the unrepentant evil doer and the 
virtuous person: "Each chooses and acts voluntarily in his own lights and as the kind of 
person he is. "640 However, as we have seen above, there is a fundamental asymmetry 
635 Plato, Gorgias (London: Penguin Classic, 1973), p. 90. 
636 The virtuous person "knows what goodness is, he is acquainted with it, in his life and actions; but he has 
no awareness of his own goodness. " Dilman, Free Will, p. 57. Dilman also notes that whereas in doing evil 
one becomes dependent on pleasures or meeting some other need, good action does not require a relation of 
dependence or possessiveness: "For relation with the good is not a possessive relationship. When one's 
relationship becomes possessive its object ceases to be the good. Thus one who loves and serves the good 
cannot become dependent on it for what he gets out of it. " Morality and the Inner Life, p. 169. 
637 Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 23. 
638 Dilman, Morality and the Inner Life, p. 157. 
639 Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 40. 
640 Dilman, Free Will, p. 55. 
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between the actions and freedom of the good and evil person. 641 The evil person may have 
voluntarily chosen evil, in Frankfurt's sense, but once chosen his will is caught up in the 
"mechanical laws" of the ego. He is ignorant of the ends of substantive freedom. The will 
does not possess a Pelagian permanent neutrality to choose between good and evil, 642 but 
is an integrated part of a person's intentionality and hence subject to the corruption of 
human choice. Frankfurt gives no account as to how the ends to which we exercise free 
will shape and direct the nature of our freedom. Although Plato and Weil hold that there is 
a sense in which evil actions are involuntary, hence supporting a "bondage of the will" 
type thesis, neither maintain that the human person is totally enslaved, or that there is a 
part of the soul which may not once re-activated be attracted to the good. For Weil, the 
way to loving the good may be a high summit to climb, one which is only achievable by 
grace. Yet, if the evil person wants "to overcome everything in himself which alienates 
him from the good, the very fact that he could think in these terms and have such a desire, 
would mean that he was facing in the right direction; and this alone, provided that he does 
not turn back, would guarantee that his thirst for the good would grow stronger, until 
finally the good entered his soul and transformed him. "643 
Let us turn to the issue of the efficacy and extent of sin in its biblical context. By birth the 
status of the human creature is to be separated from God in being ontologically, although 
not relationally, distinct. 644 This ontological distinction is the very basis of human freedom 
641 R. C. Moberly is clear that freedom as willing and acting that which is in accord with one's self is not 
ultimately compatible with the will to do evil. As he writes: "Only true correspondence with the image of 
God is man's true nature, or can be the realization of his faculties in full. " Moberly, p. 225. He goes to say: 
"Freedom is self-identity with goodness..... Freedom in a creature is correspondence with God's own self- 
identity with goodness. " ibid., p. 226. 
642 Alistair McFadyen offers the following description and critique of Pelagius' conception of the will: 
"Pelagius suspends the will in perpetual neutrality in order to ensure that it may find and choose its own 
motives (to Pelagius, freedom) rather than be drawn into movement by forces of attraction greater than itself 
(to Pelagius, coercion). Hence he atomises will, separates it out from the person's structure of intentionality 
and motivational complex, as well as from determining aspects of her environment. Will, on this account, has 
no structure, no substance; it is pure, formal capacity..... But then it is hard to see it as a specific person's 
will; hard therefore to understand its choices or its actions as in any way of the person. For every choice 
made in the will's absolute freedom is ultimately disconnected from any motive, desire or intention of the 
person whose will it is. Will's freedom is attributed, in effect, to its arbitrariness, its incapacity to be reduced 
to anything to do with the person or her situation. And that is why Augustine was correct to deem this an 
account which renders willing unintelligible as an act of the person. " A. McFadyen, Bound to Sin 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2000), p. 178. 
643 Dilman, Morality and the Inner Life, p . 167. 644 Etymologically, the Hebrew verb "to create, " br', also means to separate, and is illustrated in the Genesis 
creation narrative in the separating out of the components of creation (Gen. 1.6-7,9). Yet the separation 
involved in creation is a distinction within the bonds of relation, as in Genesis 2, where the bonds include the 
attachment between man and soil (v. 7), man and woman (v. 18,23), God and humans (v. 7; cf. 1.26), and 
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and identity, for it provides creatures the space for relative autonomy. As Weil writes: 
"God allows me to exist outside himself. It is for me to refuse this authorization. , 645 In the 
Hebrew creation narrative, what God creates is good, which is "to state that nothing is 
inherently evil... Evil, sin and satan.... are intrusive into God's creation and are never 
original .,, 
646 Human creatures echo this in being made in the 'image of God. ' There is no 
original dualism of good and evil at creation (cf. I Cor. 11.7). Although humankind is 
created good, it is also inclined to do evil. 647 The serpent's discourse is immediately 
intelligible to man, evoking in him a favourable response. Sin is a kind of second nature in 
man (Jer. 13.23). Yet in the Hebrew Bible yetser ha-ra' is not all-enslaving evil, but a 
permanent temptation. There is here no servum arbitrium or original sin in the sense of an 
inherited corrupt nature. In sum, humankind's position in his existence is an ambiguous 
one, equipped for the good, but also with an inclination to evil, stemming from the very 
created ontological distinction from God. 
In the Synoptic Gospels the personal and communal challenge to repent given by Jesus and 
John the Baptist, is so direct and unqualified that it is most intuitively read as an appeal for 
a response from a free human agent, one capable of responding. 648 The choice is made 
stark: repent or perish. 649 The parables of Jesus told in the Synoptic Gospels also confront 
people with the stark choice: are you a sheep or a goat? In the case of the parable of the 
between humans and animals (v. 19-20). Within this understanding sin leads to a separation without the bonds 
of relation, effacing the separations and bonds of the order of God's creation. Salvation involves re-creation, 
as exemplified by the Flood Re-creation narrative. This has brought D. J. A Clines to posit a "Creation- 
Uncreation-Re-creation" schema in Genesis 1-11. D. J. A. Clines, The Theme of the Pentateuch (1978), pp. 61- 
78. 
645 Weil, Gravity and Grace, p. 35. 
646 Victor P. Hamilton, "The Theology of Genesis, " in NIOTTE, Vol. 4, pp. 672. This was supported by later 
mediaeval Scholasticism by an argument of the form: God is good in being and act; creation is an act of God; 
therefore, creation is essentially good. This was not to repudiate the reality of human sin, but it is still the 
goodness of God's creating and conserving which fundamentally determines creation. Jaroslav Pelikan, The 
Christian Tradition, Vo1.3: The Growth of Medieval Theology 600-1300 (Chicago, Chicago University 
Press, 1978), p. 112ff. 
647 Gen. 6.5 cf 4 Esd. 7.118; II Bar. 40.42f. 
648 This reading is not shared by Calvin, for whom repentance is a consequence of faith or grace. Hence 
he 
re-writes the repentance formulas as, "Since the Kingdom of Heaven has come near, repent. 
" He adds: "when 
we refer the origin of repentance to faith we do not imagine some space of time 
during which it brings it to 
birth; but we mean to show that a man cannot apply himself seriously to repentance without 
knowing himself 
to belong to God. But no one is truly persuaded that he belongs to God unless he has first recognised God's 
grace. " Calvin, Vol. 1, p. 594. In relation to my model, 
Calvin is right in a sense, for repentance cannot take 
place outside of some sort of relationship with God, prior to encountering the 
Divine initiative. Where one 
may disagree with Calvin is whether that relationship yet constitutes the 
faith relationship, but is something 
rather less thematic, stumbling towards making the commitment 
to the Divine. There is room to respond to 
the call for repentance either affirmatively or negatively. 
649 Lk 13.3,5; 16.23,28,30. 
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Prodigal Son (Luke 15.11-31), the lost son only repents when he recalls his former relation 
with his father. However, he "came to his senses" on his own, provoked by the 
consequences of his actions. He comes to his father out of desperate need, tentatively 
aware of his sin, but unaware of the goodness of his father. It is only when he meets his 
father that the unexpected, unearned, unconditional, act of grace, "filled with compassion, " 
occurs which restores the relationship. 
In Paul we have a conception of the enslaving power of sin, not only of sin as a result of 
voluntary action, Romans 1, but of sin as a force or power whose grip we cannot escape. 
Only a greater power, the power of being in Christ and the Spirit can overcome it. 650 If we 
are to take seriously Paul's claims concerning the vitiation of sin, then, following Stump, 
we can conceive of conflict between second-order desires between good and evil, or even 
the possibility of there being no good second-order desires. E. P. Sanders has difficulties 
with Paul's position here. He questions how Paul's view of sin as a power strong enough to 
wrest the Law from God's control and to render humans powerless to do what is good 
(Rom. 7: 11,19), may be reconciled with the Jewish position outlined above, that God has 
created the world good. The main argument in Paul for this view is to be found from 
Romans 1-3.9: 
The conclusion in 3.9 does not correspond to what leads up to it in any 
respect: the charges of in chaps. 1-2 overstate the case and the conclusion is 
contradicted by 2.13-14. What this means is that Paul's conclusion, that all 
are under Sin, was not derived from the line of observation and reasoning 
he had presented in the previous chapter..... Adam's sin does not - in Paul's 
own statement of it - prove that all humanity is sinful and stands 
condemned. The heinous sins of some Greeks and Jews do not - even in 
Paul's own presentation of them - lead to the view that all humans are under 
Sin. This means that he held the conclusion as a fixed view and tried to 
bring forward arguments in favor of it, though without logical success. 
651 
650 John Ziesler writes: "[Paul's] diagnosis of the human condition is more pessimistic than that of his 
contemporaries, who believed that all sinners could repent, be forgiven and then by following the Torah lead 
righteous lives if they really wanted to. Paul believes they cannot. All are trapped and controlled 
by the 
power of sin whether they like it or not. Repentance and forgivenness are therefore not enough: what 
is 
needed is liberation by a superior force. Sin is slavery, although it begins 
by consent. " Ziesler, p. 76. 
651 E. P. Sanders, "Sin, Sinners (NT), " The Anchor Bible Dictionary, Vol. 6., ed. by D. N. Freedman (New 
York, Doubleday, 1992), p. 45. Sanders explains why Paul felt it necessary to come up with such an 
argument: he "deduced the plight from the solution". Sanders goes on: 
"Once he accepted it as revelation that 
God intended to save the entire world by faith in his Son, he naturally had to think that the entire world 
needed saving, and thus that it was wholly bound over to 
Sin. His soteriology is more consistent and 
straightforward than his conceptions of the human plight, and thus may show 
that in describing sin he had to 
go in search of arguments which led up to a preformed conclusion. 
This explanation gives a good account of 
why Romans 1-2 and 5 are weak as reasoned arguments 
but lead to a definite conclusion. The conclusion that 
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The contrary evidence which Paul in fact cites, in Romans 2.13-14, is that some gentiles 
despite their lack of access to the Law, nonetheless "do by nature what the Law requires, " 
and will be justified by their works in the judgement. 
Although we may accept Sander's caution about a conception of sin as an all- 
encompassing enslaving power, nevertheless we have already found extra-biblical 
grounds, in the philosophy of Plato via Weil, to support Paul's position that evil does 
constrain the will and ultimately divests one of freedom of the heart. Sander's analysis 
provides grounds for maintaining that, what Luther calls "bondage of the will"(de servo 
arbitrio), does not leave humanity in an irredeemable position, unable to respond to the 
Divine initiative. 652 The human plight seems to fall somewhere in between the two 
all need to be saved through Christ, to repeat, came by revelation, and so could not be questioned; the 
arguments in favor of universal bondage to sin are then seen as efforts at rationalization. " ibid.., cf. E. P. 
Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism (London, SCM, 1977), pp. 442-47; 474-75. Later Sanders comments 
further that Paul works with two principles in conjunction: "the one God is the God of Hebrew Scripture, the 
one who created the world, who called Abraham and who gave the Law; and the same God always intended 
to save the world by faith in Christ. Thinking backward from the second point, he had to conclude that 
Creation, Election, and the Law did not save. In his black-and-white world, if they did not save, they did not 
even help; election and the Law were not stepping-stones to salvation in Christ. " ibid., p. 46. 
652 Luther takes a much more severe reading of Paul and argues for the universal sinfulness of humanity 
which rules out all "free choice" as regards human response to the Divine. In his treatise he distinguishes 
between the "necessity of immutability" and "compulsion. " He maintains that compulsion is contrary to a 
person's own willing. However, Luther regards the will to be necessarily determined one way or the other in 
relation to good or evil, either by God or Satan, and so it cannot ever be self-determining. Luther explains 
that a person's determination of will may change in the following ways: "If they abandon their quest of it, 
they only do so under pressure [force] or because of some counter-attraction, never freely - whereas, when 
their hearts are not thus engaged, they spare their labour, and let events take their course. " Luther, p. 103. 
Luther goes on to say that in the case of Christian conversion a person is not compelled by God: "when God 
works in us, the will is changed under the sweet influence of the Spirit of God. Once more it desires and acts, 
not of compulsion, but of its own desires and spontaneous inclination. " ibid.. This rules out one option, 
leaving us with transformation by attraction or simple passivity. He writes that a person's will, "would not... 
chafe were it being changed, and were it yielding to constraint willingly. " ibid., p. 102. Yet what is it to 
"willingly submit" to something here? If the will is necessarily determined one way or the other by God or 
Satan, then of course one "willingly submits" as one has no alternative. To presume that one could "willingly 
submit" either presupposes that one has some ability to respond to the Divine or Satanic initiative which 
seeks to determine one, or that once one is so determined by the new power one is somehow able to welcome 
it. However, Luther rules out the first option, as he wishes to give no credence to the capacity of the human 
to choose the Divine by acceptance. The second option presupposes some capacity to recognise or willingly 
submit to the transformation which has overcome one. Yet, surely this presupposes the relative autonomy of 
the human subject who can step outside his current situation and see that the change has been a change for 
the better and hence to be welcomed. If the person is totally determined then it is meaningless to talk of this 
capacity of acceptance. Ebeling remarks that in Luther, "God's ominpotence 
does not destroy the human will 
altogether, but becomes the ultimate factor determining the 
human will in one direction or another, so 
permitting it to be the will in a concrete sense. " Luther, p. 
223. If God or Satan are only primary determining 
factors of the will, then it is still possible for there to be content 
in the human subject which allows and 
accepts the will to be changed one way or the other. 
Whether one is transformed by attraction or sheer 
passivity of the will, either way there has to 
be something in the person which is attracted, or is prepared to 
accept passivity. 
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extremes of absolute evil or goodness, which on the Platonic view are both governed by 
different forms of necessity, natural and moral. We are neither angels nor devils. 653 This is 
why both Plato and Weil hold that there is some residual intuition of the good which 
allows a person to respond to the Good/God. Thomas Aquinas argues that on a specific 
occasion we can withstand temptation and shun sinning by an exertion of our own will, 
which is consonant with the view that good action still falls under our scope in some 
limited way. However, sin is inevitable without a faithful relationship to God. We are not 
good of our own doing. Likewise, we can perform individual good deeds, but to build up 
the charity witnessed in the saints requires obedient relationship to God. 654 
Is this position in danger of simply resurrecting the Semi-Pelagian position which Luther 
so pungently critiques in The Bondage of the Will? Is Weil's stress on the inner work, 
which attending to the good requires, merely a veiled reworking of Erasmus' use of the 
Scholastic categories of congruent and condign merit? How may the position developed in 
this thesis respond? There is nothing about the human person which merits the Divine 
initiative of personal encounter with God, nor salvation. The question is rather one of 
receptivity, which Hans Urs Von Balthasar concurs with Weil in considering to be the true 
relation of creature to Creator. He uses the example of Mary to illustrate his thesis that 
receptivity is not pure passivity: "passivity correctly understood of a being already active 
in its receptivity, whose basic act consists in being able to receive. "655 Mary's receptivity is 
shaped by the Divine, but it is she who responds to God's mission of the sending of the 
Son in the affirmative, "I do" (Jawort). Her "watchful waiting" and "active readiness" are 
precisely an instantiation of Weil's concept of attention and openness. It is one that is not 
the surrender of "resignation, " but an obedience effected by the human "will and 
cooperation. " The Divine initiative is required to trigger a response from the person. At 
this stage the person is passive. Whether a person does respond to the Divine initiative 
depends upon what a person has become and whether the person desires and can identify 
with the call to change one's heart. 
653 To be wholly under the power of sin would constitute a victory for the 
forces of evil, positing us as devils 
rather than human creatures. The Calvinist concept of 
"total depravity" does not refer to the fact that humans 
are in a state of absolute evil, but that sin vitiates 
human existence: there is no unalloyed good. Calvin, Vol. 1, 
Bk. II. viii-xi. 
654 Aquinas, De Veritate, "On Free Choice, " Article XIV; cf. Summa Theologiae 1a2ae. g109. art. 2: "even in 
the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of 
its own natural endowments, perform some particular good. " 
655 The Glory of the Lord: A theological aesthetic, Vol. 1, p. 
236 [in the German edition]. 
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The connection with the Frankfurt-Stump analysis is evident: second-order desires to 
change what one cares about are integral to an account which gives due weight to the 
integrity of the human subject in the process of transformation. Yet even the formulation 
of an higher-order desire in response to the Divine initiative does not make one "active, " in 
the sense of being able to exercise one's volition. According to Stump's analysis an 
effective volition can only be produced, on some occasions, through the Spirit's action in 
bringing about the conformity of higher and lower order desires. Possessing an higher- 
order desire to want to respond to the Divine initiative is hardly meritorious as it is only 
triggered through relation to the Divine. In and of itself it is ineffective and hence, does 
not constitute a good act. Luther can chastise Erasmus' position so mercilessly, precisely 
because merit was conceived as an action independent of God. 656 Luther argues that 
instead of addressing the problems of Pelagianism, Erasmus by lessening but not 
extinguishing the role of merit, merely moves them to a different level, and in the process 
worsens them. 657 However, this thesis re-directs the focus of the issue away from 
soteriology and the grace-merit debate, and onto the matter of the receptivity of the human 
to the Divine initiative and the identity of the person in the process of metamorphosis. 
Justification for this approach may be gained from its correlation with the doctrine of the 
"image of God. " The biblical witness seems to testify to the indelibility of the 'image of 
God'. Genesis 5: 1 describes Adam post-Fall as being in the "likeness" of God, and 
continues that same metaphor in relation to Adam and his sons (verse 3). If Adam 
continues to be the 'image-bearer' of God, so too do his offspring. Genesis 9: 6 condemns 
murder for the reason that the human person is made in the 'image of God'. 658 In the New 
656 Congruent merit refers to the merit a person accrues by applying himself to spiritual matters, out of his 
own nature and will (ex puris naturalibus), prior to grace. Any subsequent gift of grace remains 
unconditional and not bound by merit. Condign merit pertains to the subsequent action of the grace-filled 
person, who is now able to act in a manner and towards ends previously ineligible to him. Such action does 
merit the reward of God, namely, further grace and eventually salvation. 
657 The result is the greater "hypocrisy" of: "valuing and seeking to purchase the grace of God at a much 
cheaper rate than the Pelagians.... Now if there must be error, those who say that the grace of God is priced 
high, and account it dear and costly, err less shamefully and presumptuously than those who teach that its 
price is a tiny trifle, and account it cheap and contemptible. " Luther, pp. 293-4. 
658 Psalm 8.5 has also often been seen to support this view. Anthony Hoekema writes: "Man, so says the 
inspired author of Psalm 8, was made only a little lower than God -a statement that strongly reminds us of 
the words of Genesis 1 about man's having been created in the image and 
likeness of God. Similarly echoing 
Genesis 1, verses 6-8 of the psalm affirm that God has given dominion over the works of the 
Creator's hands 
and has put all things under man's feet. " Hoekema, p. 
19. 
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Testament James 3: 9 is often cited as evidence that human persons continue to bear the 
image. 659 For Paul the 'image of God' is principally associated with Christ, and the 
disciples' task is to gain the 'likeness' of Christ. The emphasis is on redemption and 
eschatology rather than creation, moving towards ever increasing conformity to Christ's 
likeness, a reality of the future not the past. The image requires "renewal, "660 however, 
Paul does not support the view that no vestige of the "image" remains. 
The biblical evidence on the subject of the 'image' supports a dual component conception 
of the 'image' as, (a. ) continuing to be part of humankind post-Fall, but also, (b. ) requiring 
radical renewal and re-direction for its fulfilment. Anthony Hoekema argues, following 
other theologians, for a distinction between, what he calls, the 'structural' and the 
'functional' aspects of the 'image, ' such that structure is at the basis of function, and yet a 
mere skeleton without it. 661 In the history of theology earlier theologians, such as Irenaeus 
and Aquinas, tended to define the 'image' in terms of a person's structural capacities, 
whereas recent theologians stress a functional view, the image found in the activity and 
relation of worshipping, loving and serving God. Both aspects are required. Hoekema 
defines the 'image' in the structural sense as, "the entire endowment of gifts and capacities 
that enable man to function as he should in his various relationships and callings. "662 This 
refers to such capacities which allow one to function as God's image, 663 such as: reason, 
659 Hoekema again explains the verse: "Thus, the thrust of the Greek expression kath homoiosin theou 
gegonotas is this: human beings as here described have some time in the past been made according to the 
likeness of God and are still bearers of that likeness. For this reason it is inconsistent to praise God and 
curse men with the same tongue, since the human creatures whom we curse still bear the likeness of God. For 
this reason God is offended when we curse them. " ibid., p. 20 
660 See II Cor. 3.18; Col. 3.9-10; Eph. 4.22-24. Hoekema comments on this point: "The image of God in this 
sense is not static but dynamic. It is the pattern according to which our lives are being renewed by the Holy 
Spirit, and the eschatological goal toward which we are moving. We should think of the image of God in this 
sense, therefore, not as a noun but as a verb: we no longer image God as we should; we are now being 
enabled by the Spirit to image God more and more adequately; some day we shall image God perfectly. " 
ibid., p. 28. 
661 Hoekma notes that: "Various terms have been used to describe these two aspects : broader and narrower 
(H. Bavinck, L. Berkhof), formal and material image (Brunner), substance and relationships (Hendrikus 
Berkhof), endowment and creativity (David Cairns). " ibid., pp. 69-70. On the distinction he writes: "One 
cannot function without a certain structure. An eagle, for example, propels itself through the air by flying - 
this is one of its functions. The eagle would be unable to fly, however, unless it had wings - one of its 
structure. Similarly, human beings were created to function in certain ways: to worship God, to love the 
neighbor, to rule over nature, and so on. But they cannot function in these ways unless they have been 
endowed by God with the structural capacities that enable them to do so. So structure and function are both 
involved when we think of man as the image of God. " ibid., p. 69. 
662 ibid., pp. 70-1. 
663 Raymond C. Van Leeuwan makes a useful distinction between being in and as God's image: "since God 
has no form, humankind is not made in God's image, but rather as God's image; thus, humanity is his 
representative and agent here on earth. The expression 'likeness' guarantees that humans will be a faithful and 
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language, conscience, moral responsibility, decision-making, aesthetic sense, imagination 
and creativity. 664 The 'image' in the narrower functional sense, Hoekema defines as, "man's 
proper functioning in harmony with God's will for himi665 - the direction of the use of the 
structural capacities and gifts. Post-Fall, it is argued, human persons lose the functional 
sense of the 'image' because of misdirection and misuse (forms of idolatry), but not the 
structural sense, although a human person's potential to be as God's image is distorted by 
sinful use. Hoekema comments: 
The loss of the image of God in the functional sense presupposes the 
retention of the image in the structural sense. To be a sinner one must be an 
image-bearer of God - one must be able to reason, to will, to make 
decisions; a dog, which does not possess the image of God, cannot sin. Man 
sins with God-imaging gifts. 666 
Hoekema is in conformity with Paul's emphasis that Christ is the true image of God 
(Col. 1.15), because He discloses the true functional form and direction of the human 
creature, 
667 
adequate representative of God on earth. " "Image, form, " in NIOTTE, Vol. 4, pp. 644. Earlier he talks of one 
understanding of the image as seeing "humankind as God's counterpart (Gegenüber Gottes), so that a 
dialogical relation between God and humankind exist" ibid., p. 644. 
664 Victor P. Hamilton points out in relation to traditional structural conceptions of the image that, "Its 
weakness is that focusing exclusively on intellectual capacities of humanity, it correspondingly devalues 
other aspects of human experience, such as emotion. " "The Theology of Genesis, " in N107TE, Vol. , p. 672). 665 ibid., p. 72. 
666 ibid., p. 85. 
667 Colin Gunton has long argued for a more relational conception of the 'image', one that is centred on the 
Christ-event as the content of the 'image'. Gunton wishes to argue that the 'image' is bestowed at creation, a 
creation which is not separate from redemption, and hence, although the 'image' is perfected, only finally 
eschatologically, through sharing in the redemption of Jesus Christ, there is a sense that insofar as a human 
being is an existent creature s/he is gifted a likeness to God: "It would seem to follow, then, that, as created, 
the image of God is in a sense something given, even though it can finally be perfected only eschatologically, 
and through redemption. That something given cannot be taken away, except by God, because it is part of 
what it is to be a created human being. " Gunton, The Triune Creator: a historical and systematic study 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), p. 204. But is existence a sufficient category to describe 
what is actually imaged in fallen humanity? Gunton's second major point is that the 'image' is to be defined 
relationally, following from the triune nature of God, "three persons in relation": "This is where Barth and 
Bonhoeffer are right: we are concerned with an analogy of relation rather than one of being...... To be a 
creature is to be in a particular kind of relation to the creator. That is what createdness means. " ibid., pp. 206- 
7. Being in the `image' means being in relation ("likeness-in-relation"), first vertically with God as His 
creatures, and secondly, horizontally with one's fellow creatures and the rest of creation. However, the 
concept of the 'image of God' implies something which is imaged. The triune 
God might embody 
relationality, but to say from that basis alone that human creatures insofar as they are relational, 
image God, 
is relatively uninformative. What makes God God, is not that He embodies relationality, 
but that He 
embodies a specific form of relationality. If it is the Father-Son relationship which 
is to be the criteria of 
imaging, then this rules out the indelibility of the image in relation to fallen humanity. It also does away with 
the idea that humanity equipped at creation not so much with a capacity to reach God, but some ability to, in 
response to the Divine initiative, enter into a "dialogical relation" with 
God. As Rahner has maintained, the 
giving of the Word requires some ability of the hearers to at 
least begin to hear it. It is in this precondition of 
the very possibility of Revelation that the structural aspect of the 
image ought to be sought. 
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In the Prolegomena voluntary choice was defined as "one which is in accordance with the 
agent's true nature and his or her desires. " Complementary to the concept of the "image of 
God, " I wish now to introduce a conception of a latent true nature (LTN). A person's LTN, 
like the "image, " is bestowed by God at the point of creation. Classically Aristotle in the 
Physics defines a nature (phusis) as the character of an item, which shapes and guides the 
behaviour of that item, giving it form. 668 Our created nature has the formal properties of 
the structural definition of the "image" given above, and it also possesses certain intuitions 
of a moral and rational kind. 669 The status of these created intuitions are good, but our 
nature also has the capacity to negate these intuitions - the tragedy of sinning with God- 
imaging gifts. In this sense, our nature is fundamentally incomplete or latent; it is both 
partially actual and potential, and it is potential because it is only fulfilled in relationship 
with the Divine. 670 It is distinct from that of the "image" because the concept is person- 
specific, it is also the nature of a particular human being. One may talk about the true 
nature of humanity, which is revealed in the God-man, and the particular nature which 
God calls a specific person to fulfil. The concept of one's LTN does not only focus on 
668 Aristotle, Physics, Bk II. 1. Aristotle deals with human nature in the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics. 
In those works Julia Annas detects two concepts of nature at work. First, what she calls "mere nature, " which 
she defines as: "the basic material of human beings, which, so far from having its own reliable built-in goals, 
can be developed in quite opposite directions by habit and reason. Human beings start out with some 
tendencies and not others; but they develop morally not through nature, but through habit and reason and the 
ways that these get to work on the raw material provided by nature. " Julia Annas, "Aristotle on Human 
Nature and Political Virtue, " The Review of Metaphysics, Vol XLIX, No. 4 (1996), p. 734. Secondly, nature is 
defined, as in book 1 of the Politics as a goal or end: "what we say the nature of each thing is, is what it is 
when its coming-into-being is completed. " Aristotle, Politics, 1252b32-33, quoted in Annas. 
669 Errol Harris provides an exposition of a Thomist account of a universal human nature in his, "Natural 
Law and Naturalism, " International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 23 (1983), pp. 115-124. He writes: "For 
rational beings have a notion or knowledge of Eternal Law, that is, they have a conception of the general 
scheme and order of things, and a natural inclination to act in accordance with it. In other words, they have a 
natural tendency to virtue, however much, Thomas says, it may be depraved by vicious dispositions (habitus) 
and corrupted by passions. " E. Harris, p. 122, cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II q. 93, art. 6. 
670 In this regard, the concept of LTN is in spirit with Aquinas' thesis: "Gratia non destruit, sed supponit et 
perficit naturam. " Summa Theologiae, Ia. l. 8, ad. 2; cf. Pelikan, Vol. 3, pp. 284-293. H. B. Veatch in 
explaining the Aristotelian concept of natural ends, uses the metaphor of the acorn: "All this is not to say that 
merely because the acorn is thus naturally oriented or ordered to its own proper and characteristic perfection, 
it must necessarily and inevitably attain that perfection. On the contrary, the acorn may fall on rocky ground 
and so not mature and develop properly..... At the same time, so far as the acorn itself is concerned, there is 
an entirely proper sense in which such happenings may be said to be bad for it, in that they prevent or impede 
it from attaining its natural perfection or end..... Indeed, following Aristotle's terminology, the good of the 
acorn is simply the attainment of its natural end or perfection.... H. B. 
Veatch, Rational Man: A Modern 
Interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), pp. 51-52. In the 
Christian account it is the faith-relationship with the Divine which dictates whether the natural end is to be 
realised or not. 
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human capacities as such, but also on the substantive ends of reason, morality, aesthetics, 
which are God-directed. LTN is distorted and stunted out of relationship with the Divine. 
Its fruition is contingent not necessary. However, the fact that a human person's LTN may 
point to certain ends, does not mean that the end is already fully present. The content of 
the end of human nature is, as Christian revelation shows, something which requires 
disclosure. 
Does this mean that there is `ontological continuity' between God and human beings? This 
is certainly Colin Gunton's fear of certain structural conceptions of the "image of God": 
Here we must note that whatever the human likeness to God is, it does not 
appear to license the positing of any continuity between the human and the 
divine. The text's maintaining of a clear distinction between the creator and 
his creation, a distinction continued and reinforced by orthodox 
christology's ascription of divinity to Jesus Christ uniquely of the human 
race, rules out any intrinsic endowment or capacity which makes man in 
some sense inherently divine, whether by virtue of reason or any other 
similar character. 671 
However, the concept of a latent `true nature' which I posit does not hold such 
`ontological continuity. ' 672 First, one can act against one's latent `true nature, ' the 
possibility of sin, and hence can obscure it. Secondly, one's latent `true nature' is precisely 
that latent, and in order for it to become fulfilled it requires to be in relationship to God. 
Thus, it is not complete or static, and is not "already inherent in, or achieved by, the 
beginning. , 673 Neither does it allow us to make the initiative towards God; we are not 
gods, and our susceptibility towards "moral gravity" displays this. As a result of God's 
covenant intention at creation, our creation is graced and consequently our destiny inherent 
in our graced nature. To be "inherent" in this sense, is neither to posit `ontological 
continuity, ' nor a conception of redemption as anamnesis. Rather it is to conceive of 
creation and redemption as a "project", to use Gunton's phrase, or a covenantal 
pilgrimage, in which the destiny may well be inherently sign-posted from the beginning, 
but only truly recognised and fulfilled in the Christ-event and human participation in the 
Spirit-led process of regeneration and sanctification. 
671 Gunton, Triune Creator, pp. 204-5. 
672 Neither need this be true of the Scholastic concept of the homo capax Dei, which is an openness or desire 
to ascend to the fulfilment of our nature in union with our creator. 
673 ibid., p. 201. 
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In overview, although Stump's account conceives of incidences of hardening of heart, the 
possibility of conflicts at the level of higher-order desires are not considered. The account 
of sin given above has attempted to provide a more realistic picture of the nature of human 
entanglement in evil. The vitiation of human existence by sin means that such conflict 
should be expected and the question of how the heart is transformed reconsidered. The 
survival of some sort of capacity or opportunity to thirst after the good provides the basis 
for a human response to the challenge of the Divine initiative. Such a capacity is linked 
with the created nature of human persons, who are granted a LTN that is fulfilled only in 
relationship with the Divine. 
IV. ) The Personalist Model: A Modified Version of Stump's Account. 
If we are to modify and strengthen Stump's account we need to address the issue of how, 
given the entanglement of the heart in sin, the Divine initiative is able to provoke a 
response from an "intrinsic principle" within the person. For instance, how is the sinful 
second-order desire, represented by Augustine's "but not yet, " to give way to his desire to 
repent and accept Christ? Is the intervention of Divine grace at the level of higher-order 
desires required? We are back to the question of how do people's hearts change, and what 
they care about most deeply. 
It seems to be an empirical fact that aspects of people's personalities often do change, both 
for better and for worse. They change for a variety of reasons, among which one might 
plausibly suggest: the encounter of new people, the experience of particular events, and the 
undertaking of certain reflections and deliberations. The preparation for Augustine's 
conversion is quite lengthy and includes many of the above elements. For example, he had 
heard of the conversion of Victorinus, and from Porticianus about the life of St. Anthony, 
and he had undergone considerable intellectual inquiry into Christianity and personal 
reflection. Still his soul remained divided. The trigger occurred when 
he heard, in the 
garden in Milan, the voice of a boy repeating "tolle lege"(pick 
it up), and he suddenly 
acknowledged "the impossibility of healing the division 
in his soul by himself [that] he 
was at last open to a restoration and cure that would 
be effected by divine agency - by 
grace. , 674 What we have here is a pattern which 
fits well into our proposals. It was not the 
674 Colin Starnes, Augustine's Conversion: A Guide to the Argument of 
Confessions 1-IX, (Waterloo: Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 1990), p. 235. Of course, Augustine's own understanding of 
the event was couched 
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case that Augustine himself resolved the tension amidst his second-order desires. He 
recognised that his own efforts were doomed. Rather it was simply the case that given his 
incapacity, he renounced his own efforts and accepted the reality of Christ, and the 
efficacy of the work of the Spirit. This was the beginning of a turning towards Christ, not 
an act, but an intention or desire which opened the door to the activity of the Spirit. 
This does not answer the question of how the second-order desire to accept the reality of 
Christ is brought about. One might refer to the key events in the sequence of the narrative, 
just as a secular example of a change in someone's personality may refer to particular 
events, encounters and reflections in that person's life which prompted the change. 
However, a Christian account of metamorphosis must place God as the initiator of change, 
of the Divine-human relationship. The events and experiences which led up to Augustine's 
conversion may be said to mediate the personal presence of the Spirit. The Spirit, the 
parakletos is the "one who is called alongside. , 675 As argued in Chapter 3, personal 
presence is affective, in challenging the person. 
A person will not necessarily recognise the Spirit's presence, although they may recognise 
the Spirit's presence in their life retrospectively. 676 Rather the person may experience the 
effect of the Spirit's presence implicitly. It is mistaken to rigidly compartmentalise the 
Spirit-human relationship, as if the Spirit initiates and challenges explicitly at one point, 
and then leaves the person to make her response. It is also misguided to conceive of the 
encounter with the Spirit only when one hears the Word of God, at a particular spatio- 
temporal slice. The challenge of the Spirit is as persistent as God is ubiquitous. The 
activity of God is not something which enters existence at one point; it is that which 
sustains existence always. One may be ignorant of the Divine, reject Christ, but from 
cradle to grave one is never outside of some kind of relation to the Divine. Sanctification 
may be considered to be the processes of perceiving with greater clarity the value of the 
in his own philosophical terms. Starnes reconstruction is very Platonic: "Presented as a divine command, 
where he had either to obey or disobey, he could now choose definitively between his habits and his rational 
will since this order - which spoke only to his rational will - did not come from within and from what was 
merely a part of himself. It was a command he obeyed voluntarily.... The whole threat and tyranny of his 
habitual desires had come from their independence from reason - but in the position to which he had been 
called, and which he had freely and consciously chosen, nature had no such independence since here, through 
divine grace, it was perfectly united with reason in Christ. " ibid., pp. 235-6. 
675 Carson, p. 499- 
676 This will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 9 in relation to the question of discernment. 
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Divine presence, the object of one's will, and hence, a strengthening of one's willpower to 
conform to the image of God in Christ. 677 
The Spirit's affective presence will activate or re-activate a person's latent true nature 
(LTN), as long as that person's heart has not become so hardened by acting in such a way 
which negates one's LTN. The re-activation of the LTN does not make potentiality actual, 
the LTN is still latent waiting for fulfilment in relationship with God. This explains why 
Augustine's desire to call on God and repent wins out over his sinful desires, and why the 
Spirit may then be conceived to work in the manner in which Stump explicates as bringing 
about the harmony of higher and lower order desires. Stump's position was seen not to 
give a sufficient account of why the second-order desire to respond to God ever wins out, 
when the self is divided by sin, not only between higher and lower desires, but at the level 
of higher-order desire as well. In relation to this problem, we may conceive of the personal 
presence of the Spirit affecting the person in such a way that the desire to respond wins 
out. Alternatively, on a modified version of Stump's account, as long as a desire to call on 
God and repent is somewhere amidst Augustine's higher-order desires, the Spirit may 
legitimately work to make such a desire an effective volition and hence bring about a 
harmony of both between and within higher and lower order desires. Both options are 
plausible, but the first one bears more weight within the Personalist model presented and 
explains how one higher order desire may trump another within a person's mind, without 
positing extrinsic Divine intervention to alter mental states. 
While the acceptance of the Spirit's activity in enabling a person to undergo Christian 
metamorphosis requires the shedding of the belief in the absolute self-determination of the 
self, in other ways it constitutes an empowering and reinforcing of the proper exercise of 
the will. Paul emphasises that freedom in the Spirit is freedom from fear, from fate and 
from the enslaving effects of sin. This may be linked with the psychological insight that 
strength of will, the ability to execute one's highest order desires and not to be bound by 
extrinsic factors, is partly dependent upon one's own perception of one's willpower and the 
677 Mark S. Pestana makes the important point derived from both Plato and Aquinas that, 
"the more clearly 
one is aware of the worth of an object, the stronger will 
be the desire elicited by that apprehension..... the 
ability to do otherwise (than as prompted 
by contrary desires) is enhanced by clarified consciousness of the 
particular good at which one aims. " Mark 
S. Pestana, "Second Order Desires and Strength of Will, " Modern 
Schoolman, Vol. 73 (1996), pp. 179-180. 
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value one attaches to it. Those who feel themselves to be powerless, or who do not place a 
high value on being in control of their actions, tend to exhibit less strength of will when it 
comes to resisting sinful temptations. As M. S. Pestana writes: "The less sure one was of 
the worth of being in charge of one's self, the weaker would be the desire to be the one 
who gratifies one's own desires and the more satisfied one would be to have those desires 
gratified by factors outside of one's control. "678 The benign Christian paradox is that, 
through acceptance of one's dependence on God, one may begin to have the freedom to be 
confident that one is truly in charge of one's will. 
In the literature, an analogy with the Divine-human relationship is given that supports this 
Personalist model. It is of a person who wishes to help a girl who has suffered child-abuse. 
Analogous to the bondage of evil and its involuntary nature, the girl cannot just 
instantaneously decide to trust one, as if that were in her control. She cannot so readily 
escape the bondage of past experience. It simply is not an option. Trust can only be won 
not by coercion, nor manipulation, but by drawing alongside the girl, gradually over a 
period of time. This gives her the opportunity to probe one's trustworthiness, and reassures 
her that one is reliable. In this case, personal presence and an attitude of love and 
compassion enables a person to do something which unaided was impossible for her on 
her own, and which opens up new possibilities, not least of which is an ability to face the 
future unbound by the past. This is analogous to the importance given in this thesis to the 
conception of a persuading, Divine personal presence, as the key to Christian 
metamorphosis. Of course, in the above scenario, some people will continue in their 
distrust, just as some reject God's offer, even though the very position of being able to 
accept or reject the offer is one which is enabled by the Divine initiative. The Pastoral 
theology of interpersonal relations may provide us with insights to re-apply to Systematics. 
One last challenge to the proposed position should be examined. As has been noted, 
Luther conceives of the human person as being wholly passive in relation to salvation. It 
has been argued that on a Personalist account the Spirit's personal presence contingently 
affects the person, re-activating the LTN and hence triggering a response in the person. As 
678 ibid., p. 181. Pestana draws upon the work of the Jesuit introspectionist psychologists E. Boyd Barrett and 
Johann Lindworsky. 
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a rejoinder, it might be argued along Luther's lines, 679 that our affections are passively 
constituted: one does not choose what attracts one. 680 Things attract or affect us in 
particular ways, ways which liberate or possess us. Our attractions are ontologically 
ordered by what is external to us, in Luther's terms, either by God or by Satan. The human 
personality is not a closed system, the argument may go, and hence in re-ordering and 
conditioning the affections the Spirit does not intervene or invade a person's identity. One 
is never, as Luther remarks, unconditioned or undetermined. 
In response one might point to recent work in the philosophy of mind that challenges the 
view that emotions are wholly passive. Emotions are usually intentional, they tend to be 
about something. 681 They also contain propositional attitudes: "I am angry at x" is the case 
because I have certain beliefs or attitudes about x. As we have seen in relation to Helm's 
discussion of the heart, emotions have a "projectible pattern. " A person is not simply 
affected as in the Empiricist's model of perception by something impressing upon a blank 
sheet of paper or soft candle wax (resulting in an "idea" or "impression"). Beliefs and 
attitudes towards the state of affairs which constitute the object of an emotion are part of 
its causal condition, and the latter can be, to some extent, actively controlled by a 
person. 682 In this sense, it is not clear that emotions are simply involuntary or passively 
formed. 
It is possible to reflect about a particular object, S, of an emotion, to reason about whether 
S really is the case and whether one's evaluation of S is appropriate, that is whether one's 
propositional attitudes about it are valid. In doing so one is able to alter the frequency and 
intensity that an emotion in reaction to S obtains, and even whether it occurs at all. One 
can actively shape one's disposition, which effects the way one reacts to states of affairs 
and hence what affects and attracts us. In this sense, one's dispositions towards having 
certain emotions may be considered for their appropriateness or "responsiveness to 
679 Eilert Herms, Luthers Auslegung des Dritten Artikels (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1987); Offenbarung und 
Glaube (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1992). 
680 Robert W. Jenson commenting on Luther points out the importance of the verb rapere (to be rapt) in 
Luther's account of freedom: "when God 'enraptures us' he 
faces us by sharing with us his own freedom, his 
liberum arbitrium. Human freedom, in the only sense Luther wants to talk about, 
is nothing less than 
participation in God's own triune rapture of 
freedom. " R. W. Jenson, "An Ontology of Freedom in the De 
ServoArbitrio of Luther, " Modern Theology, Vol. 10, (1993), p. 252. 
681 W. Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge, CUP, 1980). 
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reason. "683 One is active insofar as one may exercise self-control and self-understanding in 
relation to one's beliefs and emotions. One is purely passive when one lacks control, when 
one has no control or understanding concerning what affects one, where one's mental 
states are not responsive to reason. One may be a "wanton, " to use Frankfurt's terminology, 
where all reason responsiveness is redundant, or one may have failed in self-control, 
knowing what is proportionate to reason, but being unable to alter one's mental 
dispositions and will. 
This is not to say that at the point where the state of affairs, S, impinges upon one, one has 
the choice to have an emotion. Many emotions are, in this sense, non-voluntary. In the 
history of ideas emotions have been designated as passions, produced by reacting to a state 
of affairs external to the subject, over which we have limited control. 684 Choice is more 
appropriate to action than to emotion. 685 In certain respects these conclusions about the 
relation of passivity and activity in relation to emotion may be generalised to other aspects 
of human psychology. For instance, perception can no longer simply be considered as the 
visual impression of external objects on the mind, but as involving a "tacit activity of 
integration and interpretation of clues" received from the objects of perception. 686 
Likewise we may say of beliefs that they are formed, rather than chosen or adopted, often 
682 Robert M. Gordon, "The Passivity of the Emotions, " The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCV (1986), pp. 
371-392. 
683 The phrase is culled from Joseph Raz, "The Active and the Passive, " Aristotelian Society (1997), 
Supp. 71, pp. 229-246. His argument is that the holding of beliefs are active only when they are "responsive to 
[what we think is] reason, " which does not mean that beliefs are chosen after deliberation: "This 
responsiveness is manifested in two ways. First, in that unconscious processes of belief formation, just like 
explicit deliberation, depend on absence of awareness of reasons against the belief, and - normally - on 
reasons for it..... Second, when I deliberate and come to the view that the evidence is that a proposition that I 
believe is false the very process of coming to that conclusion is also a process of ceasing to believe it. " Raz, 
p. 218. 
684 Gordon offers the thought experiment of imagining a race of people who possessed "internalised controls" 
which can totally control one's emotional reactions to states of affairs once they have been activated. He 
comments, "embarrassment would remain, for them as for us, a way of being acted on, a passion. These 
people, when they are embarrassed, are embarrassed about something. " Gordon, p. 384. They can control 
their emotions, not the object which activates them. This is true even if the object is illusory, for the person 
believes the state of affairs, S, to obtain. 
685 Gordon argues persuasively that emotions do not involve the will in the way that actions do. Actions 
involve instrumental or means-end belief and deliberation about how to satisfy a desire and hence for 
intentionally X-ing. We may directly choose which desire to act upon and how to do so. The beliefs or 
attitudes that emotions involve relate to the object or content of the emotion that activates the emotion. 
ibid, 
p. 386ff.. Joseph Raz concurs, preferring to talk of the passivity and activity of emotions and 
beliefs rather 
than their voluntariness. Raz, p. 220. 
686 R. T. Allen, "Passivity and the Rationality of Emotion, " The Modern Schoolmen, Vol. 68, (1991), pp. 323. 
Note that the "tacit activity" referred to does not equate to secret choice; most of our perceptual beliefs are 
acquired without conscious deliberation or an exercise of the will. 
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by subconscious processes, and are constrained by reason. At the same time they are 
actively held in that the subject's beliefs are reason-responsive and hence a person may 
exercise some degree of control over them. 687 
What this brief discussion questions is "the separation of a passive from an active and self- 
directing level of the self, " and suggests that "there is no mere passivity or pure activity in 
human life, but that each necessarily involves the other. X688 In sum, a human subject is not 
simply passively determined. We do have a degree of control over what attracts and affects 
us, and hence, to conceive of the Spirit's action in conversion as an attraction or affection 
which overrides that control, as in the above objection, is to return to the problems raised 
by the Divine Fiat view. If the Spirit could affect or attract us in a way which overrides our 
internal dispositions, then the question is begged as to why everyone is not so affected. 
Luther was prepared to adopt an apophatic position on this issue, 689 but in the light of the 
argument above, one may question whether one needs to resort to such a strategy. 
V. ) Conclusion. 
The Christian metamorphosis of conversion and regeneration conceived on a Personalist 
model, requires the Divine initiative, the personal, affecting presence of God, which 
encounters the human with a challenge to respond to the Gospel of salvation. The human 
response is not in the form of an assertion of merit, but an acceptance of the Divine 
presence, a renunciation of the self s claims to be absolutely self-determining. Merit is that 
which in a good action qualifies the doer for reward, but nothing which we do warrants the 
salvation that God bestows upon us. As Well has shown, acceptance of Christ is not an act 
of self-assertion, but something which is passive, a surrendering of claims to be able to 
accomplish all by ourselves. The "inner work" of attention to the Divine follows on, rather 
than precedes, from the Divine initiative. To translate this point into the categories of 
Stump's thesis, to have the appropriate higher order desire, to want to want a relationship 
with the Divine, is not in fact to will anything. If anything comes of that second-order 
687 J. Raz also posits a similar structure to the relation of activity/passivity involved in beliefs, emotions and 
desires, hence his claim that, "activity is related to the proper functioning of the processes which govern our 
mental lives, our beliefs, moods, emotions, desires. " Raz, p. 
226. 
688 Allen, p. 322. Allen while acknowledging that "we do no create ourselves or our world, 
" talks of "an 
engaged receptivity, in Piaget's terms, an 'assimilation' of the world, which also requires, when we meet novel 
objects, an adaptation by us of the schemata and frameworks which we employ 
in assimilating it so that they 
can accommodate what otherwise they could not. 
" ibid., p. 324). 
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desire, if it is to be turned into an effective second-order volition, then Divine activity is 
required in bringing about harmony with competing second-order desires and lower order 
desires. Nonetheless, some inner disposition towards the Divine, which stems from an 
"intrinsic principle, " is crucial in safeguarding human identity and responsibility. 
Personal relationship with the Divine depends upon the re-activation of one's LTN, by the 
affecting Divine presence. As the Divine presence is a persisting presence, though not one 
ever to be taken for granted on our own terms, human life is lived from cradle to grave 
with the challenge to fulfil one's LTN through relationship with the Divine. Conversion is 
related to the disposition of one's LTN, whether it has been, through implicit or explicit 
rejection of the Divine presence, obscured and left stagnant, or allowed to remain lucid, 
open and attentive. It has been argued that sin vitiates the existence of the human person 
and has a propensity to bind the will, blind perception of the truth, and obscure one's LTN. 
Yet, alongside the permeation of sin, is the persisting presence of the Divine, which means 
that the power of sin is never absolutely controlling, unless the human person has 
consistently and over a lifetime accepted such a master. 
Despite the human creatures' involvement in sin, as long as there is some higher order 
desire to accept the offer of Divine grace, there is an "intrinsic principle" which permits 
God to intervene to turn around human sinful desires, in such a way that enables or 
enhances human freedom, by liberating the good second-order desire. In relationship with 
the Divine, that is with the aid of Divine grace, the human creature moves towards the 
fulfilment of his LTN as called forth by God. In this process, sanctification is not 
accomplished overnight, precisely because, as Weil comments, 
it requires inner work, 
wanting to want the total metamorphosis of one's 
heart, which love of God requires and 
which the Spirit enables and perfects. In this process of sanctification the control of one's 
behaviour by attaching oneself to the new habits of the Christian 
life, centred in the liturgy 
and practice of the Church, will, through relationship with 
the Divine, alter the disposition 
of one's heart, bringing about coherence of emotions and 
desires. 
689 Luther, IV, Sc. (x) - (xii). 
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CHAPTER 6. 
A NON-PERSONAL MODEL: THE NEED FOR COMPLEMENTARITY? 
One of the negative analogies that a Personalist model of the activity of the Spirit has to 
confront is the non-personal language used in the Bible, such as the images of fire, water, 
wind and breath (ruach). 690 The Spirit is first presented in Scripture not as the clearly 
distinct third hypostasis of the Trinity, but in Hebrew Scripture as "God in act, "691 not 
even manifestly identical with God. John McIntyre points out: 
The Spirit is seen as acting, as noted, 692 with all the power and authority of 
God, yet God does not lose himself in the Spirit, nor is he identified, 
without remainder, with the Spirit. Nor is it quite enough to say that the 
Spirit is the presence of God in this occasion or that, almost as if the 
phrase, 'the Spirit of God' were no more than a periphrasis for 'God'. Such a 
suggestion does not do justice, either to the notion, recurrent in so many 
examples we have examined, of God sending the Spirit, or endowing 
someone with the Spirit, as with some quite unique gift. If terms are not 
pressed too literally, the Spirit, as we see matters at this stage, is God's alter 
ego going out of himself into the world to effect his will, or dwell with a 
person.... 693 
The Spirit of God is synonymous with God's power and this link is continued in the scarce 
references to the Spirit in the Synoptic Gospels and the more frequent citations in Acts. In 
this light, David Brown has rightly pointed out that when it came to reflecting on the 
Spirit's trinitarian identity, it was not so much the Spirit's divinity which could be 
questioned, but "whether he[the Spirit] may legitimately be regarded as a separate person, 
indeed, more fundamentally, whether he may be conceived as personal at all. , 694 
The term 'non-personal' refers to the opposite of what has been defined as 'personal, ' 
namely, events or happenings not stemming from a centre of agency, non-intentional, and 
incapable of exchange with human persons. For instance, the events of Pentecost have, 
690 For a description of non-personal metaphors used of the Spirit see Moltmann, pp. 274-285. 
691 Ernst Kasemann, "Geist und Geistgaben im Neue Testament", in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 
vol. 2, ed. by H. F. von Campenhausen et al., 3rd edition 
(Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1958), cols. 1272-78. 
692 E. g. Judg. 6.36,11,29ff; I Sam 11.6; Ezek. 3.12,14; I Kgs. 18.7. 
693 McIntyre, p. 34. 
694 Brown, The Divine Trinity, p. 159. McDonnell concurs with this view: "Possibly the impersonal category 
of 'power' used to designate the Spirit might 
have contributed to this difficulty [i. e. the obscurity which 
enveloped much of early pneumatology]. Athanasius 
held an almost completely non-personal view of the 
Spirit. Possibly taking his cue from Mark 8.38, Justin Martyr speaks of the Father, Son, and angels, and then 
refers to the Spirit almost as an afterthought. 
" McDonnell, "The Determinative Doctrine of the Holy Spirit", 
p. 144. 
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prima facie, a non-personal quality: 'a sound from heaven as of a rushing wind' and 
'tongues of fire'(Acts 2.2-4). This is combined with the feeling of 'being filled with the 
Spirit, ' which as in Hebrew Scripture empowers and endows. 695 Non-personal events or 
happenings may have personal effects, but that does not mean that their mode is a personal 
one. Neither is it a sufficient reply to maintain that these events are acts of a personal God, 
as the mode of operation is, prima facie, non-personal. If the mode of operation is non-- 
personal, Vincent Brummer argues that, "The relationship therefore becomes impersonal 
in the sense that only one of the partners in the relationship is a personal agent. The other 
has become an object. , 696 
One response to the presence of non-personal language in Scripture is to develop non- 
personal models of the Spirit's activity. Two such accounts by German theologians, 
Wolfhart Pannenberg and Michael Welker, shall be examined. Both develop 
pneumatologies which are based on an 'analogy' with the concept of a 'field' in theoretical 
physics. As Peter Hodgson notes, one motivation for developing non-personal models is 
contemporary science, such as the New Physics, where "relations of energy rather than bits 
of matter" are the dominant paradigm. 697 If non-personal models are not to be adopted, 
then some account needs to be given of why non-personal language is employed in the 
Bible and how it is compatible with a Personalist model (section IV). This raises the 
question as to whether non-personal models or metaphors are complementary to a 
Personalist model. 
695 David Brown compares the disciples' experience of the Resurrection with the experience of Pentecost: "In 
one case we have visions of an exalted Lord whom the 
disciples had already known as the subject of personal 
experiences.... that being so, both his separateness 
from the Father and his personhood were natural 
inferences to draw. In the other case we have, by contrast, an experience with no obvious personal marks 
about it; if anything at all was seen or heard, 
it was entirely impersonal.... What could be more natural than 
that the object of the experience should be thought of as something 
that has taken control of them and as 
quite distinct from the very personal characteristics 
displayed by the object of their Resurrection 
experiences? ..... the thing or power 
which they now encountered they had hitherto not experienced in any 
other form and its thing-like quality meant that 
there was no hint of possible conflict with the dictates of 
monotheism; moreover, an ascription of 
divinity must have seemed especially appropriate in view of the 
supernatural powers with which they now 
felt themselves endowed..... as well as perhaps the divine sense of 
well-being. " Brown, The Divine Trinity, p. 
184. 
696 Brummer, The Model of Love, p. 158. 
186 
I. ) Pannenberg on Spirit and Field. 
The theological methodology of Wolfhart Pannenberg is one which is refreshingly open to 
dialogue with science. In Anthropology in Theological Perspective, Pannenberg states his 
method in the following way: "[T]he secular description is accepted as simply a provisional 
version of the objective reality, a version that needs to be expanded and deepened by 
showing that anthropological datum itself contains a further and theologically relevant 
dimension. "698 Philip Hefner considers that Pannenberg's approach recaptures the breadth 
of Aquinas' theology in attempting to relate God to all things. His theological engagement 
with science, "claims to add to our knowledge of empirical reality", and secondly, holds 
that "science is important as a realm within which theological issues arise and science can 
either lend credence to theological statements or falsify them. "699 My aim here is limited to 
indicating the background of Pannenberg's interest in science and why the use of scientific 
concepts in his theology appeal to him. 
It is instructive to place Pannenberg's employment of the concept of "field" in its context 
of his relevant early work. He treats the Spirit in several early articles, 700 which draw 
primarily on the pneumatologies of Paul Tillich and especially Teilhard de Chardin. De 
Chardin's conception of the activity of the Spirit is couched in non-personal terms. He 
associates spirit and energy, which Pannenberg redirects towards field theory. 701 Both de 
Chardin and Tillich tend to blur the distinction between the human and Divine 'spirit. i702 
Rather like de Chardin's work, Pannenberg's doctrine of the Spirit is at this stage 
insufficiently integrated into Christian dogmatics, viz. reference to the Spirit of the 
697 Peter Hodgson, The Winds of the Spirit. A Constructive Christian Theology (London, SCM Press, 1994), 
p. 86. 
698 W Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective. trans. by M. J. O'Connell (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1985), pp. 19-20. 
699 Philip Hefner, "Theology's Truth and Scientific Formulation". Zygon, Vol. 23 (1988), p. 135. 
700 W. Pannenberg, "Workings of the Spirit in the Creation and in the People of God, " in Spirit, Faith and 
Church. eds. W. Pannenberg, A. Dulles, and C. Braaten (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1970), pp 13- 31; "The 
Doctrine of the Spirit and the Task of a Theology of Nature, " Theology, Vol. 75 (1972), pp. 8- 21; E. Frank 
Tupper, The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), p. 237ff.. 
701 Pannenberg relates the association to the concept of self-transcendence.: "Now, if it was correct to revise 
Teilhard's account of radial energy in terms of a fields of energy that shapes a process of evolution, then it 
makes sense also to maintain that this field of energy manifests itself in the self-transcendence of the living 
being, and thereby it even creates the lives of individuals" "The Doctrine of the Spirit", p. 18. 
702 Paul W. Newman, "Humanity with Spirit, " The Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 34 (1980), pp. 415 - 
426. Notice the lack of distinction between the divine and human spirit in Pannenberg's discussion of 
ecstasis: "This ecstatic element of the life of the mind I call 'spirit'. It is at work in the ecstatic activity of all 
life, but only the human mind participates subjectively in the spirit since the mind is able to take his stand 
beyond himself to have his center outside himself. " Pannenberg, "The Workings of the Spirit", p. 119. 
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trinitarian God, the Spirit who mediates Christ. 703 The emphasis is too much on creation 
and eschatology, 704 the Spirit as the spirit of life, and not enough on redemption, the Spirit 
as Jesus' Spirit. 705 A little earlier Pannenberg in his collection of essays Gottesgedanke und 
menscliche Freiheit argues against modem atheism's turn to the subject, by posing the 
question of the "ultimate basis of subjectivity". The 'ultimate basis' is the faceless God of 
theism, 706 suggesting a separation of his conception of anthropology and freedom from 
Christian theology. 707 Thus, in both these early works, Pannenberg's theological 
conceptions take on a non-personal character, and they do so largely through not bringing 
into the fore Christian revelation of the triune God. 
In his Systematic Theology Pannenberg goes some way to rectifying the above deficiencies 
by placing his ideas in a dogmatic context. 708 The specific question of religious 
epistemology is addressed, and the doctrine of revelation is brought to the foreground. 
With the entrance of the doctrine of revelation, the Trinity becomes the framework of the 
dogmatic project and is the setting for his use of the concept of "field". The triune 
economy is seen to be completed in pneumatology. The Spirit is viewed as the principle of 
703 The other major influence on Pannenberg's thought here is Hegel. Robert Jenson writes of Hegel's 
conception of Spirit: "The Spirit is the act in which God as Consciousness overcomes history's apparently 
static standoffs, by creative discovery of the meaning of the contradictions. The Spirit is the freedom of 
whatever merely is, and just so is in some contradiction, for the new synthesis that will come of that 
conflict. " "Holy Spirit", p. 168 [italics are mine]. Pannenberg is equally opposed to the association of spirit 
with mind, and adopts too Hegel's analysis of the Spirit as bringing about the consummation and perfection 
of history. Also in common are the high value placed upon and associations between the concepts of spirit, 
freedom and transcendence. However, Jenson goes on to criticise Hegel, and the broad structure of his 
criticism is, I suggest, what is at the heart of the criticism of the early Pannenberg: "To reclaim Hegel's truth 
for the gospel, we need only a small but drastic amendment: Absolute Consciousness finds its own meaning 
and self in the one historical object, Jesus, and so posits Jesus' fellows as its fellows and Jesus' world as its 
world. What we thereby provide a theory for is the assertion of the risen Jesus' universal lordship. " ibid, 
pp. 168-9. 
704 Seeking to justify this Pannenberg writes: "Only an understanding of the Spirit on the basis of his function 
in creation and this regard to his contribution to an explanation of nature can overcome the subjectivistic bias 
of traditional Christian piety and thought in dealing with the spirit. " "The Doctrine of the Spirit", p. 13. 
705 Notice the way in which redemption is explained in very vague, almost Existentialist terms, in this 
passage where Pannenberg appears to link creation and redemption. A distinction between the Spirit's 
operation in creation in general and in the indwelling of the Christian believer is not clearly made, principally 
because Christology seems to be absent from soteriology at this point. "And only because it is the same spirit 
that created all life by inspiring its abundant self-transcendence, it provides no escapist opiate, but the power 
of sustaining to and finally overcoming the absurdities and adversities of the present world. " The Doctrine of 
the Spirit", p. 21. 
706 W. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology (Gottesgedanke und menschliche Freiheit), Vol. 111 
(London, SCM Press, 1973), p. 95. 
707 David Polk describes Pannenberg's approach as a "post-theistic vision. " D. Polk, On the Way to God: An 
Exploration into the Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg (Lanham, University of America Press, 1989), p. 272. 
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the creative presence of the transcendent God within his creation, and as the medium of 
the participation of created life in the trinitarian Divine life. In volume III the full 
eschatological role of the Spirit is unveiled: bringing the economy of salvation to 
perfection; enabling believers to participate in the eternal life of God in filial relationships; 
binding believers in the communion of the body of Christ where the Spirit is received; 
orientating them towards the Kingdom of God. The question we must pursue is whether, 
despite his attempt in his Systematics to redress many of the deficiencies of the early work, 
Pannenberg's pneumatology, which utilises the concept of 'field, ' really does escape the 
inheritance of his early corpus and is given a sufficiently personal basis. 
Pannenberg, relying on the work of Max Jammer, dates the concept of 'field' to the Stoic 
concept of pneuma, which was influential in framing the modern scientific concept. This 
origination in non-scientific thinking lends justification, according to Pannenberg, for its 
adoption in theology. 709 He views the development of the concept by modern science as 
actually opening up its potential application to theology: "The field theories of modern 
physics which have developed in the train of the Stoic view of pneuma no longer view 
field phenomena as bodily entities but see them as independent of matter and defined only 
by their relations to space and space-time. 1,710 The arguments which Pannenberg proffers 
for using the term in the theological arena may be divided into three areas. 
I. 01)The First Argument: 'God is Spirit'. 
The first argument comes in volume 1 of Pannenberg's systematics, within a discussion of 
the will and knowledge of God as an agent. Here he considers God as a spiritual being and 
the merits of the concepts of pneuma and nous as applied to the Divine. 711 The patristic era 
rejected the Stoic doctrine of a physical pneuma in favour of the conception of God as 
708 For an excellent overview of the Systematics see Christoph Schwöbel, "Rational Theology in Trinitarian 
Perspective: Wolfhart Pannenberg's Systematic Theology, " Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. 47 (1996), 
pp. 498 - 527. 
709 W. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p 382. 
710 ibid.. 
"' The concept of nous is not the same as my concept of the 'personal', and therefore, I 
do not consider 
Pannenberg's critique of the application of nous to God to effect the utility of my concept. He seems to 
associate nous with 'consciousness', 'self-consciousness', a 
'rational being', an 'intellect' and 'will'. It should be 
noted that none of these concepts need be linked with my 
definition of what it is to be "personal" predicated 
of 'a centre of intentional agency'. 
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spiritual mind (nous), which Pannenberg finds inadequate. 712 The appropriation of the 
modern scientific concept of a 'field', rid of its physical connotations in Stoicism, is seen as 
a renaissance of the concept of pneuma. The following points are then made about God's 
Spirit as a force field: 
1. ) The Spirit is the force field of 'God's mighty presence. '713 
2. ) This relieves one of having to describe the Spirit as a subject, in contrast to the concept 
of nous, so avoiding tritheism or monism. 714 
3. ) "The deity as field can find equal manifestation in all three persons. "715 The concept of 
field need not be used of one divine subject, and hence the divine essence considered as a 
field can be common to all three hypostaseis. 
4. ) Points 1. ) and 3. ) seem to be held together in the following argument: 
The idea of the divine life as a dynamic field sees the divine Spirit who 
unites the three persons as proceeding from the Father, received by the Son, 
and common to both, so that precisely in this way he is the force field of 
their fellowship that is distinct from them both. An ancient problem of the 
doctrine of the Trinity was that the term Spirit denotes on the one side 
(John 4.24) the divine essence that is common to all three persons, and on 
the other the third trinitarian person alongside the Father and the Son and 
also distinct from them as he glorifies the Son in the Father and the Father 
in the Son. 716 
5. ) The Spirit is defined as the Divine essence. 717 
One can see that Pannenberg wishes to use the non-personal concept of the 'field', while at 
the same time maintaining the personal reality of the trinitarian hypostaseis. 
712 Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, pp. 370-81. As is often the case with Pannenberg's tendency to revel in the 
historical overview of an issue, it is difficult to separate his own argument against the use of the concept of 
nous. Drawing on Spinoza, Hume and Kant, he seems to endorse the view that 'self-consciousness' cannot be 
applied to the divine without causing disastrous consequences ("human mental life fluctuates, and self- 
consciousness presupposes something over and against it from which to distinguish itself. " ibid., p. 376. 
Hegel's response links the divine too closely with the world process. The outcome of our tour through these 
historical arguments is that applying the concept of nous to the divine "demands so many changes in the 
phenomenon of reason as we know it that it can have no more than metaphorical significance. " ibid., p. 
379. 
Pannenberg goes on to remark that, "This does not mean, of course, that the idea is meaningless or 
dispensable. " ibid.. But this is not the conclusion that we find at the end of the section: "Critical reflection 
has dissolved the idea of nous as subject of the divine action. " ibid., pp. 384. This backtracking on the 
criteria of judging his argument is not only slipshod, but highly self-contradictory. 
First, the piecemeal 
argument which Pannenberg presents is hardly rigorous enough to convince any 
Analytic philosopher, and 
secondly, if all he has shown is that qualities of the human mind can only 
be applied analogously to God, that 
is precisely the same for his preferred concept of a 'force 
field'. Both are used metaphorically, so ruling out 
the use of nous on the grounds that it is a metaphor, also negates 
his development of the concept of a 'field'. 
713 ibid., p. 382. 
714 ibid., p. 383. 
715 ibid.. 
716 ibid.. 
717 ibid., p. 384. 
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The concept of a 'force field' is introduced without an explanation of how it is being 
used. 718 Is it a metaphor? Is it denotative or connotative? Is it law-like? Does it possess 
explanatory and predictive power as scientists claim that a physical field does? As Jeffrey 
Wicken argues if science is going to be appropriated in some way by theologians, "Terms 
with specific denotative meanings must not be muddied over with a connotative 
penumbra. "719 The key challenge facing Pannenberg's position is how the concept of 'field, ' 
specifically point 2. ), is compatible with the Spirit being personal. Classical field theory, 
Pannenberg's source, concerns systems whose (measurable) physical properties at each 
instant of time are given by a collection of real-valued functions on some region of space. 
The functions are called fields. A field is a physical entity whose observable value varies 
with position and with time, and although a field might be considered to be an 
"interpenetrating network of energetic forces, " energy is still a physical feature. 720 How 
can such a definition of a field be considered to be personal in the sense given in my 
introduction? Certainly Fritjof Capra in his popular book The Tao of Physics, believes he 
can apply the concept of a field to non-personal, non-theistic Eastern religion. 721 
Pannenberg does not have some privileged right to use the concept for his own Christian 
end, so the onus is on him to explain exactly how the concept is being used and why it is 
compatible with the personal reality of the Holy Spirit. 
It is unclear as to whether point 3. ) means that the three hypostaseis are to be conceived of 
as fields. Such a meaning is surely excluded by the specific association given to the 
relation of the Spirit and the field. Or perhaps that the field represents some fourth entity 
718 John Polkinghorne concurs with this observation in, "Wolfhart Pannenberg's Engagement with the Natural 
Sciences, " Zygon, Vol. 34 (1999), pp. 153-4. 
719 Jeffrey S Wicken,, "Theology and Science in the Evolving Cosmos: A Need for Dialogue". Zygon, Vol. 
23 (1988), p. 48. 
720 John Polkinghorne criticises Pannenberg for failing to recognise this: "It is important to recognise that 
energy is not a kind of spiritual concept. Einstein's famous equation, E=mc2, asserts the materiality of energy 
as much as it does the energetic character of matter. A physical field, such as Maxwell's electromagnetic 
field, carries energy and momentum, inertial properties that function in the same way for the field as they do 
for particles of matter. " "Wolfhart Pannenberg's Engagement with the Natural Sciences, " p. 154. 
721 Notice the odd parallels, but clear difference of intention between Fritjof Capra's application of the 
concept of a 'field' to Chinese philosophy and Pannenberg's use: "the field idea is not only implicit in the 
notion of the Tao as being empty and formless, and yet producing all forms, but is also expressed explicitly 
in the concept of ch'i.... The word chi literally means 'gas' or 'ether', and was used in ancient China to denote 
the vital breath or energy animating the cosmos..... Like the quantum field, chi is conceived as a tenuous 
and non-perceptible form of matter which is present throughout space and can condense into solid material 
objects. " F. Capra, The Tao of Physics, new edition (London: Flamingo, 1983), p. 
236. 
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over and above the hypostaseis? The danger of modalism lurks in the background for this 
interpretation. Alternatively, it could mean that the Spirit as field is manifested in all the 
hypostaseis. This is the most likely interpretation. How then can Stanley Grenz interpret 
the meaning as, "the Godhead thought of in terms of a dynamic field can appear in an 
equal way in all three persons"? 722 For how can the hypostasis of the Spirit be identified as 
the field, yet also manifest that same field? Is this not a confusion similar to any attempt, 
in the language of traditional trinitarian theology, to predicate both the concepts of 
hypostasis and ousia to one member of the Trinity? There is also a lack of clarity in the 
relation between 1. ), 3. ) and 4. ). How does 1. ), the Spirit as a field of God's presence, 
relate to 3. ), the field which is represented as the unity of the three hypostasis, and then to 
4. ) which sees this uniting field as specifically predicated of the Spirit? How many fields 
are actually being postulated? 
When we come to point 4. ), we see the real motivation of Pannenberg's position. He 
believes that this alternative to, what I shall call, 'nous-theology', captures the way in 
which the Bible and Christian tradition has used the concept of 'spirit' in a dual way as 
both a general predicate of divinity and in reference to a particular Divine hypostasis. To 
support his position that the concept of 'spirit' or pneuma has a general reference in the 
Christian tradition, he cites only John 4.24. On this verse Raymond Brown comments: 
God is Spirit. This is not an essential definition of God, but a description of 
God's dealing with men; it means that God is Spirit toward men because He 
gives the Spirit (xiv 16) which begets them anew. There are two other 
descriptions in the Johannine writings: 'God is light' and 'God is love'(1 Jn 
iv 8). These too refer to the God who acts; God gives the world His Son, 
the light of the world (iii 19, viii 12, ix 5) as a sign of His love (iii 16). 723 
Brown makes it clear that 'God is Spirit', in John's Gospel, is not a metaphysical definition 
of God's essence. 724 In reference to the "God is... " statements in the Johannine literature, 
Brown writes: 
There is a tendency of predicate nouns to be anarthrous with the possible 
exception of statements of identity, and so commentators have concluded 
that these are not statements of identity but at most descriptions of a quality 
of God, or existential statements about God's activity toward human beings, 
e. g., the God who is love shows that love by giving His own Son (1 in 4.8- 
722 Stanley Grenz, The Systematic Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg (New York: OUP, 1990), p. 61. 
723 Brown, The Gospel According to John, I-XII, p. 172. 
724 Barnabas Lindars concurs with this reading: "God is spirit is not a metaphysical statement but much more 
a character-description, like 'God is light'... " Lindars, p. 
190. 
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10). Nevertheless, these formulas also touch upon the mystery of God's own being. For instance, the Johannine Jesus speaks not only of God's love for 
human beings but (logically) first of all of God's love for him, the Son (Jn 
3.35 
.. ), a love that is the model of God's love for Jesus' followers..... Thus, in such 'God is' formulas, while there is emphasis on God's activity, that 
activity is internally related to what God is before creation. 725 
The verse links in a practical way Spirit and worship, and is not an abstract homily on the 
essence of God: "Jesus explains that true worship can come only from those begotten by 
the Spirit of truth. Only through the Spirit does the Father beget true worshippers. "726 As 
Barnabas Lindars adds: "the point is that like requires like..... The argument is exactly the 
same as 3.8: the God-like person (in 3.8 compared to the wind) alone can have fellowship 
with God (3.3,5), and the God-like person alone can offer true worship to God. X727 
The verse may well have multiple meanings. Certainly C. K. Barrett argues for two related 
meanings. The belief that God was not corporeal in the human sense comes from Stoic and 
Hellenistic philosophy (c. f. John 3.8): "The proposition 'God is Spirit' means that he is 
invisible and unknowable(c. f. 1.18). "728. Secondly, we have the disclosure of God through 
pneuma: "the Spirit, the Paraclete, brings home to men the truth revealed in Jesus ( 
John. 14.26,16.14). i729 However, Barrett does not explain why John should be interested 
in Stoic/Hellenistic philosophy. 730 Brown's reading has more weight, certainly as the 
primary reading of the text. In contrast, Pannenberg treats the verse as a proof text, with no 
investigation of whether his reading is exegesis or eisegesis. He plays on the initial 
ambiguity of the verse to associate it both with a general (God is incorporeal) and a 
particular (the Holy Spirit is a divine hypostasis) interpretation, neither of which are the 
meaning of this verse. 
725 R. E. Brown, The Epistles of John (New York, Doubleday & Co., 1982), pp. 194-5. 
726 Brown, The Gospel According to John, p. 177. 
727 C. K. Barrett, The Gospel of John, p. 189. 
728 Barrett, The Gospel According to John. 2nd edition (London: SPCK, 1978), p. 238. 
729 ibid., pp. 238-9. 
730 Leon Morris seems at first to support Barrett's two-layered reading, but then, rather interestingly and 
somewhat inconsistently, appears to plump for one over the other. First, the 
'general' reading, which would 
endorse Pannenberg's position: "Here Jesus is not saying, 
'God is one spirit among many'. Rather His 
meaning is, 'God's essential nature is spirit'..... We must not think of 
God as material, or bound in any way to 
places or things. " Morris, p. 271. Then, a more convincing reading, which emphasises 
the particular Spirit 
and the context of worship, which does not sit well with the 
first reading: "In view of the references to living 
water (which symbolizes the life-giving Spirit) 
in the context it is probable that this verse contains an allusion 
to the life-giving activity of God. This is all the more likely in that when the 
Old Testament refers to the 
Spirit of God, the usual idea is that of divine activity, not of opposition 
to things material. John not 
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Finally, let us turn directly to Pannenberg's conception of Spirit in terms of the categories 
of the general divine essence and the particular hypostasis. 731 Pannenberg is aware that, 
"As a field, of course, the Spirit would be impersonal. , 732 At the same time, he wishes to 
safeguard the Spirit as a distinct divine hypostasis: "The Spirit as person can be thought of 
only as a concrete form of the one deity like the Father and Son. "733 Yet, the solution is a 
concoction of both, the general and the particular: 
But the Spirit is not just the divine life that is common to both the Father 
and the Son. He also stands over and against the Father and the Son as his 
own center of action. This makes sense if the Father and the Son have 
fellowship in the unity of divine life only as they stand over and against the 
person of the Spirit. Precisely because the common essence of the deity 
stands over and against both - in different ways - in the form of the Spirit, 734 they are related to one another by the unity of the Spirit. 
This seems contradictory giving the particular, namely the hypostasis, the character of the 
general, viz. the 'divine essence' or the 'force field'. The Spirit is personal by warrant of its 
status as a divine hypostasis, yet its status as hypostasis comes about "precisely because 
the common essence of the deity [i. e. the Spirit] stands over against both [Father and 
Son]. r735 Pannenberg does not distance himself from his identification of the Spirit with 
the 'force field', and so, as he concedes, the force field cannot be conceived of as being 
personal. 
1.02) The Second Argument: God is Love. 
In a later section of volume 1 we find what one may hope to be a clarification of 
Pannenberg's position. In fact, the argument is similar to the first one, revolving as it does 
around another biblical proof text. The setting of the argument is a discussion of 'The Love 
infrequently combines the ideas of Spirit and life (cf. 6: 63). God is a living 
God. Since He is ceaselessly 
active as the life-giving Spirit He must be worshipped in a manner 
befitting such a Spirit. " ibid., p. 272. 
731 I note here that Pannenberg's full position on the question of the constitution of triune unity 
is more 
complicated than a mere appeal to the Spirit. He later says that, 
"Both the Father and Spirit in their different 
ways represent the Godhead as a whole. " Systematic 
Theology, Vol. 1, p. 429. His approach to the question 
seems to be multifaceted. His account of trinitarian unity 
depends on a specific reworking of 'divine essence', 
its association with both the concepts of love and field, 
in turn connected to the Spirit; an understanding of 
unity arising from mutual relations, which effects a sharing of 
divine attributes. 
732 Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, p. 383. 
73; ibid.. 
734 ibid., p. 384. 
735 ibid. (the italics are mine). 
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of God', which culminates in a deliberation on 'The Unity of God'. The points Pannenberg 
makes can be broken down in the following way: 
1. ) Love (1 John 4: 8,16) is the divine essence. 136 
2. ) "It [Love] is the materially concrete form of 'Spirit' as the characteristic of God's 
essence. "737 
3. ) The Spirit as love is the union of the hypostaseis: 
The essence of the Godhead is indeed the Spirit. It is the Spirit as a 
dynamic field, and as its manifestation in the coming forth of the Son 
shows itself to be the work of the Father, the dynamic of the Spirit radiates 
from the Father, but in such a way that the Son receives it as gift, and it fills 
him and radiates back from him to the Father. 738 
4. ) Nevertheless, the distinct hypostasis of the Spirit is maintained: "The Spirit comes 
forth as a separate hypostasis as he comes over against the Son and the Father as the divine 
essence, common to both, which actually unites them and also attests and maintains their 
unity in face of distinction. "739 
5. ) In conclusion, the same dual role is given to the Spirit as before, both particular and 
general: "On the one side the Spirit and love constitute the common essence of deity, and 
on the other they come forth as a separate hypostasis in the Holy Spirit. "740 The Spirit is 
also the source of unity and the essence of divinity: "The divine persons, then, are 
concretions of the divine reality as Spirit. They are individual aspects of the dynamic field 
of the eternal Godhead. "741 
Much of this second argument is a repeat of the first. Thus Pannenberg still fails to explain 
the conditions of his use of the concept of a 'force field'. What is of note is the association 
of the Spirit with love. One might first imagine that Pannenberg's linking of the Spirit and 
love is intended, in some way, to give more credence to the personal existence of the 
hypostasis of the Spirit. However, on reflection, it is quite clear that connection between 
Spirit and love is a further explanation of the Spirit's general function as divine essence 
and source of triune unity. The idea that the Spirit is love and that this constitutes the 
Divine unity seems to be an Augustinian move. The problem with the Augustinian 
736 ibid., p. 427. 
737 ibid.. 
738 ibid., p. 429. 
739 ibid.. 
740 ibid., p. 430. 
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position is that if the Spirit is defined as an intentional state or relational complex, that is 
as love, it seems to lose its distinctness and 'personhood'. 742 Pannenberg is aware of this 
problem, 743 however he wishes to hold on to a "deeper truth in Augustine's view of the 
Spirit as the love that unites the Father and Son. "7' He rightly claims that, "The Gospels 
trace back the relation of Jesus to the Father being filled by the Spirit" 745 This is 
insufficient to support the identification of the Spirit and love. It is one thing to hold that 
the Spirit as a divine hypostasis has an eternal role in personally binding together the 
Father and Son in fellowship, in J. V. Taylor's words, the Spirit is the 'Go-between God'. It 
is another thing altogether, to then go on and qualify this function by saying that the Spirit 
is 'love' (an intentional state or relation, detached from a centre of agency) or the 'divine 
essence, ' which orthodox theology has rightly considered to be predicated of all three 
hypostaseis. For Pannenberg to state that "the personhood of the Spirit.... is a necessary 
premise of his work of fellowship of the Son with the Father, " in lieu of the above critique 
seems to be a mere assertion. 
As with Pannenberg's use of the proof text of John 4.28, his treatment of I John 4: 8,16, 
"God is love", suffers from a similar exegetical deficiency. Brown maintains that "God is 
love" is part of the Johannine "God is.. " statements, and so is comparable with the function 
of John 4.24. The verse is clearly grounded in practical issues for Christian discipleship 746 
741 ibid.. 
742 See Gunton, "God the Holy Spirit, " pp. 109-10. 
743 To be fair to Pannenberg, he has already recognised this problem earlier in his historical discussion of the 
doctrine of the Trinity: "Augustine described the Spirit as the eternal communion of the Father and Son, as 
the love (caritas) that unites them. Along these lines it was thus natural that the proposal should be made to 
see the Spirit not as a distinct person alongside the Father and Spirit but as the 'we' of their communion. 
Orthodoxy replied, of course, that this is to eliminate his person. The criticism is correct, for there is no place 
for the self-distinction of the Spirit from the Father and the Son whom he glorifies if he viewed merely as the 
'we' of their communion. " Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, pp. 315-16. 
744 ibid., p. 316. 
las ibid.. The biblical passages he utilises to support this claim are: Rom. 1.4; Rom. 8.14-15; Luke 1.35; Luke 
10.21; John 16.14. 
746 R. E. Brown comments: "As in the other two Johannine descriptions, 'God is Spirit'(Jn 4.24) and 'God is 
light'(1 Jn 1.5), the predicate is anarthrous. The author does not say simply, 'God loves', for loving is not just 
another action of God, like ruling. Rather, all God's activity 
is loving activity. Nor does the author say, 'Love 
is God'; for he is interested in the loving activity of a person, not in abstract definitions. " The Epistles of 
John, p. 515. K. Grayston adds: "[I]t must be argued that 
God is love does not function mainly as describing 
God's activity but as defining the condition on which 
God may be known. Compare the Jewish Shema in Dt. 
6: 4, which does not exist to provide information about the unity of 
God but sets down the condition on which 
God will benefit his people: 'The Lord is our 
God, the Lord alone'. " K. Grayston, The New Century Bible 
Commentary: The Johannine Epistles (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984), p. 124. 
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and the economy of salvation, not the metaphysics of God. 747 Love is not used in I John 4 
in specific relation to the Spirit, but primarily in relation to Christ. 
In sum, Pannenberg resolves none of the problems which were raised about his first 
argument from 'God is Spirit'. Indeed, he further re-enforces the interpretation that he is 
unable to maintain the personal hypostasis of the Spirit, by predicating of the Spirit both 
the concept of the 'field' and 'love. ' He does so by basing both arguments on inadequate 
exegesis of two biblical verses, which he uses as proof texts, but which ought not to 
function in that way. 
1.03) Spirit, Field and Creation. 
In volume II Pannenberg includes a discussion of the Spirit as a force field in his doctrine 
of creation. The Spirit is interpreted as 'the life-giving principle, ' to whom creatures owe 
not so much their particularity, order and independence - that is due to the Logos of 
creation - but their 'life, movement and activity. i748 Whereas the Son's role in creation acts 
to validate creaturely otherness and distinction by his self-differentiation from the Father, 
the Spirit's role is "the link and movement that connects the creatures to one another and 
God. X749 Thus, the generating question of my theses is explicitly addressed by Pannenberg 
in his trinitarian Christology not in his pneumatology. 750 The 'analogy' with field theory in 
747 Judith Lieu concurs: "[Y]et it is rooted in God as experienced, and is directed towards the inescapable 
conditions for those who claim to continue to experience God. It is surely right to draw the conclusion, as is 
often done, that the saying means not just that all God's activity is loving activity, but 1 John is more 
concerned with the conclusion that love must characterise those who claim fellowship with this God. In v. 8 
the affirmation explains the previous such assertion, while in v. 16 it is followed by one. " J. Lieu, The 
Theology of the Johannine Epistles (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), p. 67. 
748 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p-76- 
749 ibid., p. 84. 
750 In this thesis we are concerned with the pneumatological version of the question, and Pannenberg's 
christological approach remains unconvincing. Pannenberg writes that the self-distinction of the Son from the 
Father, is according to Pannenberg, the key to "the participation of God in the life of creatures. " ibid., pp. 58. 
The self-distinction is evident from the New Testament's witness to the subordination of Jesus to the Father, 
but also the very act of the Incarnation of becoming a creature: 
"For if the eternal Son in the humility of his 
self-distinction from the Father moves out of the unity of the 
deity by letting the Father alone be God, then 
the creature emerges over against the Father, the creature 
for whom the relation to the Father and Creator is 
fundamental, i. e. the human creature. " ibid., pp. 22. Several problems present themselves 
here. First, if we 
are to follow orthodox trinitarian theology, God 
is not only God as Father, but also as Son and Spirit and the 
Son is never merely "creature, " but a unique union of two natures, 
"truly God and truly man. " Secondly, 
Pannenberg's position that the self-distinction provides an 
"ontic basis for the existence of the creature in its 
distinction from the Creator, " fails to show why this is so when Jesus is never a creature in quite the same 
way as we are, as the subject of his personhood 
is the Logos, who is consubstantial with the Father. ibid.. 
Does this then really safeguard the integrity of the 
identity of the creature? The same question, it may be 
recalled, was posed of Barth. The 
idea that the Son "moves out of the unity of the deity by letting the Father 
alone be God, " again is unclear. The 
Son is homo-ousios with the Father so unity remains. If radical kenosis 
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theoretical physics, is aimed at helping to conceive of 'movement and changei751 and the 
concept of the Spirit. 752 
To avoid a form of unitarianism, Pannenberg writes that it is the field which is "structured 
in a trinitarian fashion". He continues: "The person of the Holy Spirit is not himself to be 
understood as the field, but as a unique manifestation (singularity) of the field of the divine 
essentiality. , 753 Now, this seems to be a move away from the position articulated in 
volume I, in which the Spirit was described as the field uniting the three persons. It also 
makes us question, in the absence of an explanation of how this divine field operates in 
relation to the hypostaseis, whether or not the field represents a form of modalism. The 
field appears to constitute an entity behind the 'manifestations' or hypostaseis. Indeed, 
without an explanation as to the compatibility of the personal nature of the Spirit and the 
employment of the concept of the field, how can the hypostaseis be personal if they are 
mere manifestations of a field? 754 
Pannenberg's discussion of field and Spirit overlaps with his theories on space and time. 755 
Briefly, Pannenberg wishes to give priority to time over space, and sees eternity as the 
necessary framework for understanding the nature of time. This he views as giving 
precedence to the future in theories of time, and helps to explain the only additional 
description of the Spirit's relation to the concept of field in volume II: 
We are thus to think of the dynamic of the divine Spirit as a working field 
linked to time and space - to time by the power of the future that gives 
creatures their own present and duration, and to space by the simultaneity 
of creatures in their duration. From the standpoint of the creature, origin 
from the future of the Spirit has the appearance of the past. But the working 
is assumed, how much kenosis may take place before the Logos loses His Divinity and how is it then 
restored? The influence of Hegel is important here, but Pannenberg wishes to correct Hegel's version of the 
argument that "in the Trinity the Son is the principle of otherness, the starting point for the emergence of the 
finite as that which is absolutely other than deity. " ibid., p. 28. The corrective is to apply a perichoretic 
understanding of the persons of the Trinity. Yet, this appears to deny his statements above about the Son 
letting the "Father alone be God. " 
751 ibid., p. 79. 
752 ibid., p. 83. 
753 ibid.. 
754 Do the divine hypostaseis as concrete, particular existents, together constitute the field? If this were so 
then the problem of essence above and beyond the hypostaseis would be avoided, for the hypostaseis in their 
relation would constitute the field. I am not therefore, denying that the metaphor may have some positive 
uses in relation to trinitarian theology. 
755 This may reflect the importance of space-time co-ordinates in measuring fields. 
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of the Spirit constantly encounters the creature as its future, which 
embraces its origin and its possible fulfilment. 756 
This is hardly an analogical application of the concept of field. It gives substance to Jeffrey 
Wicken's questioning of whether Pannenberg's use of the concept of field is "overly bound 
to physical science. , 757 Commenting on Pannenberg's observation of the transition from 
the Stoic to the contemporary scientific understanding of field, Wicken, who is himself a 
scientist, writes: 
[Pannenberg] believes that this dematerialization of the field gives God 
(being immaterial) a kind of physical justification in nature's wholeness. 
Although as metaphor this notion is rich for theology, taken literally it 
binds God needlessly to physics. Is God conceived here as a field as in 
physics? If so, why the need for God at all? If not, the relativistic reification 
of the space-field seems important to theology only in the sense of showing 
that nature has its own grounds for wholeness that might provide boundary 
conditions for God's presence in nature. 758 
Science utilises the concept of a field for explanatory or predictive potency. Are we to 
imagine that divine providence also has a law-like pattern, which a theological use of the 
concept of a field will help to predict? Wicken comments further: 
I am especially concerned about biased assignments of ontological 
priorities in Pannenberg's field-interpretation of nature, which seems to 
treat a field itself as a 'whole' exerting regulative influences (God's hand) 
over material elements. It is not. Granted, space consists of fields of force 
which exert regulative controls on material elements; but its 'structure' is 
reciprocally regulated by those elements and their movements. The two 
together constitute the only 'whole' of which physics can speak. If all the 
matter were removed from the universe there would be no field..... Space 
and matter coevolved, and are relationally constituted by each other. They 
have no identities apart from each other. 759 
The danger here is that of tying God too closely to the world process, which undermines 
the concept of creatio ex nihilo and God's sovereignty over creation. 
To conclude, Pannenberg's account of the concept of 'field' in relation to pneumatology is 
unsatisfactory. It is not firmly grounded in an explanation of the conditions of the use of 
the concept, and does not fully overcome the problems which are latent in his early work. 
756 ibid., p. 102. 
757 Wicken, "Theology and Science in the Evolving Cosmos, " p. 51. 
758 ibid., p. 52. 
759 ibid.. 
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All in all Pannenberg's position does not advance beyond the tension to be found in the 
biblical witness between the personal and non-personal language used of the Spirit. By his 
identification of the Spirit first with a force field and then with love, Pannenberg actually 
undermines the Spirit's standing as a personal hypostasis. Noticeably, the analogy is not 
pursued by Pannenberg when he comes to explicate matters of soteriology and 
ecclesiology in volume III. In fact, he wishes to draw a distinction between the Spirit's 
work in creation as "an external, invisible, and incomprehensible field of force, " and, what 
he seems to consider a more appropriate metaphor for the Spirit's role in 
soteriology/ecclesiology, a 'gift. '760 In relation to the generating question of my thesis, 
Panneneberg's use of the concept of 'field' in pneumatology has very little explanatory 
power. The idea of human existence being centred in divine action may be safeguarded by 
the use of classical doctrines of general and special concurrence. No account is given of 
how the Spirit's action conceived in terms of a "force field" may bring about Christian 
metamorphosis in a way which safeguards human freedom and identity, and involves 
interaction at a personal level. 
II) Welker on the Spirit as a Force Field of Love. 
Pannenberg is not alone in appropriating the scientific concept of 'field' for theological 
purposes, and our task is to see whether or not a more convincing account may be given. 
In section III of his article "The Holy Spirit, , 761 Michael Welker is concerned to explain 
the biblical metaphor of the "pouring out" of the Spirit "from heaven". In this regard he 
refers to the analogy with field theory in theoretical physics: "For the individual human 
being, however, the pouring out of the spirit means that he or she stands in a force field, in 
which he or she is more and more filled with 'the fullness of God'(Eph. 3: 19). "762 As with 
Pannenberg there is an astonishing absence of any explanation of what the conditions of 
using the analogy are. 
760 Systematic Theology, Vol. 3., p. 7. 
761 M. Welker, "The Holy Spirit, " Theology Today, Vol. 46 (1998), pp. 5-20. Much of the same material 
appears in Welker's later monograph entitled, 
God the Spirit, trans. J. F. Hoffmeyer (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1994), pp. 311-315. 
762 ibid., p. 17. 
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Welker at least addresses head on the issue of how the concept of field may be considered 
to be compatible with personal identity. Opposing a conception of personhood as "an 
individual-human center of action, " he writes: 
[I]f what is at issue is the Holy Spirit as a clearly determinable, individual 
center of action, if that is what personhood must mean, then one will not be 
able to point to anything but Jesus Christ. He is the individual-human 
center of action of the spirit. 763 
One may agree that the Spirit mediates the Son and the Father, but insofar as one can 
identify acts of the Spirit, such as at Pentecost, or in the life of Samson, then one can 
surely ask: what or who brought about such acts/events? As we have seen from our 
discussion of the Spirit in Chapter 1, the Spirit's role is not just to re-iterate what has 
already been given in Christ. He has the eschatological function of completing revelation 
and expounding "what is to come"(John 16.13). Welker has given no reason why one 
should not predicate these actions of the hypostasis of the Spirit. The "selflessness of the 
spirit" in her mediatorial role is not a sufficient reason to deny the Spirit intentional 
agency. All the members of the Trinity embrace a 'selflessness, ' as Augustine made clear, 
in that they are all involved in each other's intentional acts and all are 'self-giving. ' The 
pattern of the Spirit's action in fact mirrors the action of Jesus as obedient Son to the 
Father. If one pushes Welker's view to its logical conclusion, one could question 
predicating the Son as a centre of action. 764 
What Welker is reacting against in all this is, what he calls, a 'one-sided and simplistic' 
conception of personhood. A conception of personhood as a centre of human self- 
consciousness and agency, must be balanced with a social and relational conception, 
which he wishes to term 'a domain of resonance. ' It is this understanding of the importance 
of the 'multiple webs of relationships' which is constitutive in the formation of a person. 
From here his next move is to apply this distinction between personhood as 'self-conscious 
center of actions', and the 'personal unity which we are in the external perspective', to the 
Trinity. Thus, in one sense he does wish to say that the Spirit is truly personal, while 
holding that this is, at the same time, compatible with the idea of the Spirit as a field. 
763 
ibid.. 
764 Perhaps Welker's hesitancy to describe the Spirit as a centre of action rests on a confusion between the 
agency of the Spirit and what might be called the Spirit's "personality". It is questionable whether the concept 
of 'personality' is really appropriate for predication of the Divine hypostaseis. 
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The Holy Spirit is to be understood as the multiform unity of perspectives 
on Jesus Christ, a unity in which we participate and which we help to 
constitute. The Holy Spirit is thus Christ's domain of resonance. The Spirit 
is the public person who corresponds to the individual Jesus Christ. 765 
Is the Spirit really the relational web which centres around both Christ's creaturely and 
divine relations? 766 One may think that the whole point of a relational conception of 
personhood is to be interactive, 'two way' or multidimensional. If this were so, it appears 
that creation is constitutive in forming the 'personhood' and identity of the Spirit. Some 
may be content with that direction in theology, 767 but it clearly undermines divine 
transcendence and sovereign grace. Perhaps Welker means that the Holy Spirit is 'Christ's 
domain of resonance, ' in the sense of the network of relations which surround Christ. 
However, this would confuse the identity of the human Jesus with the Spirit, denying the 
humanity of Jesus proper responsibility for its creaturely relations. 
Welker writes that the Holy Spirit is the 'public person who corresponds to the individual 
Jesus Christ. ' Jesus Christ was a public person in the ordinary sense of the word. It would 
be a little odd to say that the Spirit represented his acts and relationships in his earthly 
existence. Welker might say that, post-Ascension, Jesus' human personhood is no longer 
public, and hence, it is precisely the Spirit who continues and mediates the relationship. 
This may be theological unobjectionable, but it does not do enough to guarantee the 
personhood of the Spirit. Welker has already stated two conditions for personhood: 1. ) 
being an individual, self-conscious centre of action; and, 2. ) being part of a 'domain of 
resonance' or relational web. The Spirit comes off rather badly from these conditions. Only 
the second criteria applies, and it is Jesus' personhood that fulfils the first. This makes the 
Spirit an exception to the rule, only fulfilling one of the criteria. It appears that the Spirit 
amounts to a purely relational reality, which is a non-personal outcome. Perhaps Welker 
does not actually believe that criteria 1. ) is necessary for personhood. If he does, this 
765 ibid., p. 19. 
766 Does that mean when I pray to Christ, my prayer and worship is somehow to be considered as partly 
constituting the Spirit? If we think further along these lines, 
is Welker actually saying that the Spirit is 
identical to the natural relations which Jesus as a human being would have had with the material world? 
767 Peter Hodgson is a good example of one who utilises non-personal language in relation to the Spirit and 
combines it with a "process view" of God: "There are no such pre-existing persons 
in God [i. e. trinitarian 
hypostaseis] but rather potentials for relations that become actual when God creates the world as other than 
God..... Thus Spirit is an emergent person (not an individual but a social person), generated out of the 
interaction of God and the world, in the process of which the world 
is liberated and God is perfected. " Winds 
of the Spirit, pp. 282-3. 
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would reduce personhood to the non-personal category of relations, without answering the 
question of who or what does the relating. Relations can be affirmed as integral 
personhood, without relationality being identified as the sole constituent of personhood. 
The conclusion is that Welker is caught in a no-win situation. His position denies the 
personhood of Jesus its natural instantiation of criteria 2. ), so limiting Jesus' personhood, 
while in the case of the Spirit denying the application of criteria 1. ), and hence, also 
negating the Spirit's full personhood. 
Welker ends with a move into ecclesiology. If the Spirit constitutes Christ's 'domain of 
resonance' and if human beings can become involved in this field, then: 
These human beings, mutually strengthening each other, constitute the field 
of Christ's power in the most diverse contexts and situations of life. This 
power is twofold: it both radiates outward and attracts others to its source. 
To be one with Christ, to be of Christ's spirit, to be in Christ, to bear 
Christ's spirit in us - these expressions from the Bible each illuminate one 
aspect of this differentiated, creative relation of unity. What one sees here is 
a relation of trusting intimacy with God - indeed, a participation in God - 
which, at the same time, takes seriously our concreteness and finitude, our 
frailty and fragility. 768 
Many questions remain unresolved. Has Welker clearly distinguished the activity of the 
Spirit from the existence of human beings? How does this position take seriously our 
particularity and finitude? After all, on one reading, the Spirit is precisely the relations 
between the divine and human. What are the conditions of the operation of the Spirit- 
field? How is the Spirit's personhood to be validated? 
In conclusion, Welker's conception of a field as a 'domain of resonance' in relation to a 
human person has at least provided us with some kind of handle on how the concept of a 
field might work in the personal domain. His arguments, though, are finally unconvincing 
and leave us in no better position to develop a synthesis of the 'personal' and 'non-personal' 
biblical metaphors used of the Spirit. However, arguments against two specific proposals 
for non-personal models does not mean that the development of such models, in general in 
the future, is moribund. The challenge, which presents itself to future developments of 
non-personal models, is to show their compatibility with the predication of personal 
768 Welker, "The Holy Spirit, " p. 20. 
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attributes to God. 769 In the next section it will be argued that the non-personal imagery 
used of the Spirit in the Christian tradition can be explained in a different way and so the 
importance of trying to combine or complement personal/non-personal models of the 
activity of the Spirit becomes less significant. 
III. ) An Alternative Strategy. 
111.01) An 'Error Theory' Applied to Non-personal Descriptions of the Spirit. 
David Brown argues that the personal language used in relation to the Spirit "cannot carry 
the day, unless reinforced by some account of why the disciples were wrong to regard the 
earliest definitive experiences as impersonal. t, 770 1 wish now to examine such an argument 
to see if this is the way forward to resolve our initial problem of how the personal and non- 
personal language used of the Spirit may be compatible. 
Brown's argument can be summarised as follows. 
1. In the light of the resurrection appearances and the Ascension, Pentecost was unlikely 
to be experienced by the disciples as an encounter with Christ, and so "there would 
have been a puzzle as to who this person could possibly be. , 771 With the disciples' 
roots in Jewish monotheism, the postulation of a third being over and above Jesus and 
the Father (who remained transcendent) would have presented a noetic difficulty. 
I do not quite see how this argument fits with Peter's recognition that it is the Spirit that is 
at work at Pentecost (Acts 2.33). In Chapter 4 of Acts, the disciples mention the Holy 
Spirit in their prayer (v. 25), before being 'filled with the Holy Spirit'(v. 31). Furthermore, if 
we are to believe Luke and John's account, Jesus actually prophesies the pouring out of the 
Spirit (Luke 24.49; Acts 1.5; John 14; 16; 20.22). 
769 The closest that Jürgen Moltmann comes to considering such a reconciliation 
is when he writes: "If we 
think about the personal levels, we find - in spite of all 
dissimilarity - analogous energizing rhythms and 
fields of force in what goes on in relationships. What is 
between' people on the emotional level is like a field 
of attraction and repulsion - an order that soothes us and 
does us good, and a deranging chaos. The 
reciprocity of an energizing stimulus and 
irritating sense of derangement frees new energies and awakens 
unguessed-of vitality; and this inspires 
life with new forms of expression. Joy in other people can be 
infectious. " Moltmann, p. 275. This connects well with my discussion of 
how personal presence affects. 
Despite the appeal of the analogy of field here, repulsion and attraction 
between persons is largely stimulated 
by intentional agency, with the body and the physical surrounding acting as 
the form of mediation. Joy can be 
infectious because a subject has the emotion of joy and expresses 
it in his physical behaviour. 
770 Brown, The Divine Trinity, p. 199. 
771 ibid.. 
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2. Brown does refer to the content of the experiences in his second point: "with such 
phenomena as glossolalia and the power or miracle it is very easy to see how an 
individual might become very confused as to what was the appropriate account of the 
experience, personal or impersonal, and why therefore he might opt for what seems the 
simpler option, the use of non-personal language. , 772 
Brown does not pay any attention to the Old Testament evidence relating to the activity of 
the 'Spirit of God'. The account in Luke-Acts of the Pentecost narrative is very much in the 
style of presentations of the Spirit (ruach) in the Hebrew Bible. Brown has more than just 
the experiences of Christian disciples to explain. 
3. There were also considerable conceptual difficulties, given the cultural 
assumptions of the time, in making sense of the notion of one person acting from 
within another. For it was a common assumption in the first century that all 
persons, including God, existed locally in one place rather than another (In God's 
case in Heaven). 773 
This is one of the central concerns of my thesis and is not just a conceptual problem for 
first century people. 
4. Brown now draws a distinction between the disciples' interpretation of their perception 
and the reality of the object of the experiences: 
For they [the events of Pentecost] are felt as impersonal only in the sense 
that the individual is convinced that the complete explanation cannot be 
that it is his person that is acting; it feels, as it were, too much like a take- 
over bid. Thus, descriptions of the experiences as impersonal do not intend 
exclusion of an ultimate personal explanation, but rather exclusion of a 
claim that it felt like one of the human agent's own personal actions. 
774 
Thus, impersonal language may be used as a way of safeguarding the otherness and 
transcendence of God. The language of fire and wind functions to indicate that if this is an 
encounter with a personal being, it is not identical, but something quite other than an 
experience of a human person - something altogether more powerful and awe-inspiring. 
772 ibid.. 
773 ibid.. 
74 ibid., p. 200. It will be recalled that in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis, Brown's view that the Spirit "presses to 
become subject" was criticised for falling 
into a Divine Fiat position. Here Brown never defines what he 
means by 'personal' and 'impersonal', 
but his language of 'take-over' threatens personal relations. 
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The experience really is fire-like or wind-like as the metaphors have phenomenological 
descriptive value. 
5. In experiences like the definitive ones comparable accounts suggest that the take-over 
is so sudden and so complete that the individual is not quite sure what has hit him; it is 
only subsequent reflection that reveals to him that he must have been related to 
something. Secondly, irrespective of how it feels, what is accomplished by the take- 
over is in any case best characterised as personal rather than impersonal; thus even in 
glossolalia the words are invariably regarded as comprehensible to someone, even if 
this is not always the agent whose vocal chords are used. 775 
Although personal effects of an event may indicate a personal source, there is no necessary 
connection. 
In summary, Brown shows us that the disciples' immediate interpretation of their 
experiences might not be the best guide to identifying the personal nature of their Divine 
source. However, the phenomenological content of their experiences cannot be brushed 
aside, witnessing as it does to the differences between the nature of God and His creatures. 
Two options remain if we are not to adopt Brown's view of the Divine "pressing to 
become subject. , 776 The first is to see the injections of the power of the Holy Spirit as 
described in Acts and elsewhere as episodic. The injections of power are moments which 
are not endorsed by the human subject prior to their happening, but may be retrospectively 
sanctioned. Such actions are compatible with human freedom and personal identity 
precisely because of their episodic nature. They do not deprive the human subject of 
agency for long enough to threaten his/her personal identity. They are not chosen by the 
human subject, but neither are they rejected after the event. 
The experiences are analogous to sleep. Human beings do not choose, as such, to sleep, 
and during the period of sleep they are no longer fully conscious. 
Yet sleep, so the 
argument goes, does not fatally threaten human subjectivity, and neither ought one 
to think 
that the pouring out of the Spirit does. Or again, when I see a very good 
film, I am drawn 
into very close empathy with the characters and the action even though 
I am merely sitting 
passively in the cinema. I flinch when the shot 
is fired, and my emotions swell during a 
775 ibid.. 
776 See Chapter 2 above. 
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particularly moving scene. Yet I am not the Chicago gangster, nor the soldier on Omaha 
beach, nor St. Francis of Assisi. For a short period of time, my life is enveloped, 'taken- 
over' by something quite other than me and over which I do not have any power, accept the 
refusal to be attentive. My identity and freedom are not irreparably damaged by the 
experience, in fact, the experience may have positively contributed to the development of 
my character. How much more so would it be in the case of a relationship with a good and 
loving God. 
In response it is clear in Acts and elsewhere in the New Testament that the power of the 
Spirit is not episodic, but is drawn upon regularly by the disciples during their missionary 
work. Moreover, it is also clear that reception of the Spirit is a condition of Christian 
discipleship. 777 Neither is Brown's interpretation of Pentecost as an event where the 
subjectivities of the Spirit are "taken-over" the only or most intuitive reading of the text. 
While the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is not episodic for the Christian, moments of 
special Spirit-filled power are not a permanent state, but do constitute moments of special 
grace. 
A second option is to argue that non-personal descriptions of the content of experiences of 
the Spirit can in fact be re-interpreted. The language is used as an analogical shield 
protecting the transcendence of God. Encountering the Spirit is not like experiencing a 
human being. This is not a 'take-over', but an encounter that is endorsed and welcomed. 
The people upon whom the Spirit was poured out at Pentecost, were Jesus' followers and 
disciples, who had already been involved in a process of encountering and accepting God 
in their lives. They are not mere automata of the Spirit, for the text describes the Spirit as 
'enabling' them (v. 4), not as overpowering them. It is often forgotten that the bulk of the 
Pentecost event in Acts is taken up by Peter's address to the crowd. It is only after Peter's 
address to the assembled gathering that large numbers of people are converted. Peter's 
address may have been enabled or empowered by the Spirit, but it did most definitely 
involve Peter's subjectivity and did not bypass it. The Divine Fiat view is not the best 
interpretation of the events of Pentecost. 
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IV. ) Conclusion. 
Non-personal metaphors are used of the Spirit for many reasons. Yves Congar has written 
that the Spirit is "the Person without a face. "778 Unlike the Son, the Spirit is not 
specifically incarnated and hence no immediate material form of identification may be 
used to discern the action of the Spirit. Neither is the distinctness and particularity of each 
of the hypostaseis of the Trinity constituted by each having a distinct "personality; " that 
would be too anthropomorphic. The hypostaseis of the Trinity constitute one being. The 
one being of God who has one character in three hypostaseis, distinguished according to 
the triune taxis and role in the economy of salvation. Metaphors used to describe the 
activity of the Spirit, such as wind, fire and breath, although they could be used to refer to 
God as spirit in general (I John), are pertinent to the Spirit in particular, as their images 
portray the Spirit's role in the Divine Economy as God's immanent action in the world. The 
triune taxis is revealed by the Incarnation, which means that the principle method of 
identifying the Spirit is christological. 
The self-effacing, mediating role of the Spirit in revealing the Son and the Father is the 
other key reason for the use of non-personal metaphors. The Spirit's 'face' is that of the 
Father shining through the Son. It is not arduous to find analogies based on interpersonal 
human relationships for one person mediating another. Actors and story-tellers portray 
particular protagonists in a story or drama. Indeed, the Greek word prosopon used in early 
trinitarian formulations, which may be translated as 'person, ' originally referred to the 
'mask' which actors wore precisely to block out their own specific characters or identities. 
Storytellers wish their audience to focus on the story being related not their own particular 
characteristics or mode of communication. To say that an actor or storyteller (or teacher 
etc. ) is "without a face, " in the sense of the total bracketing off of their personality, is a 
nonsense. The good actor and storyteller is the one who channels her activity through her 
personality. This is not to be egocentrically focused - "Look at me! Pay attention to me! " - 
but to use the ground of their own personalities to transcend them in the task of mediating 
the story, or character. In addition, it has been argued in this Chapter that non-personal 
language used to describe the Spirit may be the result of unthematised experience or also 
77' Acts 1.5,11.16,19.1-7; Gal. 3.2; I Cor. 14.5,18. 
778 Congar, Vol. 111, p. 5. 
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function as an analogical protective shield against the anthropomorphisms latent in the 
personal metaphors. 
Is there a case for the complementarity of personal and non-personal models or 
metaphors? With any complementary use of models there has to be a basic level of 
agreement between the propositions claimed in any model, if coherence is to be sought. 
After all, the different models are attempting to describe one reality. This is not to argue 
that the propositional content derived from a model need exhaust the efficacy of the model 
or metaphor. If the Spirit's nature and action are personal, as has been argued above, then 
the need for complementary models seems unnecessary. However, non-personal language 
has real metaphysical import in ensuring the transcendence of God from the clutches of 
anthropomorphic categories. In sum, non-personal metaphors used of the Spirit can be 
complementary, standing as a corrective to a too cosy Personalist view, as long as the 
essential personal nature of the Spirit is not undercut. This is why a 'Personalist' model of 
the Spirit-human relationship is given primacy. 
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CHAPTER 7. 
SYSTEMATIC CONTEXTUALISATION 1. 
THREE THEOLOGICAL LOCI: (I) IMAGE AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY, (II. ) 
CREATION, CONSERVATION, CONCURRENCE AND (III. ) PROVIDENCE. 
In the next two Chapters a new methodological strategy will be employed, that of 
"systematic contextualisation. " The generating question of the thesis is placed within the 
framework of relevant Christian doctrines. This Chapter will examine three theological 
loci, and their interrelations, which provide the theological framework of the generating 
question, namely: (I) the intersubjective condition of humankind as an analogy of the 
relations of the hypostaseis of the Trinity; (II) the doctrine of conservation and 
concurrence; and, (III) the doctrine of providence. 
I. ) Trinity, Image And Intersubiectivit_y. 
In the Prolegomena, it was noted that the preservation of the particularity of the three 
Divine hypostaseis within the koinonia of the Trinity, gave a prima facie reason for 
supposing that God would act towards His creatures in such a way as to preserve the 
particularity of human freedom and identity. Karl Barth, who in the twentieth century has 
been one of the key theologians who helped restore the doctrine of the Trinity to its 
rightful prominence, 779 argued that a Christian conception of the "image of God" must 
reflect such a trinitarian doctrine of God. 
78° It has already been argued in relation to the 
concept of a latent true nature, in Chapter 5 that the "image" ought to be considered in 
both structural and functional or relational terms. 
What a conception of the imago Dei based on a trinitarian doctrine of God reveals, for 
Barth, is that there is plurality among creatures, a "being in togetherness. " Barth sees the 
relational aspect of the image evident in Genesis 1: 27, where original "togetherness" 
is as 
man and wife. 781 In addition, following St. Paul, Barth sees the 
Christ as the true "image, " 
779 R. W. Jenson, "Karl Barth", The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to 
Christian theology in the 
twentieth century, Vol. 1, edited by David F. Ford 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 42. 
780 Church Dogmatics, 111/1, sc. 41. 
781 ibid., p. 184ff. 
210 
an image that again reflects analogously the structure of the inner Godhead. 782 Thus, for 
Barth, such a relational conception of the image is derived both from the relation between 
the doctrine of the Trinity (God), and Christology (the true image or relation of creature to 
God). As God in se possesses both personal particularity and plurality, so "humanity in its 
basic form is co-humanity. "783 Equally, given that human existence "is modelled on the 
human being Jesus, on his being for human companions [Mitmenschen] X784 so human life 
is a "being in togetherness, " which in its Christian form, is a life with and for others. 
It seems quite easy to push this trinitarian analogy too far, as some of Barth's expositors 
seem to do. For example, Stuart McLean talks of the "basic metaphor of covenant, the I- 
Thou dyad, present between Father and Son in the Godhead, between God and man [in 
Christ], and between man and man [in the human community]. , 785 Although, one may 
wish to talk of an analogous I-Thou dyad to that of interpersonal relationships in the 
relation between the Father and Jesus Christ, nevertheless, if we are to avoid tritheism it is 
clear that inter-trinitarian relations are not univocally "I-Thou" relations. Neither is the 
union of the two natures in Christ an "I-Thou" relation. According to the Chalcedonian 
definition there not two subjects, but one hypostasis, "one and the same Son and only- 
begotten God, Word, Lord Jesus Christ. X786 If we are to appropriate anything from the 
trinitarian analogy it has to be something more general and restricted, namely, that to be 
human, and to be, at least partly, in the "image of God, " is to embody in some way the 
trinitarian principles of relation: perichoresis, particularity and relationality. 787 
The first systematic contextualisation of the generating question of this thesis can be 
presented: human freedom is not causa sui, and although freedom is predicated of a 
particular person, the nourishment and formation of that person is dependent on an 
782 "The humanity of Jesus is not merely the repetition and reflection of His divinity, or of God's controlling 
will; it is the repetition and reflection of God Himself... " Church 
Dogmatics, 111/2, p. 219). 
783 ibid., p. 285. 
784 ibid., p. 324. 
785 McLean, p. 38. 
786 E. R. Hardy and Cyril Richardson, eds., Christology of the Later Fathers 
(Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1954), p. 373. 
787 This may be compared to Colin Gunton's re-appropriation of the 
Ancient Greek and Mediaeval concept of 
transcendentalia (transcendentals), to refer to those things which can 
be predicated of all being, both 
personal and non-personal, given God's role as 
Creator of the world. The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 
pp. 129-141. Gunton notes their "extreme generality"(ibid., p. 
153), and the danger here is that they can be 
misused and can be opened to 'crypto-ideologies. 
' 
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intersubjective environment, of world and community. To refer to the intersubjectivity of 
the human condition is not to presume that this directly mirrors intra-trinitarian relations, 
only that this is an analogue. The concept of intersubjectivity makes reference to the 
philosophical tradition, 788 and points to the fact that this move of contextualisation is not 
only to be supported by theological argument. From what might be considered to be the 
high water mark of epistemic subjectivism, Descartes' Cogito, philosophers have tended to 
argue that the way to avoid the potential solipsism to which Descartes' hyperbolic doubt 
gives rise, is to recognise that part of the tools which Descartes relies upon to achieve this 
thought-experiment, such as language, logic and culture, are best explained in terms of 
intersubjective relations. Both in Analytic philosophy with Wittgenstein's seminal, and 
much debated, "private language argument, " and the birth of the philosophy of language, 
and in Continental philosophy with a move from a "philosophy of consciousness" to a 
"standpoint which affirms the primacy of communication, 1,789 the intersubjective 
environment of human existence has been reasserted. 
We noted in Chapter 1 that John Oman brought out the association of the dialectical 
relationship of independence and dependence in a person's relation with moral reality and 
in the relation of grace-freedom. The moral personality, writes Oman, "knows nothing of 
will, except as it responds to the attractions of a varied outer world, but it only realises its 
will by possessing all things and not being under the power of any; it has no ideals except 
as it seeks the ultimate nature of reality, but it cannot find them till it return and discover 
them as absolute requirements of its own constitution; it has no knowledge except by 
going out of itself and forgetting itself in a varied world, but it can garner what it brings 
back only as its own experience. , 790 One needs an ontology that makes room for both an 
order and integrity of location for any given being and its relation to other orders. Then 
one will expect that an ontology of persons will also balance the integrity of a person's 
788 The concept of intersubjectivity is derived from the work of Edmund Husserl who, in his Fifth Meditation 
of his Cartesian Meditations, argued that the world that is the object of our intentionality is not a private 
world, but an intersubjective world, common and accessible to all. Intersubjectivity is described by reference 
to our empathy with other persons as fellow subjects, and the process of fitting our expectations of others to 
the states in which we consider them to be. From this Husserl held that our constitution of the world is not 
solipsistic. We constitute the world as a shared world, although experienced from the variety of different 
points of view of the various subjects. Such intersubjectivity constitutes the basis for objectivity and for the 
reason why our perceptions have to fit the world rather than vice versa. 
789 Peter Dews, "The Paradigm Shift to Communication and the Question of Subjectivity: Reflections on 
Habermas, Lacan and Mead, " Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 49 (1995), pp. 483-519. 
790 Oman, p. 65. Compare this with E. Levinas' philosophy below. 
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identity alongside the significance of the relational order within which a person exists. 791 
This is not to concede that relational categories are the only categories on which ontology 
is constructed, or that in ontology, as some would hold, the category of personhood is 
primary over that of nature. An adequate account of intersubjectivity cannot be given here 
for it would have to touch upon language (Wittgenstein), society and culture (Mead), and 
embodiment (Merleau-Ponty) as areas of intersubjectivity. Instead, how one philosopher, 
Emmanuel Levinas, deals with intersubjectivity in relation to ethics will be touched on to 
raise some of the import of these issues. 
From the standpoint of ethics, Emmanuel Levinas has argued that the intersubjective792 
environment is crucial in the formation of ethical subjects. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas 
argues that a supportive intersubjective environment (e. g. the mother) nourishes the person 
and allows them, through an exercise of autonomy, to establish the self. 793 This nurturing 
of the self, Levinas describes as "living from"(vivre de), whereby the world acts as source 
of nourishment and enjoyment (jouissance) to the developing self. Sensibility is the 
primary mode of operation. 794 In Levinas' terms this represents a process of the 
"transmutation of the other into the same, t, 795 one of mastery, where otherness is a pleasure 
to be enjoyed and a satisfaction of one's needs. 
791 For example, Beth J. Singer follows Justus Buchler's principle of ordinality: "To be is to be an order of 
traits and a constituent of other orders. It is to be a location of traits, located among the traits of the world. " 
Singer, "Intersubjectivity without subjectivism, " p. 323. She goes on to argue: "There can be no complex [i. e. 
ordinal location] without relations. For a trait to obtain, for it to be and be the (discriminable) trait that it is, 
is for it to be delimited. To be delimited is to be conditioned, environed by limiting and enabling conditions: 
It is to be located in an order that provides for this trait to obtain rather than any other. " ibid., p. 323. She then 
applies this ontological conception to the human subject and society, holding together uniqueness and 
relationality: "The standpoint of the self is always that of a selected perspectival location, a viewpoint, which 
may be unique to itself, on the situation in which one finds oneself. But there is no developed human being 
whose inclusive perspective as a person is wholly unique and unshared: Each of us has perspectives that, 
because of their similarity to those of individual others, enable us to communicate with and to understand 
those others.... These perspectives unite us in a state of community... " ibid., p. 328. The self has the 
possibility to be unique because it involves, what Singer calls, a "proceptive process, a moving locus of 
assimilation"(ibid., p. 324), and is a unique complex of traits. 
792 The concept of the "intersubjective" is not a term which Levinas would use to describe the relation 
between the Self and the Other, because "intersubjectivity" might be suggestive of some interpersonal 
system, in which the Self and the Other stand. As I am less inclined to 
follow the extremes of Levinas' 
analysis of the bankruptcy of "ontology, " the use of intersubjectivity 
in my use of Levinas is designed to 
point out the difference in our approach. 
793 Levinas sets out these conditions for subjectivity in section II of Totality and Infinity, entitled 
"Interiority 
and Economy", pp. 109-180. 
794 Levinas describes it almost as a state of undifferentiated childhood bliss: "One does not know, one lives 
sensible qualities: the green of these leaves, the red of this sunset. 
" ibid., p. 135. 
795 ibid., p. 111. The term "other" in the quotation is in small case to represent the other of the material 
world, rather than the "Other" (capital case) of s/he who presents 
the ethical demand. 
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The I is, to be sure, happiness, presence at home with itself. But, as 
sufficiency in its non-sufficiency, it remains in the non-I; it is enjoyment of 
'something else, ' never of itself. Autochthonous, that is, enrooted in what it 
is not, it is nevertheless, within this enrootedness, independent and 
separated. 796 
Without the egocentrism, which is fostered by the Self's initial "enjoyment" of the world, 
the self would never achieve identity, as Levinas' contention is that wholly dependent 
beings can result only in fusion or confusion. 
However, there is a second movement in Levinas' conception of how the intersubjective is 
integrally related to the formation of the self. For all the experience of the jouissance of a 
world that affirms and is available to the developing self, disruptive alterity cannot be 
excluded. The ethical "Other" (L Autrui) who unlike the material other (1'Autre), cannot be 
subsumed or reduced, "calls in question the naive right of my powers, my glorious 
spontaneity as a living being. "797 It is precisely this resistance to incorporation into the 
selfs system ("the Same") by the "Other, " that overturns any tendency towards solipsistic 
egoism, and helps to form the self as someone who can encounter and respond to the call 
and demand of the Other. As Colin Davis puts it: 
The Other puts me into question by revealing to me that my powers and 
freedom are limited. But the face does not annihilate the self; on the 
contrary, it is the condition of its separateness. It instigates dialogue, 
teaching, and hence reason, society and ethics. 798 
Far from simply closing off my freedom, the Other makes possible the investiture of my 
freedom. 799 Heteronomy justifies an otherwise arbitrary and violent freedom by making it 
responsible for the Other before a judgement that is chosen neither by the Other, nor by the 
Self. Moral freedom bestows upon the self, the possibility of praise and blame, of 
responsibility, of being subjected to the demands of the Other. Through it the self s 
"subjecthood" is formed. It does not violate free will, but rather gives it direction in giving 
it a task or meaning. Davis again: 
Without the Other, freedom is without purpose or foundation. In the face to 
face, the Other gives my freedom meaning because I am confronted with 
real choices between responsibility and obligation towards the 
Other, or 
796 ibid., p. 143. 
797 ibid., p. 84. 
798 Colin Davis, Emmanuel Levinas: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1996), pp. 49. cf. Totality 
and Infinity, pp. 203-4. 
799 Totality and Infinity, p. 88. 
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hatred and violent repudiation. The Other invests me with genuine freedom, 
and will be beneficiary or victim of how I decide to exercise it. 800 
Norman Wirzba calls this a metanoia of autonomous freedom. 801 In encountering the 
Other, the self of jouissance recognises that its attempts at mastery are unjust and re- 
orientates the self to a new way of existing and being conscious of oneself and the 
world. 802 In the words of Catherine Chalier, the heteronomy of moral freedom: 
leads to the 'difficult freedom' of one who agrees to be a creature, a creature 
whose existence answers a calling that is prior to it, a calling which is 
waiting for its answer.... According to [Franz] Rosenweig creation is the 
miracle that enables man to listen to the calling of God asking, 'where are 
you' (Gen. 3: 9).... The significance of the self -which is a prerequisite of freedom - does not rest in its self-asserting but in its answering the calling 
that appoints it as unique. 803 
The self, then, does not pre-exist its encounter with its intersubjective environment, but is 
constituted by it, which means for Levinas the primacy of the ethical demand of the Other 
in face of which the self is passive, and can only respond. The primordial self-constituting 
response is, for Levinas, "Me voici, " which literally means, "here see me, 804 nothing more 
than an affirmation of the self in response to the Other. It is of note that for Levinas the 
concept of "creation, " comes to signify both the passivity of heterogeneity and the 
uniqueness and freedom (autonomy) of beings in their relatedness: "Creation leaves to the 
creature a trace of dependence, but it is an unparalleled dependence: the dependent being 
draws from this exceptional dependence, from this relationship, its very independence, its 
800 Davis, p. 49. 
801 See Norman Wirzba, "From Maieutics to Metanoia: Levinas' Understanding of the Philosophical Task, " 
Man and World, Vol. 28 (1995), pp. 129-144. He goes on to say: "The encounter with the Other introduces us 
to the astonishing adventure called inspired living. The Other invests my freedom, inspires my being, by 
putting me on a new path of responsibility to a law beyond myself. `To recognise the Other is to give' 
(Totality and Infinity, p. 75). " Wirzba, p. 141. 
802 Roland Paul Blum concurs with this description of Levinas: "Encounter with the Other, therefore, is not a 
question of limiting my pretensions, of circumscribing my primal, 'natural' bailiwick, but of forcing an 
essential change upon me. I am now no longer defined by myself but by the Other. The state of nature cannot 
be, as in Locke and Hobbes, the theatre of my original isolation to which I can always, in principle, return. 
There is no return, since I have undergone an essential change. " Roland Paul Blum, "Emmanuel Levinas' 
Theory of Commitment, " Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 44, (1983), p. 163. 
803 Catherine Chalier, "The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and the Hebraic Tradition" in Ethics as First 
Philosophy, ed. by A. Peperzak (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 7 
804 Levinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 142. Bernard Waldenfals comments: "This responsibility, beyond any 
initiative, refers.... to an original passivity, more passive than any passion I can assume; ultimately, it refers 
to an original corporeality in whose skin I do not feel at home (Otherwise than Being, p. 108). These are all 
figures of the Other in me which rules out speaking of the Other without speaking of myself but which 
exclude even more the possibility that I speak of myself 
before speaking for the Other. I always come too late 
to assume my responsibility; so the response of my responsibility precedes every answer given 
by myself. " B. 
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exteriority to the system"805 This is precisely the Christian conception of creation, 
although Levinas' philosophy would never endorse a Christian conception of creation. 
Moreover, the primacy of the ethical call of the Other, also parallels what shall be further 
discussed in section III of this Chapter, namely God's calling forth of creation in the light 
of His prior intent of Self-communication (the doctrine of revelation). 
In sum, human freedom and identity is not causa sui, but is formed within an 
intersubjective environment, one which bears some analogy to the dialectic of particularity 
and relationality within the Trinity. The true functioning of human agency is revealed in 
the perfect "image of God, " Christ, and witnessed to by the Church. One example of a 
philosophical outworking of an aspect of intersubjectivity to be found in the work of 
Levinas, characterises the human condition as that of "separation/independence within 
relation, " which is precisely the dynamic to be found, as we shall see in the next section, 
within a Christian account of creation. However, intersubjectivity remains a 
contextualising point as regards the generating question of the thesis. It does not follow 
from the fact that human freedom and identity is formed within an intersubjective 
environment, that freedom is trans-subjective, in the sense that another person(s) can 
intervene directly in my freedom of will to alter the outcome of my willing. 
Intersubjectivity does not equate to intersubjective control of human freedom. In short, 
intersubjectivity is not a boon for the Divine Fiat view. There is independence, integrity of 
agency, within relation; a relative independence or autonomy which cannot be overridden 
without loss of freedom and identity, however much one's agency is formed and enabled 
by one's intersubjective environment. 
II. Creation, Conservation And Concurrence. 
To justify the asymmetry of the Divine-human relationship and to clarify God's relation to 
His creatures, it is necessary to place the question of human agency within the context of 
the doctrine of creation and conservation. From the very account of creation 
in Genesis 1, 
we see that creation begins with a "formless void" 
(v. 2), but is shaped by a process of 
separating and a binding together. As Cornelius 
Plantinga comments: 
Waldenfals, "Response and Responsibility in Levinas" in Ethics as 
First Philosophy, ed. by A. Peperzak 
(New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 45. 
805 Totality and Infinity, pp. 104 -5. 
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God begins to do some creative separating: he separates light from 
darkness, day from night, water from land, the sea creatures from the land 
cruiser..... At the same time God binds things together: he binds humans to 
the rest of creation as stewards and caretakers of it, to himself as bearers of 
his image, and to each other as perfect complements. 806 
This not only supports the relevance of intersubjectivity and interdependence, 807 but also 
provisionally structures our conception of identity. As Miroslav Volf points out: 
The account of creation as 'separating-and-binding' rather than simply 
'separating' suggests that 'identity' includes connection, difference, 
heterogeneity. The human self is formed not through a simple rejection of 
the other - through a binary logic of opposition and negation - but through a 
complex process of 'taking in' and 'keeping out. ' We are who we are not 
because we are separate from the others who are next to us, but because we 
are both separate and connected, both distinct and related; the boundaries 
that mark our identities are both barriers and bridges. 808 
The doctrine of creation offers a prima facie structure to our conception of identity. 
Creation is both created ontologically distinct from God, but at the same time dependent 
upon Him. Within itself creation involves the distinct identities and relative autonomy that 
comes from the Divine creative separating out of creation, in what Volf calls a process of 
"differentiation, , 809 and the binding together of creation, in its interdependence and 
interrelation. This re-enforces the conclusions we have reached hitherto. 
The Christian God has traditionally been seen not only as the Creator of heaven and earth, 
but also as the God without Whose continued act of conservation, preservation and 
sustenance, there would be no creation: "`For in Him we live and move and have our 
being. ,, 810 This is no watchmaker, as a textbook deist position might hold, whose only 
action is to wind up the clock and leave it ticking. For traditional Christianity the created 
order cannot be absolutely separate from the Creator. Scripture testifies to the Divine 
806 Cornelius Plantinga, Not the Way it's Supposed to be. a breviary of sin (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
Eerdmans, 1995), p. 29. 
807 For a complementary account of creation that stresses the importance of creation as a network of relations 
of interdependence, see Michael Welker, Creation and Reality, trans. J. 
F. Hoffmeyer (Minnaepolis: Fortress 
Press, 1999). 
808 Volf, p. 66. 
809 ibid, p. 65ff. Volf distinguishes the term "differentiation" 
from the uncreative and sinful "separating out" 
and homogenising which is "exclusion": "First, exclusion can entail cutting off 
the bonds that connect, taking 
oneself out of the pattern of interdependence and placing oneself 
in a position of sovereign independence. 
....... 
Second, exclusion can entail erasure of separation, not recognizing the other as someone who 
in his or 
her otherness belongs to the pattern of interdependence. 
" ibid., p. 67. 
810 Acts17.28, c. f. Heb. 1.3. 
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Creator and Conserver being causally active in an all-pervasive manner throughout 
creation. 811 As was remarked above, the human person is not causa sui. The free actions of 
human creatures are no exception to the work of God's all-permeating, constant causal 
efficacy. 812 By providing a conception of the relation of Divine-human agency at the 
foundational level of existence, the doctrine of conservation provides an important context 
for considering Divine-human relations at other levels of agency. It will also be maintained 
that the doctrine of creation and conservation will help us perceive a pattern in Divine- 
human relations at all levels of agency. 
Following the work of Alfred Freddoso, three theological options arise in relation to the 
question of Divine conservation: "occasionalism, " "mere conservationism, " and 
"concurrentism. i813 Occasionalism, a position held among others by al-Ghazali, Gabriel 
Biel, Nicholas Malebranche and George Berkeley, maintains that God is the sole cause of 
effects in nature, including human actions. 814 On this position, human creatures do not 
contribute any causal input as regards the effects of their actions. Human agency does not 
possess "secondary" causal power. The opposite of occasionalism is, what Freddoso terms, 
"mere conservationism. " Although this position has attracted little support in the history of 
theology, the 14th century scholar William Durandus being one of the few exceptions, it 
does have more support in present day theologies that are driven by a respect for scientific 
realism. Mere conservationism holds that although God may be said to be the Creator and 
Conserver of all things, this does not involve God being a direct and immediate cause of 
an effect brought about by a natural substance. God is responsible for bringing about the 
causal power of created substances and for preserving that causal power in existence, but 
not for its exercise. The third and final variation is concurrentism, which has attracted by 
s" For example, see Job 38.25-29; 39-41, Psalm 148.3-10. 
812 Isaiah 26.12; 1 Cor. 12.6; II Cor. 3.5. 
813 Alfred J. Freddoso outlines and critiques the options in, "God's General Concurrence with Secondary 
Causes: Pitfalls and Prospects" in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 68 no. 2 (1994), pp. 131- 
156. See also A. J. Freddoso, "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why 
Conservation is not 
enough" in Philosophical Perspectives, 5, Philosophy of Religion. ed. 
by J. E. Tomberlin (Atascadero: 
Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1991), pp. 553 - 585. 
814 For contemporary discussions of occasionalism see: A. J. Freddoso, "Medieval 
Aristotelianism and the 
Case Against Secondary Causation in Nature" in Divine and Human Action, ed. by T. V. Morris (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 74 - 118; Steven Nadler, "Occasionalism and 
General Will in 
Malebranche" The Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 31(1993), pp. 31-47; and S. Nadler, "`No 
Necessary Connection': The Medieval Roots of the occasionalist Roots of Hume" in The Monist, Vol. 79 
no. 3 (1996), pp. 121 - 139. 
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far the mainstream support in the history of theology and contends that transeunt action 
(i. e. action resulting in effects external to the agent) is the result of a concursus, a coming 
together of Divine and created causation. 
All three options involve apparent contradictions. In the case of occasionalism, setting 
aside the deeply counterintuitive nature of the theory, it appears to make a distinction 
between transeunt actions of created substances and non-transeunt action, viz., an action 
that does not have effects outside the subject. Yet, surely the logic of occasionalism 
suggests that non-transeunt actions should also fall under the sole causal prerogative of the 
Divine? If human mental states are the effects exclusively of Divine action, then it follows 
that human action is strongly determined and creatures have no claim to be morally 
responsible for their actions. Moreover, the occasionalist position runs into difficulties in 
relation to the problem of evil, in maintaining a distinction between a God who may 
permit evil and one who actively causes evil. 815 
"Mere conservationism" attempts to avoid the extreme of deism, while maintaining a 
biblical conception of Divine conservation and the integrity of direct, created causal 
efficacy. The position lacks, what Freddoso calls, the 'intuitively appealing principle of 
symmetry: ' "that a created entity depends on God for its coming into existence in exactly 
the same way it depends on Him for its continuing to exist. , 816 Any distinction which is to 
be made between "direct", "immediate" created causal efficacy and "remote, " "indirect" 
Divine conservation, needs to be carefully drawn if "mere conservationism" is not to slip 
into concurrentism. 817 Lastly, concurrentism is faced with the prima facie contradiction of 
how two agencies can both causally contribute to one effect, viz. the action of a human 
agent, or the effect of certain natural substances or events. 
815 This is the reason Freddoso gives for being sceptical about the prospects of occasionalism: "Aristotelian 
theists [i. e. concurrentists or mere conservationism] use individual natures as a causal buffer between God 
and evil. For they claim that God is only a general cause of the effects of secondary causes, and so they can 
argue with some plausibility that the defectiveness of evil states of affairs (whether they be moral evils or 
physical evils) is traceable solely to the causal contribution of the secondary or creaturely causes. 
The no- 
nature theory [the most plausible version of occasionalism], by contrast, does away with natures, and 
holds 
that God is the sole active cause of every state of affairs in nature. So if any such states of affairs are evil or 
defective, this defectiveness can be traced only to God's causal contribution. But this seems to make God 
the doer - and not just the permitter - of evil. 
" Freddoso, "Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case Against 
Secondary Causation in Nature, " p. ll6. 
816 Freddoso, "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes, " p. 568. 
S" The adjectives used to describe mere conservationism in speech marks 
here are taken from Freddoso's 
account of mere conservationism. Freddoso, "God's 
General Concurrence with Secondary Causes", p. 554. 
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There is not the space to discuss all three positions with equal weight. As concurrentism 
has been by far the best supported theological position over time, and Freddosso and 
others have given plausible arguments as to why the prima facie contradictions of mere 
conservationism and occasionalism are more intractable than concurrentism, a 
concurrentist position will be chosen to explicate the doctrine of Divine conservation. 
Moreover, as all three positions support a doctrine of conservation, in principle they would 
all lead to the general conclusion of this section, namely, that conservation presents the 
first level of Divine action in relation to the human, and hence, an important context of the 
generating question. Nonetheless, it is simplest to exhibit this conclusion on a 
concurrentist position. 
1.01) Concurrentism. 
To present a coherent position of concurrentism one must address the prima facie 
problems with concurrentism, namely, how two agencies can both causally contribute to a 
common effect. It is all too easy for a defence of concurrentism to explain this apparent 
contradiction by saying that one party does X while the other party does Y, and that co- 
operatively X and Y together produce the desired effect. Surreptitiously this hides the fact 
that actually X and Y perform two different actions and even produce two distinct effects, 
which when added together produce what is claimed to be the one common effect. David 
Griffin holds that: 
[I]f `sufficient' really means sufficient, then the idea of two sufficient 
causes for one event is clearly self-contradictory. Accordingly, if one holds 
to divine causation [i. e. concurrentism], then pantheistic monism cannot be 
consistently avoided818 
Frank Dilley argues that the result of concurrentism is either a denial of one party's 
freedom, "mutuality of freedom, " or a division of the action and effect, "mutuality of 
action. " 
What is required, however, is that the same act be done by two sets of 
causes operating freely [this is concurrentism]. If God does one part and 
man the rest, then each is doing part of the act, and they are not 
both doing 
the same act at the same time. In addition, to say that God does part of the 
818 David R. Griffin, "Relativism, Divine Causation, and Biblical Theology" 
in God's Activity in the World, 
ed. by O. C. Thomas (American Academy of 
Religion, 1983), p. 123. 
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act would be to say that he does act in nature to `interfere'.... In short, the 
dilemma is this: if there is genuine unity of action, two parties doing 
exactly the same act at the same time, then there is no duality of causes; and 
if there is duality of causes, then there is no unity of action. The one kind of 
unity there can be is unity of will, the sharing of a will to the same result, 
but in such cases each party acts separately, each does his part, but they do 
not do the same thing. 819 
A reply to such criticisms must commence from an understanding of the uniqueness of the 
Creator-creature relationship. The Creator-creature relationship does not just fall into 
another type or genus of natural relationship, such as interpersonal human relations; it is 
unique and transcends the categorical order of created causation. If God is the Creator, 
Lord of all and "in Him we live and move and have our being"(Acts 17.28), then our very 
framework of existence is divinely held in being. As such, it would indeed be 
presumptuous for creatures to assume that we can grasp our grounding in the Divine. That 
does not mean that one is left with complete mystery. The very ability to talk or recognise 
the existence of Divine conservation requires one to have some knowledge of that reality, 
however preliminary. This is why Kathryn Tanner warns that concursus "should first of all 
not be talked about as concord, a convergence of independent lines of divine and created 
agencies productive of a single created effect. , 
820 Concursus must be seen from the 
perspective of Divine conservation of existence in general: 
God's transcendence prohibits talk of God's working with created causality 
in any way that implies the parity of divine agency and created causality 
within a common causal nexus or plane. According to the rule for talk of 
God's agency, God can be said to work with created causes only in the 
sense that God creatively establishes that causality to have its place within a 
created order directly established as a whole by God. 
821 
The contradiction which Dilley and Griffin perceive is caused by there being two agents, 
two distinct intentions and even two separate centres of causation. 
822 Yet this is to assume 
that the Divine-human relation in conservation is to be conceived of in a way that places 
two agents on a level playing field, neglecting the uniqueness and asymmetry of 
the 
Creator-creature relationship outlined above. If all action is action under the 
influence of 
819 Frank B. Dilley, "Does the `God Who Acts' Really Act? " in God's 
Activity in the World ed. by O. C. 
Thomas (U. S.: American Academy of Religion, 1983), pp. 56-7. 
820 Kathyrn E. Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 93. 
821 ibid, p. 94. 
822 When Dilley and Griffin bemoan the coherence of concurrentism 
they presuppose that they have some 
self-contained valid definition of what constitutes an action, 
which they do not in fact provide. 
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Divine conservation, then the problematic dualism that Dilley attempts to construct 
between self-contained human action and Divine action is misconceived. 
Griffin holds that a concurrentist position gives rise to the over-determination of positing 
two sufficient conditions for one event. Thomas Aquinas produced an account of primary 
and secondary causation that can avoid this contradiction. Aquinas distinguishes between 
God the primary cause, who is the immediate, universal cause of something being at all 
(esse commune), and secondary causes, which are created causal powers responsible for 
the particular and determinative being of the effect, enacted through the power of primary 
causation. 823 Brian Shanley warns that this distinction does not leave the human agent with 
an operation that is ever independent of the Divine. Secondary causation is always the 
action of "moved movers. 024 God is the Creator, but He grants human creatures "the 
dignity of causing. , 825 Human secondary causation is never sufficient in itself, as God 
conserves existence and hence moves all beings to their actions as the primum movens non 
motum. 826 The Divine primary cause may be thought to be sufficient, in the sense that it is 
quite possible that an omnipotent God could by Himself alone bring about such an effect. 
All secondary causation is dependent upon Him. Nevertheless, as part of the Divine 
condescension of creation, Divine causation permits secondary causation to be a factually 
necessary condition of the production of particular, determinate effects. 827 If some such 
distinction is accepted between Divine general concurrence and determinate secondary 
causation, then Griffin's criticism can be appropriately addressed. 828 Freddoso provides 
823 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), III, 66. See also, 
Etienne Gilson, "The Corporeal World and the Efficacy of Second Causes, " in God's Activity in the 
World, ed. O. C. Thomas (Chico: Scholars Press, 1983), pp. 212 - 227. 824 He writes: "it must always be remembered that the divine causation of esse is ultimately constitutive of 
every formal perfection in the secondary cause, its causing, and its effect. " Brian Shanley, O. P., "Divine 
Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas, " American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 72 (1998), 
p. 109. 
825 Summa Theologicae, I q. 22 art. 3. 
826 Aquinas, De Potentia, 111,7. Shanley lays out the logic of Thomas' position as follows: "all finite 
secondary causes are moved movers..... because nothing moves from potency to act except under the 
influence of what is already in act. Every created agent.... requires the prior actuality of God as primum 
movens in order to actualize its potentiality to its own proper operations. " "Divine Causation and Human 
Freedom in Aquinas, " p. 109. 
827 "God lays down necessary causes for effects that he wants to be necessary, and he lays down causes that 
act contingently - i. e. that can fail of their effect - for the effects he wants to be contingent... The will of God 
cannot fail: but in spite of that, not all its effects are necessary; some are contingent. " Aquinas, 
Commentarium in Aristotelis libros perl hermeneias, I. 14. 
828 K. Tanner in her defence of concurrentism draws a distinction between two orders of causal efficacy: 
"along a `horizontal' plane, an order of created causes and effects; along a `vertical' plane, the order whereby 
God founds the former. " God and Creation in Christian Theology, p. 89. 
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common day analogies, such as two people lifting a car, to support the position that "co- 
operative effects sometimes have features that can be traced back primarily to one or 
another of the co-operating agents without destroying the unity of the effect. "829 
As regards the first prong of Dilley's concerns, namely, whether concursus could combine 
mutuality with unity of action, Aquinas would maintain that esse commune and the 
determinate esse cannot be separated. They are part of one whole. 830 When a human agent 
intends to, for example, sculpt a piece of alabaster, one cannot separate out the 
contribution of God and the person, the human intention to sculpt a particular form and the 
undergirding esse commune originating from God. Human causality is experienced as the 
exercising of real causal power, not the mere provision of mental intentionality. As 
Shanley writes: "A secondary cause is a real cause acting through its own intrinsic power 
to produce a commensurate effect, but only insofar as it acts in dependence upon the 
primary cause (in virtuteprimi agentis). X831 The effect cannot be divided up, because both 
the universal and the particular are required to produce the one effect. The effects of either 
the universal or particular cause alone are not factual realities; they are abstractions. 
The second prong of Dilley's critique concerns how concurrentism can preserve the 
freedom of both agents. As neither agent is the sufficient cause of the event, 832 both parties 
have a causal role in the production of the effect, although Divine causation has an 
undergirding role. This is so because of the self-effacing intent of God to enable His 
creation to have relative autonomy. 833 God enables secondary causation of particular 
829 Freddoso, "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes, " p. 149. In the case of two people lifting a 
car, the common effect is lifting the car ten inches off the ground, a task that neither person could accomplish 
on his own: "Yet even if neither of you could have lifted the car so much as an inch off the ground on your 
own, it still seems natural enough to say that the fact that the left rear part of the car now stands ten inches off 
the ground - instead of, say, six inches or none at all - is traceable primarily to you as an efficient cause 
rather than to your friend, and this in virtue of the fact that you are lifting from the left side. " ibid. This 
example is not meant to apply univocally, as the case involves two human agents, not the unique Creator- 
creature relationship, which on one analysis of the situation would be undertaking two distinct actions, not 
one. 
830 Summa Contra Gentiles, 111.70. 
831 Shanley, "Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas, " p. 108. 
832 This is given the proviso that in the case of Divine agency this is not a question of lack of power, but the 
choice of allowing His creatures a role in causation. 
833 A human analogue here might be the case of an anonymous benefactor, who supplies the finance for a 
student to achieve his university degree. In a sense the student's acquiring the degree is the result of double 
agency: without the benefactor she would never have been able to study. Nonetheless, the benefactor 
contributes in a non-self-assertive way laying down no conditions. It is the student's talents that are 
responsible for passing the degree not the benefactor's. 
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events, even though this might go against His own character, in the case of a sinful act. 834 
In this area, unlike the Divine Fiat view, causation does not equal compulsion. As Aquinas 
writes: "It is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent: but it is not 
necessary that this inward principle be the first principle unmoved by another. "835 To 
suggest that this denies true freedom to secondary causes, because they can never act 
independently of Divine conservation, is to set up a false ideal of absolute freedom (causa 
sui) which secondary causes never have. Neither does this augur determinism. 
For just as creation is not a change, so too the divine motion is not the 
effecting of a change in something with independent existence; divine 
efficient causation is only a motio in an analogous sense. The primary mode 
of divine efficient causation is creative and constitutive, not controlling and 
compelling. God is not rival or auxiliary to created causes, but rather the 
One who makes all causes be causes. 836 
There is asymmetry: God is Creator, and creatures cannot dictate the conditions of their 
facticity. Dilley has not shown that the Divine works against particular, created human 
freedom and acts as a constraint on human freedom. God does not determine the particular 
choices that we make, even if He determines the nature of created reality, the set of 
circumstances and possibilities within which a person can interacts. 
1.02) Conclusion: General Concurrence and the Indwelling of the Holy Spirit. 
In this section it has been argued that a concurrentist account of the doctrine of 
conservation is coherent and places the generating question of this thesis in one of its 
theological contexts. Existence as created and conserved by God is, writes Aquinas, "more 
intimately and profoundly interior to things than anything else. , 837 Such an intimacy is 
something that eludes our grasp, originating as it does from its transcendent source. There 
is a fundamental distinction and asymmetry between Creator and creature. This helps to 
provide the context of some of the limits of our enquiry. 
In one sense, Stump's intrinsic-extrinsic distinction is inappropriate to refer to the Divine- 
human relation. If concurrentism is true, then the doctrine of conservation requires one to 
hold that God is intrinsic to our very being, at work sustaining our existence. 
8-34 In this sense, God may be said to permit the existence of evil, but not to will it. Such a tension is to be 
found in many accounts of the problem of evil. 
s35 Summa Theologiae, Ia2ae. q. 9. art. 4. 
836 Shanley, "Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas, " p. 105. 
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Aquinas explains that only the very cause of an intellectual nature can 
incline the will from within as a moving cause. Any other kind of moving 
cause acting on the will would violate its nature and freedom because it 
would coerce it extrinsically. 838 
At the same time, if we are to hold to the import of the primary-secondary causation 
distinction, then even though God is the primary cause, He allows for a level of causation 
that may be said to be "intrinsically" ours, the "dignity of causing. " This is to use the term 
"intrinsic" to mean that which stems from a persons own intellect and will. This does not 
exclude the integral role of God as Creator and conserver of our being, but safeguards the 
integrity or dignity of human agency. Thus, although God is, in the first sense, intrinsic to 
our being, there is also a sense in which it would be possible for God to violate the 
intrinsic human agency by contravening the natures of creatures who possess relative 
autonomy. 
At the outset it was questioned whether the doctrine of conservation could provide a 
pattern of Divine-human relations. The pattern one may suggest is evident in creation with 
the creative act of the Divine initiating a process of separating and binding, of establishing 
relative autonomy and distinct identity, alongside heterogeneity, interdependence and a 
general dependence upon God. The pattern is continued in the relation of primary and 
secondary causes, which is analogous to the Divine-human relation at the level of 
soteriology. It was argued above in respect to concurrentism that God's agency was 
primary, but self-effacing in enabling created reality to integrally participate in the causal 
process. As David Burrell emphasises: "For the divine agency effects particular actions 
through the proper modality of creatures, as befits the Creator, whose proper effect is the 
very existing of things. , 839 Analogously, it has been argued in this thesis that the Spirit- 
human relation in Christian metamorphosis, although initiated by the Divine and therefore 
primarily a result of Divine grace, does not override "the proper modality of creatures, " but 
allows creatures to respond and consent to the process of transformation. What we see, 
then, is a pattern across different levels of Divine activity, consistent with God's character 
and intentions towards His creatures. 
837 Summa Theologicae I q. 8 art. 1 
838 Shanley, "Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas, " p. 113; cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, III. 88. 
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There are, however, differences between the nature of concursus underlying Divine 
conservation and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Traditional accounts of concurrentism 
have recognised this by distinguishing between general concurrence and special 
concurrence. 840 General concurrence is universal and refers to the work of Divine 
conservation. Special concurrence, on the other hand, is not universal, but is bestowed 
upon particular activities, the works of Divine grace, such as the activity of the Spirit in 
soteriology. Does such a distinction suggest that special concurrence is somehow an 
outworking of general concurrence? Certainly the Spirit has traditionally been given a role 
in creation and in sustaining life as the Divine ruach (breath). 841 On the other hand, as 
Brian Gaybba comments, the Spirit has also a directly personal and soteriological 
orientation: 
I believe the reason was that `the Spirit of the Lord' was used as a way of 
expressing God's action towards God's people and through them on the 
world around us. `The Spirit of the Lord' seems mainly to be a way of 
describing God's active presence to people. This is instructive because it 
gives us insight into the `nature' of the Spirit. Its nature is to be a means of 
contact between persons, to be a means of unity, an idea developed very 
fully in Christian times. 842 
It is through the metamorphosis of human persons that the Spirit will ultimately sanctify 
the creatures' world (Rom. 8.21). 
The Spirit is therefore involved in both, what would be considered to be, special 
concurrence and general concurrence. It seems plausible to suppose that it is only because 
God is Creator and Conserver of the world, that He is able to save His creatures. In the 
next Chapter the interconnections between the doctrines of creation and redemption shall 
be further explored. We should, then, expect a unity in God's action, especially if we are 
to maintain the constancy of God's character and the omniscience of His intentions. This is 
why it is possible to hold that there is a similarity of pattern between Divine-human 
relations in general and special concurrence. Both allow for particular freedom within the 
839 David B. Burrell, "Divine Action and Human Freedom in the Context of Creation, " in The God Who Acts, 
ed. by T. F. Tracy (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), p. 106. 
840 See, A. J. Benedetto, "Divine Concurrence, " in New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IV, (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), pp. 125-7. He writes: "Special concurrence is given only with regard to 
certain kinds of activities. Actual grace is a case of special and supernatural concurrence. 
" ibid., p. 125. 
841 Genesis 1.2, Psalm 104.30, Psalm 33.6 and Job 33.4; Luke 8.55. The translation of ruach in Genesis 1.2 
is a matter of debate. As regards "spirit" as life-force, to 
"expire" or to "give up one's spirit" is to die 
(Mtt. 27.50). 
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essential asymmetry of the Creator-creature relation. General concurrence allows for the 
particular determination of actions by creatures and the "dignity of causing, " while 
remaining dependent on Divine conservation. Likewise, the activity of the Spirit in special 
concurrence as part of the primary Divine initiative towards humankind works for the 
metamorphosis of the person in a way that safeguards the integrity of human freedom and 
identity, requiring the real response and consent of the person. This is the pattern of the 
dialectic between distinction and communion, relative autonomy and dependence. 
On the other hand, creation/conservation and salvation are quite different levels of 
operation. As we have seen, in the doctrine of conservation Divine activity sustains 
existence (esse commune), whereas the Spirit's soteriological activity works for human 
metamorphosis in a personal way. The Spirit is described as a `counsellor', who will 
`indwell' or draw alongside the believer, `teach' them (John 14.15-27) and lead them 
(Gal. 5.16,25). The Spirit is said to search the hearts of believers and reprove. Scripture 
also refers to, `The Spirit said... ' (Acts 13.2; 21.11; I Tim. 4.1). If the argument of the 
thesis is correct, this level of God's agency is best conceived of, primarily, on a Personalist 
model. In contrast, general concurrence can rightly be described in quite impersonal terms, 
as the action of direct Divine causation, although, its effects are to uphold personal reality. 
If this is so, then the "intimacy" of the Divine operation in conservation (causal), is of a 
different kind from the personal intimacy of soteriology, although how God acts in the 
world to reveal His personal presence is dependent upon His prior causal sustenance of all 
things. 
If general and special concurrence refer to two different levels of Divine action, then it 
cannot be assumed or asserted, as some do, 843 that all questions concerning the place of 
842 Gaybba, p. 10. 
843 I am thinking here of Thomas F. Tracy's and William Hasker's critique of Kathryn Tanner's version of a 
concurrentist position. See K. Tanner, "Human Freedom, Human Sin, and God the Creator, " in The God Who 
Acts. ed. by T. F. Tracy (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 111-135. Tracy 
argues that Tanner's position undermines the causal efficacy of secondary causes, arguing that Tanner's 
position asserts that "God is the direct and total cause of every finite event. " T. F. Tracy, "Divine Action, 
Created Causes, and Human Freedom, " ed. by T. F. Tracy The God Who Acts (Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), p. 88. Tanner appears to combine incompatibilism on the 
horizontal order of created causality, with Divine compatibilism on the vertical plane. For Tracy this means 
that theological determinism wins out: "Although our free actions do not follow with necessity from the past 
history of the world, they do follow with necessity from God's act of willing that we undertake them. 
For 
God's agency necessarily achieves what it wills, and (on this account) 
God's will includes each of my 
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human freedom and identity in relation to the Divine may be solved at the level of general 
concurrence or by extension. As we have seen, God's primary causation in conservation 
upholds human nature and empowers the will, and does not determine a person against her 
nature or will. 844 For God to do so, to use creaturely causal dependence at the level of 
conserving existence to act to bring about psychological changes in the person, would 
negate the very self-imposed boundaries that God has set to ensure the integrity of His 
creation. As noted above, at one level God's causal power is so intimate to our being that it 
is, in a sense, intrinsic to our being. 845 Yet, that same Divine power establishes the 
integrity of creaturely existence in such a way that it is possible to talk of an act stemming 
from an intrinsic principle of the human agent, and for that to refer to the agents own 
intellect and will and no others. 846 In this sense, God can intervene, although never in the 
same way as another created agent. Thus, the internal logic of a concurrentist doctrine of 
conservation does not legitimise a hard theological determinism or a return to the 
controlling God of the Divine Fiat view. Rather, the doctrine of general concurrence, 
enacted at the level of causation, has ends that are person-forming. Likewise, but at a 
different level of operation, the Spirit's activity in the life of the believer, is person- 
enabling and enhancing, in that (a. ) the Spirit works within the created structures of 
freedom and identity, and (b. ) perfects true human particularity by drawing the person 
towards her eschatological fulfilment. 
In summary, special concurrence is not so much an outworking of general concurrence or 
even vice versa. Both levels of Divine action are an expression of the Divine intention 
choices. If we share the incompatibilist intuition that an action cannot be free if it is necessitated by its causal 
antecedents in the world, then there appear to be equally compelling reasons to deny that free human actions 
are necessitated by the divine will"(ibid., p. 94). William Hasker adds to this critique by pointing out the 
negative consequences of Tanner's approach for the problem of evil. W. Hasker, "God the Creator of Good 
and Evil? " in TThe God Who Acts, ed. by F. Tracy (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1994), p. 143. 
844 That there may be a grey area on this point in Aquinas himself, or at the very least Thomist exegesis, is 
indicated by the fact that two recent commentators classify Aquinas' position as a form of theological 
determinism. W. Hasker treats Thomism alongside Calvinism "Providence and Evil, " pp. 91-105. See also 
T. P. Flint, "Two Accounts of Providence" in Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of 
Theism, ed. by T. V. Morris (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 147-181. 
845 We noted in Chapter 5 that Stump's account did not make clear whether Divine agency was to be 
considered intrinsic or extrinsic to the human personality. I hope the above points offer a clarification. 
846 It is noteworthy that many Thomists do not make this distinction, emphasising God's role in creating and 
conserving human freedom and neglecting the relationship of Divine and human in soteriology. See for 
example, Herbert McCabe, "Freedom, " in God Matters (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1987), ch. 2. There 
appears to be a tension in Aquinas himself regarding the nature of Divine 
determination of the human (see 
the discussion of Aquinas in relation to Stump in Chapter 5). 
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from the beginning towards creation. Although special concurrence is rooted in Divine 
conservation, the specific ends of each level of Divine operation are distinct: existence and 
salvation. By far the most significant conclusion has been the discernment of a pattern to 
God's action at these different levels. As God has shown His intention to create beings 
with distinct identities and to respect the dignity of particular human actions by His 
general concurrence, we should not be surprised to discover that when God comes to 
interact with the particular actions of human beings in Christian metamorphosis, He 
should do so in a way that does not override the created structures of our being. At the 
same time, metamorphosis could never happen were it not for relationship with the Divine, 
the creative Divine initiative upon which we depend and which seeks to lead us to full 
communion with God and creation. 
III. ) The Doctrine of Providence. 
According to the Scholastic tradition both Catholic and Protestant, what has just been 
discussed above, namely, conservatio and concursus, were treated under the doctrine of 
providence. 847 A third component of the doctrine of providence was sought, which was not 
principally concerned with existence or nature, but with God's direction, purpose and goal 
for creation and history, gubernatio (steering). Colin Gunton articulates a further 
traditional distinction that is made: 
General providence is a name for that activity by which God is conceived to 
hold in being the order of creation: maintaining the order and teleology of 
the human and non-human realms. By contrast, particular and special 
providence are ways of speaking of saving or redemptive acts directed to 
restoring the right order, or, better, directedness of creation. 
848 
Recent debate in the philosophy of religion on the subject of providence has primarily 
been concerned with the issue of Divine foreknowledge and its compatibility with human 
freedom. Thus, for example, Thomas Flint in his review essay, "Providence and 
Predestination, "849 treats the issue of providence solely in this regard, hence substantially 
847 For an account of the Reformed tradition see B. W. Farley, The Providence of 
God (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Book House, 1988); also Lutheran Orthodoxy in Carl Heinz Ratschow, Lutherische Dogmatik zwischen 
Reformation und Aufklärung, Part II. (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1986); and 
Christoph Schwöbel's 
discussion of it in his article, "God, Creation and the Christian Community, 
" in The Doctrine of Creation, ed. 
by C. E. Gunton (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), pp. 166-7. 
848 Gunton, The Triune Creator, p. 176- 
849 Tr p Flint, "Providence and Predestination, " in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, eds. 
by P. L. 
Quinn & C. Taliaferro (Oxford, Blackwells, 1997), pp. 569-576. The same approach 
is taken by William 
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overlapping with Linda Zagebski's article in the same volume on "Foreknowledge and 
Human Freedom. " Our discussion will focus on gubernatio, providence as God's care, 
provision and direction of His creation. 
It has already been seen from our discussion of concurrence that for Aquinas God is the 
primary cause of existence, of the way creation is ordered and the manner or mode by 
which things come about: some necessarily, through necessary causes and others 
contingently, through contingent causes. 850 Thus, human action is contingent and not 
necessarily caused, and hence possesses its own relative autonomy and agency. 851 What is 
meant by "necessity" above may be related to modern physic's shift away from a 
Newtonian mechanistic paradigm and an understanding of nature as a deterministic 
"closed system. " Only when the physical laws which science generates are interpreted 
deterministically, as providing unquestionable sufficient conditions for an event, do 
particular acts of Divine providence appear to be violations of nature. 852 Unless the 
universe is a closed system where all relevant factors can be calculated, there appears to be 
a place for both necessity and contingency. This is a dialectic which mirrors that between 
separating out and binding discussed above. 853 The insights of modem science lead us to 
Hasker in both, "Providence and Evil, " pp. 91-105, and, "Providence, " in Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Vol. 7, ed. by Edward Craig, (London/New York: Routledge 1998). 
850 Summa Theologiae, I q. 19 art. 8. 
851 Brian Shanley writes of Aquinas' position: "That God works in each thing according to its own nature is 
one of the major themes in Aquinas's treatment of divine providence. Aquinas argues that the temporal 
execution of God's eternal plan is accomplished through the mediation of genuine secondary causation. God's 
providence does not ride roughshod over secondary causes, but rather works through them This means that 
divine providence does not squeeze contingency out of the universe but rather provides for contingent causes 
as the means by which the divine plan is accomplished. " Shanley, "Divine Causation and Human Freedom in 
Aquinas, " p. 117. 
852 As William Alston argues, "The most we are ever justified in accepting is a law that specifies what will be 
the outcome of certain conditions in the absence of any relevant factors other than those specified in the 
law. " W. P. Alston, "Divine Action, Human Freedom, and the Laws of Nature, " in Quantum Cosmology and 
the Laws of Nature. Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, eds. by R. J. Russell, N. Murphy, and C. J. 
Ishram (Vatican City State/Berkeley: Vatican Observatory Publications/ Center for Theology and Natural 
Sciences, 1993), p. 190. He goes on to conclude: "Since the laws we have reason to accept make provision 
for interference by outside forces unanticipated by the law, it can hardly be claimed that such a law will be 
violated if a divine outside force intervenes; and hence it can hardly be claimed that such laws 
imply that 
God does not intervene, much less imply that this is impossible. " ibid.. Steven Crain makes a similar point in 
arguing against the need to resort to Polkinghorne's search for a specific 'causal 
joint' in the indeterministic 
openness of chaotic systems which God influences via a 'top-down' or 'downward' mode of causation 
S. 
Crain, "Divine Action in a World Chaos: An Evaluation of John Polkinghorne's Model of Special Divine 
Action, "in Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 14 (1997), pp. 41 - 61. 
853 Note that differentiation (separating out) and interdependence/interrelation (binding) are supported by 
both necessity and contingency within creation. If there were no 
laws of nature what would bind different 
entities together? We would return to the undifferentiated 
"formless void" of the first state of creation. 
Equally, it is difficult to conceive of distinct identities and relative of autonomy of beings were there not 
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suppose that the world God has made is built upon reliable distributions of undetermined 
events in probabilistic patterns. 854 The interplay of chance (not uncaused) and necessity, is 
both at the level of indeterminacy at the microlevel (microbiology) and unpredictability at 
the macrolevel (evolutionary biology). Natural causality works in a very flexible way 
(chaos theory, quantum mechanics), as well as a highly repetitive or patterned way 
(probabilistic laws of nature), to allow for a "structured openness" or "freedom within 
regularity. " It is this interplay that allows for "cosmic creativity" and an "emergent 
universe. i855 As regards human agency it is precisely the nomological structure of the 
universe that bestows the reliability and regularity so integral to our decision-making, 
planning and intentional mental states. Equally it is the openness and flexibility of the 
world-system that allows human beings to exercise freedom. In fact some see the 
856 emergence of consciousness as the ultimate flexible system. 
This structured openness of regularity and flexibility that God has created, is also the 
frame within which God acts. Within the limits set by the probabilistic and lawful 
structures of God's creation, God's providential action may be considered to affect the 
course of events in the world by acting at crucial junctures to determine otherwise 
undetermined events. God's providentia actualises particular possibilities or alternatives 
offered by the world process at particular points, in a way that is pro-active and re- 
active. 857 
some degree of contingency. Again, we would return to a state where there may be distinct entities, but the 
homogeneity of hard determinism. 
854 Keith Ward, Divine Action (London, Collins, 1990); Arthur Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Theology for a Scientific Age. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); John 
Polkinghorne, One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986); Science and Providence: God's Interaction with the World (Boston: Shambhala Publications 1989). 
855 "The mutual interplay of chance and law, the operation of chance in a law-like framework, is creative. It is 
the combination of the two that allows new forms to emerge. On the one hand, if all were law-like and 
regular, then the system would be ossified. It would always repeat itself. On the other hand, if all were 
chance, then we would have chaos.... It is chance and law together that produce a universe in which new 
forms emerge, a universe that has creativity built into it. " A. Peacocke, "Theology and Science Today, " in 
Cosmos as Creation, ed. by Ted Peters. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989), p. 39. 
856 Polkinghorne, Science and Providence, pp. 28-31,33-34. 
857 For a complementary analogy, which envisages God as actualising particular possibilities within a range 
of possibilities given by the world-system, Niels Gregersen has recently suggested utilising autopoietic 
processes. An autopoietic process refers to a self-organising or producing system, 
like a cell for example, 
which has a considerable degree of 'autonomy, ' and the capacity to creatively adapt to their environment, 
through selective interaction (link to complexity theory). Employing Fred Dretske's 
distinction between 
triggering and structuring causes, Gregersen argues that according to the analogy, "God 
does not do anything 
that replaces the ordinary operations of nature. The workings of nature would still 
be the only triggering 
causes (like the Thomist concept of secondary causes). 
God is rather the underlying causality that enables the 
creatures to trigger themselves forth in their given setting... 
Working as a structuring cause, God is seen as 
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God may work within the probabilistic structure of physical laws set to 
select a set of paths which would not necessarily have eventuated by 
physical laws alone, though the possibility of such a path exists in the 
natural world. Thus God could act within the natural world, intentionally 
bringing about a particular future. 858 
It is important to see that there are self-imposed constraints to Divine action by the very 
act of creating such a world. Although God establishes the structures of the universe and 
conserves them in existence, if they are to remain as a relatively autonomous system, then 
God must not act so frequently as to alter the probability-pattern of their structure. 859 Some 
theologians and scientists would want to go further and argue for the specific location of 
the "causal joint" of Divine action in the world. 860 Others hold that these theories might be 
useful at an analogical level, but if one maintains that God is the transcendent Creator of 
the world, then the 'causal joint' is at a metaphysical level and need not to be sort in the 
physical arena. 861 The latter approach is adopted here. 
reshaping the possibilities as history goes along, by acting in different ways in different contexts, in analogy 
to other mental events. " N. Gregersen, "The Idea of Creation and the Theory of Autopoietic Processes, " 
Zygon, Vol. 33 (1998), p. 359. Unlike Wards proposal above in which the natural laws constrain God's 
activity, Gregersen's model proposes that, "God may change the constraints themselves at many different 
levels in and between autpoietic systems. " ibid., p. 361. Gregersen concludes, "God may thus work 
simultaneously on different levels of reality by opening (in-formating) or by constraining (or ex-formating) 
their possibility spectra. Hereby, probability rates are raised for some pathways rather than for others. " ibid.. 
858 Ward, Divine Action, p. 120. 
859 ibid., Ch. 8: "The Constraints of Creation. " 
860 These range from a conception of Divine action working holistically, in the manner of "top-down" or 
"whole-part" causation, of God interacting with the state of the universe as a whole (A. R. Peacocke, "God's 
Interaction with the World: The Implications of Deterministic 'Chaos' and of Interconnected and 
Interdependent Complexity, " in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. eds. by 
R. J. Russell, N. Murphy, and A. R. Peacocke [Vatican City/Berkley: The Center for Theology and Natural 
Sciences/Vatican Observatory, 1995], pp. 263-287; and Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age), to 
"downward" causation on chaotic systems, at the level of events, via "information" input (John C. 
Polkinghorne, "The Metaphysics of Divine Action, " in Chaos and Complexity, pp. 147 - 150; Science and 
Providence, ch. 2. ), and Divine action at the quantum level (Nancey Murphy, "Divine Action in the Natural 
Order: Burridan's Ass and Schrödinger's Cat, " in Chaos and Complexity, pp. 325 - 357; Thomas F. Tracy, 
"Particular Providence and the God of the Gaps, " in ibid., pp. 289 - 324.; Robert J. Russell, "Does 'the God 
who Acts' Really Act? New Approaches to Divine Action in Light of 
Science, " Theology Today, Vol. 54 
[1997], pp. 43-65). 
861 "The alternative is to recognize that because the divine act of creation itself 
is not a physical act, i. e., one 
that presupposes pre-existing material, but rather a bringing forth ex nihilo of all that exists outside of 
God, 
then the causal joint between God and the world is metaphysical in nature, 
located 'behind' or 'under' the 
physical world open to scientific investigation. " 
Crain, "Divine Action in a World Chaos, " p. 57. See also 
Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation: an essay in philosophical theology (New York: New York University 
Press, 1967); Denis Edwards, "Discovery of Chaos and the Retrieval of the Trinity, " in Chaos and 
Complexity, eds. by R. J. Russell, N. Murphy, A. R. Peacocke, pp. 
157 - 175. 
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IV. ) Conclusion. 
The three dogmatic loci of this Chapter have begun to place the generating question of this 
thesis in its proper context. Human freedom and identity is never self-sufficient (causa 
sui), but constituted within a relational context, dependent on Divine creation and 
concurrence, and upon the intersubjective environment of creation. This order of identity 
within relation, particularity within plurality, is an analogue, in a weak sense, to the 
structure of the trinitarian relations of God. As God is Almighty Creator and Conserver, 
Divine and human agency can never be assessed on the same scale or as competing agents. 
Nonetheless, the issue of human freedom and identity may still be raised given what is 
revealed of the Divine intention for creation. The three dogmatic loci directly strengthen 
the Personalist model of this thesis by revealing a pattern of Divine action, across the loci, 
which is consonant with the model. Although creatures are dependent upon the Divine and 
interdependent with the rest of creation, God grants them a relative autonomy that is 
maintained both through Divine conservation and subsequently through Divine action in 
providence, and conversion, regeneration and sanctification. It is a dialectic of distinctness 
and communion, relative autonomy and dependence, that has its analogical source within 
the structural dynamic of the Trinity, and is evident in God's intentions and actions 
towards His creation. 
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CHAPTER 8. 
SYSTEMATIC CONTEXTUALISATION 2: (I. ) THE DOCTRINE OF 
REVELATION: ON RELATING THE DOCTRINES OF CREATION AND 
REDEMPTION; (II) COVENANT, FREEDOM AND IDENTITY. 
I. ) The Doctrine of Revelation. 
The third application of systematic contextualisation to the generating question of this 
thesis is to place our subject matter within the overarching framework of the Divine intent 
or purpose of creating. Substantial knowledge of the Divine intent, Christian theology 
holds, is something that is revealed. Special Revelation, God's revelation ephapax in the 
Incarnation, has been described by two great theologians of the twentieth century, Barth 
and Rahner, as a form of "self-revelation" (Selbstoffenbarung) or "self-communication" 
(Selbstmitteilung). 862 The framing context of the generating question is, then, the doctrine 
of revelation. Karl Rahner articulates his concept: 
God wishes to communicate himself, to pour forth the love which he 
himself is. That is the first and last of his real plans and hence of his real 
world too. Everything else exists so that this one thing might be: the eternal 
miracle of infinite love. 863 
In doing so he connects the doctrines of creation and redemption, for "the self- 
communication of God is always first in God's intention, creation and incarnation are not 
`two disparate, adjacent acts of God... but are two moments or phases' in the single process 
of God's self-gift to man. , 864 In pursuing this theme in my contextualising strategy, 
Rahner's theology acts as a source of inspiration, rather than a prescription. 
865 From 
Rahner two principles shall be distilled and expounded, what one may call the 'grammar' 
862 Despite the many methodological differences between Barth and Rahner, Christoph Schwöbel argues that 
in relation to the concepts of "Self-revelation"(Barth) and "Self-communication"(Rahner) there is some 
convergence: "Bei Barth wie bei Rahner ergibt sich die Stellung der Trinitätslehre aus dem Ansatz bei 
der 
Offenbarung, die streng als Selbstoffenbarung bzw. Selbstmitteilung gedacht werden muss. " C. Schwöbel, 
"Trinitätslehre als Ramentheorie des christlichen Glaubens, " Marburger Jahrbuch Theologie X (Marburg: 
N. G. Elwert Verlag, 1998), p. 133. 
863 K. Rahner, Theological Investigations, Vol. 3, trans. K. H. and B. Kruger (London: Darton, Longman & 
Todd/New York: Seabury/Crossroad, 1961-91). p. 310. 
864 Anne Carr, "Theology and Experience in the Thought of Karl Rahner" The Journal of Religion Vol. 53 
(1973), pp. 366. The quote in this passage from Carr is from Rahner, Theological Investigations, 
Vol. 5, 
trans. by Karl H. Kruger, pp. 177-78. 
865 Half a Chapter would be no place to do justice to Rahner's discussion of grace and nature, 
"pneumatology" or the status of the human creature, all of which are far from exegetically straightforward to 
expound or uncontroversial in outcome. George Vass shows how 
Rahner's concept of the "supernatural 
existential" alters significantly as his work develops. G. Vass, The 
Mystery of Man and the Foundations of a 
Theological System. Volume 2 (London/Westminster: Sheed & Ward/Christian Classics, 1985), pp. 67-83. 
234 
of Rahner's approach. 866 The two principles, which can be detached from Rahner's own 
particular arguments for supporting them, to wit his Transcendental Thomism, are as 
follows. 
1. ) The doctrine of revelation is the overarching framework of creation and the gracious 
activity of God towards His creatures, in redemption. 
2. ) A minimal form of Rahner's transcendental postulate: for Divine self-communication 
to be effective, there must be certain conditions of the possibility of receiving Divine 
communication on the part of the recipients. 867 
1.01) Principle I: The Unity of the Doctrines of Redemption and Creation. 
Rahner arrives at the principle of the unity of the doctrines of redemption and creation in 
relation to the doctrine of grace by critiquing the Neo-Scholastic position, to be found in 
early 20th century Roman Catholic "manual theology. " Before we trace Rahner's argument 
it may be worth noting that recent theologians of the grace-nature debate, 868 very much in 
the wake of Rahner's work, have argued that the fracture between creation and redemption 
in the doctrine of grace is to be found within the theology of the founder of the "form and 
content" of the discussion, 869 Augustine of Hippo. J. A. Carpenter's thesis is that Augustine 
contended that grace relates to the "cure" and restitution of human nature (redemption), 
and not to "the constitution" of that nature (creation). 870 In Augustine's mature work, The 
City of God, we have a conception of grace "deserting" Adam and Eve at the Fall. 871 In 
866 Lee Yearley holds that Rahner himself is in the business not so much of presenting a hard and fast 
solution to the grace-nature debate, but of advancing a correct grammar: "Indeed, one might even argue - 
perhaps particularly in regard to the question of nature and grace - that his [Rahner's] writings often 
represent not so much a definite position as a way of approaching a problem which keeps all the necessary 
factors both in focus and in some kind of relation to each other. " L. H. Yearley, "Karl Rahner on the Relation 
of Nature and Grace, " Canadian Journal of Theology, Vol. 16 (1970), p. 221 cf. R. R. Reno The Ordinary 
Transformed: Karl Rahner and the Christian Vision of Transcendence (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1995), 
p. 120. 
867 Rahner expresses the principle succinctly as: 'God can reveal only what man can hear. ' Hearers of the 
Word, rev. J. B. Metz, trans. by Ronald Walls (London: Sheed & Ward, 1969), p. 115 
868 See, James Carpenter, Nature and Grace. Towards an integral perspective (New York: Crossroads, 
1988); D. Lyle Dabney, "Nature Dis-graced and Grace De-Natured: The Problematic of the Augustinian 
Doctrine of Grace for Contemporary Theology, " Journal for Christian Theological Research, Vol. 5 
(Internet Publication, 2000). 
869 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition. A History of the Development of Doctrine, Vol. ]: The 
Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 
293. 
870 Among other texts to support this view he cites Augustine's On Nature and Grace, 12. Lyle Dabney puts 
the above in the following way: "in the theology of the Bishop of Hippo, one might say, nature suffered 
'dis- 
grace' and grace was correspondingly 'de-natured. "' "Nature Dis-graced and 
Grace De-Natured, " Sc. 6. 
871 Augustine, The City of God, XIII, 13,24, quoted in Dabney, "Nature Dis-graced and Grace De-Natured. " 
Carpenter writes: "For Augustine, grace above all else is the grace of redemption. 
His theology of grace is 
developed almost entirely in terms of sin and the recalcitrant human will. 
The operation of grace is limited to 
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comparison, Carpenter argues that the Eastern tradition has a more balanced conception of 
grace and nature, redemption and creation: "grace was unitary, continuous, and 
universal. 1,872 For eastern theologians God does not act from outside of nature, but through 
and within creation. Augustinian scholars may wish to question some of these 
generalisations, 873 but my point here is merely to suggest the possible extent of the divorce 
between the doctrines of creation and redemption in relation to the grace-nature debate in 
the history of theology. 
The framework of Rahner's discussion is much more parochial, namely his critique of 
what he terms the "extrinsicism" of the Neo-Scholastic position. For Rahner 
"extrinsicism" stands for a position that regards grace as an elevation of the substance of 
human nature. 874 Nature and grace on this view are seen as distinct entities, the former 
arising from creation, and the latter from the supernatural action of God upon the 
human consciousness, to the realm of the spirit. Grace is inapplicable to the exterior circumstances of life, to 
its constitution; it is an interior reality, operating in the personal dimension of life and effectively nowhere 
else. " Carpenter, p. 3. Augustine can appreciate the beauty and order of God's creation, but fails to connect 
such intuitions with his assessment of Christian anthropology. ibid., p. 4. This is combined with what 
Carpenter calls Augustine's "emphasis on interiority", that "Grace is the gift of the Spirit to the inner man. " 
ibid., p. 5 cf. Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, v. 36. This stance coupled with Augustine's soul-body 
dualism, prevented him from seeing the possibility of creation being graced, and hence being a form of the 
mediation of grace: "It is a curious fact that he who gave the Western church such an intensely corporate 
understanding of itself as the many in the one and devised the conception of the city of God as a social reality 
through and through, a body united in a common allegiance and love, at the same time set forth a view of 
grace that privatized it and virtually limited its operation to the conscious mind - to individuals who had 
reached sufficient awareness 'to delight in, to love, and to cleave to God'. Here again inconsistency inevitably 
arose when he came to speak of the grace of infant baptism, to say nothing of his deliverances on the 
irresistibility of grace in respect to those elected to salvation. Grace here is a coercive force, something 
operating without regard for consciousness. " ibid., p. 6. 
872 Carpenter, p. 18. 
873 For example, one may question whether this view really integrates Augustine's thinking on love, and even 
Lyle Dabney wishes to argue for a development in Augustine's thought, from the early focus on knowledge 
leading to the vita beata, which "knew no disjunction indeed, barely acknowledged a differentiation between 
nature and grace, " and a later theology centred on the doctrine of grace, which in the wake of Pelagianism, 
rested on "an explicit denial of grace to nature, thus placing salvation in effect over and against creation. " 
"Nature Dis-graced and Grace De-Natured, " Sc. 16,31. What we probably have in Augustine's position are a 
series of tensions, even contradictions. Lyle Dabney highlights one when he draws our attention to the 
fact 
that "The created world is, for [Augustine], good both as to its origin and its proper end, and itself knows no 
'fall, "' yet, when it comes to "the religious and ethical life of human beings" human nature 
is "dis-graced. " 
ibid., sc. 33. 
874 On this position, grace cannot be experienced, since the entitative elevation that makes 
it supernatural 
cannot be known. See K. Rahner, "Nature and Grace", 
Theological Investigations, Vol. IV, trans. by Kevin 
Smyth, pp. 175, and, "Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of 
Uncreated Grace", Theological 
Investigations, Vol. 1, trans. Cornelius Ernst, p. 329ff. 
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creature. 875 Rahner's principle systematic criticism of "extrinsicism" is that it makes the 
"supernatural" appear secondary and abstract to ordinary life. Rahner writes: 
Supernatural `enlightenment', moral `impulse' and `inspiration' to good 
acts, the `light of faith, ' the 'breath of the Spirit' and other similar concepts from Scripture and tradition (the unction, the signing of the Spirit), are 
reduced either to this purely entitative elevation of our natural moral acts, 
or to a natural influence of a psychological type - which is however 
considered to be providentially directed to our supernatural salvation. In a 
word, the relationship between nature and grace is conceived in such a way that they appear as two layers so carefully placed that they penetrate each 
other as little as possible. 876 
Extrinsicism has the unpalatable consequence that either the created is usurped by the 
supernatural, or the created remains untransformed, whereby grace does not really 
penetrate nature. It also separates creation on the one hand, and redemption and 
consummation on the other. As Reno remarks, "though we are quite obviously related to 
God as creator, for the extrinsicist, we are externally related to God as redeemer and 
consummator. "877 Further, within the doctrine of redemption itself, grace and the 
Incarnation remain unconnected. 
The essential skeleton of Rahner's response is to fasten back together again the doctrines 
of redemption and creation, underpinned by the reality of the Divine intent of Self- 
communication. Hence, (i. ) the act and form of creation is shaped by the Divine intent, 
and, (ii. ) God is actively present to human nature and created existence from the beginning 
as the God who intends Self-communication. Thus, in some telling phrases Rahner writes: 
"the goal [i. e. the Self-communication of God] itself is also the very power of the 
movement [i. e. the movement of creatures towards the Divine] "878 and "in grace the spirit 
[i. e. the human spirit] moves within its goal. r879 Rahner sums up his position: 
The term 'self-communication' is really intended to signify that God in his 
most proper reality makes himself the innermost constitutive element of 
man. We are dealing, then, with an ontological self-communication of God. 
However, this term 'ontological'..... should not be understood merely in an 
objectivistic sense, objectified and reified, as it were. A self- 
875 R. R. Reno has given "extrinsicism" the following formula, where P is the human creature or nature and 
Q is God's loving self-communicating: "A relation is external if P is related to Q in such a way that if P were 
not related to Q, then P would still be P. " Reno, p. 121. 
876 Theological Investigations, Vol. IV, p. 167. 
877 Reno, p. 122. 
878 Foundations of the Christian Faith, p. 130 content of the brackets is my exegesis. 
879 ibid. 
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communication of God as personal and absolute mystery to man a being of 
transcendence signifies from the outset a communication to man as a 
spiritual and personal being. First of all, then, we want to avoid both 
misunderstandings, that of mere word about God, although perhaps spoken 
by God, as well as that of a self-communication of God which is reified and 
understood entirely after the manner of a thing. 880 
If one distances oneself from Rahner's adoption of the post-Tridentine technical 
framework, 881 and substitutes the concept of "uncreated grace" in favour of the biblical 
language of activity of the Spirit, 882 the presence of the Spirit will be seen as part of the 
human condition from the beginning and not as an afterthought. 883 The structure and main 
thrust of Rahner's discussion, can therefore lead to re-enforcing a Personalist model of the 
Spirit-human relationship, by setting the model within the context of God's personal offer 
and presence to His creation. The human condition is understood in the light of the Divine 
intent, offer and presence, rather than from a grace-nature debate couched in 
substantialist884 and causal terms. 885 The overall strategy of contextualising remains the 
same: 
880 ibid., p. 116. 
881 William Shepherd points out the tension embodied in Rahner's utilisation of such a framework: "Much of 
Rahner's own theology strives to point out such incompatible divisions in the ordinary [Roman Catholic] 
theological handbooks. A good example... . 
is the divorce of a natural theological concept of God from the 
revealed trinitarian notion..... But, at the same time, Rahner's own theology is disjointed. He adheres on one 
side to a restricted concept of the problem of nature and grace - this problem arises within a traditional, post- 
Tridentine framework of thought. On the other side, he achieves a fully developed system which ought to be 
construed as a `theology of nature and grace' in an extended but appropriate sense - this enterprise is 
conceived and carried out within the context of a modern, non-static, unified, historical, evolving view of the 
universe..... Rahner's occasionalistic handling of the technical doctrine of nature and grace, and his 
willingness to treat it in terms drawn from the traditional hierarchical, static, layered view of the world, need 
to be overcome. " W. Shepherd, Man's Condition. God and the World Process (New York, Herder & Herder, 
1969), p. 25. 
882 I would support Rahner's prioritisation of "uncreated grace" over "created grace" argued 
in "Some 
Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace, " Theological Investigations, Vol. 1, 
but find the 
continued employment of such terminology unhelpful. From a biblical perspective 
John Muddiman remarks: 
"The whole debate about the doctrine of grace, whether conducted 
in Greek or Latin, could be said to be 
built on such mistranslation. For grace in the New Testament 
(charis, gratia) takes its sense from the Jewish 
tradition; it is the elective favour of God, essentially corporate and historical. It 
has little or nothing to do 
with individual conversion or sanctification, with `means of grace' or 
divine assistance for the frailty of the 
human will. When and if such ideas appear, they are denoted 
by `the Holy Spirit poured into the heart', 
which is spoken of far more frequently in New Testament 
in this way than as a separate person of the 
Godhead. " J. Muddiman, "The New Testament in theology, " in Companion Encyclopaedia of Theology, eds. 
by P. Byrne & L. Houlden (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 114. 
883 Kenneth Eberhard defines Rahner's concept of "supernatural existential" as ultimately: "man's 
`situation' 
within this offer [of Divine self-communication]: an offer which effects 
him ontologically and intrinsically 
because it affects his preconcept by which he performs very act of 
knowing and willing. " Kenneth Eberhard, 
"Karl Rahner and the Supernatural Existential, " Thought, Vol. 
44 (1971), p. 555. 
884 William Shepherd argues that Rahner's final position of seeing concrete nature as a mixture of natura 
pura plus the "supernatural existential, 
" perpetuates the Scholastic shortcoming of conceiving the grace- 
nature debate in substantialist terms: 
"It fails to make clear that the supernatural existential is not merely a 
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If, then, there is nevertheless to be an immediacy of God to us, if we are to find him in his own self here where we are in our categorical world of time 
and space, then this immediacy both in itself and in its categorical, historical objectification must be embedded in this world to begin with. S86 
This does not mean, as some critics of Rahner have supposed, 887 that grace is necessarily 
offered to humankind, that the Spirit is necessarily present to us, or that "nature" by its 
own means has some intrinsic access to the divine. Graced creation is precisely that, 
graced, freely willed. 
One of the consequences of this position is that the context of the Spirit's activity in 
Christian metamorphosis is not an aberration of the natural order, nor a disruption of 
human freedom and identity. Rahner comments that his theology gives a new meaning to 
the theological weasel word, "Divine intervention, " which usually implies action ad extra. 
A special `intervention' of God, therefore, can only be understood as the 
historical concreteness of the transcendental self-communication of God 
which is already intrinsic to the concrete world. Such an `intervention' of 
God always takes place, first of all, from out of the fundamental openness 
of finite matter and of a biological system towards spirit and its history, 
and, secondly, from out of the openness of the spirit towards the history of 
the transcendental relationship between God and the created person in their 
mutual freedom. Consequently, every real intervention of God in the world, 
although it is free and cannot be deduced, is always only the becoming 
historical and becoming concrete of that `intervention' in which God as the 
component in man's being, as, indeed, Rahner's technical doctrine of nature and grace seems to imply. If 
man's being is all that is involved, then the supernatural existential appears to be nothing other than a piece of 
human equipment. Instead it should be emphasized that the supernatural existential refers to the mode of 
God's activity towards man. " Shepherd, p. 256. This is why Shepherd makes a distinction between the 
"supernatural existential" as "modal" elevation rather than an "entitative" one. Ibid., p. 252. By "modal" I 
take it that he intends to refer to the way or manner that the human condition is elevated. "Thus the human 
condition as a whole is the point of concentration, and it is really this that is complex and structured, both 
natural in itself and supernatural in the aspect of God's presence to it in uncreated grace. As a complex 
whole, the created world process is modally supernatural, though not entitatively supernatural. " ibid.. Reno, 
in contrast, holds that Rahner refashions the central theological concepts of "essence" and "substance" in a 
constructive and novel manner. Reno, p. 127ff.. 
885 George Vass questions whether, what he calls, the "bastard category of quasi-formal cause" can really: 
"express that personal encounter between God and man which is presupposed by God's presence as grace? 
Can it express that love between God and man which is the culmination of engracement? " The ; tfv, srenv of 
Man and the Foundations of a Theological System. Vol. 2, p. 109. On the one hand, Rahner wishes to speak 
of God's self-communication and personal presence, on the other hand he reverts to an abstract and archaic 
concept of causation. 
886 Foundations of the Christian Faith, pp. 86-7 (my italics). 
887 For example, Paul Molnar argues that the positing of Rahner of a receptivity towards the Divine offer of 
self-communication represents a form of 'mutual conditioning', "rejected by the tradition 
in the interest of 
maintaining God's freedom and self-sufficiency. " Paul Molnar, 
"Can we know God directly? Rahner's 
solution from experience, " Theological Studies Vol. 46 
(1985), p. 244n72. 
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transcendental ground of the world has from the outset embedded himself 
in the world as its self-communicating ground. 888 
This passage comes from a section entitled, "God's Activity in and Through Secondary 
Causes, " which shows us that Rahner is thinking along similar lines to the systematic 
connection made in our previous Chapter, between general concurrence and special 
concurrence. God is "embedded in this world to begin with, " not only as the causal power 
that creates and sustains existence, but also as the Divine personal presence whose intent 
to enter into self-communication shapes creation, and hence the nature of human 
identity. 889 In this light, the supernatural and natural, the Divine and the human, cannot be 
separated or siphoned off into two closed realms, they are always in relationship. The 
human is continually shaped by the Divine, even in the decision to reject God. 
Finally, it is worth noting that Rahner makes an additional systematic link between the 
doctrines of creation, grace and Christology. Creation is seen as an evolutionary movement 
of grace, which reaches its "high point, " though not its end, in the life of Jesus Christ. For 
Rahner, the hypostatic union in Jesus Christ is the objectification of the fact that God has 
freely willed from the beginning of creation the relation of the "two natures, " Divine and 
created. In short, the hypostatic union in Christ is analogous to the relationship of grace 
and nature, the transcendental experience to be found in all. 890 Anne Can perceives a 
"hermeneutical (or theological) circle" in Rahner's theology, whereby he moves from 
ontology/anthropology to Christology and other Christian doctrines and back again: 
If man is essentially spirit, open to the self-communication of God through 
revelation, incarnation, and grace, then these moments of the single mystery 
of Christianity are at once - dialectically - anthropocentric and theocentric. 
Human experience, both as transcendental, ungraspable mystery and as 
objective, conceptual reflection of that reality, finds its meaning and 
explanation in Christian revelation. Conversely, the truths of Christianity, 
888 Foundations of the Christian Faith, p. 87- 
889 As Michael Buckley writes, for Rahner our dependence on God radically shapes our conception of human 
autonomy: "To be a creature.... refers fundamentally to an absolute and unique relationship of utter 
dependence, unlike any other in my experience: The total dependence upon Mystery as upon the context of 
reality which gives direction to the movement of inquiry and establishes the freedom of choice and personal 
responsibility. " M. Buckley, "Within the Holy Mystery, " in A World of 
Grace: An Introduction to the 
Themes and Foundations of Karl Rahner's Theology, ed. L. J. O'Donovann (New York: Crossroads, 1980), 
pp. 45,46. 
890 "Grace in all of us and hypostatic union in the one Jesus Christ can only be considered together, and as 
one reality they signify the one free decision of 
God for the supernatural order of salvation, for his self- 
communication. " Foundations of the Christian Faith, p. 
201. 
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especially the core truth of the self-communication of God, transforms 
human experience. 
891 
The connection between Christology and grace reveals a similar theological pattern of 
Divine-human relations. However, a systematic pattern or analogy does not in and of itself 
resolve the distinct problems which confront both the Christology and grace-freedom 
debate, as has been pointed out in Chapter 1 regarding the theology of D. M. Baillie. It is 
difficult to see how the revealing of a pattern alone will properly address the problem set 
out in the generating question of this thesis. 
In sum, the "ground" and "horizon" of our being, which Rahner talks about, is none other 
than the personal presence of God, a presence which God wishes to communicate to His 
world from the point of creation. As Rahner's Transcendental Thomism is not being 
appropriated, this general conclusion is compatible with the Personalist model put 
forward. 892 What Rahner argues for is a more fundamental level of concursus over and 
above that of general concurrence, namely, the fact that God's offer of Self- 
communication and hence His presence is graciously concurrent with human existence, 
shaping it, but not strongly determining it. 893 As our strategy in this Chapter is that of 
systematic contextualisation, the conclusions drawn qualify rather than solve the 
generating question, just as the doctrine of general concurrence was found to do in the last 
Chapter. The fact that the Divine intent of 'Self-communication' is "embedded in this 
world to begin with" leaves open the question of how the Divine may wish to 
communicate Himself and whether that is compatible with human freedom and identity. 
891 Carr, "Theology and Experience, " p. 371. 
892 It is not at all clear whether Rahner's Transcendental Thomism is compatible with a Personalist model, as 
he describes the infinite, unthematic horizon, "the Mystery, " of transcendental experience in fairly 
impersonal terms. This has led Paul W. Newman to argue that Rahner, among other recent theologians, is in 
danger of collapsing the Spirit of God into the human spirit, so threatening the distinction between Creator 
and creature and opening up the danger of pantheism. Newman, pp. 415-426. Newman is not the only person 
who has problems with Rahner at this point, so do William Hill in, "Uncreated Grace -A Critique of Karl 
Rahner", Thomist, Vol. 27 (1963), pp. 333-356, and Molnar pp. 228-61, not to mention Rahner's many 
German critics. It may equally be said that Rahner does not have a developed pneumatology. He most 
commonly talks of the Spirit in terms of religious (transcendental) experience and grace. 
Michael Welker 
comments on Theological Investigations volumes 16 and 17: "With regard to a substantive pneumatology, 
these volumes are astonishingly devoid of insight. " God the Spirit, p. 280 n. 2. 
893 Shepherd also appears to agree that the fruit of Rahner's handling of the grace-nature debate 
is a 
rediscovery of the importance of the concept of concursus: "To phrase the matter 
in traditional terms: grace 
on the new account suggested above is more concursus 
dei than it is auxilium speciale, mostly because no 
distinction is made between the orders of creation and redemption. Instead the new 
doctrine of nature and 
grace insists on position that only one single order exists, 
developmentally directed toward God's final 
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Unfortunately, some of Rahner's commentators fail to make this distinction, assuming that 
just because God's agency is concurrent with His creatures somehow this solves all the 
difficulties of the Divine-human relationship. 894 The effect of applying Rahner's first 
principle is, therefore, to qualify and contextualise the generating question of this thesis. 
1.02) Principle II: The Presupposition of Divine Self-Communication. 
The second principle, which we have distilled from Rahner, maintains that the Divine 
intent of Self-communication presupposes, on the logic of interpersonal relationships, 
creatures that are capable of receiving this communication and love. This idea of 
creaturely receptivity is to be found in the Scholastic concept of potentia obedientialis, 
which Rahner describes as having "an inner ordination" or "openness" to the Divine. He 
draws a distinction between "[t]he possibility of experiencing grace and the possibility of 
experiencing grace as grace. X895 For the Divine intent to shape the structure of our created 
nature such as to produce a potentia obedientialis is neither to identify such a disposition 
with the Divine event of Self-communication itself, nor to necessitate such self- 
communication: "[t]o be ordained to grace, and to be so constituted that there is an 
exigence for grace which would render the whole ordination to grace futile if grace were 
not actually imparted, are by no means the same thing. "896 
Thus, Rahner attacks what one may suppose to be Henri de Lubac's conception of a natural 
desire for the supernatural, for necessitating or demanding grace, so undermining the 
integral quality of the "unexactedness of grace. , 897 This position Rahner terms 
"intrinsicism, " the contrast to extrinsicism, an interiorisation of grace such that human 
creatures are internally directed towards a supernatural end. 898 He holds that this outcome 
impinges on the sovereignty of God, for it appears that the creature is owed fulfilment of 
its desires towards God. As Reno says, 
consummation of it. " Shepherd, p. 262. Rahner's advocacy of the pivotal nature of God's self-communication 
in world history is the proper grounding of general concurrence in special concurrence. 
894 Thus Michael Buckley writes: "For genuine reality is not threatened by the ground of all reality; on the 
contrary, reality is established in its freedom and autonomy by its ground. The dependence upon 
God is that 
which establishes my reality, not what denies it. " Buckley, p. 46. 
895 , Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace, " Theological Investigations, Vol. I, 
p. 300. 
896 "Nature and Grace, " Theological Investigations, Vol. IV, p. 186. 
897 Rahner, "Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace, " TI I, p. 309-10. 
898 Again, Reno provides the following formula: "A relation is internal if P is related to Q in such a way that 
if P were not related to Q then P would no longer 
be P. " Reno, p. 121. 
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For Rahner, our existence cannot be internally related to God's grace. For 
ultimately our relation to God is governed by the pure love of God's self- 
giving, and love cannot be the `unexpected miracle, ' nor can it presuppose 
a `real partnership' if it is already constitutive of our human nature. 899 
As we can see from this last quotation, intrinsicism does not only threaten the sovereignty 
of God, but also undermines the very meaning of a concept of human nature and loosens 
the integrity of the human creature. 900 Rahner's own concept of potentia obedientialis or 
"openness" differs from intrinsicism, in that it is "openness, " not desire, which "demands" 
fulfilment and so is intelligible even without the actualisation of the offer of Divine Self- 
communication. 901 John Galvin explains: 
This potency is not a separate faculty or regional section within us, like our 
ability to breathe, but rather our human nature as such. If the divine self- 
communication did not occur, our openness toward being would still be 
meaningful as the condition for the possibility of human knowledge and 
human self-disposal in freedom. We would still have to do with God but 
only as the distant horizon of our existence. But because of this same 
openness we are by nature possible recipients of God's self-communication, 
listeners for a possible word. While the actual offer of grace transforms our 
concrete existence, it does not destroy that which characterizes us as 
specifically human - our finite openness as spirit in the world. 
902 
899 ibid., p. 122. 
900 Stephen Duffy comments: "From the creature's side, a gift may not be regarded as unexacted when God's 
generosity must objectify itself by implanting in the very nature of the creature a definite disposition, so that 
under pain of losing its proper intelligibility, nature must find in this gift its unique finality and sole possible 
fulfilment. God's wisdom would owe itself the completion of this disposition, since it has created this 
disposition in such a way that it demands its fulfilment...... Where an unconditioned disposition of nature 
precedes the gift, the gift itself can be thought of as unexacted only in the sense in which nature itself is , 
i. e., 
only in the sense that God's creation is free in the first place. " S. J. Duffy, The Graced Horizon: Nature and 
Grace in Modern Catholic Thought (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1992), pp. 89-90. 
901 The Scholastic tradition had various strategies to show that the potentia obedientialis was not a natural 
capacity to see God. First, the potency was said to be passive, in being ordered only to receive act not to 
produce it. Secondly, it is essential, viz. it is the capability of receiving the first, not the second, act . This is 
so because it is without the form or intelligible principle, which permits a second act to be produced in it. For 
example, children may be capable of virtuous acts, but they do not possess the settled disposition to act 
virtuously, which some adults might have, because they have not acquired the form or habit that permits them 
to act virtuously at will. Thirdly, the potency is remote: it does not have the same proportion, either formally 
or virtually, as the first act to which it is ordered. Lonergan gives the example of prime matter's reception of 
a spiritual soul. It is the human body that has the support of a spiritual soul as its end, because it has a 
suitability, it is proportionate to its end. On the other hand, matter lacks this suitability, unless it undergoes a 
further determination of being ordered into a human body. So a potency is remote if it requires some further 
determination in order for it to be fitted to receive a specific first act. Or again, for the adult the virtuous end 
of action is already reflected in a disposition to such an end, whereas in the case of the child it is not. Lastly, 
for precisely this reason, the potency is obediential rather than natural because it is extrinsically activated by 
God, rather than intrinsically activated by the finite efficient cause of a human nature. For further details on 
the Scholastic approach to these issues see Bernard Lonergan, De ente Supernaturali (Torronto: Regis 
College, 1973), and M. Stebbins, The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-Order and Human Freedom in the 
Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan (Torronto: University of Torronto Press, 1995). 
902 J. Galvin, "The Invitation of Grace, " p. 72. 
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The postulation of an obediential potency or "openness" to the Divine does not presuppose 
an ontological continuity with God. Just because one has some capacity to receive Divine 
Self-communication, does not mean that one possesses the communication itself. There is 
a sense in which the receptive capacity of a person is anticipatory, 903 but it does not follow 
that this necessitates the possession of an innate knowledge of it. 904 Someone may have 
the capacity to enter into an intimate personal relationship with another human being, 
without that ability detracting from the fact that when such a relationship occurs it is 
unexpected, unexacted, a gift which never ceases to surprise, a real encounter with 
otherness. 905 
It may be noted that this idea of receptivity, embodied in the traditional Scholastic 
concepts of a natural desire to see God and an obediential potency, 906 is a correlative to the 
concept of a human latent true nature (LTN) developed in Chapter 5. My concept of a 
LTN is broader than that of the traditional concepts, but its function overlaps with them, in 
that it was adopted precisely to account for the fact that creatures are able to respond to the 
Divine initiative and are not wholly enslaved to sin. Like the concepts of the obedentia 
potentialis and natural desire, one's LTN is only ever perfectly fulfilled in relation to the 
Divine and ultimately eschatologically. The concept is in line with a broadly Aristotelian- 
Thomist teleological conception of nature, which is also the basis for traditional 
903 Hence, Rahner's concept of the "Vorgriff, " which means a preliminary to a grasp. 
904 In the same way, it may be said that a miracle is not "a violation of the laws of nature, " if we are unaware 
of either the full set laws, or how they are supported. 
905 Bernard Lonergan explicates Aquinas' position that neither the natural desire to see God, nor the 
obedentia potentialis, necessitates the beatific vision. The natural desire has a natural proportionate end or 
beatitude, let us say analogical knowledge of God, but for Lonergan this is not the end of the story, as this 
does not constitute a perfect fulfilment of the desire. B. F. Lonergan, "The Natural Desire to See God, " in 
Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan, ed. by Fred Crowe, SJ. (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), p. 91. 
To deny this would be to deny the supernaturality of the beatific vision, and that there is a disproportion 
between any human desire and the fulfilment of its end. Lonergan explicates this further by utilising the 
Scholastic distinctions: active and passive, accidental and essential, proximate and remote, intrinsic and 
extrinsic (see footnote 901 above). Michael Stebbins comments: "The natural desire to see 
God, then, is an 
innate tendency of a potency, rather than an act; because it is found in a potency that flows from human 
nature, it is proportionate to that nature; but because the desire is only a remote potency 
in relation to its 
object, it does not ground a natural exigence for the beatific vision. " Stebbins, p. 
154. 
906 Bernard Lonergan writes on the distinction and relation between these two concepts: "[N]atural potency 
and obediential potency are congruent [conveniunt] inasmuch as 
intrinsically they are one and the same 
human potency, but they differ by reason of the agent proportionate to their actuation, since a 
finite agent is 
proportionate to the actuation of a natural potency 
but only an infinite agent is proportionate to the actuation 
of an obediential potency. " De ente Supernaturali, p. 
75, quoted in Stebbins. 
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discussions of the obediential potency. The fact that human creatures have God-given 
ends, does not mean that their attainment is necessary. 907 
The structure of Rahner's account can be appropriated to meet the conception of Spirit- 
human relations established in Chapter 3,4 and 5. The Divine personal presence, as the 
offer of Self-communication (principle I) activates and actuates the potentiality of the 
obediential potency or the LTN. George Vass in his explication of Rahner, refers to the 
event of the personal encounter of the Divine and human, which results from God's offer 
of Self-communication. 
Now someone becoming aware of and using this opportunity for co- 
relationship with the 'other' who is God somehow encountered, can become 
a person capable of living out of this encounter. ..... Man is engraced insofar as he is, out of this relationship, made capable of love which 
embraces not only his fellow human persons but also the person of God. 908 
The language of "engracement", which Shepherd sometimes calls "empowering" or 
"actuating, "909 is an important feature of Rahner's account. The concepts of the 
empowerment, actuation, even elevation of the human, need to be set within the relational 
framework of the Divine offer of Self-communication, consonant with the Personalist 
model proposed. 
1.03) Conclusion. 
The Divine intent of revelation is the overarching bond of creation and redemption and 
determines, in a general way, the created structures that allow us to operate. As the Divine 
intent is that of Self-communication towards the end of bringing about full communion 
with His creatures, we should expect the Divine purpose to specifically shape our created 
reality in such a way which allows for, not only human receptivity, but also a capacity to 
freely respond. 
II. The Doctrine Of The Covenant. 
The concept of the covenant is one of the key personal motifs of the Bible and as such may 
develop further the Personalist model of Divine-human interaction proposed. Following on 
907 See Bernard Lonergan's explanation of Aquinas' conception of created ends and exigence. De ente 
Supernaturali, p. 76. 
908 The Mystery of Man, Vol. 11, p. 115. 
909 Shepherd, p. 172. 
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from the first section, there is also a link with Rahner's drive to reconnect the doctrines of 
creation and redemption, for Karl Barth presents the covenant as the overarching 
framework of the divine purpose of love. He writes that the covenant is "the basis and 
essence, the ontological substance of the original relationship between God and man. "910 
The contention of this Chapter is that the covenant is not to be reduced to an agreement or 
contract between God and man, nor is it limited solely to one particular tribe, but is the 
basis of the Divine-human relationship itself. 
The concept of the covenant is not to be reduced to the concept of a contract, which is 
"one powerful contemporary metaphor for social life. "911 As we have seen, a contract for 
Vincent Brummer is something that is entered into out of self-interest and is impersonal: 
[I]n agreements of rights and duties my partner, as well as the relationship, 
has an instrumental value for me as a means for furthering my own 
interests. As such they are replaceable by any other means which might be 
equally effective. 912 
Miroslav Volf complements this definition of a contract, by giving three of its essential 
components: being "performance oriented"("the point of a contract is to insure that a task 
is accomplished"), 913 "limited commitment" ("The contract obliges only to what it 
explicitly or implicitly states, no less and certainly no more"), 914 "strictly reciprocal" ("'the 
'duty to fulfil the duty' is for each side dependent on the other side's record. I am obliged to 
abide by the contract only as long, and in as far, as the partner does the same' 11). 915 As 
James Barr has pointed out the Hebrew term for the covenant, berit, has a wide scope of 
reference, which does not exclusively distinguish between some of the terms in English 
that might appear to be its referent, such as "agreement, " "treaty, " "contract, " "promise, " 
"obligation. "916 However, as Bernard W. Anderson holds, the root meaning of berit is 
910 Church Dogmatics, IV/1, Sc. 57,44. 
911 Volf, p. 148. Volf is not the only theologian recently to make the distinction between covenant and 
contract, Paul F. Palmer SJ does so in his article, "Christian Marriage: Contract or Covenant? ", Theological 
Studies Vol. 33 (1972), pp. 617-65. 
912 The Model of Love. pp. 126. Although, Brummer draws upon a tripartite distinction between manipulative, 
contractual and loving personal relations, he does not utilise the concept of the covenant in his description of 
loving personal relations. The closest he comes to it is in section 7.3 in his distinction between "agreements 
and fellowship. " ibid., pp. 164 - 73. 
913 Volf, p. 148. 
914 ibid.. 
915 ibid., p. 149. 
916 J. Barr, "Some Semantic Notes on the Covenant, " Beitraege zur Alttestamentlichen Theologie, Festschrift 
fuer Walther Zimmerli zum 70. Geburststag, eds. by H. Donner, R. Hanhart, R. Smend (Goettingen, 1977). 
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"bond" or "fetter, " signifying a "binding relationship, " and hence not a "limited 
commitment, " but an expression of God's love and fidelity. Neither is the covenant of the 
God of Israel, merely "performance orientated, " nor "strictly reciprocal, " although it does 
involve obligation. For God's love is steadfast, gracious and merciful towards an unfaithful 
people. It is "based on commitment, which includes both promises and obligations, and 
which has the quality of reliability and durability. 017 Although Brummer does not employ 
the concept of covenant, it shall be argued that the Divine-human covenant is indeed a 
form of personal loving relation. 
In a recent study Ernest Nicholson has shown that the Hebrew understanding of the 
covenant places a strong emphasis on choice and hence on personal relations, which stand 
as a counterpoint to the polytheism and the sacralisation of religious society in the Ancient 
Near East. 
The concept of a covenant between Yahweh and Israel is... the concept that 
religion is based, not on a natural or ontological equivalence between the 
divine realm and the human, but on choice: God's choice of his people and 
their 'choice' of him, that is, their free decision to be obedient and faithful to 
him. Thus understood, 'covenant' is the central expression of the distinctive 
faith of Israel as 'the people of Yahweh, ' the children of God by adoption 
and free decision rather than by nature or necessity..... So far from being a 
social institution, the covenant represents the refusal of prophets and their 
disciples to encapsulate Yahweh's relationship with his people in 
institutions, and to insist that it depends on a moral commitment on both 
sides which needs to be continually reaffirmed in faithful conduct, not 
taken for granted (as were institutions such as the monarchy in the ancient 
world) as though it were part of the order of nature. 
918 
Note the stress on the categories of "choice, " "moral commitment" to the One God, and in 
opposition to apostasy. What the eighth century prophets condemned Israel for was 
precisely their transgression, not of a rite, nor of a social order, but of "the basis of 
Yahweh's divine 'order' in the sphere of interpersonal relationships. "919 The primary focus 
pp. 23-38. He writes, "There seems to be no other bordering and 
distinguishing term under which they might 
fall, if a specific terminological distinction is to be made. " Barr, p. 
31. 
917 "Covenant, " in The Oxford Companion to the Bible, eds. by Bruce M. Metzger and Michael D. Coogan 
(Oxford: OUP, 1993), p. 138. 
918 E. W. Nicholson, God and His People. Covenant and Theology in the Old Testament, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1986), pp. 215-6. Nicholson's main thesis is that the concept of the covenant 
between Yahweh and 
Israel was instigated sometime during the second 
half of the monarchy and utilised mostly by the 
Deuteronomists. He argues that the covenant was not, therefore, a long standing 
institution of Israel, but a 
theological innovation which reached its peak in the late pre-exilic period and the 
6`h century. 
919 ibid., p. 206. 
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of the Hebraic covenant was to assure the exclusive nature of the relationship between 
God and His people. 920 
As the basis of the loving personal relationship between God and humankind, the covenant 
follows the characteristics of God's gracious action: it is initiated by the Divine; 
unconditional in origin, if not wholly without conditions (hence bilateral); it involves 
God's promise and steadfast intention towards humankind; and although unilaterally 
established, it is mutual or reciprocal in accomplishment. Again, Nicholson brings out the 
primarily personal dimension of the covenant: 
The making of the covenant was not only upon Yahweh's initiative; more 
than that, he himself was a partner to it. In no sense, therefore, did the 
covenant-theology conceive of life as mere observance, upon penalty of 
disaster, of divinely decreed laws. Rather, life for Israel was understood as 
fellowship with Yahweh who had entered a covenant with this people, and 
the fulfilment of Yahweh's commandment was to be an expression of this 
fellowship. Hence keeping the commandments can be described as loving 
Yahweh (cf. Exod. 20: 6; Deut. 5: 10; .... Josh. 22: 5). 
921 
The personal nature of the covenant is often indicated in the Hebrew Scriptures by 
association with marriage. Hosea condemns Israel for marital unfaithfulness (5.7) and in 
Malachi the 'covenant' of marriage becomes a sort of symbol of the Divine-human 
covenant (2.13-16). 
The fact that the covenant is unconditional in origin and in persistence means that Volfs 
third criterion for a contract, that it be "strictly reciprocal, " is not applicable. Israel 
continually breaks the agreement but God graciously restores it. Moreover, although there 
is a bilateral element to the covenant, it is not the case that the covenant is arrived at by 
negotiation between two parties. Neither is it the case that the conditions, which God lays 
down, have first to be met, with the reward bestowed consequentially. Rather the 
stipulations made by the covenant constitute, "the regulations for the new life that is made 
possible by God's covenant. "922 The covenant involves all the characteristics of a truly 
loving relationship: love, trust and obedience (Dt. 7.9,12; 1 Kings: 8.23). It is difficult to 
920 As Nicholson goes on to note, "the 'breaking, ' 'transgressing, ' 'not keeping, ' 'forsaking, ' and 'forgetting of 
the covenant are most frequently described precisely in terms of 'going after other gods, ' 'going whoring after 
other gods, ' 'serving other gods "'(ibid., pp. 213), that is precisely in relational terms. 
921 ibid., p. 215. 
922 J. Guhrt, "Diatheke, " in NIDN7T, Vol. 1, ed. by Colin Brown., p. 367. 
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see that the covenant fully matches up to Volfs first criterion of a contract, namely, that it 
be "performance orientated, " for how is a relationship a "task" which may be objectified? 
The living, relational, non-static nature of the covenant is emphasised in the New 
Testament923 by reference to its unwritten character. Thus, Volf's second condition of a 
contract appears to be transgressed, for the covenant does not involve "limited 
commitment. " In II Corinthians 3.6 Paul declares that the Divine covenant is "not in a 
written code, " but is personal, because it is mediated by the Spirit, and results in the 
personal attributes of freedom (II Cor. 3.14,16-17). Paul contrasts the Jew who is one only 
outwardly with the Jew who is one inwardly "by circumcision that is of the heart, in the 
Spirit and not in the letter"(Rom. 2.29, cf. Deut. 30.6). He also notes the Gentiles who have 
come to faith in Christ and who, apart from the law, do by nature the works of the law and 
show that it is written in their hearts (Rom. 2.14-16). That does not mean that the law, of 
the so-called "Old Covenant, " is redundant. As Jesus says in Matthew's Gospel, "I have 
come not to abolish but to fulfil"(Mtt. 5.17), yet he then proceeds to radicalise the law 
(v. 21ff). Jesus' concern is with the all-encompassing covenant, which grounds the 
abundance or fullness of life (John 10.10). Unlike previous covenants, the "new covenant" 
instituted in Christ is "eternal" (Hebrews 9.13; 13.20), and cannot be abrogated 
(Mtt. 16.18). 
It might be objected that this analysis of the covenant as requiring the possibility of the 
human covenant partner responding to the Divine initiative does not fit some of the early 
covenants. E. Kutsch argued in the 1970s that the Hebraic covenant was never used in the 
sense of an agreement, which could be in some way bilateral, but was essentially either 
promissory or obligatory. 924 Kutsch's point is perhaps best made in relation to the Noahic, 
Davidic and Abrahamic covenants, where the Divine promise is accompanied by a lack of 
corresponding obligation on the part of man. These covenants seem to be one-sided, they 
require no condition on the part of the human covenant partner. For example, God 
enjoined upon Abraham the rite of circumcision, but His promise to Abraham, called a 
923 Reference to the covenant in the New Testament are much more less frequent, but not without reason: "If 
the term covenant (diatheke) does not appear as one might expect, the reason is that the underlying thought 
has been taken over in the sayings about the Kingdom of God. " ibid., p. 369. Further, G. E. Wright has argued 
that another reason for the lack of references is that the term `covenant' had legalistic connotations in the 
New Testament period. G. E. Wright, "The Theological Study of the Bible, " in The Interpreter's One- 
Volume Commentary on the Bible, ed. C. M. Laymon (Nashville & New York, 1971). 
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covenant, was not conditional upon the observance of circumcision, though a penalty 
attached to its non-observance. 
In response it seems difficult to deny any bilateral element to the Hebrew covenants. As 
Gordon McConville writes regarding the Noahic covenant, it is not a case of either/or: 
Clearly, the element of promise dominates it, yet here too, when Genesis 
8: 22- 9: 7 is taken with 9: 8-17, the note of command is also present in the 
prohibition both of murder (vv. 5-6) and of the consumption of blood (v. 4), 
which is to play an important role in the Old Testament's ritual laws 
(Leviticus 17: 11) and which is even sustained in the New Testament (Acts 
15: 20). In reality, therefore, both promise and command belong within the 
covenantal thought of Genesis 1-11.925 
A response is also expected in the Abrahmic covenant (Gen. 17.1,9-14), and circumcision 
acts as the sign of the covenant. The Davidic covenant although possessing this strong 
promissory element, is only intelligible within the context of the Mosaic covenant (I Kings 
2.4), which has a more bilateral form. It is also wrong to take the institution of the various 
covenants out of the context of the individual faith stories of these patriarchs, stories that 
testify to the bilateral nature of the relationship and the requirement to show trust and 
obedience. 
Moreover, a conception of the covenant cannot afford to neglect the crucial texts contained 
in Exodus, Joshua and Hosea. The key Sinai covenant is clearly a covenant which requires 
bilateral obligation. The human partners are bound to specific obligations toward the 
Divine and one another (the Decalogue), transgression of which will bring awful 
retribution. Nicholson comments on the covenant described in Exodus 34: 10-28: "one 
covenant is here announced, encompassing both Yahweh's commitment to Israel as his 
people, and the commitment this requires of, and lays upon, Israel precisely as his 
people. "926 Nicholson shows how this pattern is repeated in the other covenant texts in 
Deuteronomy, Joshua, and Hosea: 
924 E. Kutsch, Verheissung und Gesetz. Untersuchungen zum sogenannten 'Bund' im Alten Testament, 
Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 131 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973). 
925 Gordon J. McConville, "berit, " in NIDOTTE, Vol.!, ed. W. A. VanGemeren, p. 749. 
926 God and his People, pp. 211. He writes: "It is not 
here the case of the making of one berit followed by the 
making of another separate berit, as Kutsch's understanding of 
the meaning of the word would appear to 
imply for its usage here in vv. 10 and 27, the first an obligation which 
Yahweh takes upon himself (v. 10; eine 
Selbstverpflichtung), the other an obligation which he imposes upon Israel (v. 27; eine Verpflichtung des 
Volkes). " ibid.. 
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[T]hese promises are conditional upon Israel's response to Yahweh; they 
reaffirm that the making and keeping of the covenant involved a choosing 
and deciding on Israel's part throughout its generations. Thus at Sinai Israel 
chose to enter the covenant, twice over giving its pledges in response to 
Moses's reporting and subsequent reading of the commandments 
(Exod. 24: 3-8). On the plains of Moab a subsequent generation chose and 
declared 'this day' that Yahweh had become its God (Deut. 26: 19). At 
Shechem Israel was again called upon to choose (Josh. 24). It was a choice 
between life and death which each generation was called upon to make 
(cf. Deut. 30: 15 -20; Josh. 24: 19). 
927 
In sum, the covenant is unilateral in origin, but requires mutual commitment, and a 
balance between promise and command. 928 Similarly, although the 'New' covenant 
established by Jesus Christ is established once and for all (ephapax), it requires repentance 
and a turning to follow Christ in love and obedience. Thus, the key articulations of the 
Jewish and Christian covenant presuppose the free response of human beings. This does 
not mean that the salvation accomplished by Christ's fulfilment of the covenant, can be 
altered or haggled over by human beings. Rather, the covenant requires a free human 
acceptance of a reality that has already been opened up by Christ, and to which the only 
response is grateful acceptance, or rejection. There is no third way. No way, that is, that 
creatures may alter the covenant on their own terms. 
It has been consistently argued throughout the thesis that if we are to avoid a conception of 
the Spirit-human relationship as on the "Divine Fiat" model, involving "take-over", 
coercion, or manipulation, then there has to be space for the other. The contention of this 
part of the Chapter will be to show that the concept of the covenant is the condition of that 
space, and the ground and security of the Divine-human relationship. This part will have 
two major sections. The first will use the concept of the covenant, inspired by Barth 
though not following him in detail, as a device for systematically contextualising the 
generating question of my thesis. This will strengthen the conclusions following on from 
the discussion of Rahner's concept of Self-communication and grace regarding the 
connections between creation and redemption. The second section will go beyond 
systematic contextualisation, and examine how the concept of the covenant may directly 
address the generating question of the thesis, and help develop the Personalist model. 
927 ibid., pp. 214-15. 
928 This is also G. J. McConville's conclusion of his survey of the Old Testament literature NIDOTT, Vol. 1, 
p. 752. 
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II. 01) Systematic Contextualisation: The Concept of the Covenant. 
In this section it will be argued that the concept of the covenant provides the overarching 
connection between the doctrines of creation, Christology, reconciliation and eschatology, 
and as such a vital context to our generating question. This has to be shown in relation to 
the three movements of the Heilsgeschichte: creation, redemption (Incarnation), and 
perfection (consummation/eschatology). This is essentially a position in dogmatics, 
although such a categorisation is supported by some biblical scholarship. 929 Where 
appropriate I shall briefly indicate my main divergences from Barth's account. 
11.0101) Creation is the external basis of the covenant and the covenant is the internal 
basis of creation. 
This is the dictum that is at the heart of Barth's account of the doctrine of the covenant. Put 
simply the idea is that creation is designed to be a fit place for the enactment of God's 
loving purpose towards his creatures, the theatrum gloriae dei, and the covenant is the 
inner meaning of world history precisely as the instantiation of God's loving purposes. 
This position is not devoid of scriptural support. W. J. Dumbrell has made an exegetical 
case for creation being covenantal in character. 930 Although, the origin of this idea in Barth 
is very different from Rahner's conception of a graced creation, it seems there is 
substantial similarity. On both accounts creation is shaped and grounded by the Divine 
intent, or what Barth would call God's covenantal purposes. What this means, according to 
Barth, for the nature of the Divine-human relationship and for the basis of a conception of 
human freedom and personal identity is spelt out as follows: 
There is no existence of the creature in which it can originally belong 
elsewhere than to this compact. It has no attributes, no conditions of 
existence, no substantial or accidental predicates of any kind, in virtue of 
929 W. J. Dumbrell, for example, argues that the "covenant" is the central unifying link between the Old and 
New Testaments. He maintains that behind the biblical records of the various `sub-sets' of covenants, there is 
an essential covenant between God and humanity. Dumbrell posits a threefold working out of this covenant: 
1. ) the continued apostasy or unfaithfulness of Israel, results in the evolution of the eschatological 
hope of a 
new creation (Jer. 31.34; Ezk. 40.48; Isa 40.66). Such an eschatologically 
hope is partially realised in the 
events of the New Testament, although this too points to 
fulfilment of the covenant in the eschaton. The 
development of the biblical covenants point to such an eschatological fruition. W. J. Dumbrell, 
Covenant and 
Creation. An Old Testament Covenant Theology (Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1984). 
930 Dumbrell, pp. 20-33. For example, Dumbrell points to the Noahic covenant and to the phrase 
"establish 
my covenant" (Gen. 6: 18). He notes the peculiarity of the use of the verb 
heqim in this context, as opposed to 
the more common verb for the inauguration of the covenant 
(krt, e. g. Gen. 15: 18; Exod. 22: 32). On this basis, 
he maintains that the Noahic covenant is a re-establishment of a relationship 
that had been hitherto existent, 
to wit, "a divine relationship established by the 
fact of creation itself. " ibid., p. 32. 
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which it can or may or must be alien to the Founder of this covenant..... It 
has no ground on which it can deal with him [God] on an equal footing...... 
And God wills from it [the covenant] only that for which he prepared and 
bound and pledged it when he first gave it its being and nature. 931 
Just as Rahner talks of the Divine presence or grace being "embedded in this world to 
begin with, " we may equally say that humanity is embedded within the covenant, which is 
precisely the form of God's presence within the world. Both creation and covenant stem 
from the Divine initiative: "in both creation and covenant the dilemma 'God or man' is 
excluded, in both God alone is the cause of man's being himself; in creation it is God's 
command alone that causes man to freely realise himself, in the covenant it is again solely 
God's calling that enables man to answer freely. 032 Barth talks of creation as "one long 
preparation" for the fulfilment of the covenant, and an "equipment for grace, "933 and of 
creation as "intrinsically determined as the exponent of his glory and for the corresponding 
service. "934 We must add that God's covenant activity is eschatological: "the connection 
that God's creation has with his covenant.... is one of destination. God creates for the 
covenant, in order to raise humans further; he creates persons to enter into covenant with 
him, to make them his children. "935 The latter is precisely the reason why Rahner posits 
the potentia obedientialis and the 'supernatural existential, ' although for Barth such a 
supposition would be to undermine the Creator-creature distinction. In sum, creation is 
shaped and ordered by God's covenantal intentions. If we connect this with the two 
principles derived from Rahner, it entails that humanity is given at creation the receptivity 
required to respond to the direct presentation of God's covenantal intentions in Christ. As 
Schoonenberg writes: 
He makes the creature in the whole of its reality, and thus in the whole of 
its purposiveness and utility. Orientation towards the covenant and 
exaltation is therefore intrinsic to the creature. 
936 
II 0101) Reconciliation I"937 The Christological Proleptic Fulfilment of the Covenant. 
931 Church Dogmatics III/1, pp. 96-7. There are similarities here with Rahner's contention that the idea of 
natura pura (pure nature) is to be rejected, and only given a 
hypothetical status as a Restbegriff. 
932 Piet Schoonenberg, Covenant and Creation, trans. by Peter Tomlinson (London: Sheed & Ward, 1968), 
pp. 124-5. 
933 Church Dogmatics, 111/1, p. 230. 
934 ibid., p. 231. 
935 Schoonenberg, p. 144. 
936 ibid., p. 147. 
93' "Barth claims..... that the thought of sinful man's reconciliation with 
God in Jesus Christ and of God's 
fellowship with sinful man, thereby made possible 
for him and for man, was in the mind of God before the 
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Jeremiah 31 reveals the frightening analysis that the covenant has been annulled by Israel's 
behaviour (v. 32) resulting in the curse of the covenant, namely the breaking up of the body 
politic. Jeremiah 32 claims that the cycle of apostasy will be broken by the bestowal of "an 
everlasting covenant"(v. 40) in the "hearts" of creatures(v. 33). 938 The book of Hebrews 
proclaims that Christ is the "mediator of the new covenant"(9.15), the great High Priest 
who enters for us the heavenly sanctuary (7.26). The author of Hebrews maintains that the 
promises contained in the "new covenant, ", are more propitious than those of old. They 
contain God's unconditional commitment to forgive sins, bought by the truly efficacious 
sacrifice of Jesus (9.1-14), which makes redundant the need for further sin offerings 
(10.18). For Barth, Jesus Christ has both the revelatory role of disclosing "the original and 
basic will of God, "939 and how humanity may respond to it, as well as an atoning role as 
humanity's representative to God, taking upon himself "the lost cause of man. " Hence, 
Jesus becomes the pivotal "mediator of the covenant, 040 in an undeserved and 
unconditional act of grace. It is this structural dynamic which allows for the constancy of 
God's covenant in the face of human rebellion, and allows for the triumph of God over 
human sin "unilaterally. " 
All this is standard Christian soteriology. Where I diverge from Barth is on his version of 
the doctrine of election as the crucial bridge linking the doctrines of creation and 
world and man were created and thus even before sin became a reality. The unparalleled precedence thereby 
given to the idea of reconciliation over creation and sin has to be seen in the light of Barth's teaching on 
creation..., the Nihil... and reconciliation, before its true meaning can be grasped. " H. Hartwell, The Theology 
of Karl Barth (London: Duckworth, 1964), p. 109. 
938 G. E. Mendhall and G. A. Herion comment on this passage suggest that this is a rediscovery of the personal 
basis of the covenant: ".... no longer are there a set of prohibitions and injunctions, no code of laws or 
externally enforced and legalistically defined body of `commandments, statues, and ordinances' such as 
depicted in the Deuteronomistic History.... It is a description of the complete internalization of the divine 
will that makes unnecessary the entire machinery of external enforcement..... Even more astonishing is the 
abrogation of the entire paraphernalia of religious indoctrination: `they shall no more teach each man his 
neighbor and each man his brother, saying `Know Yahweh'(v. 34). Instead of the deposit and periodic 
reading of the covenant text, the knowledge of the divine will is deposited within the conscience of the 
members of the community.... Thus knowledge of God cannot be identified with the accumulated written 
corpus of prestigious scribes or theologians.... The community thus envisioned is not one subject to human 
social control but one that can only be monitored and maintained by the deity himself. In this regard, the 
vision and hope associated with this `new covenant' draws deeply from that originally associated with the 
old. " G. E. Mendhall and G. A. Herion"Covenant, " in The Anchor Bible Dictionary, Vol. 1, ed. D. N. Freedman 
(London/NY: Doubleday, 1992), pp. 1192,1193. Interestingly E. Nicholson comments on the paradox that 
this institution of the "new covenant" produces for the author, who "is constrained to produce a paradoxical 
theory according to which God himself promises to make possible the very response which he inexorably 
demands. " Nicholson, p. 216. 
939 Church Dogmatics IV/1, p. 36. 
940 ibid.. 
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redemption. For Barth the election of Jesus Christ is the primary act, which determines all 
Divine action in the world. The Divine-human distinction is such that human capacities 
and merits can never provide the basis for the covenant, which can only be established by 
God putting Himself in the place of man. The rest of us are "those whose place has been 
taken by Jesus Christ. " The covenant partner of God is not 'man' as an idea, nor 'humanity' 
as a term for the species, but the one man Jesus and the 'people represented' in him: "Only 
secondarily, and for His sake, is it 'man' and 'humanity' and the whole remaining 
cosmos. "941 
However, as Colin Gunton argues, this position leads to, (i. ) a too immediate incorporation 
of everything into Christ at the expense of eschatology, and, (ii. ) an anthropocentric 
exclusion of non-human creation. 942 Furthermore, insofar as the covenant is primarily 
fulfilled in the person of Jesus Christ, the God-man, the primary covenant partner and only 
"secondarily" by humanity, one may question to what extent the covenant is just an intra- 
Divine covenant. Is this really a covenant that respects human otherness, if it is made not 
with humanity as a whole but only with the God-man? This leads to the impression of 
Divine narcissism. Only the humanity that participates in the imago Dei, that is the 
likeness of Christ, appears to be guaranteed entry into the covenant. The fact that God in 
Jesus Christ has become God for man and man for God, is not enough to secure the 
distinct integrity of human beings. For although Jesus is 'true man', He is also 'true God. ' 
The 'who' of Jesus is the Divine 'who' of the second 'person' of the Trinity. If the 
Incarnation is to be truly pro nobis then, it has to be directed towards the mass of sinful 
creatures, the very intended covenant partners from the beginning. If it is not made clear 
that it is to the whole of humanity that the covenant is offered and directed, then Barth's 
own intention that the concept of the covenant unites creation and reconciliation appears to 
be undercut. For how can the covenant truly be the "internal basis of creation" 
if the 
creature is not a party to the covenant from the beginning? What sort of "fulfilment of the 
covenant" can Christ be, if all of humanity decides not to participate in His 
image? 
941 Church Dogmatics 11/2. 
942 Gunton writes that Barth's exposition of the concept of the covenant 
in relation to the doctrine of election: 
"makes creation not only second to covenant, but subordinate in a way that 
detracts from the fullness of the 
order of creation... [A]n eternal and thus pretemporal election, generous or no, 
tends to order all things to a 
beginning..... real eschatology is lost, or at least suggests only the playing out of that which 
has already been 
decided in advance in a way that endangers the freedom at once of the Spirit and of the creation. 
" Gunton, 
Christ and Creation (Carlisle: The Paternoster Press, 1992), pp. 94,95. 
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An alternative to Barth's position would be to hold that Jesus is the proleptic fulfilment of 
the covenant between God and humankind. Proleptic because although in Christ the 
ephapax form of the covenant has been made, as directed to humanity it is not completed 
without the perfection of creation which has yet to move to Christ in the Spirit. 943 Christ is 
not so much the one true covenant partner, but discloses the condition of the covenant's 
fulfilment* Election relates to God's covenant intention to freely relate with humanity as an 
expression of His love. Hence, it refers to the sweep of Divine history in creation, 
reconciliation and consummation, and not only to the specific, although pivotal act of the 
Incarnation of the Son. On my revised version of the Barthian dynamic, the emphasis 
comes off election conceived in this specific way (the election of Jesus), and onto the 
intention of God from the beginning to enter into a loving relationship with created 
humanity, which is only ever to be eschatologically realised. 
11.0102) Reconciliation II: The Pneumatological Perfection of the Covenant. 
Having established the axis of the covenant in the person of Jesus Christ, we are still left 
with the question of how God, who has shown that He is pro nobis (in nobis in the sense 
that Christ is 'true man') and pro mundo, can bring about the extension of the covenant into 
the lives of human beings as a subjective reality, to become in nobis. It is the Spirit who 
achieves this eschatological orientation of creation, and as Basil of Caesarea pointed out is 
its "perfecting cause. "944 Although Barth is fully aware of creation history as an 
eschatologically completed event, some commentators are less convinced of his 
appropriation of the Spirit as the perfecter. 
945 If the covenant is made with the God-man, 
and human beings only enter the covenant when they have been brought into the 'likeness' 
of the God-man, then the Spirit appears, as does the bulk of humanity, to be initially active 
outside the covenant. In Church Dogmatics IV/4 when Barth has the opportunity to really 
explicate how the activity of the Spirit is internally constitutive of the covenant, he hardly 
mentions the relationship of the Spirit to the covenant. Thus, he writes that Jesus "fulfils 
943 As Gunton points out: "Creation is not merely through Christ, but to him: from the 
beginning, it has an 
eschatological thrust. Salvation takes place within the created and material order with an eye 
to the perfection 
of that which was begun. " Christ and Creation, p. 97. 
944 On the Holy Spirit, XV. 36 and 38. 
gas "It is noteworthy that in Barth election is conceived rather binitarianly: as something 
happening between 
Father and Son. The Spirit contributes nothing structurally, as in much of 
Barth's theology. " Gunton, Christ 
and Creation, p. 95. 
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and perfects the covenant, "946 which seems to deny the role of the Spirit as the "perfecting 
cause. " The sending of the Spirit is part of the promise of the covenant and a further 
condition of, not an appendage to, the central fulfilment of the covenant in Christ. If 
human creatures are God's intended covenant partners, and Christ the condition and 
mediator of the covenant, not the elect covenant partner, then we require a conception of 
the covenant which embraces the sweep of salvation history from creation to eschaton. 
11.0103) Conclusion. 
The covenant is to be explicated in a threefold manner in relation to: creation as its 
shaping and structuring order; Christology as key to the expression of God's covenantal 
intentions and the mediation of the covenant to humanity; the eschatological drawing of 
the Spirit of creation to its proper perfection in Christ. This still leaves plenty of room for 
risk and exposure. In the encounter with the risen Lord through the Spirit, human beings 
may still refuse to become covenant partners. This does not undermine the covenant offer, 
which remains unaffected by human sin thanks to the atonement, but it does mean that the 
response of human creation will affect the final outcome. Were this not so God might as 
well have made a covenant with Himself or with automata and achieved narcissistic 
fulfilment. 
Thus, the doctrine of the covenant like Rahner's conception of Divine Self-communication 
and grace provides an essential context to the generating question of my thesis. The 
doctrine maintains God's essentially personal intentions towards His creatures, made as a 
free, unconditional Divine initiative, which nevertheless allows room for mutuality in the 
Divine-human relationship. It holds that creation is ordered so that God's intentions may 
be worked out and that His creatures may actually be receptive to them. It discloses the 
substantive end of freedom as disclosed in the Incarnation, and recognises the Spirit as the 
personal means of bringing God's covenant intentions to fruition. Miroslav Volf writes of 
the way that the covenant forms identity: 
Precisely because covenant is lasting, the parties themselves cannot be 
conceived as individuals whose identities are external to one another and 
who are related to one another only by virtue of their moral will and moral 
946 Church Dogmatics, IV/4, p. 60. 
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practice. Rather, the very identity of each is formed through relation to 
others; the alterity of the other enters into the very identity of each. 947 
Although this is written of the realm of interpersonal human relations, it points us to the 
function of the covenant as grounding and forming identity. Humanity, however 
unconsciously, is embedded in God's covenantal love, which orders creation, forms and 
shapes human identity, and calls us to make explicit life in relationship with God. That 
communion, the explicit communion of the covenant, involves an exchange and reciprocal 
identification that brings about Christian metamorphosis. 
11.02) Beyond Systematic Contextualisation. 
11.0201) The Covenant as Promise of the Surety of Human Freedom and Identity. 
As has been noted, the strategy of systematic contextualisation only indirectly addresses 
the problematic of my thesis. Nonetheless, the concept of the covenant may play a more 
direct role in positively addressing the generating question. If the covenant is the promise 
and pledge of the God revealed in Jesus Christ and the basis of a loving relationship, then 
we may be justified in asking whether such a covenant appears to fit with Christian 
experience. The concept of the covenant requires a covenant partner who in some sense, if 
it is not to be a manipulative relationship, must make a response, must accept and then 
contribute to the relationship. One may ask the question: does Christian experience 
support the belief that God acts in the covenantal manner described in this Chapter? 
It is necessary first to draw some analogies with human experience of relationships to be 
clear on what might constitute evidence in relation to the question. Hugh Lafollette argues 
in his book on Personal Relationships that we come to know whether or not someone is to 
be trusted, honest, sensitive and so on, all necessary attitudes for a loving relationship, 
through observing and interpreting their behaviour. He compares this with an extreme 
dualist position where the self is an inner thing: 
In non-dualists' views, coming to know another resembles assembling a 
jigsaw puzzle. Just as we arrange the pieces of the puzzle to yield a 
coherent picture, we likewise arrange 'pieces' of a person's behavior to yield 
a coherent picture of her. Of course, we may have seen the other person 
only occasionally, and then in tightly prescribed circumstances; thus we do 
not have enough pieces of the puzzle to detect even a vague picture. Or we 
may have seen her in a variety of circumstances over an extended period of 
947 Volf, p. 154. 
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time, yet don't know how to interpret her behavior: thus, although we have 
enough pieces of the puzzle, we don't know how to put them together. 948 
Moreover, Lafollette argues that we love for reasons, reasons that are, in part, connected 
with an assessment of a person's character traits. This is not to suggest that one could 
provide a comprehensive or systematic explanation of the love between two persons, 
merely that one could give a provisional explanation or insight. Indeed, the very ground 
for our being open to this or that particular person is partly because of our prior, however 
unconscious, assessment of what our preferences are. 
We think it is inappropriate to love someone for no reason at all and we 
assume some reasons are better than others..... Not only do we want to have 
reasons for loving others, we want others to love us for reasons. No one 
wants to be told: ".... I don't like any of your traits. I just love you. '949 
We discern character traits by being attentive to behaviour. 950 Likewise God's character 
and covenantal intentions are not hidden and inaccessible, but to be judged by His action 
in the world, principally through the Incarnation. 
Lafollette gives four attitudes that are integral to intimate personal relationships, such as 
trust, sensitivity, honesty, commitment and self-knowledge. How might these be displayed 
in God's covenant relationship with His People? As a maximally perfect being God must 
have self-knowledge. What of the other qualities? I have trust when I have confidence in 
the behaviour of another person to respect and promote my true interests. The moral 
dimension of personal trust means that we trust in persons, as free agents who may discern 
how best to keep our trust. As Lafollette explains: 
[T]he trust we have in our closest friends is not just a trust that they will 
keep confidences; it is not just a trust that they will never hurt us - though 
doubtless these are crucial elements of trust. Rather, we trust the character 
of our intimates, we trust they have sufficient moral integrity to discern 
how they should act. If this trust is well founded, then they can be trusted to 
look after and promote our interests. 951 
948 Hugh Lafollette, Personal Relationships. Love, Identity, and Morality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 73- 
4. 
949 Lafollette, p. 51. 
950 In comparison to the dualist position, it is not enough to work on the mental attitudes of the person alone; 
attitudes are to be displayed in an agent's disposition. Thus, Lafollette writes: "Suppose, for a moment, that 
Rick regularly runs roughshod over the interests and needs of others. Further suppose we could investigate 
Rick's inner space (whatever this would mean) and discover that Rick was filled with kindly feelings toward 
those he harms. We would still maintain our conviction that he is callous. His feelings would be irrelevant to 
our evaluation. " ibid., p. 65. 
951 ibid., p. 118. 
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The importance of this aspect of trust is that we trust the character of our intimates, a trust 
that springs from a knowledge and experience of relating to the whole person. Trust is part 
of a larger relational web. Sensitivity to the other's particularity is also part of trust and the 
construction of intimacy: 
A revealer demonstrates communicative sensitivity if, in her desire to be 
understood, she tailors her revelation to the capabilities and background of 
the listener, for example by expressing herself using language the listener 
can understand. A revealer demonstrates interest sensitivity if she responds 
to the recipient's general interests and desires, for example by expressing 
her views so as not to remind the listener of a recent tragedy. 952 
Honesty may be simply defined, as Lafollette does in the following way: "to be honest we 
must disclose our thoughts and feelings which are genuinely revealing, and we must 
disclose them in ways the other is likely to understand. , 953 Lafollette talks of the need for 
meta-honesty, which is more than disclosing x to y, viz. honesty about something. It 
involves further engagement with oneself and the other person at a deeper level, of 
disclosure of our "overarching traits. "954 When meta-honesty is focused on the relationship 
itself, this may lead not just to an exchange of feelings or an expression of attitudes, but a 
discussion of each other's conceptions of the relationship. 
The final necessary, although not sufficient, attitude for intimate relationships is 
commitment. The importance of commitment to intimate relationships is to be 
distinguished from contractual exchange, as Lafollette argues: 
In contrast, although close personal relationships are often beneficial, they 
are not good deals - they are not deals at all. Intimates adopt one another's 
interests as their own. Thus, if either participant in a relationship were to 
leave (or seriously consider leaving) a presumably close relationship as 
soon as it no longer satisfied her purely self-directed interests, we would 
have good reason to think that relationship had not been genuinely 
personal, but was instead, a trade relationship masquerading as a personal 
one. 955 
952 ibid., p. 110. 
953 ibid., p. 126. 
954 "To be completely (meta-)honest we should share this information with our intimates, to explain why we 
chose, in a specific situation to be dishonest. This would require exploring our motivation for 
dishonesty..... This disclosure provides our intimates with a different level of understanding and thus opens 
possibilities for real growth - for us, for them, and for our relationship. " ibid., p. 128. 
955 ibid., p. 183. 
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Moreover, commitment conceived purely as a verbal pledge is one-dimensional, rather 
than as "a thread woven into the fabric of all close relationships"956 As M. Friedman says: 
"Commitment to a person... . has as its particular focus the unique concatenation of wants, 
desires, identity, history, and so on, of a particular person. "957 May it be said that God 
fulfils these necessary, although not sufficient intentional stances, in His covenantal 
relationship with His People? 
The Hebrew Scriptures contain a testimony to God's faithfulness to His People Israel 
despite their unfaithfulness. It is precisely the fact that God does not merely hold to the 
conditions of the broken covenant, but renews the covenant through the self-giving of His 
Son and Spirit -a personal commitment to His creatures. Indeed, God's covenant 
faithfulness is a key Divine attribute, expressed by three related terms signifying 
reliability, faithfulness and steadfastness: `emet (also has the connotation of truth), hesed, 
and `emunah. Indeed, Yahweh's character is defined in several places as "compassionate 
and gracious, slow to anger, abounding in love (hesed) and faithfulness (`emet). "958 God's 
faithfulness is associated with his covenant love (Deut. 7.9; Pss. 25.10; 85.10). Anthony 
Thiselton notes: 
[T]he connection between faithfulness and truth depends not on semantic 
considerations said to be peculiar to the Hebrew language, but on the fact 
that when God or man is said to act faithfully, often this means his word 
and his deed are one...... What is perhaps most distinctively Hebraic is the 
notion that even God binds himself to his word once spoken, especially in 
the covenant. Hence, the biblical writers speak repeatedly of the 
faithfulness of God, with whom word and deed are one. 959 
Hence, one may say, following Lafollette's criteria, that one may trust God, because one 
trusts God's character and moral integrity. His words and actions are one. 
God's actions exhibit His faithfulness to His People. The Divine hesed rescues God's 
People from calamities and from the yoke of their oppressors. Thus, Lot praises the hesed 
of the three men (one of whom is Yahweh) that saved him and his family from the 
destruction wrought on Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen. 19.19). The Divine hesed also 
956 ibid.. 
957 Marilyn Friedman, What are Friends For? Feminist perspectives on personal relationships and moral 
theory (Ithaca: Cornell University press, 1993), pp. 190-1. 
958 Exod. 34.6-7; Num14.18; Neh. 9.17; Ps. 86.15; 103.8; 145.8; Joel 2.13 
959 A. C. Thiselton, "Truth, " in NIDN T, Vol.!!!, ed. by Colin Brown, p. 879. 
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comforts the afflicted: "Unless the LORD had given me help, I would soon have dwelt in 
the silence of death. When I said, 'My foot is slipping, ' your love (hesed), 0 LORD, 
supported me"(Ps. 94: 17-18). The preservation of life is said to be due to the Divine hesed, 
in the face of the power of death: "Hear my voice in accordance with your love (hesed); 
preserve my life, 0 LORD, according to your laws"(Ps. 119.149). God's faithfulness is 
durable and everlasting, in contrast to worldly things, which persist but eventually decay 
(Isa 54.10a). Divine hesed is also the reason why one may seek God's forgiveness or 
petition Him in prayer. 960 The sheer profusion of the Divine hesed is stressed by its 
permeation of creation (Ps 33: 5), and by statements of its magnitude (Ps 106.7,45; Ps. 
117.2). It is the unity of word and action which is the Hebrew claim for the faithfulness of 
God and the good man alike, and of truth as an "actional" concept. Thiselton observes that 
this association between truth and action as expressing faithfulness, is also implicit in the 
New Testament: 
Positively, Jesus' own words always accord with his deeds and with 
actuality. He proclaims grace to the outcast; therefore he eats with tax 
collectors and sinners. He is messiah in word, proclaiming the advent of the 
kingdom of God; therefore he is also messiah in deed, demonstrating the 
advent of the kingdom by works of power. Jesus' life of integrity culminates 
in the cross. Thus his life provides backing that gives the status of reliable 
currency to his words. 961 
God's character is revealed by His action in the world, specifically, His becoming incarnate 
in space and time (John 3.16). In so doing, God has reached out by His revelatory action 
and as a result has given the Christian community the foundation and orientation for its 
continued life in the Spirit. 962 Jesus Christ is the faithful and true witness (Rev. 3.14), the 
Faithful and True (Rev. 19.11). The "meta-honesty" of God is expressed in that in the 
Incarnation revealer and revealed are one. 963 This is the ultimate expression, one might 
say, of the Hebraic conception of truth given in action. As we have noted from the book of 
Hebrews, Christ's sacrifice is said to be ultimately propitious and Jesus is the covenant 
surety (7.22). In the Incarnation God gives Himself in sacrificial love (John 15.13-14). 
God's honesty is displayed in His frank exposure of the sins of His creatures. At the same 
960 Num 14: 17-19; Neh. 13: 22; Ps 6: 4; 44: 26; 109: 21,26; 119: 149. 
961 Thiselton, NIDNTT, Vol. 111, p. 883. 
962 Karl Barth puts the point this way: "The baptising community and those whom it baptises have both the 
basis behind them and the goal before them. " Church Dogmatic, IV/4, p. 195. 
963 Thus according to Barth the Triune God Himself is "in unimpaired unity yet also in unimpaired 
difference" Revealer, Revelation and Revealedness. Church Dogmatic, I/1, p. 339. 
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time His forgiveness ("The New Covenant brings forgiveness" [Rom. 11.27]) and His 
guidance in both the 'old' and 'new' covenants point to what is required to transform the 
human person into the state of faithful and obedient covenant partnership. As Miroslav 
Volf comments, forgiveness enhances, rather than negates, freedom and identity, which is 
surely a key sign of sensitivity towards the other: 
Forgiveness is the boundary between exclusion and embrace. It heals the 
wounds that the power-acts of exclusion have inflicted and breaks down the 
dividing wall of hostility. Yet it leaves a distance between people, an empty 
space of neutrality, that allows them either to go their separate ways in what 
is sometimes called 'peace' or to fall into each other's arms and restore 
broken communion. 964 
Volf uses the metaphor of "the embrace" as complementary to the concept of the covenant. 
For our purposes of focusing on the import of the Incarnation, he explicates the metaphor 
of the embrace in relation to the cross: 
At the heart of the cross is Christ's stance of not letting the other remain an 
enemy and of creating space in himself for the offender to come in..... The 
cross is the giving up of God's self in order not to give up on humanity; it is 
the consequence of God's desire to break the power of human enmity 
without violence and receive human beings into divine communion. The 
goal of the cross is the dwelling of human beings 'in the Spirit, ' 'in Christ, ' 
and 'in God. ' Forgiveness is therefore not the culmination of Christ's 
relation to the offending other; it is a passage leading to embrace. The arms 
of the crucified are open -a sign of a space in God's self and an invitation 
for the enemy to come in. 965 
God's character as revealed in the Incarnation is one of an open, inviting embrace, which 
waits patiently for a response and is concerned to make room for His human creatures. The 
Incarnation as the proleptic fulfilment of the Divine covenant shows humanity the way to 
enter into the embrace, that is, it offers the condition of the covenant, which is faith in 
Christ. The offer of the embrace, is tendered with "space" for the human creature. Such a 
"space" is embodied in the Gospel accounts of Jesus' encounter with people, and his 
immediate awareness of their needs. 
In line with the Personalist model of this thesis, God's sensitivity to His creatures in 
revelation can best be conceived by utilising a model of "dialogue, " as David Brown 
does, 
echoing many of the points mentioned in Lafollette's discussion of sensitivity: 
964 Volf, pp. 125-6. 
965 ibid., p. 126. 
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[R]evelation is a process whereby God progressively unveils the truth about 
himself and his purposes to a community of believers, but always in such a 
manner that their freedom of response is respected.... [T]he term 'dialogue' 
most effectively sums up this process..... it suggests on the one hand, 
accommodation to one's interlocutor - expressing oneself at a level which 
he can understand and, on the other hand, some contribution from that 
interlocutor, some explication of the point which he believes the dialogue 
to have reached, which will then in turn elicit a further response and so 
on. 966 
It has been argued above, following Nicholson that God's bestowal of His covenant 
involves a real choice on the part of His People, to respond faithfully or to become 
involved in vain idolatry. God respects His creatures to give them that choice and does not 
establish His covenant by dictat. 
Finally, the Divine direction to his creatures given in the foundation of the Church and the 
inspiration of Scripture, is yet another sign of God's faithfulness that he will not leave His 
People as "orphans"(John. 14: 18). The role of the Sacraments also function as signs of 
God's covenantal faithfulness, with the Eucharist as the new covenant meal or celebration. 
In the catholic tradition God's action through the lives of the Saints provides reassurance 
and guidance. The New Testament talks of God rewarding those who do His good will 
(Mtt. 545). He leads believers through the trial of temptation (I Cor. 10.13), and will fulfil 
His promises (II Cor. 118-19). Applying a form of the principle of credulity, 967 one may 
take the testimony of Christians throughout the centuries and ask the question: do they 
experience that God is faithful to His covenant, and that human freedom and identity are 
respected? With a response to the problem of evil to hand, prima facie, the claim of the 
966 D. Brown, The Divine Trinity, p. 70. 
967 Richard Swinburne defines the principle of creduility in the following terms: "It is a principle of 
rationality that (in the absence of special considerations) if it seems (epistemically) to a subject that x is 
present, then probably x is present; what one seems to perceive is probably so. " R. Swinburne, The Existence 
of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 254. It is argued that such a principle is required if our 
experiential claims are not to succumb to a search for justification of experience which leads to an infinite 
regress or circle. William Alston's defence of religious perception is based on mystical practices: mystical 
practices and sense perceptual practices exhibit analogous epistemic structure. It would be unreasonable, 
claims Alston, if one were to reject mystical perception while accepting sensory perception, unless one 
possessed good reasons for maintaining that mystical practices were unreliable. Any disanalogies between 
the two sets of practices may be accounted for by the differences between the nature of the objects of each 
perceptual practice. In both cases, what would constitute "good reasons" for rejecting religious experience 
may be said to be threefold: 1) a disproof of the existence of God; 2) a natural explanation for religious 
experience which demonstrates that such experiences are caused by natural sources which are known to 
produce false and deceptive experiences; 3. ) systematic reasons for holding that perceptual claims derived 
from such experiences are inconsistent or incoherent. Theists argue that such reasons for rejecting religious 
experience are yet to be found. W. P. Alston, Perceiving God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
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Church is that the majority of Christian testimony is affirmative in this regard. 968 The 
majority of Christians do not experience the Divine as a coercive force, pressing to "take 
over, " but as a loving presence, whose embrace is like that of the father in the parable of 
the prodigal son. 
11.0202) Confirmation from the secular perspective. 
Common intuition holds that human beings are free and have a distinct personal identity, 
with causal power. Most philosophers agree that such an intuition of free-will is universal, 
and although they may then wish to go on to explicate a concept of freedom in different 
ways (compatibilism, libertarianism etc. ). Few philosophers wish to argue for no 
conception of freedom at all or that our intuitions concerning our freedom ought not to be 
treated seriously, even if their error is to be shown. As the intuition of freedom is pretty 
much universal to human beings it appears to support, though certainly does not 
necessarily entail the claim that God has no intention to undermine human freedom. It is 
consonant with Christian theism. For as this is God's world, why should God wish for His 
creatures to be in a state of such universal delusion? Such an intuition is, of course, very 
far from a replacement for a sophisticated conception of freedom, and how it is used is 
very much open to distortion. People do come to the conclusion that this intuition 
concerning freedom equates to a freedom without God, and human history is littered with 
examples of the delusion of taking one's own freedom to be causa sui. However, a 
sophisticated Christian epistemological position would wish to uphold an epistemic 
realism which endorsed, certeris paribus, appearances. God created His world good, and 
intends us to operate at a level of transparency and honesty. This is not possible if we 
continually doubt our intuitions in a radical way. A universal intuition of freedom, set 
within a doctrine of creation shaped by the covenant, suggests that such an 
intuition did 
not arise as a matter of chance. This is not to say that such an 
intuition may not be 
perverted. 
In addition, the very ambiguity of God's reality to humankind, the so called 
"hiddenness of 
God, " allows for the possibility of human beings to come to 
faith as a result of a personal, 
968 The question of discernment of God's action will 
be addressed in the next Chapter. 
265 
free response to the encounter with the Divine. 969 The "hiddenness of God" is embedded 
within the Christian and wider theistic tradition. The theophanies in the Hebrew Scriptures 
describe the inability of human beings to bear the presence of God, a point followed up in 
the theology and mysticism of the Eastern tradition. Two modern day philosophers of 
religion, M. J. Murray and Robert McKim, discuss whether to exercise freedom in a 
morally significant manner, one must be free from certain conditions, which would 
otherwise act as compulsions to act or believe in certain ways. 970 If God were not to 
remain hidden to some degree, His full presence would constitute a compulsion, which 
would undermine the morally significant exercise of human freedom. God's full presence 
would be so impressive, that we would lose the deliberative and reasoned exercise of 
freedom to decide whether or not to believe in Him. In short, in the face of God we would 
only have one course of action, to wit, to believe in Him. 
Murray proposes that an argument of this kind must show at least two things. First, it must 
show that the full presence of the Divine is incompatible with a morally significant sense 
of being free to believe. Secondly, it must demonstrate that the claim of the Judeo- 
Christian scriptures that lack of faith will be punished by eternal damnation is also 
compatible with a morally significant sense of freedom. The threat of eternal punishment 
is a strong one. According to an orthodox Christian theism it will occur at God's appointed 
time. For a person who has heard of this claim and believes it to be true, their freedom to 
believe in God is threatened by compulsion. 971 Murray argues that a threat can vary 
according to the degree of, what he calls, epistemic imminence. A presentation or 
communication of something can be made more or less forcefully. Thus, for example, the 
969 My argument here is inspired by the recent raising of this issuing in the philosophy of religion. See, for 
example: Michael J. Murray, "Coercion and the Hiddenness of God, " American Philosophical Quarterly, 
Vol. 30 (1993), pp. 27-38; Robert McKim, "The Hiddenness of God, " Religious Studies, Vol. 26 (1990), 
p. 141-161. 
970 Richard Swinburne, for example, holds that if we are going to be truly responsible for one another's well 
being then we must have the power not just of benefiting one another but harming each other and nature as 
well. R. Swinburne, "The problem of evil, " in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, eds. by S. M. Cahn and 
D. Shatz (Oxford: OUP, 1982), p. 8. Peterson also argues along these lines: "At stake here is not merely the 
ability of humans to choose among options, but the ability to choose among significant kinds of options: 
between goods and evils, even the highest goods and the most terrible evils. " M. Peterson, The Problem of 
Evil (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 104. 
971 McKim writes: "If we have a proof, or a compelling case, then everything speaks for the existence of 
God. The existence of God would stare us in the face. It might be a belief which one could resist, but it 
would seem not to be a belief that one would choose to adopt, except perhaps in the special case where one 
had chosen not to hold it and then changed one's mind. Generally speaking, unless we chose not to hold it, 
we would hold it. " McKim, p. 152. 
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latest particularly gruesome government advertisements about seatbelt use in cars, is not 
designed to engage the taciturn consent of people who would probably all agree publicly 
that seatbelt use was necessary. Rather, it is designed to present the message so forcefully 
that people feel that they really have no other option other than to wear seatbelts. Murray 
applies this reasoning to the case of the Divine-human relationship and the prospect of 
eternal damnation. He argues that a degree of Divine hiddenness makes the prospect of 
eternal punishment less epistemically imminent, enough to secure a morally significant 
degree of freedom for the human person. 
[I]f God desires that there be individuals with free-will who can use it in 
morally significant ways, then He must decrease the threat imminence of 
eternal and temporal punishment and He, in fact, does so by making the 
existence of the threat epistemically ambiguous. It is this epistemic 
ambiguity that we call the problem of the hiddenness of God. 972 
Robert McKim points out that it is possible for there to be a valid argument for something, 
and for people still to reject it through irrational motives. In response, one might say that 
although one could choose to believe on some irrational basis, it would be difficult to 
choose, with the exception of mental abnormality, to believe on such grounds, to wit, on 
the understanding that they are wholly irrational. However, McKim poses another 
objection, by drawing a distinction between belief that and belief in God's existence. The 
thought is that it is conceivable that one believes that God exists because of His epistemic 
imminence, and it would be irrational to do otherwise. Yet equally it would be quite 
rational still to withhold belief in God, viz. have faith in or commitment to God. One 
could project such a distinction onto a further differentiation between nominal and full 
theism, whereby epistemic imminence ensures the rational compulsion of maintaining 
nominal theism, while not entailing the further step of that belief affecting one's will, to 
produce commitment to full theism. McKim suggests a counter-argument to the last point, 
based on a "linkage" between belief that and belief in: 
To be even a nominal theist is to accept that there is a creator of all things 
who cares about you, knows what is in your interest, wishes what is best for 
you, and so on. Once one accepts these beliefs, it seems that the rationality 
of failing to be a full theist, and failing to believe in God, would be at least 
diminished. One way to characterize the situation is to say that there is 
linkage of a certain sort between these different sorts of beliefs..... an 
elimination of rational freedom of choice about nominal belief would also 
972 Murray, p. 34. 
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be tantamount to an elimination of rational freedom to choose about full 
theism and belief in God. 973 
However, the nature of this purported linkage appears far from necessary: the demand of 
rational coherence of beliefs requires a linkage, but it is also clear that human beings are 
irrational, or that their intellect does not always connect with their will. Thus, McKim does 
not raise the paradigm Christian example given in the Letter of James: "You believe that 
God is one; you do well. Even the demons believe - and shudder"(2.19). Why do the 
demons not have faith? One must suppose that their wills have become perverted, that 
their first and second-order desires to do evil trump the recognition of their intellect that 
God exists. One may appeal to what might be termed "agent defectiveness" in the face of 
Divine revelation, a defectiveness which is caused itself by the agent's abuse of free 
choice. 974 
In sum both McKim and Murray come to the conclusion that an account of Divine 
hiddenness in terms of the moral significance of the exercise of human freedom is a 
contributory but not a sufficient explanation of the degree of God's hiddenness. However, 
our point is not to give a full explanation of God's hiddenness, but merely to show the 
connection between this issue and the requirement of personal "space" which God's 
covenant relationship prescribes. Murray's and McKim's conclusion are adequate for our 
purposes. As regards Christian theology, Divine hiddenness or apophaticism, has to be 
balanced alongside the affirmation of God's character given in Special Revelation. 
Nonetheless, Special Revelation is itself ambiguous, in the sense that it is not universally 
epistemically imminent; it is not obvious to all. An explanation for this would also refer to 
the exercise of human freedom and agent defectiveness. This is consonant with the space 
that God makes for His creatures in His covenant. It is mirrored by Jesus' caution and 
scepticism about the fiduciary results of miracles or 'signs' (John. 4.48; 14.11). 
III. ) Conclusion. 
In part II of this Chapter it has been argued that a conception of the covenant as the ground 
for a loving personal relationship between God and 
His People, complements our 
discussion of revelation, helping to connect the doctrines of creation and redemption and 
973 ibid., p. 156. 
974 Murray, p. 35; McKim, pp. 155-156. 
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hence providing an important systematic context to this thesis. It has been maintained that 
from its inauguration with the people of Israel, the covenant as initiated by the Divine is 
personal, bilateral and involves the active participation of the human creature. The 
covenant is not a form of "cheap grace. " In the Hebrew Scriptures conditions and 
obligations are attached to the covenant which are binding, default of which brings curses, 
and maintenance blessings. The New Covenant comes with the assurance of lasting 
forgiveness, but requires entry into the faith-relationship and obediential discipleship. 
Further, it has been argued that the doctrine of the covenant can directly address the 
generating question, by considering whether Christian experience in Scripture, in practice 
and experience, testifies to a God who acts in a covenantal manner as described above. My 
preliminary answer maintains that there are grounds for believing that God does indeed act 
in such a manner. If the case were comprehensively marshalled, my claim is that this 
would provide strong grounds for believing that the activity of the Spirit in bringing about 
Christian metamorphosis is compatible with human freedom and personal identity. 
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CHAPTER 9. 
DISCERNMENT OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. 
Earth is filled with heaven 
And every common bush aflame with God. 
But only he who sees takes off his shoes 
The rest sit round it and pick blackberries. 
(Elisabeth B. Browning) 
The last systematic locus of contextualisation, the doctrine of the covenant, returned the 
discussion of the second half of my thesis directly to the Personalist model presented in 
Chapters 3 to 5. This reconvening of a direct examination of the Personalist model will be 
continued further by addressing the issue of how on this model the activity of the Spirit in 
Christian metamorphosis may be discerned. I shall begin by relating my line of enquiry to 
the traditional discussion of discernment (I). Section II will comment on how discernment 
of the Spirit is to be related to the other hypostaseis of the Trinity. From there the matter 
will be discussed in relation to the possibilities of perception of the Divine (III). Section 
IV will examine the importance of the cultivation of an appropriate disposition for 
discernment, and section V will present an account of how such discernment might take 
place. Section VI will explore an argument for the possibility of discernment from 
retrospection, and will reconsider again the Pauline emphasis placed on the fruits of the 
Spirit. 
Which Question of Discernment? 
Discernment in the New Testament is wedded to the Holy Spirit; it is, in the language of 
St. Paul, the gift of the Spirit bestowing "the ability to distinguish between spirits"(I 
Cor. 12.10-11). Often, it is paired with the gift of prophecy, as Cecil W. Robeck comments: 
It is the discernment of spirits. Most scholars suggest that the discernment 
to which Paul refers here is discernment of the source of prophetic claims. 
What spirit inspires the prophetic utterance? Is it the Holy Spirit, the Spirit 
of God, or is it some other spirit? 975 
Christian communities are exhorted by Paul to 'test everything' (panta dokimazete), 
especially regarding the prophecies received. A person and community may either be in a 
975 Cecil W. Robeck, "Discerning the Spirit in the Life of the Church", in The Church in the Movement of the 
Spirit, eds. by W. Barr and R. M. Yocom (Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1994), p. 33. 
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state where the Spirit is absent, in the dominion of the flesh, 976 or in a state of faith where 
the Spirit is present, aiding and guiding believers in conformity with Christ. 977 The 
Christian tradition has broadened this rather specific use of the concept: 
While discernment may be associated in the biblical tradition most 
specifically with prophetic words and inspiring 'spirits, ' the expansion of 
the concept and the development of the practise of a more broadly defined 
'discernment' is clearly consistent with the narrower description given by 
Paul's phrase, the discerning of spirits. Repeatedly the people of God are 
confronted with ethical, moral, and doctrinal choices. 978 
Thomas Aquinas certainly wanted to broaden the concept. For him moral discernment is 
the exercise of Christian wisdom rooted in the love of God, an imparted affinity or 
'connaturality' with the Holy Spirit. 979 St. Catherine of Siena in her Dialogues describes 
discernment as a multifaceted phenomenon. It is true knowledge of the soul and God, 98° 
linked with charity and humility. It is a supernatural infusion into the soul, almost a 
supernatural entity in itself: 
Discernment is that which dissolves all darkness, dissipates ignorance, and 
seasons every virtue and virtuous deed. It has prudence that cannot be 
deceived... reaching as it does from heaven and earth, that is, from the 
knowledge of me [God] to the knowledge of oneself, from love of me to 
love of one's neighbors.... By this gentle glorious light the soul sees and 
rightly despises her own weakness; and by so making a fool of herself she 
gains mastery of the world, treading underfoot with her love, scorning it as 
worthless. 981 
St. Ignatius of Loyola provides rules for the discernment of Spirits in his Spiritual 
Exercises to aid us in examining the orientation of our affective states, our reason and 
conscience, and the preternatural influences upon them. 
982 Etymologically the concept of 
discernment stems from the Greek word krisis, which refers to the moment when one is 
976 Gal. 5.19-21 cf. Rom. 13.12. 
97 I Cor. 12.3, cf. I Jn. 4.2-3; Rom. 8.12-17. Michael Buckley interprets these as the "three relationships 
possible between Christians/a Christian community and the promised 
Spirit of God. " M. Buckley, 
"Discernment of Spirit, " The New Dictionary of Catholic Spirituality. ed. by Michael Downey 
(Collegeville: 
The Liturgical Press, 1993), pp. 274 - 281. 
978 Robeck, p. 34. The biblical examples Robeck gives are the following: Deuteronomy 
30: 19; Psalm 1: 6; 
Jeremiah 21: 8. 
979 See John Mahoney, S. J. "The Spirit and Moral Discernment in Aquinas", Heythrop Journal, Vol. 13 
(1972), pp. 282 - 297. 
980 Catherine of Sienna, "Dialogues, " in Catherine of Sienna: The Dialogue, trans. 
by Suzanne Noffke, O. P. 
(London: SPCK, 1993), Sc. 9. 
981 ibid, Sc. 11, p. 44. 
982 For a good modern discussion of Ignatius text see, 
Michael J. Buckley, "The Structure of the Rules for 
Discernment, " in The Way of Ignatius Loyola: Contemporary Approaches to the 
Spiritual Exercises. ed. by 
Philip Sheldrake (London: SPCK, 1991). 
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confronted by a choice. One then has to discern, that is separate out or make discrete, the 
nature of the elements of the choice and one's own response to it. In Christian terms it is to 
decide what is the best act of love of God in this situation, in this crisis. 
The sense in which I want to use the concept of discernment, although related, does not 
mirror exactly any of the traditional definitions. The issue that concerns me is slightly 
different from the questions that initiated the traditional discussion of discernment. Hence, 
I will neither address the specific question of what is the source of a prophetic claim, nor 
the broader issue of how to discern the will of God in relation to this or that ethical 
dilemma. My question concerns the discernment of the indwelling (menein) of the 
Christian believer by the Holy Spirit. In attempting to develop a 'Personalist' model of the 
Divine-human it may be recalled that the negative analogy described by Rahner as the 
'unthematic' work of the Spirit in the believer's life, or by Alston as the 'internality' of the 
work of the Spirit, was encountered. 983 This problem raised directly the question of how to 
discern the indwelling of the Spirit. My concern is not just with the discernment of the 
Holy Spirit in this context, but also with the question of how the Spirit is to be conceived 
to indwell the believer. I wish to connect the questions of `who' and `how. ' Who is at work 
in this particular event and how may we identify the agent as the Spirit? Further, how does 
the `who' relate to the human person? If the problem of 'internality'984 cited above can be 
partially overcome, if a person can discern the personal relation of the Spirit, then this will 
further the case for holding that the indwelling of the Spirit is compatible with human 
freedom and identity in accord with the Personalist model presented. 
St. Paul in his discussion of discernment talks of the effects of the Spirit, which can be 
taken as signs of the Spirit's presence, the so-called "fruits of the Spirit. 085 Such a focus is 
appropriate for Paul's concerns, namely, the external, public discernment of a prophecy 
983 See above Chapter 4, section II. Out of the two descriptions of indwelling as 'unthematic' and as an 
'internality', the latter is more open to misinterpretation. As Rahner's distinction between the categorical and 
transcendental, as well as his critique of, what he defines as, the theological position of 'extrinsicism' shows, 
the application of spatio-temporal categories to God or Divine action, even by implication, can result in 
dangerously distorted theologies. The concept of 'internality' has misleading spatio-temporal connotations 
that are unhelpful. The indwelling of the Spirit is neither just another object in the world, nor something 
bounded by the extent of a person's body. The concept of the 'unthematic' is never clearly defined by 
Rahner. It also seems to pre-empt the answer to the question that I am posing, viz., that the indwelling of the 
Spirit can never be discerned because it is per definition unthematic. 
" See Chapter 4, "Negative Analogy II. " 
9'ý5 See Rom. 8.23; Gal. 5.22ff. 
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within a Christian community. Would such a principle of discernment from the effects be 
of use to my general concern of discerning the indwelling of the Holy Spirit? According to 
this Pauline principle one could discern whether or not the Spirit indwells a person by 
assessing whether that person possesses any of the "fruits of the Spirit. " However, this is 
of little help to my concern, for it is not just a question of whether or not the Spirit 
indwells a person, but how the Spirit does so. Discerning the effects of the Spirit, whether 
it be by the criteria of the fruits of sanctification, or of the building up of the Church (I 
Cor. 12.7; 14.2), or of the confession of Jesus Christ as Lord (I Cor. 12.3), does not tell us 
anything about how these effects are established (by some form of "infusion" as in 
Mediaeval Catholicism, or via Divine fiat, or as a result of the exchange that takes place in 
personal relationships? ). We shall return to the subject of the fruits or effects of the Spirit 
later. 
II. ) Discernment of the Spirit and the Trinity. 
An initial query concerning the very possibility of discerning the Spirit may arise from 
what we have earlier talked of as the "self-effacing" nature of the Spirit, "the Person 
without a face, " in the words of Yves Congar. 986 This is because the Spirit is the one who 
mediates the person of Christ to people now, the "Go-between God, " to use J. V. Taylor's 
phrase. Hence, the content of the Spirit's communication is christological, and the criteria 
of the discernment of the Spirit must likewise be christological. Divine communication 
takes place through God's incarnational activity in the world, and the Incarnation of the 
Son is the key to unlocking, and hence, discerning such activity. In short, the discernment 
of the Spirit is inalienably trinitarian, for one cannot talk of the Spirit other than by His 
relations with the other hypostaseis of the Trinity. The Spirit does not have a distinct 
"personality, " this would be an anthropomorphism from western psychology, but shares a 
common will and power with the Father and Son. Rather the Spirit has a distinct taxis 
within the Godhead, and a distinct function in the Divine economy. The 
latter allows us to 
appropriate certain qualities and activities to the Spirit that are not as such proper to 
His 
being. 987 This is merely to retread steps taken in Chapters 1 and 6, and with it to reaffirm 
Augustine's principle of opera sacrosanctae Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisia. 
986 Congar, Vol. III, p-5- 
987 What is proper to the Spirit is His taxis within the 
Trinity, being sent from the Father and the Son, or 
through the Son, depending on one's stance towards the 
Filioque, and as acting as a bond between the Father 
and the Son. As for the Spirit's work 
in the economy of salvation Daniel Helminiak points out, "insofar as 
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III. ) Perceiving God: Direct and Indirect Perception. 
Although William Alston does not attempt to resolve the negative analogy of the 
"internality" of the indwelling of the Spirit in relation to a Personalist model, in his later 
monograph, Perceiving God, he appears to indirectly provide a way forward. The direct 
aim of the book is to produce an epistemology of religious perceptual belief. His thesis is 
that Christian mystical perception should be understood as a reliable, direct presentation or 
appearance of what is taken to be God by the subject of the experience, and not as purely 
subjective feelings or sensations that are subsequently given religious explanation. 988 I am 
not concerned with the development of this thesis, but in Alston's initial description of 
Christian mystical perception. Alston arrives at this thesis by examining selected accounts 
of Christian mystics and believers, in the same manner that William James analyses edited 
highlights of the mystics. "Mystical perception" is quite a narrow category and Alston is 
certainly not attempting to provide an account of all religious experience. 989 He identifies 
the problem we are attempting to address in this Chapter succinctly: 
[A]ccording to the Christian tradition the main significance of mystical 
perception is that it is an integral part of that personal relationship with God 
that is the fundamental aim and consummation of human life. Without God 
and me being aware of each other in a way that, on my side, is properly 
called 'perception', there could be no intimate relationship of love, devotion, 
and dialogue that, according to Christianity, constitutes our highest good. 990 
Notice the reference to the "personal" in the above. He talks here about perception as a 
crucial part of the interaction in the Divine-human relationship, which again re-enforces 
my belief that his claim that it is possible to perceive God would significantly overcome 
the negative analogy of "internality. " Clearly, Alston holds that there are times when 
salvation actually occurs in any human being, it is a created effect and so is not proper to any of the Three 
alone but is common to all as the one Creator-God. Accordingly, the supposed work of the Holy Spirit, 
sanctification, is the work of God as One. " Helminiak, p. 187. Yet, latter he goes on to write: "[T]here is a 
connection between the Holy Spirit and the sanctification of humankind. That connection is found not in 
what is done by the Holy Spirit but in what is done by God because the Holy Spirit is sent by the Mother- 
Father and the Begotten One. "By the Holy Spirit" would entail efficient causality, disqualified by the ad 
extra rule. "Because of the Holy Spirit" suggests final causality. The mission of the Holy Spirit is that 
because of which God effects a transformation in the human. Because the Holy Spirit is sent to dwell in us, 
God creates in us the capacity to receive and respond to the Holy Spirit. " ibid, pp. 192-3 
988 Aaston is not the first Christian thinker to compare religious experience with sense perception; John Henry 
Newman does so in his An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Ascent, Chapter five. 
989 Alston, Perceiving God, p. 34. 
990 ibid., p. 12. 
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Christians do perceive God, and that means that the "internality" of God's operation does 
not obstruct recognition of His presence and communication to persons. 
How does Alston explicate perception of the Divine? He recognises that the analogy with 
sense perception is not univocal: "though mystical perception is like sense perception in 
the fact of presentation, it is frequently utterly unlike it in content, at least in those 
numerous cases in which no awareness of sensory qualia is involved, no colors, sounds, 
smells, and the like. "991 He offers two challenges to doubters: "Why suppose that the 
possibilities of experiential givenness, for human beings or otherwise, are exhausted by the 
powers of our five senses? .... why can't we also envisage presentations that do not stem 
from the activity of any physical sense organs, as is apparently the case with mystical 
perception. , 992 So whereas in sense perception we have a pattern of object -> sense organs 
-> qualia, in the case of God-perception we bypass the middle stage and move from the 
object of perception (God) to qualia in our minds. The perception is a form of mediate 
immediacy ("direct perception"), 993 defined as being an awareness "of X through a state of 
consciousness that is distinguishable from X, and can be made an object of absolutely 
immediate awareness, but is not perceived. "994 The mystical perception that Alston is 
interested in is not a form of "absolute immediacy", as he terms it, or unity of subject and 
object. 995 
991 ibid, pp. 16-17. Alston does note later that sensory qualia of God are conceivable and draws upon the 
Lockean primary and secondary quality distinction to explain further such perception: "there is a long 
tradition that holds that secondary qualities like colors do not really characterize physical substances. Thus it 
is not inconceivable that God should appear to us as looking bright or sounding a certain way, even though 
He does not, in His own nature, possess any sensory qualities...... It may be that, given our proclivities, this 
would be the best way for Him to get a certain message across; just as, even if physical substances are not 
really colored, the system of color appearances enables us to make many useful distinctions between them. " 
ibid., p. 20. However, for Alston's purposes he is going to focus on non-sensory perception, because he 
considers it a better way of God presenting Himself. ibid.. 
992 ibid, p. 17. 
993 It is 'mediate' because the subjects of the experience can distinguish between their states of consciousness 
and the object of perception. Nonetheless, it is 'immediate' in the sense of a direct presentation of the object; 
it is not mediate perception whereby the primary object is perceived through a secondary object. 
994 ibid, p. 22. 
995 He holds further that perception in general is, contra Kant, a non-intentional relationship and independent 
of conceptualisation and interpretation; X's appearing to S as such-and-such is 'fundamental' and 
'unanalyzable'. Alston writes, "From the fact that we use a concept to identify something of a certain type, it 
does not follow that what we are identifying 'involves' concepts and judgements. If it did, we would be 
unable to classify anything but cognitive psychological states. From the fact that we use a concept to pick 
out cabbages as vegetables, it does not follow that cabbages are, have or use concepts. " ibid., p. 41. He holds 
that a distinction must be drawn between direct awareness of X and awareness of X having some properties, 
the latter involves concepts and judgements the former does not. See page 55ff for an account of the 
'unanalyzability' of Alston's theory of appearing. 
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Alston's case re-affirms the importance of the category of perception in religious life, but it 
will not solve in one go the negative analogy of 'internality. ' A theological realist would be 
reluctant to challenge Alston's thesis, for it seems to hold true not only of some of the 
mystics, but also the figures of faith in the Bible. Even in the great theophanies in the Old 
Testament when the patriarchs were unable to see God's face, they still heard his voice. 
Yet as Samuel Terrien's study of the theopanies shows, a perceptual encounter with God 
may be characterised as an 'elusive presence': 
Presence perceived in an epiphanic visitation, a theophany, or the invaded 
solitude of a prophetic vision was 'swift-lived', yet the acceptance of the 
promise it carried transformed those who received and obeyed the 
command. Faded presence became a memory and a hope, but it burnt into 
an alloy of inward certitude, which was emunah, 'faith'. When God no 
longer overwhelmed the senses of perception and concealed himself behind 
the adversity of historical existence, those who accepted the promise were 
still aware of God's nearness in the very veil of his seeming absence. For 
them, the center of life was a Deus absconditus atque praesens. 996 
If we are to follow Terrien and hold that such mystical perception testifies to an "elusive 
presence, " then Alston's account of mystical perception can hardly be thought to provide a 
satisfactory solution to the problem of "internality" The fact that a believer may sometimes 
perceive God directly cannot adequately do justice to the presence of a continuous 
relationship, which the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is said to be. This is surely one of the 
differences between pneumatological claims in the Old and New Covenant: the Spirit of 
God no longer dwells occasionally and particularly in a prophet or in the Shekinah, but is 
given to all who allow themselves to receive Him in Christ. 997 Let us suppose that 
mystical perception of God, as Alston describes it, safeguards human freedom and 
personal identity at the times when God is perceived. What about the interim period 
between perceptions? 998 If the Holy Spirit is meant to indwell the believer in these periods, 
996 Samuel Terrien, The Elusive Presence: Towards a New Biblical Theology (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 
1978), p. 470. Bernard Zelechow from his reading of the Old Testament also confirms this picture: "The 
biblical God is from the first a present but receding God. This is the only way it could be once God decided 
to grant humankind the paradoxical gift of freedom with its bewildering dialectics of intentionality and 
conditionality, autonomous volition and heteronomous consequences from the human perspective. " Bernard 
Zelechow, "God's Presence and the Paradox of Freedom", Hermeneutics, the Bible and Literary Criticism, 
eds. by A. Loades and M. McLain (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 166. 
997 See Eduard Schweizer, "On Distinguishing Between the Spirits, " Ecumenical Review, Vol. 41 (1989), 
p. 413. 
998 Nelson Pike in his book, Mystic Union, argues that "union without distinction" in mystical experience is 
"not a distinct kind of mystical experience, but is instead, an interval in a more comprehensive experience, " 
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how can human freedom and identity be secured in the interregnum? It would be a mistake 
to suppose that the Spirit could only be active in sanctifying the believer, when God is 
somehow directly perceived. 
By precisely focusing on a narrow category within religious experience, namely, mystical 
perception, Alston may be charged with distancing his account from the experience of the 
"average" Christian. Whatever the truth of such an assertion, my point is that Alston's 
account cannot explain the presence of the Divine in the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, 
which is continuous and not periodical. What the relation exactly is between Alston's two 
articles on the Spirit and his book Perceiving God, he does not declare. Indeed, his having 
treated the two questions in different places without association, suggests that a defence of 
mystical perception and an explication of pneumatological indwelling are separate issues 
for him. In sum, my response to Alston's account of mystical perception as regards the 
issue of "internality, " is similar to my stance towards the Spirit's gifts of the charismata. 
The charismata may be interpreted as signs of the presence of God, but as long as they are 
not incorrectly interpreted as a necessary and sufficient sign of the Spirit's presence, then 
one can say that the charismata are temporary effects of the Spirit, and will not suffice as a 
description of the continued presence and relation of the Spirit in the believer. Likewise, 
mystical perception need not be the sole means of discerning the indwelling of the Spirit. 
To consider how the indwelling of the Spirit may be more aptly discerned, we turn to the 
central issue of the nature of God. It is clear from general theistic principles that God is not 
a particular object, alongside other beings in the world. Hence, God cannot be discerned in 
the way in which spatio-temporal objects in the world are identified unless He chooses to 
reveal Himself, as He does so in the specific event of the Incarnation, or by acting in the 
world, what may be called His general incarnational activity. God's nature is, in the words 
of Aquinas, 'ubiquitous', transcendence in immanence: 
When one apprehends that God is only deeply immanent, in and containing 
all things, everywhere and nowhere, the 'substantial form', the inner reality 
of all things, 'more myself than myself, because not only not in space and 
time but not any thing or person, present in, containing, giving their whole 
life, form and reality to all things and persons by that presence because not 
which takes a subject-object form. Such an argument 
is not really applicable in the case of the indwelling of 
the Spirit, as "indirect" perceptual experience of the 
Spirit seems to better fit the case of indwelling. Hence, 
direct perception (mediated immediacy) would 
be the "interval" experience and not the other way around. 
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any or all of them, one has totally excluded pantheism in the sense of any 
confusion of God and creatures, and this seems to me the only useful sense 
of 'transcendence', in positive theology. 999 
God's essence as the personal ground of being manifests itself through the subject-object 
framework of human perception as a whole, instead of being part of it. The Creator and 
creature cannot be separated out, dualistically, into two spheres or realms. Hence, the 
discernment of the Spirit's action in indwelling the human person is mediated by creation, 
and may be more appropriately described, in Alston's terms, as indirect perception. The 
Spirit is to be seen as a transcendent, yet immanent personal presence. Equally, the 
concept of "indwelling" does not refer to some 'inner' or 'outer' boundary that is the domain 
of the Spirit. 1000 When the Spirit is said to indwell a person it does not mean that the Spirit 
is somehow spatially inside that person, accessible only by some form of introspection. If 
the Spirit is beyond the categories of space and time, such a conception of indwelling is 
unsuitable. The Spirit is rather to be conceived of as active in and through the space-time 
continuum that is experienced and present within a person's subjectivity. 
IV The Disposition Required for Discernment. 
Simone Weil draws a distinction, which may be of some use, between implicit and explicit 
love of God. 100' For Weil, we experience God's hiddenness, His absence, but she believed 
Him to be 'secretly' present, implicitly, yet incarnationally, in our neighbours, in nature, 
and in Christian rites. 1002 This is a dialectic of the absence of God as a categorical object 
of the world, yet at the same time, secret presence, which requires an appropriate stance or 
disposition to be perceived. Her account of our conversion to this stance, what she would 
call a state of "attention" or "waiting on God, " is twofold. First, we experience the world 
as indifferent and unable to satisfy our desires. God is judged absent by the world's own 
terms, and we learn to become attentive to God by first being attentive to what God is not - 
a theological move which echoes Aquinas' via negativa. This Weil describes as a process 
999 Hilary A. Armstrong, "The World in God", Modern Churchman, Vol. 34 (1992), pp. 10-15. 
100° See Owen C. Thomas, "Interiority and Christian Spirituality, " Journal of Religion, Vol. 80 (2000), pp. 
41-60. 
10°' S. Weil, "Implicit and Explicit Love of God, " in Waiting on God (London: Collins, Fontana Books, 
1959), p. 160. 
1002 Note that the experience of the presence of the Spirit here is not confined to internal-external dichotomy, 
whereby the Spirit's activity takes place in the interior realm of the soul. Rather the Spirit indwells my 
experiences, which include most importantly events that take place outside of my body, viz. what might be 
called the external world. 
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of renunciation and self-emptying. A degree of detachment is thereby achieved which 
creates the possibility of attending to a fantasy-free presence of God. It also provides the 
space for the growth of true love and desire for God. By loving our neighbour, for 
example, we indirectly love God who is present in them. We may add to this thought by 
saying that, conversely, when we experience, say, the love of another person, we are also 
experiencing God's love. For Weil implicit love of God acts as a preparation and grooming 
for explicit love of God. As Diogenes Allen writes: 
[God] does not come as a reward to those who have loved their neighbors 
and the universe. But the effect of loving them better and better is to turn us 
with increasing attentiveness to where God dwells, though he dwells there 
in secret. All that is needed for God to come to the soul is attentiveness to 
the places where he is - in our neighbor, in the universe, and, in religious 
ceremonies. 1003 
We are slowly weaned off our attachments to what is not of God in creation, renouncing 
the hope of gaining completeness by following the way of "gravity" alone, and training 
ourselves to be attentive to the secret presence of God in the world, in a process which for 
Weil is sanctification. 
Gabriel Marcel helps to clarify the conditions for discernment. At the heart of the matter, 
what is needed is the participation or engagement of the human subject. To be able to 
experience a person, a 'thou', Marcel says that one has to be 'disposable' (disponsible); 1004 
one has to be open and responsive to the 'thou. ' 
We cannot dispose of a person 
instrument which we employ, or 
information we would like to have. 
unless we consider the person as an 
look at him as a possible source of 
We can never dispose of presence; if we 
treat persons as things over which we have a power of disposal, they will 
invariably withhold their presence from us. .... Availability 
[i. e. 
disponsibilite] is an opening upon the presence of another, not a way of 
access to certain goods he possesses. Marcel writes that the available 
person is capable of being entirely with me; the unavailable person only loos 
gives me a provisional loan on resources which lie at his disposal. 
1003 Diogenes Allen, Three Outsiders (Boston: Cowley Publications, 1983), p. 121. 
10°4 Marcel writes: "The French terms I use are disponsibilite and indisponsibilite. Literally, in English, one 
would have to render these as availability and unavailability, but it might sound more natural if one spoke of 
handiness and unhandiness, the basic idea being that of having or not having, in a given contingency, one's 
resources to hand or at hand. " G. Marcel, The Mystery of Being, Vol. 1: Reflection and Mystery, trans. by 
G. S. Fraser (London: Hanvill, 1950), p. 201. He writes further: "It is essential to human life not only to 
orientate itself towards something other than itself, but also to be inwardly conjoined and adapted. " ibid.. 
10°5 McCown, pp. 9-10. 
279 
Such openness is something that is also an ingredient of Weil's concept of attentiveness 
and is also to be found in Von Balthasar, with his concept of Verfügbarkeit. 1006 In Marcel's 
words, we have to "reverse the process of objectification, " the idea that all reality can be 
experienced in discrete parts, just as any other object in the world. Marcel also provides us 
with an analysis of what makes us "unavailable" (indisponsible): being "encumbered by 
the self; , 1007 the anguish of a susceptibility which comes from self-concern; 1008 contracting 
behind the shell of one's fixed habits and way of thinking (crispation); 1009 and "moral ego- 
centricity. "1010 Orthodox Christian theology would encompass this in an analysis of sin, 
that which dislocates us from relationship with God, and especially the sin of pride. 1011 
Marcel also explicates phenomena that are conducive to 'disposability, ' namely, self- 
presence, receptivity and being welcoming. Self-presence is not very precisely defined by 
Marcel, but for our purposes it could refer to God's call to us to be our true nature in 
relation to him, in self-awareness and mindfulness. Marcel does connect self-presence 
with recognition of the other, so that both are mutually integral and constitutive, 1012 which 
1006 For a survey of the different contexts that Von Balthasar employs this concept, see Raymond Gawronski, 
SJ., Word and Silence. Hans Urs Von Balthasar and the Spiritual Encounter between East and West 
(Edinburgh: T&T. Clark, 1995), pp. 161 - 163. Gawronski writes: "Etymologically, it [Verfügbarkeit] carries 
the connotation of being at someone's disposal, and furthermore of being able to be moulded by the forming 
hand of another. " ibid., p. 161. He goes on: "The disponsibility requires a constant vigilance, for it is never 
the case that the Christian has already 'heard' the Word of God.... In the Biblical vision, the apatheia which 
truly does belong to the human condition is transformed, lifted into the 'readiness to commitment to every 
role ordered by God in the play. ' The epical moment is then taken up into the Christian drama precisely in 
this being ready - in an Ignatian indifference - to take on whatever role it is God assigns the person, an 
availability to mission. " ibid., pp. 162 -3. 
1007 Mystery and Being Vol. 1, p. 176. McCown comments: "An encumbered person literally cannot make 
room in himself for another. He is physically and emotionally incapacitated for response by the load of self- 
concern he carries.... Things are encumbering, because they get in the way; they interpose themselves 
between the self's presence to itself, and between the self and the presence of another. " McCown, pp. 11-12. 
1008 Again, McCown comments that this vulnerability is a "basic contradiction: between a need to possess, to 
annex everything, thus creating a monopoly over all available goods; and an obscure consciousness of an 
abyss opening within the self, a consciousness that, in spite of every attempt to fill up the abyss, the self still 
is nothingness. " ibid, p. 14. He adds, "The susceptible consciousness, " in its zealous excessive self- 
consciousness, "projects its own feelings upon the other, and actually never reaches the other. " ibid., p. 15. 
1009: "A coagulation of the life of the whole self around any particular adherence or manifestation of the self 
always means loss of sensitivity and a general devaluation of life. " ibid, p. 13. The ultimate example of the 
fixated or congealed (figer) man is the fanatic. 
1010 Marcel, Homo Viato: Introduction to a Metaphysics of Hope, trans. by Emma Crauford (London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1951), p. 19. Marcel compares the egoist to the dreamer: action and its consequences are centred 
round the self's conception and not on reality or the other (ibid., pp. 22-23), and hence, there is no reflective 
interaction between the self and reality. 
'o'1 This is not altogether alien to Marcel who utilises the concept of "the Mystery, " a relation where the 
boundary between self and what confronts it is not simply subject to our grasp, and refers ultimately to a 
theonomous ground to our being. See Bruce Campbell, "Can Prayer be Humanizing? Person and Prayer in the 
Thought of Gabriel Marcel, " Canadian Journal of Theology, Vol. 15 (1969), pp. 186-197. 
1012 The Mystery of Being Vol. 1, p. 205ff. 
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returns us to the theme of intersubjectivity and the formation of the self. 1013 As regards 
receptivity, Marcel rejects a simplified empiricist conception as mere passive impression. 
Rather there has to be an active "readiness" and "preparedness" for a subject to welcome 
the other to something, which means, "putting our own house in order. " As McCown 
explains: 
The human meaning of receptivity, then, is to introduce the other into a 
qualified (and privileged) zone of our experience or life, a region which is 
uniquely our own, which we have readied or prepared by investing 
something of ourselves in it..... At its center is an active element something 
like a power of taking upon ourselves or into ourselves...., or better still, the 
power of opening ourselves to.... Reception transcends the dilemma of 
activity versus passivity. 1014 
This reminds us of Levinas' discussion of the relation of autonomy and heteronomy, and 
the inseparable interdependence of self and Other. For our purposes at present what is to 
be affirmed is the active receptivity or disposition required for discernment, which is at the 
same time equally conditioned or initiated by the presence of the Other. 
Another Christian thinker, from a very different school of philosophical theology, Austin 
Farrer, held the position that the manifestation of divine agency in nature, history and 
individual lives is only discernible to those with faith. 
Without the readiness of [initial] faith, the evidence of God will not be 
accepted, or will not convince..... [Initial] faith is the subjective condition 
favourable to the reception of evidence. 1015 
Diogenes Allen explicates this theme in Farrer: 
To open the heart is to allow what is in the domain of value, and in 
particular self-evaluation, to affect one....... [W]ithout a heart that is open 
'the cosmic facts are dumb, ' as Farrer puts it. What is crucial is what we 
seek with. This has priority over where we look, whether to nature, history 
or to Christ. Without an open heart nature and history are dumb and Christ 
1016 is not given admittance. 
If we are to discern the indwelling of the Spirit we need to be open, disposed towards and 
participative in the Spirit's activity. Then, through a process of spiritual maturation, as 
1013 See Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
1014 McCowan, pp. 19-20. 
1015 A. Farrer, Saving Belief (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1964), p. 18. 
1016 D. Allen, "Faith and the Recognition of God's Activity", in Divine Action, ed. B. Hebblethwaite and E. 
Henderson (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), p. 207. 
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Weil indicates, one becomes more attentive and sensitive to the working of the Spirit in 
one's life. 
V. ) An Account of Discernment. 
If we are not going to attempt to describe an awareness of the indwelling of the Spirit 
solely in terms of Alston's mystical perception, is the indwelling of the Spirit inferred or an 
interpretative extrapolation? Is the experience of the Spirit simply based on an inference 
drawn from cumulative experiences of the world and ourselves? Hilary Armstrong seems 
to advocate this with a Thomist twist: 
We apprehend that God is always about the place, almost never directly 
encountered, but leaving tracks and signs of presence everywhere in the 
world, in vast diversity to match the God-given diversity of human 
creatures for whom they are intended. 1017 
To suggest that any experience of the Spirit is just a mere interpretation or inference does 
not seem to do justice to Christian experience. When a Christian experiences the beauty of 
nature, the love of their neighbour or friend and the sanctifying effect of religious worship, 
this is not commonly reported as an inference, a hypothesis of best explaination. The 
experience in its religiously mature form is an experience of the presence of the Spirit 
through nature, friends, community and worship. 
Let us take an example. 1018 The caretaker at my church, who is not a believing Christian, 
said to me once that he very much enjoyed working amongst the church community and 
that he experienced a depth of love both flowing from him and coming from the 
community which he could not explain. He said that he was not the type of person who 
typically carries out such acts of love. 1019 Attempting to understand this experience from 
1017 Armstrong, p. 12. 
1018 Other examples are recorded in the work of the late Alister Hardy, such as this one: "Several times in my 
life I have been either very frightened or very unhappy or have been unable to see how my life could 
continue. At those times I have been able to put my trust in this calm love and sense of God, concentrate on 
what little I could do, and though it wasn't always pleasant and certainly I didn't go around in a bland 
euphoria, I was given strength I didn't have and things were accomplished and righted with a great kindness 
that had my gratitude, because I knew it was God's help, and not something I had done or something that 
would have come about anyway in the way the world works. " A. Hardy, The Spiritual Nature of Man 
(Oxford: OUP, 1979), p. 54. Here we seem to have a direct perception, the 'calm love and sense of God, ' 
although not definitely, and, further, the citing of an effect of God's activity, namely, the psychological 
strengthening of the person. 
1019 This example is similar to one given in Alistair Hardy: "The guys still wear their hair long, but we're all 
like children when we talk about Jesus, we love him so much...... There's a love in me that's supernatural. I 
never could love people as I do now with Jesus in my heart. " Hardy, p. 59. 
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the frame of reference that I have put forward, one could say that the caretaker experienced 
implicitly the love of God. This was not a perception of the Spirit as a distinct entity, but 
was experienced through his perceptions of himself and the community. One cannot 
isolate an element of categorical experience, to use Rahner's term, which represents the 
Spirit: "To prove such a thing would necessitate being able to distinguish within the 
experience between the divine element and the spatio-temporal wrapping..... such an 
attempt is doomed to failure. "1020 
In the example cited above, what was of note was the excess of love, according to the 
caretaker, and this excess was not experienced explicitly as the Spirit's love, but again, was 
experienced in and through the events of his relationship with the community. It was not 
something simply inferred, though concepts and contexts were not absent, it was to refer 
to Alston's term presented. This mediated perception of the Divine has some "weight" or 
"heaviness, " as Emmanuel Levinas metaphorically describes it. By this Levinas wishes to 
capture something intrinsic to the nature of personal relations: one cannot reduce the other 
person to a series of representations; a surplus always remains. There is a surplus to the 
representing consciousness of Husserlian phenomenology and it is in this surplus, this 
"overloading of phenomenology, "1021 that the overflowing, ecstatic love of the Divine may 
be found. In the words of the poet R. S. Thomas, "There is nothing too ample/ for you to 
overflow, nothing/ so small that your workmanship/ is not revealed. "1022 The fact that a 
person may be able to discern this "excess" or "weight" in his experience, as something 
which is not simply self-generated, or explicable by the categorical objects that one 
perceives, gives the experience the quality of something presented "over and against" the 
mind of the subject. Even though this may not be an explicitly recognised perception of 
the Divine, the fact that it has this "sign" embedded within the experience, the "weight" or 
"excess, " acts as a kind of mark of recognition. This corroborates the view that, although 
the Divine may not be as we are in either nature, being incorporeal, or mode of operation, 
His presence may still be recognised, supporting the idea of Divine-human relationship 
and Divine respect for the human subject. 
'020 Gabbya, p. 258. 
1021 Richard Cohen uses this turn of phrase to describe Levinas' philosophy. R. Cohen Elevations: The 
Height of the Good In Rosenweig and Levinas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 180n. 13. 
Levinas writes "The trace will be the indelibility of being.. . 
its immensity incapable of being enclosed in itself 
and somehow too great for discretion, for interiority, for a Self. " Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 45. 
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In the cases of indirect perception of God, which I have given, the object of perception that 
can be isolated within the subjectlconsciousness/object framework of experience1023 
appears at first glance to be a categorical, space-time object, for example, the loving 
behaviour of people, or the beauty of nature. Yet the experience cannot be reduced merely 
to the perception of a categorical object, for the quality of experience is such that mediated 
through the consciousness/object structure is an experience of an "excess of love, " which 
one is enabled to perceive by one's attentive and open disposition. From the vantage point 
of a faith commitment, such an experience may be explicitly recognised as coming from 
the Divine. Hence, the caretaker, even though he lacks explicit faith, has enough openness 
of heart to discern that there may be something more to the experience, and someone with 
full-blown faith will experience the occurrence, explicitly, as an event of Divine love. 
By emphasising the category of the quality of an experience, its "excess" or "weight, " it is 
not intended to reduce religious experience or life to the class of feeling, as some might 
claim that the early Schleiermacher does. For a start, what is given in the quality of the 
experience is not a self-generated feeling, but is experienced as stemming from another 
source distinct from the self, hence the appropriateness of the category of presentation and 
indirect perception. Note too, that in the case of the caretaker the experience consists not 
simply of an isolated experience of love, which has been termed "excess. " The experience 
is complex, mediated by a creaturely reality, the loving behaviour of the Christian 
community, and assessable from a Christian epistemological framework. Thus, Scripture 
tells that God is to be experienced through others and commands us to love one another. It 
also tells us of how true love is to be recognised and that God is love. 
Let us consider two other cases of mediated perception of the Divine, which may appear 
more explicitly Christian. Many in the Protestant tradition would see Scripture expounded 
in preaching as a central event in a person and community's relationship with God. 
According to Karl Barth, for example, preaching is a means of God speaking and acting, 
1022 R. S. Thomas, Collected Poems 1945-1990 (London: Phoenix Giants, 1993), p. 296. 
102-3 Keith Yandell in his work on religious experience distinguishes between two different types of structure 
of experience: subject/content experience, such as 
"I feel tired"; and subject/consciousness/object 
experience, for instance, "My hand 
is aching". K. Yandell, "Religious Experience", A Companion to 
Philosophy of Religion, eds. by P. L. Quinn & C. Taliaferro 
(Oxford: Blackwells, 1997), pp. 367 - 73. 
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and thus, preaching has value only insofar as it concurs with and is appropriated by the 
Word of God. The Word of God is not conceived of as being a static datum, like an object 
at a person's disposal, but the living act and event of God freely willing to reveal Himself 
to His creatures. 1024 The event of preaching, it might be claimed, is experienced as being 
"personally addressed, " which Barth articulates in terms of the particular act of God 
addressing an individual through the proclamation of the Gospel. One may feel that a 
classic novel addresses one personally, that is it provokes thought about one's situation or 
state. If that is all that is meant in the case of preaching, then, the experience remains 
rather two-dimensional. However, as Barth points out hearing the Word is not simply 
about our own personal and private wrestling with the meaning of Scripture and its 
application to ourselves. It is about meeting the living Christ, His call, reconciliation, 
judgement, forgiveness, through the power of the Spirit. 
Do the categories of direct or indirect perception apply here? Unless a person is aware of 
hearing Divine words, the experience seems to fit best the indirect model, for the Divine 
address is mediated by the words of Scripture and the preacher. Barth is keen to emphasise 
that the creaturely mediation of both the form of Scripture and the Church's proclamation 
in preaching, are in themselves not the Word of God. Again, it is only by grace, in the 
power of the Holy Spirit, that they may be transformed into the Word of God. 
1025 In short, 
what distinguishes the hearing of the Word through the proclamation of Scripture from 
reading a classic novel is that there is, "when and where God pleases, " a personal presence 
behind the words that addresses the person*1026 This is not to be simply identified as one of 
the categorical facts that are experienced (a datum e. g. the words, the sound, etc. ), but a 
presence that may quite evocatively be described as a "weight" or "excess. " 
One should also mention the Eucharist as another paradigm example of Divine 
incarnational activity after the resurrection. The bread and wine function as symbols 
within the web of meaning of the Christian narrative, and 
hence, receive new meaning in 
the Christian community. To leave matters there at the level of symbol would again be 
1024 Church Dogmatics I/1, p. 79; 1/2, pp. Iff. 
1025 Church Dogmatics I/1, pp. 79ff, 98ff, 122ff. 
1026 Note that what is said above does not rule out the possibility of the novel, 
in the right context, from 
becoming a form of mediation of the Divine presence. 
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two-dimensional. One must include the living action of the Christ through the Spirit, 
symbolised in the liturgy by the epiclesis: 
The bread and wine are not merely tokens or signs of Christ, pointing to 
him and reminding us of him. Rather, with a sovereignty and freedom that 
now belong to his glorified body, he identifies himself with the bread and 
the wine. He uses them to embody and express his eternal giving of himself 
to the Father and to us. 1027 
This is the "weight" and "excess" that the symbols and liturgy have. The personal presence 
is dependent for its expression on the relational web that is the interaction between the 
Divine presence through the symbols and signs, and the disposition of the worshipping 
community. If the congregation approaches with faith and love the symbols are allowed to 
work, to mediate the deeper personal presence, and there is real exchange and reciprocity. 
John McKenna re-enforces this point when he argues that full presence is dependent upon 
an inter-personal environment of openness, reciprocity and love. 1028 
[E]ven the personal presence of Christ offering himself to his Father and to 
us does not constitute presence in the fullest sense, since presence to be 
fully personal must be reciprocal. The Church must also respond by 
opening up to Christ's gift of himself. Otherwise we do not have presence 
in its fullest sense. 1029 
The Eucharist encapsulates our model of the activity and discernment of the Spirit, 
mediated through creaturely reality, within the context of the Christian narrative and 
community, and expressing the personal presence of the Divine experienced as an "excess" 
or "weight" within this relational dynamic. The experience of the Divine presence as 
"excess" or "weight, " is not something that is experienced on every occasion that a person 
attends the Eucharist, and lack of such an experience does not invalidate the Eucharist. It 
may be that the disposition of the believer is such that attentiveness to the Divine presence 
is lost, or the mediation, the liturgy for example, is poorly executed. How the event is 
experienced is not the key point. After all, the experience of "excess" or "weight" is only a 
sign, or as Levinas would say, a "trace" of the Divine, that points to a reality that may 
never be contained by experience. 
1027 John H. McKenna, C. M., "Eucharistic Presence: An Invitation to Dialogue, " Theological Studies, Vol. 
60 (1999), p. 311, 
1028 "On the deepest level this kind of presence involves love, because only in a climate of love can people 
reveal themselves as they are. " ibid, p. 307. 
1029 ibid, p. 312. 
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VI. ) An Argument from Retrospection and Spiritual Maturity. 
"There is an unseen 
power..... We never catch 
him at work, but can only say, 
coming suddenly upon an amendment, 
that here he has been. " 
(R. S. Thomas, "Adjustments")"" 
R. S. Thomas captures the elusiveness and extraordinary work of the Spirit, and suggests 
that the Spirit's indwelling may often best be discerned from retrospect. The analogy with 
interpersonal human relations may be re-introduced at this point. People are often unable 
to discern the goal and intentions of the action of another person. Take a case of 
unrequited love. The tragedy for the unrequited lover is often that the beloved is unable to 
recognise the gestures of love made towards him by the lover. Retrospectively the beloved 
might be able to discern the movement of the other towards him. Broken relationships are 
often caused by a lack of sensitivity towards each other, and an inability to read actions 
and apprehend the real intentions of the other. This provides at least an analogy with the 
problem of 'internality, ' if we take it to be a question of hiddenness and lack of recognition 
of personal presence. The Spirit as incorporeal is not externally recognisable, but neither 
are people's goals and intentions always grasped and appreciated. 1031 Both require 
sensitivity and attention to discern them. Such perception comes with maturity of 
judgement, and may be retrospective. Some form of counselling may help somebody 
understand with greater accuracy their own motivations in the past and their relationship 
with others. Analogously, with growing sensitivity to the indwelling of the Spirit a 
believer may be able to discern the love of God in their life hitherto. One may in the 
process procure the services of a spiritual director, someone who possesses maturity of 
judgement, to aid as a guide. In Weil's terms, what is implicit may become explicit. 
It is at this point that Paul's conception of the fruits of the Spirit can best be appropriated. 
The fruits of the Spirit are not just intentional states of a person, whether Divinely given or 
not. If we take the case of the caretaker once again, the extraordinary love which he found 
in his life is both an intentional state, he becomes more loving, and also, primarily an 
experience of love coming from the personal presence of God, mediated through other 
1030 Thomas, Collected Poems, p. 345. 
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people. There is a created effect or fruit in the person, say love, which is a gift given 
through experience of the Divine presence in and through the world. The fruit in the 
person may, therefore, act as an aid to the retrospective discernment of the Spirit, for it 
testifies to the Spirit's presence and action. Equally the opposite qualities to the fruits of 
the Spirit may testify to a lack of openness and disposability to the Spirit's presence in 
one's life. This leaves the question of whether an intentional state is the fruit of the Spirit 
or not, which is not the issue we are directly addressing, but is treated in standard accounts 
of discernment. Such accounts would contain criteria for discernment. Does revelation 
testified to by Scripture support this experience or state? Has the experience been 
subjected to examination by the Christian community and mature Christians within that 
community (e. g. a spiritual director)? Is this experience at least not in contradiction with 
what we already know about the world? 1032 
In this Chapter, it has been argued that the indwelling of the Spirit, given the nature of God 
as transcendent personal spirit and the inadequacy of human receptivity, is often an elusive 
presence. The parallel with sense perception is both enlightening and equivocal. God is not 
an empirical/categorical object, but the perceptual experience of God is strongly testified 
to in Christian experience. Some Christians perceive God directly, in a mediated 
immediacy. Perhaps the majority of Christians perceive God only indirectly, in a mediated 
form of perception, through the events of the world and in religious practice. No privilege 
or priority is attributed to this distinction: those who experience God directly are not de 
facto part of a spiritually elite body of Christians. For both types of perception, the 
disposition of the perceiver is vital. Openness, attentiveness, a maturity of faith and 
spiritual judgement, are all conditions of reception. The input of both types of perception 
gives the Christian an experience of God, which is acquired cumulatively, and grows with 
spiritual maturity. 
In the case of mediated perception God works incarnationally, in and through the world, in 
and through our subject/consciousness/object framework, drawing creation towards its 
eschatological perfection. The Spirit's presence is often signified by a "weight" or "excess" 
1031 Indeed, on a dualist account of mental states, a person's intention is also intrinsically incorporeal and 
only mediated via the body. 
1032 Grace Jantzen, "Mysticism and Experience, " Religious Studies, Vol. 25 (1988), pp. 295-315. 
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within this framework. Thus, the activity of the Spirit may be identified as a mediated 
presence, whose recognition is dependent upon the disposition of the beholder, and 
discerned through an application of the standard Christian epistemological criteria for 
discernment, and often from retrospect. If this is the case, and the indwelling of the Spirit 
may in part be discerned, an interactional model of the Divine-human relationship, such as 
the Personalist model presented in this thesis, does have considerable explanatory efficacy 
and remit. 
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION. 
Can you think what it would be like to live the rest of one's life in a new 
way? Oh, to wake up some fine, clear morning feeling as if you'd started 
living all over again, as if the past was all forgotten, gone like a puff of 
smoke. To begin a new life -. Tell me, how should I begin? Where do I 
start? 1033 
New life in Christ and the Spirit is the Gospel of Christianity. The purpose of this thesis 
has not been to envision the nature or content of Christian transformation, but to conceive 
of how it is possible given what we know of God, the world and ourselves. Christian 
metamorphosis ought not to be treated as the stuff of dreams, and theologians have a 
service to perform in treating issues of human freedom and identity seriously, to offset any 
such suspicions. Certainly metamorphosis does not take place in a puff of smoke. This 
thesis has offered a primary model and some lines of argument to help us conceive of how 
Christian metamorphosis does take place. "Where do I start? " One begins with an 
acceptance of the personal presence of God in His initiative towards His creatures, which 
invites us to enter into a personal relationship with Him in reverence, surrender and 
obedience. 1034 The Spirit is the mediator of God's personal presence and His ecstatic love, 
and the one who enables our own response in love, in the return of love to the Father and 
the Son. The Spirit's love conjoins with ours when we love our neighbour and share in the 
love of the Christian community. "To live the rest of one's life in a new way, " on the 
Christian vision is to participate ever increasingly in the ecstatic love of the Trinity. 
When the generating question of this thesis was first formulated it was noted that for many 
theologians "there is no solution which is rationally coherent, " and as a result resort is 
made to a "not unattractive and not unholy" form of agnosticism or paradox. 
1035 Robert 
Jenson, it will be recalled, remarked that, "it may well be doubted that there is any vantage 
from which thus to observe the entities God and creature, so as to be able to describe the 
process between them. " This was considered to be a pre-emptory closure of the generating 
question, as the Spirit-believer relationship can be related to the areas of provisional 
1033 Anton Checkov, "Uncle Vanya, " The Oxford Checkov, Vol. 11t. trans. by R. Hingley (London, OUP, 
1964), p. 60- 
1034 These attitudes are taken from John Oman who argues that, "The beginning is right reverence, not right 
resolve, because, above every other test of us, what we are able to honour is, in our deepest hearts, what we 
are, and, in our ultimate attainment, what we shall be. " Oman, p. 78. 
1035 McIntyre, p. 247, cf. pp. 186,190. 
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human knowledge, such as our intuitions concerning freedom and identity, and knowledge 
of God given in the Incarnation. This may not give us a transcendent vantage point, but it 
gives us some kind of viewing point. Granted this provisional knowledge, the generating 
question can be seen to enquire about what the conditions of the very possibility of 
Christian metamorphosis are. In assessing the fruits of this study we should be attentive to 
where, if anywhere, paradox remains. 
It may also be recalled that the Prolegomena set out a brief outline of the reasons why a 
trinitarian doctrine of God gave us prima facie grounds for holding that the generating 
question could receive a positive treatment. The doctrine of the Trinity classically 
maintains that personal particularity and distinctness is to be found within the being of 
God Himself, the triune communion of the three hypostaseis in ecstatic love. It was 
reasoned that if God acts towards His creatures in a way that is consonant with His own 
being, then God would act in a fashion that seeks to safeguard human particularity and 
distinctness, while purposing personal union in relationship. The Spirit both ad intra and 
ad extra acts as "go-between, " in a mediatorial and unitive "contact function. " We also 
noted that Richard of St. Victor's analysis of the ecstatic love of the Trinity had some 
analogy with interpersonal human relations. The second challenge of our Prolegomena is 
to examine whether such trinitarian analogies are borne out. If they are then this would be 
an example of the employment of what Colin Gunton calls "trinitarian controls. "1036 
The reasons why one could not rest content from the outset with a "not unattractive and 
not unholy" agnosticism or paradox can be seen from the conclusions of the second 
Chapter. Too often the neglect of the generating question of this thesis has resulted in a 
"Divine Fiat view" of Christian metamorphosis, which overlooks the integrity of the 
human subject. In the context of Christian doctrine, the model presupposes a too radical 
division, as regards Christian anthropology, between created goodness and redeemed 
humanity, created freedom and redeemed freedom. Such a discontinuity results in a 
position whereby created humanity is bypassed in the move to redeemed humanity. It also 
has a further defect in its connection to the doctrine of God, for it forces us to posit a 
distinction between God, the Creator and Redeemer. This leads to a form of Gnostic 
dualism. An alternative to the Divine Fiat view must have explanatory scope to reconcile 
291 
our common intuitions concerning human freedom and identity with the conception of 
Christian freedom liberated by the Spirit. 
Chapter 2 also directed us towards an account that is psychologically plausible, which 
describes Christian metamorphosis in a way that does justice to human qualitative 
(subjective) and numerical identity and moral responsibility. We are also seeking an 
account that finds unity between the end and the means of the action of the Spirit. If the 
end is personal communion with the triune God, then a consistent means would also have 
to be personal. In terms of our "trinitarian controls, " the Divine Fiat view operates 
primarily with a one-way not an interactive view of the Divine-human relationship. It 
threatens to destroy or dissolve human particularity, not enhance it, and hence, it does not 
create the basis for true exchange or perichoresis. In sum, the "trinitarian controls, " 
alongside the other arguments marshalled, do not favour the "Divine Fiat view. " 
The specific Personalist model proposed in Chapters 3 and 4, safeguards human freedom 
and identity, by conceiving of Divine-human interaction along the lines of an extended 
analogy with interpersonal human relationships. The first and initiating element is the 
challenge and encounter by the ecstatic love of the personal presence of God, mediated 
through the events of the world, the Church, Scripture and the love of one's neighbour. It is 
an affective presence, but not one that determines the nature of its effects. A human person 
may remain unaffected as a result of their initial disposition and their response to the 
presence. Hence, God's presence cannot be said to affect directly in a way that bypasses 
mediation and the human person's contribution, whether tacit or explicit, as to how one is 
affected and how one responds. As John Oman writes: "Grace... is never a mere direct line 
of power, passing through us with impersonal directness, as light through window-glass, 
but is a curve of patient, personal wisdom, encircling and embracing us and all our 
concerns. "1037 
A person may tacitly contribute in the sense of having a prior disposition, which has been 
formed partly through his or her own past action and reflection. Explicitly a person may 
recognise how she is affected and attempt post facto to change her disposition towards and 
1036 Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, p. 78. 
1037 Oman, p. 159. 
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perception of the affecting object. Moreover, once any immediacy of encounter has passed, 
a person may respond to being affected in different ways. As John Oman remarks, Divine 
grace and the human will may be "conflicting forces. " 1038 This has to be a possibility if 
creatures are to have relative autonomy, or what Oman calls, "moral independence. " Yet, 
Divine and human will need not be in conflict. Oman argues that God does not overcome 
this possible and real conflict between the Divine and human by an exercise of power, but 
"by accepting it. "1039 Through the patient offering of Himself to us, God actively waits 
upon our response. "The blessedness of God's rule, " writes Oman, "is not less, but more 
God's personal gift, because it takes the trouble to pass round by way of our own personal 
acceptance and co-operation. " 1040 
Once the person responds in openness and acceptance to the personal presence of the 
Divine initiative, the subsequent relationship with the Divine activates and enables a 
process of personal exchange (Charles Williams) or 'reciprocal identification' (V. 
Brummer), ideas which have their roots in the trinitarian concept of perichoresis. As R. C. 
Moberly comments, this is the nature of true freedom: 
This is what free will means. In its perfectness it is the self become another. 
It is Christ in the man. It is the man become One Spirit with Christ. It is the 
love of God reproduced in the man, till the man, in God's love or God's 
love in man, has become a Divine response, adequate to, because truly 
mirroring, God. 1041 
The process of personal exchange respects the distinctness of each party. Thus, the gradual 
identification of the human with the Divine "requires us to find God's world also our world 
and His mind our mind and His service our service. 
0042 It is this process of sanctification, 
or deification (theosis) to use the Orthodox concept, which is the main vehicle of 
metamorphosis. It is in this state of exchange and sharing of ecstatic love that what has 
been considered to be the irreconcilable poles of Divine grace and sovereignty, on the one 
hand, and human identity and relative autonomy, on the other, are brought together in a 
way that enhances the particular identity of the creature, rather than forsaking it. As Oman 
1038 ibid.. 
1039 ibid.. 
1040 ibid., p. 153. 
"' Moberly, p. 227. 
1042 Oman, p. 83. 
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writes, "Our dependence and independence are no more alien, but are united in equal 
marriage. " They are so, because they have become mutually re-enforcing. 
Despite the negative analogies relating to physical immediacy and desire, romantic love 
was seen to be an important interpersonal analogue that captured the themes of death and 
new life integral to Christian metamorphosis. In the face of the initiative of the Other there 
must be recognition of one's own vulnerability, need and readiness. The approach of the 
Other stimulates the new life of the movement and intensification of consciousness. From 
one's vulnerability and openness to the Other stems a willingness to allow the boundaries 
of the self to be partially deconstructed or de-centred and hence enlarged. One is both in a 
drawn out by the Other in the ecstasis of exchange, but also, following the insight of 
Richard of St. Victor, conjoined in love of a third. As Charles Williams understood, the 
pattern of love found in trinitarian relations and the atonement shapes the Divine-human 
relations in appropriation of salvation. The initiating love of God the Father in sending the 
Son and the Spirit, provokes a movement of exchange or perichoresis, in which the Spirit 
when permitted removes, in co-operation with the human (synergia), the impediments to 
the further movement of exchange. This second stage involves a continuation of the 
pattern established in the opening stage, namely, the gradual re-ordering of one's first and 
second-order desires, with second-order desires sanctioning any Divine action to remove 
sinful impediments to their execution. In broader terms this constitutes a re-centring of the 
self in Christ, through a de-centring of the self from the power of sin. As Miroslav Volf 
sums things up: "The Spirit enters the citadel of the self, de-centers the self by fashioning 
it in the image of the self-giving Christ, and frees its will so it can resist the power of 
exclusion in the power of the Spirit of embrace. "1043 
The key negative analogy of this Personalist model is the ontological asymmetry between 
God and the creature. This is why non-personal metaphors are often used of the Spirit 
(Chapter 6), for they function analogically, to protect the Creator-creature distinction from 
anthropomorphic compromise. They are compatible with a personal being, as the 
operations and functions described under those metaphors are primarily personal. The 
asymmetry of the Divine-human relationship has an analogue in the asymmetry of human 
relationships relating to the uniqueness of the revelation of the Other (Chapter 4). 
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Moreover, the Divine act of Self-revelation is one of condescension. The ontological 
distinction between Creator and creature requires us to accept that Divine and creaturely 
agency are not to be assessed on the same scale, or are in competition, as in a zero sum 
game. Rather Divine agency grounds human agency, respects it, and works to enable it. 
This asymmetry is also behind the negative analogy of the "internality" of the activity of 
the Spirit, viz. the difficulty of identifying the Spirit's action and presence. It was argued in 
Chapter 9, that the Spirit's activity may be discerned by applying christological criteria to 
the question of identification, cultivating the appropriate disposition to be attentive to the 
Spirit's operation, and discernment through spiritual maturity and retrospection. The 
Spirit's personal presence is mediated through creation, Scripture, the Church, worship, 
and the love of one's neighbour, providing an "excess" or "surplus" to one's experience of 
the categorical world. 
The asymmetry of the Creator-creature relationship is also maintained by affirming that 
metamorphosis primarily requires a voluntary Divine initiative. The creature exercises no 
choice over this gratuitous initiative, at this stage, which would neither be relevant (why 
should one have choice over the personal approach of the Other? ) nor feasible given the 
effects of sin. In this first movement human agency is passive, all be it a passivity which 
includes the partial activity of reception. The Divine initiative in the Spirit, following the 
way of the Incarnation, is that of personal presence which encounters and challenges His 
creatures to respond to His love and to seek fulfilment in relationship with Him. The 
Divine personal presence is also one of acceptance of the sinful creature, the creation of a 
"space of empathy, " vividly testified to in the Incarnation. The human response is to mirror 
the Divine acceptance of the human by beginning to accept oneself, both as a creature 
loved by God, whose unity is found in Him, and as dislocated from God by sin. 
Repentance and gratitude are the right responses to the Divine initiative. At the same time, 
it is an acceptance which is a form of self-renunciation (deconstruction/de-centering/ 
decreation of the ego), for what needs to be acceded to is that metamorphosis stems from 
God's direction and orientation (conclusions of Chapter 3). 
Hence, the human response is not the pure activity of the autonomous "I, " but a passivity- 
activity complex, which requires the passivity of reception. It is a response that is never 
1043 Volf, p. 92. 
295 
outside of relationship with the Divine. To respond is just to move with, instead of against, 
the Divine movement towards the human, in other words, to enter a Divine-human 
exchange. The metamorphosis is personal as it is truly interactive, requiring the mutuality 
of response to the Divine initiative. All this mirrors the initial primacy of the passive 
constitution of human agency, which is dependent upon a "given" world, the 
intersubjective grounding of language, society and culture, and ultimately the Creator God, 
all of which go to form the intrinsic properties of human agency. Nonetheless, even 
primitively there is a dialectic of passivity and activity, dependence and independence. We 
interact with the world that nourishes and forms us, just as we respond to and appropriate 
God's love. As John Oman remarks: "We are not independent, as though we could ride 
over reality; but, also, we are not dependent, as though reality could simply ride over 
us. "1044 
Chapter 5 considered how, if we are partially responsible for the way we respond to an 
affecting personal presence, the human person is able to respond to the Divine initiative 
despite the effects of sin. Two elements enable the creature to bridge the effects of sin. 
First, as we have noted, there is the Divine initiative of the affecting personal presence of 
God. Secondly, appeal was made to a concept of a latent true nature (LTN), which refers 
directly to the potentialities granted to a person at creation as part of the Creator's intended 
destiny for humankind, namely, to be recipients of Divine Self-communication and 
participants in the communion of the Kingdom of God. The potentialities of this LTN may 
be promoted or actively suppressed and disorientated by human action, although they are 
never fulfilled outside of the grounding relationship with the Divine. Thus, the model 
proposed holds that when the Divine personal presence is encountered 
it may activate and 
affect the LTN, depending upon the prior actions and choices of that person. 
The state of 
LTN once activated may, to employ Frankfurt's theory of the 
hierarchy of the will, 
generate a second-order desire to respond to God's presence. 
This process of exchange and 
'reciprocal identification' should lead to the gradual actualisation of the ideal potentiality 
latent in one (LTN), which Divine love's cleansing of the "doors of perception" allows one 
to envision. 
1044 Oman, p. 65. 
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The self despite the acceptance of the Divine initiative may be divided and remain so, 
because of the efficacy of sin. One may have sinful first-order desires that prevent the 
second-order desire, to respond to the Divine presence, from being executed. 
Alternatively, one may have competing second-order desires that create a state of mental 
impasse or quiescence. Here, following the suggestion of Stump, it was argued that the 
Divine may intervene to re-orientate the impeding mental states, as long as there is a 
second-order desire, intrinsic to that person, which would desire this to be the case. For the 
Divine to play such a role in re-orientating the human personality would be consonant with 
the LTN that God bestowed at creation. Such an account captures the Spirit's action as 
enabling human nature, and balances the Divine initiative and action on the one hand, with 
the importance of the human person maintaining some sort of ownership of her 
reorientation, by a response stemming from an intrinsic principle within the human mind. 
In overview, Christian metamorphosis of a person is generated by a change in relational 
structure, as shown by Paul's understanding of new creation as a transition of creatures 
from one power, namely, sin, chaos and futility, to the new dominion of Christ. This 
constitutes a restoration of creatures' grounding relationship with God, a re-ordering of 
creation after the dislocation and exclusion of sin, and a drawing of creatures towards their 
eschatological destiny of full communion of creation with the Creator. New creation does 
not refer to a change of numerical identity. The faithful still possess a continuous 
numerical personal identity. In contrast to classical apocalyptic thought, the new world 
does not come about after the destruction of the old. At the level of qualitative identity, 
change within the personality takes place as a process of sanctification through reciprocal 
identification in ecstatic love. Although, the new relational order is ontologically 
continuous with the old order, the new relational matrix of God and His redeemed creation 
determines what kinds of things exist and their nature. Hence, the change of relational 
structure does have ontological import, and is not something confined to psychological 
identity, viz. changes within a person's personality. This is seen in John's insistence that 
only those who possess faith will have eternal life. Faith in God in this world determines 
the quid sit in the eschaton. 
From Paul we have the insight that the resurrected will have "spiritual bodies"(I Cor. 15), 
in some way continuous with earthly bodies, yet not exactly the same kind of thing, hence 
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a "spiritual" rather than a fleshly body. As Isaiah's vision sets out, the ontological change 
of the eschatological fulfilment of new creation is seen in interlocking cosmological as 
well as social and cultural spheres (65.17-25). The biblical language of incorporation 
refers to ontology at this relational level, as Charles Williams calls it, the "great web" or 
"co-inherence of all life. " The new creation will be free of the futility of death and 
destruction. Thus, the life-threatening forces represented by wild animals will be 
transformed into benign and harmonious co-existence. These relational changes of 
reforming and reshaping creation at multi-dimensional levels are all pivoted on a new 
closeness and presence of God to his creation: "I will rejoice in Jerusalem and delight in 
my people"(Isa. 65.19). This may be compared to Paul's emphasis on the presence of the 
Spirit as the Divine agent of recreation in Romans 8. 
Part two of the thesis employed a method of systematic contextualisation, aimed at 
placing the generating question within the context of relevant loci of Christian dogmatics: 
creation and conservation, the image of God, providence, revelation and finally the 
doctrine of the covenant. This had the purpose of pursuing coherence within systematic 
theology and to qualify remaining negative analogies concerning the Personalist account. 
Thus the asymmetry found in the Divine-human relationship is set within the context of 
God's agency as Creator and Conserver, and hence the ground of human agency. As a 
result, human freedom/identity can never be interpreted in 'isolation' from the Divine. 
Moreover, God's intent of Self-communication is embedded within creation from the start 
and is also its goal. Divine activity is an interplay, one might say, between special action 
in the foreground of salvation history, such as the Incarnation, and the constant Divine 
relation to His creation in the hinterland or horizon. The thread running through the 
different forms of Divine activity is the Divine purpose embodied in the covenant, which 
is itself the meaning and basis of creation, and is made explicit in God's special acts, first 
through the Hebrew prophets and then in the Incarnation of the Son. God's character is 
revealed in this way, and hence God's behaviour may be practically judged to see if it is 
worthy of trust and of personal commitment. 
There was a second purpose of the strategy of systematic contextualisation, namely, to 
discern whether through all the different levels of Divine agency - creatio continua, 
concursus divinus and providentia - there could be found a pattern. It was held that 
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creation involves a dialectic of separating out (distinction/ differentiation) and binding 
(communion/interdependence), of establishing relative autonomy and dependence. 
Likewise in respect to concurrentism (creatio continua), God's agency was primary and 
grounding, but also self-effacing in enabling created reality to participate in the causal 
process with integrity (secondary causation). A similar pattern was noted regarding the 
doctrine of providence. God is also the ultimate cause of the way things are ordered, or the 
way things come about: some necessarily through necessary causes and others contingently 
through contingent causes. The dialectic of contingency and necessity allow for the causal 
integrity of creatures. This view is complemented by the insights of modern science, which 
lead us to suppose that the world God has made is built upon reliable distributions of 
undetermined events in probabilistic patterns. God's providential action affects the course 
of events in the world by acting at crucial junctures to determine otherwise undetermined 
events within the bounds of natural probabilities. Thus, God's providentia actualises 
particular possibilities offered by the world process. Nonetheless, God's activity will be 
constrained by respect for the integrity of the natural order and by regard for human 
freedom. 
Analogously, it has been argued in this thesis that the Spirit-human relation in Christian 
metamorphosis although initiated by the Divine, and therefore, primarily a result of Divine 
grace, does not override "the proper modality of creatures. " Creatures are allowed to 
respond and form second-order desires which are in accordance with the end of 
metamorphosis. The pattern of Divine activity established here is that of God as the 
ground of existence and initiator, who at different levels of activity - creatio continua, 
providentia and the soteriological action of the Spirit - grants His creatures relative 
integrity of agency and the freedom to respond to His presence which seeks the 
metamorphosis of the creature. Identity and distinction (differentiation) of creatures is held 
together alongside relation: dependence on God, interdependence with the rest of creation 
and the destiny of the Kingdom of God, full communion of the Divine and creation. The 
identification of a pattern in Divine agency towards the world is consonant with the 
personal and purposive intentions of the loving God revealed in the person of 
Jesus Christ. 
The unity of Divine action pivots, as we saw in Chapter 8, on the Divine covenantal 
intention to reveal His being in love. This is an intent that binds together God's action in 
creation and redemption. It also fits the trinitarian dynamic of relationality and 
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perichoresis, in conjunction with particularity and distinctness. The pattern fits the "Divine 
Fiat" view less well, and constitutes another reason for rejecting it. 
What paradox remains? The answer to this will depend upon how much compatibility of 
the elements of the dialectic outlined above, between relative autonomy and heteronomy, 
identity and interdependence, distinctness and communion, can be offered. The Personalist 
model presented above offers an explanation to some degree. Yet, room for paradox 
clearly remains. First, there is the paradox that stems from dealing with a transcendent 
God, the Divine as the ground of existence. As Jenson remarked, we cannot gain a 
complete vantage point on the Divine-human relationship. Our knowledge is dependent 
upon what is revealed. As a consequence, the actual "causal joint" of God-world relation, 
as Austin Farrer termed it, will remain hidden within the probabilistic and lawful 
structures of nature. 1045 Secondly, there will continue to be a difference concerning the 
intelligibility of personal relations with a non-spatio-temporal being. God is spirit. We 
cannot simply peel off, within human experience, the divine element from the spatio- 
temporal wrapping. Our models and metaphors are limited, never banishing the whisper "it 
is and it is not". This is to be expected given the nature of God and our analogical talk 
about Him. God's otherness and difference need to be maintained. God's difference is 
different from all difference that we may imagine. 
One last avenue presents itself. In recent years several theologians have called for the 
reconfiguration of the doctrine of grace, to "transcend the mode of Western theology"1046 
1045 Even John Polkinghorne, who initiates a quite aggressive search for the causal joint, concedes: "If it is 
the unpredictabilities of physical process that indicate the regions where 
forms of holistic causality can be 
operating, then all such agency, including divine providence, will 
be hidden within these cloudy domains. 
There will be an inextricable entanglement - it will not be possible to 
itemise occurrences, saying that God 
did this and nature did that. Faith may discern the divine hand at work, but 
it will not be possible to isolate 
and demonstrate that this is so. In this sense, the causal 
joint is implicit rather than explicit. " John 
Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998), p. 72. 
1046 D. Lyle Dabney, "Nature Dis-Graced and Grace De-Natured, " Sc. 53. See also, J. Carpenter. Nature and 
Grace; and Kilian McDonnell, "The Determinative Doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit. " Stephen Duffy in his 
conclusion to The Graced Horizon holds that two challenges present themselves 
to the continuing debate: 1. ) 
to widen the anthropomorphic focus so as to embrace the whole order of creation within grace; and, 
2. ) to 
apply narrative and process theology to free the 
debate from its traditional substantialist metaphysics, 
classical doctrine of God and use of univocal logic. 
R. R. Reno in The Ordinary Transformed redraws the 
debate in terms of transcendence and immanence, arguing for a mixed or "amphibious" view, which 
maintains a dialectic of transcendence and immanence without 
fusion. 
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in its Augustinian formulation of the debate between grace and nature. 1047 It is interesting 
to note that these concerns were partially prefigured by John Oman at the beginning of the 
last century. 1048 In broad brush strokes Lyle Dabney argues that Augustine's formulation of 
the doctrine of grace had three deleterious elements from which subsequent theology has 
found it difficult to extract itself: "1) a restricting of the meaning of the term `nature' to 
`human nature', 2) a defining of grace in such a way as to place it in opposition to `nature' 
so defined, and 3) a narrowing of the realm of grace to the `interior' or the `soul' of the 
individual. 11049 Like so many other debates in the history of ideas, he considers the 
doctrine of grace ensnared in its own formulation: "no alternative to the 'dis-gracing of 
nature and the 'de-naturing' of grace has been found other than a theology of creation 
which plays down or redefines sin and grace. 0050 The successors of Augustine, both the 
Scholastics and Reformers, despite attempts to mitigate tensions within their positions, 
have found "no way ... 
beyond the dead end of the either/or of continuum and 
contradiction. "1051 
It might be that these theologians would consider that my thesis also fails to "transcend the 
mode of Western theology" in its traditional formulation of the doctrine of grace. 
However, I have parted from the traditional grace-freedom debate in restoring the 
hypostasis of the Spirit to its central role in Christian metamorphosis and not relegating 
the Spirit to an "addendum" or "ornament" to the discussion. '°52 As a result of the 
restitution of the hypostasis of the Spirit to a central position in the discussion, the Divine- 
human relationship in Christian metamorphosis has been conceived in Personalist terms. 
This avoids the tendency of the traditional language of grace to be interpreted in a 
"substantialist" metaphysics. Here is a distinction between this thesis and John Oman's 
Grace and Personality, which despite its advocacy of the personal nature of God's 
"gracious relationship, " that of love and not power, still operates primarily out of the 
language of grace as opposed to personal relations with the Divine hypostaseis. His stress 
1047 Western theology, writes Eugene TeSelle, "both Catholic and Protestant, is largely a series of annotations 
to [Augustine's] work. " E. TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian (New York, Herder & Herder, 1970), p. 19. 
1048 For example, Oman writes of Augustinianism, "Attention is fixed on grace as a gift merely given, and on 
works as human resolves merely carried through, with no attention paid to the gracious relation of the Father 
to His children which does away with all that hard contrast between tasks and gifts. " Oman, pp. 81. The move 
here is towards a more Personalist model. 
1049 Dabney, "Nature Dis-Graced and Graced De-Natured, " sc. 27. 
1050 ibid., sc. 46. 
1051 ibid., sc. 49. 
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on the category of morality and the "moral independence" of the person, in combination 
with his employment of the language of grace, mean that the Personalist model is not fully 
utilised and extended. At times his accentuation of the moral independence of the creature 
in appropriating salvation, "all by our own insight and devotion, " removes Christian 
metamorphosis from its fundamental relational context. 1053 By utilising a Personalist 
model, my thesis extends the relational context of Christian metamorphosis further. In 
addition, in the wake of the work of Rahner and others, 1054 it has been maintained that the 
Divine initiative of love and Self-communication places God's gracious activity as the 
framework of creation, uniting redemptive history with God's intentions in creating. 
Nonetheless, it might appear that my own account has not transcended some of the 
dualisms and problematic features outlined by Lyle Dabney above. This may especially 
apply to the issue of the narrowing of grace to the "interior, " given the focus on the 
individual person in the thesis. Lyle Dabney, following on from the work of James 
Carpenter and Kilian McDonnell, suggests that the way to transcend the impasse of 
Western theology on grace is to set out a "theology of the world, " which articulates "a 
wholistic vision of the creation and redemption of the world in all its multifaceted being": 
[I]f a theology of the world is a form of theology that takes not just the 
inner states of the individual, but the historical, the social, the material 
reality of this world seriously, then grace cannot be categorically denied to 
nature nor all of nature to grace. 1055 
Quite what is meant by a "theology of the world" beyond the unity of creation and 
redemption in relation to God's intention of Self-communication, not just to His human 
creatures, but also as power and presence to the whole of creation, remains unclear. 
Certainly it may be agreed that the tendency in Western theology to restrict grace to human 
consciousness at nature's expense, has led to unhelpful consequences. However, it remains 
unclear how these points actually solve or tackle the underlying generating questions of the 
grace-nature-freedom debate, or for that matter of my thesis. We are not told how grace, 
1052 These terms are in McDonnell, "The Determinative Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, " pp. 142,161. 
1053 Oman wishes to maintain the strange polarity of, on the one hand, the "absolute independence" of the 
person in moral judgement, and the "absolute dependence" upon God. Oman, p. 57. Certainly one would want 
to qualify this by saying that creatures possess only relative independence. 
1054 On this point S. J. Duffy in his Graced Horizons points out many of the similarities between some of 
these theologians, such as the primacy of grace over nature, and the importance of starting with the actual 
historical order of grace, rather than the abstract concept of human nature. Whether he sufficiently analyses 
the differences between these accounts may be questioned. 
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nature and human freedom cohere. 1056 For sure these points may qualify and re-orientate 
one's approach to the questions, as they have in this thesis, but they do not in and of 
themselves answer the questions or render them non-questions. In short, despite the 
salutary warning to avoid an account of grace restricted to the interior of the person, some 
account still needs to be given of the relation of the Divine and the individual person in 
Christian metamorphosis. This thesis has attempted to provide such an account. 
1055 Dabney, " Nature Dis-Graced and Graced De-Natured, " sc. 53,41. 
1056 This point is brought out by Stephen Duffy in his review of J. A. Carpenter's book Nature and Grace who 
writes: "We are never told clearly how nature and grace, while distinct, are integrated, and thus whether the 
classical nature-grace problematic is now to be conflated with the problem of general 
divine concursus or 
subsumed under divine providence, as in Aquinas. " S. Duffy, "Review of Nature and 
Grace, " Theological 
Studies, Vol. 46 (1989), pp. 580 - 1. As I argued in Chapter 7, it will not do to conflate the 




THE INDWELLING OF THE HOLY SPIRIT: COMMUNITYAND INDIVIDUAL. 
This appendix deals at greater length with a possible objection to the construction of the 
generating question raised in Chapter 1 (Sc. I11.02), namely, the focus of the thesis on the 
metamorphosis of the individual Christian. To substantiate this objection I shall turn to the 
work of John D. Zizioulas, from which a case can be made for the priority of the 
community as the object and domain of the operation of the Spirit. 
For Zizioulas' trinitarian theology the concept of communion (koinonia) is central and 
communion is, of course, social and plural. 1057 Zizioulas moves from the doctrine of the 
Trinity to ecclesiology by a consideration of the relation of pneumatology and 
christology. 1058 The presence of Christ through the Spirit in the Eucharist, that celebratory 
communal event, constitutes the Church's identity. Christ is not an 'individual', but a divine 
hypostasis whose very identity is His relation to the Father and the Spirit. 1059 As a result 
His identity is open to us for us to find true being in communion with him. The Spirit 
works to realise and preserve that relation: 
1057 Zizioulas' approach is neatly summarised: "The idea of 'communion' functions for Zizioulas as a kind of 
systematic principle. Like those geometric patterns known as fractals, which repeat themselves at ever 
smaller levels of detail, the economy of salvation can be described as 'communion' wherever one looks. " 
Review of Mcpartlan's The Eucharist Makes the Church, in Modern Theology (1995), pp. 475-476. 1058 Zizioulas rebukes his erstwhile mentor, Vladimir Lossky, whose position is that the Spirit is the agent of 
the 'personalization' of the mystery of Christ and its appropriation by believers: "Lossky would develop the 
view that both Christology and Pneumatology are necessary components of ecclesiology, and would see in 
the sacramental structure of the Church the 'objective' Christological aspect which has to be constantly 
accompanied by the 'personal' or 'subjective' aspect. The latter is related to freedom and integrity of each 
person, his inner 'spiritual life', deification etc.. " Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 125. Paul McPartlan 
who is well acquainted with the Zizioulas' corpus, makes the following comments about Zizioulas' difficulties 
with Lossky's position: "Zizioulas thinks that the Person of Christ is an objective provocation to freedom 
unless Christ is recognised as being corporate, such that he is acknowledged from within. However, Lossky 
maintains that our freedom is preserved by means of the indwelling Spirit manifesting to us 'the Deity of the 
Son' which we can then freely acknowledge. In that Christ still remains a distinct, objective reality here, 
Zizioulas would not accept that freedom is preserved in Lossky's scheme...... Zizioulas implies that the idea 
of an 'economy of the Spirit' is an overreaction to the view of the Spirit as just a 'satellite' of the 'self-defined' 
Christ-event and he adds that it makes it hard to understand 'the biblical assertion that the Church is the Body 
of Christ, and not of the Spirit'...... The Spirit's one unchanging activity has been, we may say, first, to make 
Christ the Church and now to make the Church Christ. " P. G. McPartlan, SJ., The Eucharist Makes the 
Church: Henri de Lubac and John Zizioulas in Dialogue (Edinburgh: T&T. Clark, 1993), pp. 225-6. 
1059 This draws on the traditional Orthodox distinction, also found in the work of Martin Buber, between 
'individualism, ' which is atomistic and exclusionary, and 'personhood, ' whose source is the Divine Father and 
hence a state of Divine relation. It may also be related to Zizioulas' distinction between the "ecciesiological" 
and "biological" hypostasis. Individualism realises only the "biological" hypostasis. For Zizioulas the word 
'individual' is a black term, standing for the Western intellectual tradition's faulty anthropology, inspired by a 
mistaken doctrine of God and its affair with the Cartesian and Enlightenment enterprise. When I use the term 
in this thesis I do not wish it to bear such connotations. It is, in fact, quite a useful word in referring to the 
single human. 
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The Holy Spirit, in making real the Christ-event in history, makes real at 
the same time Christ's personal existence as a body or community. Christ 
does not exist first as truth and then as communion..... All separation 
between Christology and ecclesiology vanishes in the Spirit. 1060 
Zizioulas' emphasis on the social, leads him to talk of the 'corporate personality' of Christ. 
Christ is essentially plural and relational, possessing His life only as He receives it from 
others. 1061 Christ is constituted by the Spirit, and through the Spirit, by the Church. In a 
real sense Christ is the Church, or rather the Church in its future form as the fellowship of 
the saints in heaven. 1062 Thus, the indwelling of the Spirit is to be identified with the 
corporate Christian sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist. 
This is all as background to what Zizioulas specifically says about the Spirit's 
indwelling. 1063 The Holy Spirit brings about koinonia (11 Cor. 13.13). Thus, in his article 
"Communion and Otherness", Zizioulas writes: 
When the Holy Spirit blows, He does not create good individual Christians, 
individual 'saints', but an event of communion, which transforms everything 
the Spirit touches in to a relational being. The other becomes in this case 
an ontological part of one's identity. The Spirit de-individualizes and 
personalizes beings wherever He operates. 1064 
This seems to be a point about the Spirit's function as communion-creator. It does not 
state, nor necessarily entail the proposition that concerns me, viz. the Spirit only indwells 
the community not the individual. The import of Zizioulas' position comes out slightly 
more strongly in his article, "The Early Christian Community": 
Christian spirituality, therefore, could not be experienced outside the 
community, which involved a multiplicity and variety of spiritual charisms. 
..... Individualism 
is incompatible with Christian spirituality. None can 
possess the Spirit as an individual, but only as a member of the community. 
1060 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 111. 
1061 The concept of "corporate personhood" is in part derived by Zizioulas from Maximus the Confessor. 
1062 Zizioulas' concept of the corporate Christ should not go unquestioned. Andrew Louth in his review of 
McPartlan's The Eucharist Makes the Church, is concerned that Zizioulas' case for adopting the language of 
'corporate personality', rests too heavily on an outdated understanding of the Biblical use of the term 'Son of 
Man': "The notion 'corporate personality' is not as such biblical, rather it is characteristic of a phase of 
'biblical theology' -a very different matter. " A. Louth, "Review, " Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. 46 
(1995), p. 425. 
1063 It is difficult to find more than a paragraph, here and there, in Zizioulas' work that addresses this issue. 
1064 J. Zizioulas, "Communion and Otherness, " St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly, Vol. 38 (1994), p. 354. 
Elsewhere Zizioulas says something very similar: "The Spirit is the Spirit of 'communion' and his primary 
work consists in opening up reality to become relational. The Spirit is incompatible with individualism...... 
There is no 'one' whose identity is not conditioned by the 'many'. " J. D. Zizioulas, "The Mystery of the 
Church in Orthodox Tradition, " One in Christ Vol. 24 (1988), p. 299. 
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When the Spirit blows the result is never to create good individual 
Christians but members of a community. 1065 
McPartlan's interpretation of Zizioulas supports the argument that the Spirit indwells the 
community and not the individual: 
As the local community in the Eucharist is the Body of Christ, so also it, 
strictly, is the Temple of the Spirit. As Zizioulas interprets such texts as Paul's statement that the mystery is 'Christ in you' to mean 'you' not as many individuals but as a single corporate unit, such that the mystery is Christ as 
a community, so also he maintains that, although it is commonly assumed 
to do so, the New Testament never refers to Christians as temples of the 
Spirit, in the plural. Rather, it is local communities which the epistles 
address and acknowledge, each as a temple of the Spirit. 1066 
McPartlan makes Zizioulas' position more robust, and I shall adopt this Zizioulas-inspired 
position as the thesis to be examined. 1067 Scripture informs us that the Spirit is given to the 
community in Acts 2, and that the singular form ('temple, ' 'building, ' ... ) is used in many 
Pauline texts. 1068 1 will take this to be the argument for the position that the Spirit indwells 
the community not the individual. 
In his article "The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life", Albert Winn poses the following 
questions: 
Is the primary work of the Holy Spirit to initiate, sustain, renew, and shape 
the lives of individual believers, so that the bestowal of shared life on the 
community is a happy by-product? Or is the primary work of the Holy 
Spirit to initiate, sustain, renew, and shape the shared life of the 
community, so that the bestowal of life on individual believers is 
instrumental to that end? 1069 
1065 J . D. Zizioulas, 
"The Early Christian Community, " in Christian Spirituality: Origins to the Twelfth 
Century, eds. by B. McGinn and J. Meyendorff (New York: Crossroad, 1985), p. 27. The italics are mine. 
1066 McPartlan, pp. 278-9. 
1067 Albert Winn argues that the Western tradition has tended to emphasise the poetic work of the Holy Spirit 
upon the individual, rather than the life-bestowing role of creator of communion. He cites John Calvin as one 
among many who have exemplified this tendency. According to Calvin we know the Bible to be the Word of 
God by inward witness of the Holy Spirit in our hearts. The Holy Spirit as the interior magister, the inward 
teacher who alone enables us to understand Scripture by opening our blind eyes and unstopping our deaf ears 
(The Christian Institutes Il, ii, 20; III, i, 4; III, ii, 34). Yet, Calvin is aware of the life giving aspect of the 
Spirit in his section of the Institutes "The Life of the Christian Man" (III, vi-x). But Winn argues that: "What 
is lacking is any clear teaching that the Holy Spirit is the author of koinona, that the life he bestows is the 
shared life, that 'the life of the Christian man' is instrumental to the life of the Christian community. Calvin 
has a high doctrine of the Church, but he does not link it directly with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. It is not 
for him a part of the third article, but rather the principal subject of Book Four! " A. Winn, "The Holy Spirit 
and the Christian Life, " Interpretation, Vol. 33 (1979), p. 52 
1068 For example, I Cor. 3.16-17; I Corinthians 3.9; II Cor. 6: 16; Eph. 2.21-22. 
1069 Winn, p. 50. 
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I do not wish to dispute that the priority for the Christian life is the second alternative. 
Christians are called to the shared life of the Christian community, to true koinonia, which, 
as Zizioulas points out has an important eschatological focus. Winn goes on to defend this 
position: 
If the bestowal of life on individuals. were primary, would ancient Israel 
have expressed such longing for a totally shared life in the Spirit? If the 
new birth and resurrection of individuals were the main thing, would Paul 
have argued so constantly from 'the common good' (I Cor. 12.7) and 'the 
building up of the church'(I Cor. 14.3,4,5,12,26)? The whole biblical drama 
moves, not toward the salvation of unrelated individuals, like beads in a 
box, but toward the Kingdom of God, the New Jerusalem, where the 
dwelling of G is with his redeemed people (Rev. 21.3). The salvation of 
individuals is instrumental to this. And the role of the Holy Spirit in the 
drama is to bestow koinonia, the shared life, on the people of God. The 
bestowal of new life on individuals is instrumental to that. 1070 
The real point of dispute relates to Zizioulas' statement that, None can possess the Spirit as 
an individual, but only as a member of the community. This statement seems to be 
perfectly compatible with the indwelling of the Spirit at the individual level, as long as that 
individual is part of the Christian community. It is then McPartlan's interpretation of 
Zizioulas' position that the Spirit indwells the community as a 'corporate unit' which is the 
bone of contention. 
What does it mean for the Spirit to indwell the Christian community purely on the level of 
the corporate unit? Both Zizioulas and McPartlan believe that the Church is constituted 
when the Eucharist is celebrated. 1071 In the Eucharist the identity of the local Christian 
community with the heavenly Church of Christ surrounded by the saints is realised. This is 
the paradigm example of a corporate event, enabled by the Holy Spirit indwelling the 
Christian community as a corporate unit. Yet, are we not in danger by excluding the 
definition of the community as a collection of individuals as McPartlan does, of losing the 
connection with individual lives and of turning the Christian life into an abstraction? Is 
this talk of 'corporate personality' and 'corporate unit' in danger of reifying the collective 
abstract, rather like attempts to reify the nation/society? I experience the Holy Communion 
as an individual, "The body of Christ keep you in eternal life - Amen, " but at the same 
1070 ibid., pp. 50-1. Israel's longing for a corporate bestowal of the life of the Spirit on the people of God is 
testified to in Numbers 11.29; Isa. 44.3, cf. 28.5,32.15,59.21. 
1071 One may ask what Zizioulas would make of churches which 
do not celebrate the Eucharist, such as the 
Salvation Army? Are they denied the indwelling of the Spirit? 
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time as an individual who is part of a community and seeking communion, "Though we 
are many, we are one body, because we all share in one bread. " In John's Gospel the Spirit 
has the role of "helper", "counsellor/teacher", and "comforter"(John 14.16-18). To assume 
that this teaching and counselling is only at the level of the corporate life seems 
unnecessarily prohibitive. 
The Zizioulas-inspired position unnecessarily subordinates the indwelling of the Spirit to 
the category of the community. In doing so it seems to set up a false either/or: the 
community versus the individual. In contrast, the scriptural witness shows that when the 
Spirit bestows life and power it does so to both individuals and the community to which 
they belong. The two are not set-up in contradistinction. Examples of the work of the 
Spirit in relation to the individual are the Spirit's bestowal of power on Jesus (Lk 4.14 cf. 
4.16-19), Peter (Acts 4.8), Stephen (6.10), Philip (8.39), Saul (9.17), Barnabas (11.24). As 
Albert Winn remarks: 
When the life given by the Holy Spirit is described as birth (Jn 3.5) or 
resurrection (Rom 8.11), we are speaking of what individuals experience. 
The varied gifts of the Spirit are given to individuals (lCor. 12.7; Rom. 12.6; 
Ephes 4.11; 1 Pet. 4.10). 1072 
Jesus' exhortation of Nicodemus is a personal challenge. Paul contrasts the reality that 
"you are in the Spirit" with the alternative, which seems to refer to the individual: "Anyone 
who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him"(Rom. 8.9). In his epistles 
Paul addresses a community, in an open letter, so the "you" does refer to the communal 
"you. " To suppose that this fact, in and of itself, rules out the application of the pronoun to 
the individual, or that it cannot refer to a collection of individuals, seems an unnecessarily 
restrictive reading. In II Corinthians Paul talks of God's anointing, 
"by putting his seal on 
us and giving us his Spirit in our hearts. " The Spirit 
is linked to the heart (kardia), the seat 
of a person's reason, emotions and will. Or again, 
in Ephesians the Spirit is linked with the 
strength of the believer's 'inner being' 
(Eph. 3.16). 1073 This all suggests that the Spirit's 
interaction with a person's motivational and noetic structures, 
is an important element of 
the activity of the Spirit. In Galatians 
Paul talks about living by and walking with the 
Spirit. This involves the experience of inner conflict, a 
battle between the Spirit and one's 
1072 ibid., 49. 
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former 'unspiritual' self. 1074 In Acts 2 the spectacular coming of the Spirit upon the 
disciples is followed by Peter's address to the Jews, which is a personal challenge, which 
follows the call of John the Baptist and Jesus of repentance, "and you will receive the gift 
of the Holy Spirit"(Acts 2.38). 
Zizioulas' expositor, McPartlan, concedes that I Corinthians 6.19 is an exception to the 
rule that the term 'temple' refers to the community, for it is used in this instance in the 
plural not the singular and seems to refer clearly to individual indwelling. 1075 Paul is happy 
both with the view that the Church is the Spirit's home (I Cor. 3.16-17), while at the same 
time realising that the Church is composed of individuals and that the Spirit's role is to 
enable such individuals to live as productive members of the Christian community. Thus 
he can move in the same chapter from references to the Spirit's indwelling which are 
singular and communal, to allusion which are plural and individual. For my purposes all 
that I have to show is that the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is an individual, personal 
reality as well as a communal one, and I hope I have shown that there is a scriptural case 
for saying this. 
The position that the Spirit only indwells the community, seems to entail the proposition 
that the community is a necessary and sufficient condition for the indwelling of the Spirit. 
It seems conceivable that someone might be an active member of a Christian community, 
but does not show any of the fruits of the Spirit, his actions are contrary to the faith in 
Christ which is publicly confessed. Does such a person partake of the indwelling of the 
Spirit as a corporate unit? It is also conceivable that a local Christian community might 
confess their faith, celebrate the sacraments of the Church, yet display none of the fruits of 
the Spirit and again act in such a way that it is the polar opposite to life in the Spirit. Is its 
outward identity as a Christian community a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
indwelling of the Spirit? It might be necessary to draw a distinction between the institution 
and the event. The institution may be no guarantee of spiritual blessings, but the events of 
the Christian life constituted by the Spirit are the true source of the indwelling of the 
Spirit. 
1073 Note that this passage makes another reference to the indwelling of the heart. Paul uses the second person 
pronoun, but kardia is notably in the plural. 
1074 Gal. 5.16-21; Rom. 7.14- 8: 9. 
1075 McPartlan 1993, p. 279n. 84. 
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Finally, what about a person who is expelled from their church on unsatisfactory grounds, 
like Peter Abelard, who spent some time not in communion with a Christian community. 
Is the indwelling of the Spirit absent from their lives? Or take the case of someone who is 
not a member of a local church, although she displays some of the fruits of the Spirit and 
her actions are a witness to her faith. Is the Spirit absent again? All these cases suggest that 
much more work needs to be done by Zizioulas and others to give an ecclesiological 
explanation of the status of such persons. Membership of the Christian community need 
not be a necessary or sufficient condition of the Spirit's indwelling, however, movement 
into the Christian community must be the hope and will be the future. That is the Spirit's 
eschatological role. 
Zizioulas and McPartlan do not connect their understanding of the Spirit's role in the 
Church, with the Spirit's operation within creation. Philip Rosato examines the Spirit's 
activity as teacher, unifier, liberator, and vivifier, and in all areas argues that Christians 
should pray for and be open to the possibility of the Spirit acting in these terms beyond the 
Church. 1076 Not to do so would not only be to betray the power and sovereignty of God, 
but also to neglect the way in which events outside the Church can help to re-vitalise and 
nourish the Christian community. 1077 Relating the operation of the Spirit in creation with 
the Spirit's role in the Church offers the potential of cross-fertilisation. The Church should 
not simply conform to the world, but it may be able to learn of the Divine will through the 
world. It is clear from Scripture that the Spirit operates outside the Christian community: 
in the conservation of all creation (Psalm 24,104), the pagan prophet Balaam prophesying 
under the influence of God (Num. 22-24), and the gentile Cornelius receiving Divine 
revelation (Acts 10: 1-8). 1078 Certainly it would seem inconceivable that anybody outside 
of the Christian community could be drawn into and converted to the Christian faith were 
it not for the activity of the Spirit extra-ecclesia. The activity of the Spirit extra-ecclesia, 
may not be strictly identical to the indwelling of the Spirit in the believer and the 
1076 Philip J. Rosato, SJ., "The Mission of the Spirit Within and Beyond the Church, " Ecumenical Review 
Vol. 41 (1989), pp 388 - 397. 
1077 For Rosato, "the undeniable praise bestowed by Jesus on those who were not 'believers' but did the will 
of the Father (Mtt 21: 28-31), and in the unexpected presence of the Holy Spirit in those who had not yet been 
baptized (Acts 10: 48), " means that "the church must leave aside any attempt to pronounce a final judgement 
on the work for solidarity and peace undertaken by those who verbally, 
if not actually, deny the transcendent 
source of fraternal love. " Rosato, p. 392. 
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community. Some sort of qualitative, as opposed to quantative, distinction needs to be 
drawn. In John's Gospel indwelling is described as an intimate relationship which allows 
for teaching, counselling and comforting. 1079 Thus, indwelling of the Spirit which is 
accompanied by explicit and true faith of the believer, allows for a much deeper and richer 
relationship. It would be perfectly consistent for Zizioulas/McPartlan to draw this 
distinction too. 
In conclusion, the indwelling of the Spirit within the Christian community is not 
incompatible with the indwelling of the Spirit within an individual Christian, or the 
activity of the Spirit outside of the Christian community altogether. What I have called the 
'two levels, ' of the community and the individual, are mutually complementary and 
integral. All the Spirit's actions are directed towards building up Christ's Body, the Church, 
but in doing so the Spirit enables, renews the individual, both at a motivational level and at 
a noetic one. In this way the person is drawn into fully sharing the koinonia of the 
Christian community. Given that one of the goals of the Christian life is "the communion 
of the Holy Spirit"(II Cor. 13: 13), Zizioulas is quite right to say that it is incompatible with 
individualism, as a dogma. This is no reason, though, to forsake the category of the 
individual. 
1078 "The wind (pneuma) blows where it chooses"(John. 
3: 8). 
1079 Note that in the Old Testament God's presence is 
described in a multitude of ways: in a sanctuary 
(Gen. 12: 6,7); the 'face' (Exodus 33.14); the Ark (Num. 
10: 35f); the cloud (Num. 10: 33); the glory (kabod, 
Ezek. 1: 28); the shekinah. 
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